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ABSTRACT
DECLINE OF THE DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN AND
THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1921-1922
FEBRUARY 1993
RAYMOND C. GAMBLE, B.S., UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Mary B. Wickwire
This dissertation examines Britain's decision to cede
naval parity to the United States at the Washington Naval
Conference of 1921-1922. The study recognizes that
scholarly opinion emphasizes the role of economic weakness
in Britain's decision to accept capital ship limitation.
The most useful sources in this study are the Cabinet and
Admiralty records at the Public Record Office, London.
The accounts of the various subcommittees of the Committee
of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet Finance Committee are
essential. Three sets of records are particularly helpful
for the Conference itself: the papers of the British
Empire Delegation, the State Department's Conference on
the Limitation of Armament , and Butler and Bury's
Documents on British Foreign Policy . The papers of the
members of the British government provide limited
assistance. At the turn of the century, the Royal Navy,
imbued with the Alfred Thayer Mahan's doctrines of sea
power, enjoyed the nation's confidence. The Great War
vi
damaged the reputations of both the battleship and its
most ardent supporters. At the Paris Peace Conference,
the United States challenged the supremacy of British sea
power. In the face of the continuing American naval
construction, the British policy of supremacy with economy
became untenable* The Jutland and submarine controversies
of 1920 exacerbated the government's loss of faith in the
battleship and led to an investigation into the future
weapons of the Navy. The Imperial Conference of 1921
precluded the possibility of Dominion support for a naval
building program or a decision to renew the Anglo- Japanese
Alliance in the face of American opposition. The British
Empire Delegation at the Washington Conference sought the
maximum relief from naval expenditure consonant with
traditional measures of national security. In the face of
American proposals for Anglo-American equality and a ten-
year holiday in naval construction, Britain salvaged
superiority in cruisers and a two new battleships. These
results lead to the conclusion that the Cabinet no longer
believed that the battleship remained the ultimate arbiter
of naval disputes. The Cabinet therefore choose to
disregard the advice of the Admiralty and accept the naval
limitation agreement.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
This work developed from a question posed by a cadet at
the Unites States Military Academy. After listening for
most of a semester to an interpretation of modern history
colored by frequent and respectful references to the power
of the Royal Navy, he wanted to know why the British had
agreed to the limitations on their naval strength imposed by
the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. The resulting
treaties struck the cadet as a repudiation of longstanding
British national policy; the question struck his teacher as
worthy of investigation. Since the Restoration, a long line
of British statesmen pursued the security and prosperity of
the British Empire through adherence to three constant
principles: a balance of power in Europe, the defense of
imperial possessions, and, above all, the command of the
seas. The Royal Navy served as the twine which bound the
Empire together. Why, in 1921, had London agreed to a
conference on naval disarmament?
The answer, in short, reflected the changes wrought by
the First World War. When George Nathaniel Curzon, K.G.,
P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., F.R.S., Baron Curzon of Kedleston,
Baron Ravensdale, Viscount Scarsdale, and 1st Earl of
Kedleston, assumed duties as Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs in January, 1919, the traditional formula for
security seemed inadequate. The First World War had imposed
a massive strain on the Treasury and had given rise to new
challengers for naval supremacy, Japan and the United States
of America. The war had also complicated the formulation of
British national policy; the official British mind, once
comfortably insulated in a small office in Whitehall,
increasingly felt the pressure of public opinion and the
Dominions. The tension between retaining command of the
seas, establishing satisfactory foreign relations, and
relieving the current economic burden caused division within
the Lloyd George ministry. British participation in the
Washington Naval Conference reflected a resolution of that
tension
.
I suggest that a specific pattern of events informed
the British decision to accept President Harding's
invitation to Washington. At the turn of the twentieth
century, the Royal Navy, imbued with the doctrine of sea
power espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan, enjoyed the nation's
confidence. The First World War damaged the reputations of
both the battleship and its most ardent supporters. At the
Paris Peace Conference, the United States challenged the
supremacy of British sea power. In the face of the
continuing American naval construction, the British policy
of supremacy with economy became untenable. The Jutland and
submarine controversies of 1920 exacerbated the government's
lack of confidence in the capital ship and led to an
investigation, independent of the Admiralty, into the future
role of the capital ship in the Navy. The Imperial
Conference of 1921 precluded the possibility of Dominion
support for a naval building program or a decision to renew
the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in the face of American
opposition. Thus, the British Empire Delegation (B.E.D.) at
the Washington Conference sought the maximum relief from
naval expenditure consonant with traditional measures of
national security. In the face of sweeping American
proposals for Anglo-American equality and a ten-year holiday
in naval construction, Balfour salvaged superiority in
cruisers and a small program of new battleship construction.
The most useful sources in this study are the Cabinet
and Admiralty records. The Admiralty records on m.ost issues
contain the Board's position and reasoning in considerable
detail, largely in the form of Board minutes and memoranda
to the Cabinet. The Cabinet papers, which far too often
register conclusions with only scant summaries of the
preceding discussions, are generally less effective at
illuminating the government's decision-m.aking processes.
The accounts of the various subcommittees of the Committee
of Imperial Defence (the Cabinet's strategic planning forum)
and the Cabinet Finance Committee constitute fortunate
exceptions to the general trend. The Parliamentary Debates
(commonly known as Hansard) supported C.L. Mowat's
generalization: "low-grade ore for the historian."^ Three
^C.L. Mowat, Great Britain Since 1914 (Ithaca, NY,
1971), 54.
4sets of records were particularly helpful for the Conference
itself: the papers of the British Empire Delegation (CAB 30
series), which unfortunately were available only in
microfilm; the State Department's Conference on the
Limitation of Armament , which contained the transcripts of
the plenary and committee sessions in a more accessible
format than the Cabinet records; and Butler and Bury's
Documents on British Foreign Policy , which published most of
the correspondence between the Cabinet and the B.E.D. in
Washington.
Of the m.ajor actors within the British government.
Admiral David Beatty wrote most extensively on the
development of British sea power between 1919 and 1922. The
private papers of Arthur Balfour proved marginally helpful.
Eric and Auckland Geddes left no writings at all. I have
not had the opportunity to examine the papers of Austen
Chamberlain or those of David Lloyd George, who, to a great
degree, relied on oral arguments rather than detailed
position papers. Winston Churchill's contributions are well
established through the voluminous biographies of Randolph
Churchill and Martin Gilbert. The published papers of
Admirals Fisher and Jellicoe are extremely good on limited
pointS/ while most of the political memoirs (those of
Colonel House excepted) provide little more than anecdotes.
The work of four or five historians has been
particularly useful. Max Beloff provides the best overview
5to the concerns of the Cabinet. Stephen Roskill contributes
a reliable introduction to the workings of the Admiralty
during the inter-war period. The Sprouts, who have written
the standard work on the arms control negotiations from
1918-1922, emphasize the American perspective. Roger
Dingman, who seems unduly concerned with parochial
interests, still renders the most detailed coverage of the
naval arms limitation process in Britain. In my opinion,
however, none of these authors places sufficient weight on
the Cabinet's loss of confidence in the capital ship in
their explanation of the British decision to accept naval
arms limitation.
CHAPTER 1
BRITAIN'S MATERIAL POSITION
The story of Britain's participation in the Washington
Naval Conference of 1921-1922 is closely bound up with the
rise and fall of the pound sterling. Two leading naval
theorists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Paul Kennedy, have taken
diametrically opposed views on the value of the Royal Navy
as a creator of wealth in the twentieth century. Most
historians of the naval conference have attributed Britain's
willingness to bargain away her long-standing naval
superiority to economic difficulties. But considerations
other than financial also figure in some historical
assessments. One school of thought has focused on the role
of Canada in the transformation of the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance, completed at Washington. Another group of authors
has emphasized the desire of British leaders to promote
Anglo-American cooperation. Recent work on the conference,
while acknowledging the role of finance, has moved away from
simple economic determinism and underscored developments in
British domestic politics.
Modern naval theory began with Alfred Thayer Mahan at
the end of the nineteenth century. Earlier naval
historians, influenced by Edward Creasy 's concern with
"decisive battles" and Thomas Carlyle's emphasis on heroes,
focused on the finer points of tactics and the exploits of
charismatic captains without examining the larger framework
7within which fleet engagements took place. Mahan, a career
naval officer, surveyed the rise and fall of nations rather
than the exchange of broadsides. He produced his seminal
^ork The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 in
1890.^ As a publicist as well as an historian, he sought to
influence naval development within Great Britain and his
native America. Mahan discussed the factors that influenced
maritime strength and then examined the course of modern
European history to demonstrate the value of sea power.
Sea power, according to Mahan, involved control of the
sea, particularly the world's shipping lanes. He saw sea-
borne commerce as an irreplaceable source of wealth. He
recognized that the development of railroads and motorways
had reduced the relative superiority of water transport, but
he asserted that water remained "the great medium of
transportation." Monopoly of the shipping lanes therefore
enabled the holder to profit through sea-borne commerce and
to deny the same benefits to an opponent. Mahan argued:
4iis other major works included The Influence of Sea
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812
(1892), and The Life of Nelson; The Embodiment of the Sea
Power of Great Britain (1897).
^Alfred Thayer Mahan, as recorded in Margaret Sprout,
"Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power" in Edward Earle, ed. The
Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli
to Hitler (Princeton, 1971), 424.
^Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy (Princeton,
1958), 13-14, notes the same functions and adds the shelling
of shore installations, the transportation of troops between
theaters, and the denial of those options to the enemy.
8It is not the taking of individual ships or
convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down
the money power of a nation; it is the possession
of that overbearing power on the sea that drives
the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear
only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the
great common, closes the highways by which
commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores.^
Mahan clearly appreciated the economic component of war,
identifying the profit of commerce, "the sinews of war," as
the ultimate object of naval warfare. His analysis reflected
traditional British strategic thought. Henry Dundas,
Secretary at War under Pitt the Younger, had adopted a
similar attitude. Defending British strategy since the
onset of war with Revolutionary France to the House of
Commons in March 1801, Dundas stated:
we ought as early as we can at the beginning of a
war to cut off the commercial resources of our
enemies as by doing so we infallibly weaken or
destroy their naval resources.
Although he never precisely defined sea power, Mahan
advanced the possession and concentration of a superior
fleet as the most effective strategy for obtaining command
of the sea.
Mahan clearly stood for the concentration of ships into
a powerful fleet. In order to achieve control of the sea,
he felt a nation should focus its sea power on the
'Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon
History 1660-1783 (Boston, 1894), 138.
^enry Dundas, as recorded in Herbert Richmond,
Statesman and Sea Power (Oxford, 1946), 338.
9destruction of the opposing fleet, guerre d'escadres (fleet
combat)
. He wrote:
If naval warfare is a war of posts, then the
action of fleets must be subordinate to the attack
and defence of the posts; if its object is to
break up the enemy's power on the sea, cutting off
his communications with the rest of his
possessions, drying up the sources of his wealth
in his commerce, and making possible a closure of
his ports, then the object of attack must be his
organized military forces afloat; in short, his
navy
.
The success of such an attack depended upon the strength of
broadsides, "the power of offensive action," rather than
speed. Mahan insisted that "the maximum power of the
fleet.. and not the maximum power of a single ship, is the
true object of battleship construction" and utterly
Q
denounced any division of the battle-fleet. He extolled
the value of numerical superiority, echoing Nelson's dictum
gthat "numbers only can annihilate."
Slahan, Sea Power . 288.
^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, as recorded by Sprout, "Mahan:
Evangelist of Sea Power" in Earle, Military Thought from
Machiavelli to Hitler , 433. Sprout suggests that Mahan'
s
emphasis on concentration of the fleet reflected his reading
of Swiss military theorist Antoine-Henri , Baron de Jomimi,
who advocated concentration of force as an eternal principle
of war.
^Alfred Thayer Mahan, as recorded in Philip Crowl
,
"Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" in Peter Paret,
ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age (Princeton, 1986), 458.
^Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon
the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812 (Boston, 1895),
Vol II, 186.
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Mahan considered commerce raiding as a supplementary
activity to guerre d' escadres
. Commercial vessels, without
naval protection, stood little chance for survival in times
of war and thus represented a lucrative target for a rival
fleet. Other theorists, particularly the contemporary
French Jeune ficole. advocated guerre de course (commerce
raiding) as the primary focus of naval warfare. Admiral
Hyacinthe Aube
,
leader of the influential French school of
naval thought, shared Mahan' s appreciation for the value of
the sinews of war and asserted that "everything which gets
at the source of these riches becomes not only legitimate
but obligatory
.
"^'^ Mahan admitted that "the harassment and
distress caused to a country by serious interference with
its commerce will be conceded by all." As a war-fighting
strategy, however, he portrayed commerce raiding as "a most
dangerous delusion. "^^ He reasoned that a nation which
dispersed its warships against the opposing merchant marine
would see her naval strength destroyed piecemeal by
successive encounters with the enemy fleet. Mahan thus
12
referred to raiding as "a secondary operation" of war." He
^Admiral Aube, as recorded in Arthur Marder, The
Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval
Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era. 1880-1905 (New York,
1940), 87.
-^Alfred Thayer Mahan, as recorded by Crowl , "Alfred
Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" in Paret, From
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age , 459.
%ahan, French Empire , Vol II, 197.
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suggested that the absolute priority in naval warfare should
be the destruction of the opposing fleet, after which the
hapless merchant marine would face a Hobson's choice of
remaining uselessly in port or facing inevitable capture.
Naval strategy, according to Mahan, remained
unchanging. He defined strategy as follows: "Naval strategy
has for its end to found, support and increase, as well in
peace as in war, the sea power of a country." He made a
clear distinction between strategy and tactics, which
concerned particular battles and on which he acknowledged
the impact of technology. He noted that "from time to time,
the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly
torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far
remain, as though laid upon a rock." The possessor of a
superior fleet assumed the offensive and sought an
engagement, while a nation faced with superior sea power
maintained its fleet in an impregnable port, as the
existence of such a "fleet in being" compelled the enemy to
sustain a burdensome blockade.*^ The turbine engine replaced
the wind as the motive power of warships, but the workings
of sea power remained constant for Mahan. Maritime commerce
still provided unmatched economic benefits, and the
concentration of battleships into a powerful fleet
^^ahan. Sea Power , 88-89.
**Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power" in Earle,
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler , 433.
12
constituted the most effective means of competing for
control of the sea.
Mahan also addressed the crucial role of the national
government which affected sea power through the resourcing
and management of the navy. He argued that the sea power of
any given nation reflected her endowment with certain
resources
: "geographical position; physical conformation,
including, as connected therewith, natural productions and
climate; extent of territory; number of population;
character of the people; and character of the government,
including therein the national institutions."*^ Geography
determined the quality of a country's ports, requirements
for defense upon land (which reduced the resources available
for use at sea), and ease of access to the shipping lanes.
A merchant marine served as a source of revenue and a
reservoir of ships and trained sailors for the navy. The
natural resources which informed sea power varied according
to the era; oak trees (2,500 of which sufficed to build
Nelson's Victory) had given place to coal, which would in
turn yield to oil. While he advocated unequivocally the
maintenance of a superior fleet as the timeless strategy for
obtaining command of the sea, he complained that democratic
regimes "are not generally favorable to military
expenditure, however necessary" and that the British had
'-Mahan, Sea Power . 28-29.
neglected their fleet in the late nineteenth century. He
sought to awaken the Anglo-American publics to the value of
investing in sea power, particularly the battleship. His
writings offered support to those who argued for more men,
more ships, bigger ships, faster ships--at ever-increasing
costs
.
Posterity credits Mahan with raising important
questions to which the march of time has rendered his
answers largely irrelevant. One analyst, after citing "the
vastly increased strength of land power vis-a-vis sea power
in Europe, and certain technological developments which made
sea bl ockade a 1 ess deadl y weapon than it had previousl
y
been, " questioned whether "Mahan grasped the significance of
these wor 1 d-wide changes . "^^ Another condemned his negl ect
of "power-projection from the seas" and "the interdependence
of armies and navies in wartime."*
The validity of these criticisms appears increasingly
questionable as one moves chronologically backward from the
Second World War. A modern strategist noted that Mahan's
"architecture of naval power ... expl ained clearly why the
handful of big battleships would actually make all the
^ Mahan , Sea Power , 67
.
^^Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power" in Earle,
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler , 422.
^^^Crowl , "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian" in
Paret, From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age , 461.
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difference" until the advent of the submarine.'' A
contemporary naval historian explained the success of the
primitive German submarines in the Great War largely in
terms of the British Admiralty's unwillingness to adopt the
practice of convoy rather than any inherent superiority of
the submarine over the anti-submarine weapons of the time.^^
From a naval perspective, Mahan's discussion of sea power
remained valid in the first third of the twentieth century.
Although Mahan's ideas held sway before World War I,
subsequent scholars who studied the relationship of sea
power to the economy differed. One such theorist, the naval
historian Paul Kennedy, offered an alternative
interpretation of the relationship between economic and
military power. To be sure, both theorists recognize the
mutual influence of economic and military strength.
Kennedy, however, rejected Mahan's proposition that sea
power directly produces wealth. In his most recent work.
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 , he suggested that since
the Industrial Revolution, economic strength generates
military might with far more certainty than the reverse, in
effect turning Mahan on his head.
'^Edward Luttwak, On the Meaning of Victory; Essays on
Strategy (New York, 1986), 100.
^^Dan van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign: World War II 's
Great Struggle at Sea (New York, 1988), 36-42.
15
The ability of the Great Powers to supply their armed
forces with the "sinews of war" rested upon their economic
capacities. Kennedy wrote:
Once their productive capacity was enhanced,
countries would normally find it easier to sustain
the burdens of paying for large-scale armaments in
peacetime and of maintaining and supplying large
fleets in wartime.
Kennedy then went beyond the truism that military strength
requires an adequate economic base. First, he noted that
Great Powers experience economic growth at varying rates.
Second, while admitting that "economic prosperity does not
always and immediately translate into military
effectiveness,'' he asserted that changes in the economic
capacity of the Great Powers have led to all of the shifts
in their relative military power. The outcomes of the
Great Power wars have in turn confirmed these shifts in
22
relative economic position.
From the general position that wealth produces military
strength more effectively than the reverse, Kennedy went on
to challenge Mahan's interpretation of the wealth-producing
nature of sea power at the turn of the twentieth century.
^*Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers;
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New
York, 1987), 439, xvi
.
Kennedy, Great Powers , 537, questions whether the
changing status of the Great Powers contributed to the
outbreak of war. Geoffrey Blaney, in The Causes of War (New
York, 1973), suggests that constantly changing economic and
military strengths would increase the potential for
disagreement as to relative strengths and hence conflict.
16
From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the sea
provided the most efficient mode of transportation. From
about 1850, however, the major advances associated with
industrialization--steam, the factory system, railways, and
later el ectrici ty--subsequently reduced the economic
advantage associated with water-borne transportation.
Kennedy highlighted commentary by navalist Gerald Graham:
It is an interesting commentary on human affairs
that Mahan's exposition of the influence of sea
power on the course of European and American
expansion should have occurred at the very time
when new instruments of the Industrial Revolution
were beginning to erode principles and theories
upon which his doctrines were based.
He thus suggested that in accordance with the ideas of
British geo-pol i tician Sir Halford MacKinder, sea power had
waned relative to land power by the turn of the century.
Kennedy himself noted that "what industrialization did was
to take away some of the advantages hitherto enjoyed by
smaller, peripheral, naval -cum-commercial states and to give
them to the great land-based states." Sea power, according
to Kennedy, had failed to keep pace with land power as a
24
source of either economic or military strength.
In fact, he argued, it became a liability. The
international situation which Kennedy depicted featured
^^Gerald Graham, as recorded in Paul Kennedy, The Rise
and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Atlantic Highlands, NJ
,
1983), 177.
'^Kennedy, Great Powers , 157.
17
Great Powers that experienced economic change at different
rates, leading to shifts in relative strength. Rising
nations, particularly the leading Great Power, tended to
assume "overseas obligations (dependence upon foreign
markets and raw materials, military alliances, perhaps bases
and colonies)" vacated by powers in decline. Kennedy noted:
if a state overextends itself st rategical 1 y . . . i
t
runs the risk that the potential benefits from
external expansion may be outweighed by the great
expense of it all--a dilemma which becomes acute
if the nation involved has entered a period of
relative economic decl ine
•
Sea power thus led Great Britain at the turn of the
twentieth century toward imperial overstretch--to incur in
relation to unprofitable regions costs which would later
aggravate the massive deficits imposed by war. The British
Empire in the late nineteenth century, in the face of
growing French and German competition, increasingly became
formal (i.e., London established direct political control,
rather than working through local elites) and more expensive
to administer. British historian Correlli Barnett
denigrated the net value of the Empire to Britain during the
Great War, claiming "the whole British position in the
Middle East and Southern Asia was in fact a classic, and
gigantic, example of strategic over-extension." Kennedy
^^Kennedy , Great Powers , xvi , xviii
.
^^Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New
York, 1972), 75-80.
18
himself cited the work of Barnett on the British Empire in
support of his argument for the concept of imperial
overstretch.
Kennedy's analysis, however, seems ill-suited to
Britain during the reign of George V. First, his
application of imperial overstretch to the British Empire
between the World Wars appears unsound. One historian noted
that after 1920, "the empire was very far from being an
anachronism; that on the contrary it was only just beginning
to pay the dividends its old champions had always expected
ii23from it." Second, his correlation between the economic
strength of a nation and its military might remains a
generalization, rather than a description of British
circumstance. During the Great War, for example, Britain,
despite its massive wealth, experienced enormous difficulty
translating its riches into the specific forms of production
10
needed for mass warfare on land. The British shipbuilding
industry, on the other hand, proved able to respond to
wartime demands and to compete successfully in the post-war
Paul Kennedy, personal interview at the United States
Military Academy, April 7, 1989.
^^The Empire's share of Britain's exports, for example,
rose from 37% between 1920-24 to 49% between 1935-39. See
Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British
Imperialism 1850-1983 (New York, 1984), 260-61.
^'Barnett, Col lapse , 84-89. Luttwak, Victory , 142-43,
makes the point that there is no automatic correlation
between productive capacity and diplomatic power.
19
world market.^" Finally, Kennedy's reference to the
declining importance of Britain's peripheral location only
assumes validity at least a decade after the Great War with
the development of the bomber and later the rocket. From
the perspective of British statesmen in the opening decades
of the twentieth century, Mahan's conceptualization of sea
power might have constituted the more useful paradigm.
Ignoring the relationship between sea power and
economic strength, most interpretations of the Washington
Conference have reduced British motives for participation to
economic exhaustion. Raymond Buell pioneered this approach
in 1922 when he wrote:
For the time being at least, Great Britain was
unable to answer the challenge of the United
States who was now threatening the British
supremacy of the seas. Its finances were in a
state of semianarchy and it could not afford to
engage in a new race for armaments. "
Harold and Margaret Sprout, writing in 1940, shared Buell 's
emphasis on economic factors . They noted
:
Yet, to maintain even a nominal naval equality
with the United States, in open and unrestricted
competition , woul d require a financial out 1 ay
which Great Britain's war-weakened and seriously
depressed economy was then in no condi t i on to
bear. Also it could scarcely be doubted that any
large British effort in this di recti on would
further stimulate navalism within the United
States ... requiring still larger expenditures by
-"Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and
the Great War. 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1986), 782-83.
"Raymond Buell, The Washington Conference (New York,
1922), 141-42.
20
Great Britain.
Thomas Bailey, in a standard short treatment of the subject,
noted in 1964 that Britain's economy "had been so badly
strained by the war that her taxpayers would welcome a
holiday in building. "^^ William Braisted took a similar line
in 1971:
What Britain needed to compete successfully with
the United States was a throbbing economy capable
of undertaking new ships comparable to the
dreadnoughts and battle cruisers already
authorized by Congress and far more. This Lloyd
George did not have in his hand.^'
Part of the explanation for this monocausal view of British
motivation lies in the fact that much of the major work on
the subject has been written by Americans." These authors
concentrated on the United States rather than treating all
participants in the conference equally. Yet, lest it be
thought that this economic fixation merely reflects American
oversimplification, Canadian James Stokesbury, a naval
Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea
Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922
(Princeton, 1940), 26.
Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
People (New York, 1964), 641.
"^William Braisted, The United States Navy in the
Pacific 1909-1922 (Austin, TX, 1971), 437.
"cL. Hoag, Preface to Preparedness: The Washington
Conference and Public Opinion (Washington, D.C., 1941); John
Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and
the Washington Conference 1921-1922 (Athens, GA, 1955);
Thomas Buckley, The United States and the Washington
Conference. 1921-22 (Knoxville, TN, 1970).
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specialist, wrote in 1983:
The treasury was empty; the war had transformed
Britain into a debtor country, and a nation that
lost thirty-five million working days to strikesm 1919 was not going to welcome an increase in
taxes for a new naval race.
Kennedy himself, in Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945
.
limited his explanation to a brief reference to British
economic weakness .
The general tenor of these dismal appraisals of the
British economy seems substantial ly correct, if somewhat
imprecise. That the war weakened His Majesty's Exchequer
can scarcely be doubted. The doubl ing of the value of
retained imports from £600 millions in 1914 to £1200
millions in 1918 while exports remained stable at £550
millions during the same period adversely affected Britain's
balance of payments. Furthermore, the British national
debt, £650 millions before the war, increased by
approximately £7 billions during the course of the Great
38War. As a result of these trends , the relative infl uence
James Stokesbury , Navy & Empire : A Short History of
British Sea Power from the Armada to the Falklands ( London
,
1983), 343.
^"'paul Kennedy , Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945
(London, 1983) , 68 .
^^Sidney Pollard, The Development of the British Economy
1914-1967 (New York, 1969), 66-75, gives a figure of £7,186
millions as the deficit on the wartime budgets and notes
that the national debt increased by a similar figure; Robert
Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War 1914-1919: Bri tish Economic
War Aims and the Origins of Reparations (Hamden, CT: 1975),
137 .
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of Treasury officials vis-a-vis the spending departments,
the concept of "Treasury control," increased tremendously
immediately upon the signing of the Armistice.
Nonetheless, Braisted's notion that Britain could not
afford "new ships comparable to the dreadnoughts and battle
cruisers already authorized by Congress" under the 1916
building program appears an exaggeration. In 1920, the
First Sea Lord estimated that four new capital ships would
maintain the Royal Navy at a strength roughly equal to that
of the American Navy. The construction of four such ships,
at that time, would have cost some £38 millions.''' Dividing
that sum over three years of construction, the outlay
required to meet the 1916 program would have been under £13
millions per annum. In the 1920-21 Budget, which surpassed
£1400 millions, the Naval Estimate exceeded £84 millions."
The Admiralty, which at this time possessed considerable
autonomy to determine naval priorities and reallocate funds
within total constraints determined by the Cabinet, could
have offset partially the cost of capital ship construction
by measures such as retiring older ships and putting a
higher percentage of the navy into reserve commission. The
^^Robin Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain,
1918-1940. a Case Study (Foulis, 1962), 278-79.
%DM 116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920.
^'Robin Higham, Armed Forces , 113.
23
Lloyd George ministry in the summer of 1921 in fact
authorized four such ships to meet the American 1916
42program. This analysis suggests that, from a purely
monetary perspective, naval competition remained unwelcome
rather than impossible and that financial pressure
constituted one reason for the British appearance at
Washington, but not the only one.
The economic school contributed an important
perspective on the British decision to attend the Washington
Conference by emphasizing that naval competition with the
United States dominated strategic debate in London from 1919
to 1921. Buell noted the origins of the naval competition
in President Woodrow Wilson's demand of February 1916 that
the United States develop "incomparably the most adequate
navy in the world" and the consequent Naval Appropriation
Act, which authorized the huge 1916 program of naval
construction of sixteen post-Jutland capital ships. " The
Sprouts discussed the "seemingl y hope 1 ess disagreement" over
the second of Wilson's Fourteen Points. British
reservations toward freedom of the seas, "utterly abhorrent
to British naval authorities and to the majority of British
statesmen," led to the ensuing American announcement of "a
CAB 23: Conclusion 60 (6), July 20, 1921.
Buell, Washington Conference , 140-41.
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huge post-war building program in the late autumn of 1918. "••
Braisted detailed "the naval battle of Paris," where the
Anglophobia of American Admiral William Benson exacerbated
existing Anglo-American antagonism and permitted only a
temporary naval settlement (Britain supported Wilson's
League of Nations in exchange for cancellation of the U.S.
Navy's proposed 1918 program) rather than permanent
resolution between the world's major naval powers.
J. Kenneth MacDonald, in a valuable essay in 1971,
discussed Britain's search for a naval policy in 1919. In
the aftermath of Versailles, American naval construction
under the 1916 program threatened Britain's naval
superiority. At the same time, "pressure for the reduction
of expenditure," according to MacDonald, led to the
promulgation of the ten year rule, which directed the
fighting services to base their estimates on the assumption
of no major war within the next decade. "The conflict
between the immediate pressure to reduce navy spending and
the prospect of an impending naval race with the United
States," in MacDonald's view, led Prime Minister David Lloyd
George to explore the possibility of a naval agreement. He
dispatched a special envoy to Washington, where the physical
incapacity of President Wilson dashed any hope that the
^'Sprouts, New Order , 60-61.
•'Braisted, United States Navy , 414-38.
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emissary could convince the American government to allow
Ortat Britain to retain her world maritime supremacy
unchallenged.^^ In the fall of 1919, the British government
thus realized that for at least the next fifteen months
their naval policy could not involve agreement with
Washington
.
Stephen Roskill, in Naval Policy BelwM-n the Wars^^ Ij_
The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919 1929_( 1969)
,
provided the Admiralty's perspective on the major
devel opments in British naval policy during the inter -war
period. In the spring of 1920, First Lord Walter Long
"reaffirmed the principle of the One Power standard" of
naval strength. On the same occasion, the First Lord "took
a firm stand on the future of the capital ship." Later that
year. First Sea Lord David Beatty opened a campaign for new
capital ship construction "with particular reference to the
relative strength of the British and American navies." The
Cabinet then directed the Committee of Imperial Defence to
investigate the role of the capital ship in the navy. In
the spring of 1921, the commi t tee i ssued conflicting
reports, "which left matters very much where they were."
The Cabinet then struck a deal with the Admiralty. In
return for cost-cutting measures which included reducing the
^^J. Kenneth MacDonald, "Lloyd George and the Search for
a Post-war Naval Policy, 1919" in A. J. P. Taylor, ed, Lloyd
George: Twelve Essays (New York, 1971), 191-222.
number of capital ships in full commission from twenty to
sixteen out of the thirty on the effective list, they
authorized the construction of four new capital ships,
deemed replacements "to avoid providing ammunition to the
'Big Navy School' in America." The First Lord, meanwhile,
issued an informal invitation to certain American contacts
in the hopes that the new Harding Administration might
consider "an international agreement on naval limitation."^'
The role of American competition is central to an
understanding of the British willingness to consider naval
disarmament. At the conclusion of hostilities, the Royal
Navy possessed a massive superiority in fighting strength
49
over any possible opponent. Churchill, before the Paris
Peace Conference, trumpeted Britain's absolute refusal to
accept "any fettering restrictions which will prevent the
British Navy maintaining its well-tried and wel 1 -deserved
supremacy." The relentless progress of the American 1916
program, however, combined with the Royal Navy's extensive
post-war demobilization, effectively challenged that
•'Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars. I: The
Period of Anglo-American Naval Antagonism (New York, 1969),
218-229.
^^Stokesbury , Navv & Empire , 342. McDonald, "Lloyd
George and the Search for a Post-War Naval Policy, 1919" in
Taylor, Twelve Essays , notes that the Royal Navy nearly
equaled all of the remaining major fleets combined.
^'Winston Churchill, as recorded in Sprouts, New Order,
62.
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supremacy. The Admiralty, aware of the challenge, advised
the Cabinet:
The Board believes it to be unquestioned that
Great Britain owes her leading position among the
Nations to her long-maintained pre-eminence upon
the sea. They believe this pre-eminence cannot be
relinquished without her ability to hold her
position being profoundly affected, with all that
position involves in respect of presjj^ige,
authority, and commercial advantage."^
The Board then presented the alternatives of new capital
ship construction or diplomatic agreement. The American
building program forced the Cabinet to choose between
maritime inferiority, an extensive construction program, or
a naval limitation agreement, thus bringing into play
economic weakness and other factors
.
The second scholarly group to study the British
presence at Washington, the Dominion school, dominated by
Canadian historians
,
emphasized the growing inf 1 uence of the
Dominions in the foreign policy of the British Empire.
Britain ' s heightened concern for Dominion considerations
sprang from a recognition of their contributions to the war
effort and from a desire to develop a common Imperial
foreign policy. At the Imperial Conference of 1921, British
and Dominion statesmen jointly considered the renewal of the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance, which apparently was due to expire
in a matter of weeks. J.B. Brebner in 1935 detailed the
^^ADM 116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
Expenditure, October 24, 1919.
role of Canada's Prime Minister Arthur Meighen in preventing
a renewal of the alliance. Brebner wrote:
Arthur Meighen ... practical 1 y unassisted, checked
his British and Dominion colleagues at an Imperial
Conference in their determination to renew the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance, ther eby
. . . f aci 1 i tat ing
the movement which culminated in the Washington
Conference
.
John Galbraith, writing in 1948, emphasized the deference
which the delegates of the Imperial Conference paid to the
reaction of the United States, "perhaps the most powerful
influence in shaping the decisions of the Conference."'^ In
1966, A.R.M. Lower highlighted the influence upon Meighen of
Loring Christie, the legal adviser to Canada's Department of
External Affairs. Christie's memorandum on the alliance,
which advocated a conference on Pacific affairs, provided
Meighen with the arguments he would employ in London."^
Michael Fry in 1967 qualified the extent of Canada's
influence at the Imperial Conference. He pointed out that
Meighen "by forceful argument, had succeeded in directing
the imperial meeting toward the calling of a [Far Eastern]
conference, but he had not secured non-renewal." Prime
J.B. Brebner, "Canada, The Angl o- Japanese Alliance,
and the Washington Conference", ( Political Science
Quarterly , L, 1935).
^^John Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and
the Washington Conference", ( Canadian Historical Review ,
XXXIX, 1948).
-^A.R.M. Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the
Washington Conference of 1921-1922", ( Canadian Historical
Review
,
XLVII, 1966).
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Minister William Hughes of Australia, who sought protection
against Japanese expansion in the Pacific, secured retention
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance pending the resolution of
President Harding's opportune invitation to Washington.
Although they thus present an intriguing picture, the
Dominion school in general and J.B. Brebner in particular
have misstated the role of Arthur Meighen in "facilitating
the movement which culminated in the Washington Conference.'*
Meighen's stance on the Angl o- Japanese Alliance had little
impact on London's willingness to go to Washington. The
British Cabinet, even before the Imperial Conference,
decided
:
that the President of the United States should be
asked to summon a Conference of the Pacific
Powers, but only after it has been made clear to
Japan and to the other Powers concerned we had no
intention of dropping the Alliance."^
After the shouting match at that conference between Meighen
and Hughes died down, the Cabinet concluded:
That the representatives of the United Kingdom at
the Imperial Meetings should have the authority to
propose or assent to the initiation of full and
frank conversations with the Governments of both
the United States of America and Japan with a vi^w
to some arrangement satisfactory to all parties.
After some legerdemain involving a legal opinion from the
^^Michael Fry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and the
Abrogation of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance", (Journal of
Modern History . XXXIX, 1967).
"cab 23: Conclusion 43 (2) a. May 30, 1921.
^•CAB 23: Conclusion 56 (3) a, June 30, 1921.
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Lord Chancellor, the Imperial Cabinet agreed the following
day that the Alliance remained in force and that the Foreign
Office should contact America and Japan concerning an
international conference. When Lloyd George informed the
Imperial Cabinet of President Harding's invitation to a
disarmament conference, no one suggested refusing to attend.
Arthur Meighen thus caused neither the abrogation of the
Angl o- Japanese Alliance nor the British Cabinet's acceptance
of President Harding's invitation
.
Meighen, on the other hand, profoundly influenced the
range of choices open to the British delegation in
Washington. On July 4th, Lord Lee and Admiral Beatty
provided the Dominion leaders a briefing on imperial defense
and explained Britain's difficulties with the cost of new
58
naval construction
. In a series of meetings among the
prime ministers two weeks later, after the Imperial
Conference had accepted the American invitation, Hughes of
Aus t ral ia proposed that the Dominions share in the burden of
imperial defense on a per capita basis of white population.
Meighen demurred. Smuts proposed applying German
reparations payments towards naval construction , but Meighen
again refused • Hughes in turn refused to contribute unl ess
Canada did so. Meighen's obstruction thus precluded any
^^CAB 32/2: Minutes 12/13, July 1, 1921; CAB 32/2
Minute 21, July 11, 1921.
-^CAB 32/2: Minute 14, July 4, 1921.
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concrete arrangements for Dominion contributions for
imperial defense. He influenced the British mission to
Washington by denying it options based on economic
constraints rather than by his insistence that British
diplomacy defer to his views.
Another interpretation of British foreign policy
stressed London's own desire to maintain favorable relations
with the United States. In the aftermath of the Versailles
peace settl ement , Britain recogni zed a communi ty of
interests, the advancement of which depended upon Anglo-
American cooperation. John Vinson in 1955 thus described
Britain's wish "to cultivate the good will of the United
States
. Such an expl anat ion easily incorporated Britain's
economi c woes and her debt to Amer i ca
.
Correlli Barnett, in 1972, discussed the origins of Pan
Anglo-Saxon feeling in Britain. He suggested that in the
1880s the British ruling class began to cultivate a myth
whereby America assumed first an "ident i ty of race" and
later "identity of political and cul tural t radi tions and
national aspirations." This myth, according to Barnett, had
its roots in the manicured lawns of the East coast
oligarchy, where English aristocrats such as George
Nathaniel, 1st Marquess of Curzon, courted their American
brides. Within the Lloyd George Cabinet of 1920-21, Winston
John Vinson, Parchment Peace , 29.
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Churchill and Austen Chamberlain shared the distinction of
American descent on the distaff side.-''
Michael Fry further refined Vinson's interpretation in
the same year by identifying the At lanticists , those elites
within the British Empire who supported "the creation of a
global hegemony enjoyed by the United States and the British
empire, expressed in maritime and financial terms."" Even
among this group, motives for cooperation with America
varied considerably. Liberals Sir Edward Grey, Richard,
Viscount Haldane, and H.A.L. Fisher supported the radical-
liberal program of President Woodrow Wilson, while Sir
Robert Cecil and General Jan Smuts sought to further the
League of Nations. The imperialists of the Round Table
group desired to harness the North American republic to
their vision of missionary idealism. Conservatives Arthur
Balfour and Arthur, Viscount Lee of Fareham acted from the
Pan Anglo-Saxon conviction of the collective heritage and
common future of the English-speaking peoples.
Yet, the prevalence of Pan Anglo-Saxon views among
British elites constituted at most a subordinate factor in
the British decision to enter negotiations for naval
disarmament. Lee, who assumed the position of First Lord of
the Admiralty in February 1921, certainly used his extensive
"•Barnett, Collapse , 258-263.
-•Michael Fry, The Illusions of Security (Toronto,
1972), 6-17.
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American contacts, which in the past had included friendship
with the late Theodore Roosevelt, to promote Anglo-American
naval agreement. Yet Lee remained among the "lesser men
politically." Fry described him as "a cypher, owing all to
Lloyd George."" Curzon, despite his American wife,
denigrated America's diplomatic record and urged the Cabinet
to renew the Angl o- Japanese Alliance. Arthur Balfour, the
leading Pan Anglo-Saxon, agreed. During the Imperial
Conference of 1921, he noted to the Dominion leaders that
"it is, from a strategic point of view, of very great
importance that the Japanese Alliance should be
maintained."^' Winston Churchill, the former First Lord,
preferred to place his trust in British battleships rather
than the vagaries of American policy. In February 1921, he
accepted "the overwhelming case for the capital ship as the
foundation and ultimate sanction of sea-power" and advocated
an extended building program of four capital ships every
year.'^ While several members of the Lloyd George Cabinet
held pro-American convictions, only the politically trivial
Lee sought to construct a naval policy on such a basis.
Perhaps the best general account of the developments
that led the British government to agree to the naval
^Fry, Illusions , 16.
"cab 23: Conclusion 43 (2), May 30, 1921.
'Ssfinston Churchill, as recorded in Kenneth Young,
Arthur James Balfour (London, 1963), 419.
34
conference can be found in Max Beloff's Imperial Sunset.
Volume I: Britai n's Liberal Empire 1897-1921 (1970). The
First World War unleashed a host of new inf luences--the
increasingly self-conscious colonies; ideological opposition
to Bolshevism; a loss of confidence among the ruling elites;
growing popular desires for both pacifism and domestic
consumption; and, of course, "the weakening of Britain's
material posi tion"--which constrained the choices open to
British statesmen. They assumed, according to Beloff, that
"the international world was one of competing powers and
that their duty was to make the most of whatever assets were
available. "^^ The war affected the nature of the great game,
introducing new rules, sweeping old pieces from the board,
and changing the way Britain looked at familiar players.
Bel of f suggested that psychol ogical factors weighed
heavi 1 y in Britain's decision to accept naval 1 imitation at
the end of the First World War. He noted a change in
Britain's outlook on the world which undermined the need for
maintenance of the traditional degree of naval superiority.
This devaluation of the importance of the f 1 eet stemmed from
three causes. First, the reduction of the German and
Russian fleets served to eliminate serious threats to the
home islands. Second, the supporters of the League of
Nations argued that the new organization had assumed
-^Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset. Volume I : Britain's
Liberal Empire. 1897-1921 (New York, 1970), 5, 10-18.
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responsibility for Britain's defense. Third, the ruling
elite increasingly questioned the purpose and existence of
the British Empire, the defense of which constituted an
important mission for the fleet.
Beloff's concern for the British attitude towards the
Royal Navy appears reasonable. His discussion, however,
though reasonable in nature, lacks detailed evidence. He
fails to differentiate between elites in general and those
in office. Rejection of the Empire characterized the
radical wing of the Liberal Party far more than the Lloyd
George ministry. Appeals to the League of Nations failed to
sway pragmatic senior officials such as Sir Maurice Hankey
and Sir Eyre Crowe, who deprecated the ability of that
agency to provide protection. Japan and the United States,
in the eyes of the Cabinet, replaced Germany and Russia as
CO
naval rivals. Beloff's investigation of elite support for
British sea power might have proved more profitable had he
restricted his scope to the Cabinet.
In the most recent major work on the naval conference.
Power in the Pacific (1976), Roger Dingman made a valuable
contribution to the study of British motivations for naval
arms limitation. He focused on the crucial role of British
"Beloff, Imperial Sunset . 295, 336, 348, 359.
"Barnett, Col lapse , 244-45.
^^CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920; CAB
32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 14, July 4, 1921.
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domestic politics in the foL-mulatiou ot foreign and d^-fenae
policy. Dingman noted thai David Lloyd George played a
critical role in Britain's decision to accept naval parity
with the United States and further suggested that the prime
minister elevated "Ireland over everything" in the summer of
1921. Thus, in order to maintain his fragile coalition
government long enough to resolve the Irish problem, the
Welsh Wizard used the Washington Naval Conference as a
"middle way out of diplomatic, imperial, and naval
problems."''
Dingman's emphasis on British internal affairs seems a
particularly fruitful line of inquiry. His observation that
Lloyd C7eorge played a significant rol» in domtitic politics
approaches a truism. Dingman's suggestion that Lloyd
George's concern for Ireland provided the impetus for a
naval agreement, however, appears doubtful. Surely, the
nationwide coal strike, rising unemployment, and the
failure of government housing schemes provided other grist
for the Irish mill. Furthermore, the Royal Navy, "an
institution with roots deep in the traditions and psychology
of British political life" in Dingman's own words, would
seem at first glance particularly ill-suited as an object of
political sacrifice.^" Yet, if the national leadership had
^'noger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: the Origins of
Naval Arms Limitation (Chicago, 1976), xii, 161-63, 172-77.
^"oingman. Pacific, 161.
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suffered a loss of confidence in the future of the
Dreadnought, then the premier's selection of naval
limitation as a vehicle makes more sense.
The historiography of the Washington Naval Conference
lacks a clear linkage between Cabinet attitudes towards the
capital ship and British willingness to conclude a naval
limitation agreement. The Sprouts addressed the importance
of developments in naval warfare in a very general context.
They stated that '*only incurable optimists and hopeless
reactionaries believed that the submarine peril had been
laid to final rest" at the end of the Great War.
"Submarines and aircraft, both alone and in combination with
surface craft" thus gave rise to "doubts as to the batt 1
e
fleet's future utility." They noted:
There were uneasy forebodings in certain quarters
that further advances in submarine and air power
might progressively undermine the security of the
island base which supported the sea power of Great
Britain. *
Roger Dingman, who considered the British position in depth,
flatly opposed this viewpoint. He wrote:
Some commentators have suggested that the
negotiators in Washington limited capital ship
fleets because they believed battleships were
obsolete. This study suggests that precisely the
opposite was true.
Dingman is surely correct as far as the views of the
^Sprouts , New Order , 43-46
^Dingman, Pacific , 216.
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Admiralty were concerned. They shared the world of the
American Navy, where Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and
the Navy the only true Church.
The civilian members of the Cabinet, however, lacked
Admiral Beatty's absolute faith in the value of the capital
ship. Roskill described Bonar Law, Sir Eric Geddes, and Sir
Robert Horne as "impressed by the arguments of the [junior]
naval men who expressed doubts regarding the continued
dominance" of the capital ship."^' Higham noted that Lloyd
George "did not like Beatty's big ships, but felt more
attention should be paid to small A.S.W. [anti-submarine
warfare] vessels."'* Conscious of the American challenge to
British maritime supremacy
,
cognizant of Britain'
s
precarious economic position
, and conversant with
contemporary criticisms of the capital ship, these men chose
to accept the American invitation to a disarmament
conference • Their acceptance
,
unimaginabl e in 1914
,
reflected at least in part the British experience with the
Great War, in which the performance of the Royal Navy failed
to meet popular expectations and in which new technologies
emerged to pose a threat to the dreadnought.
'^Roskill, Naval Policy . 225
^^i gham , Armed Forces . 116.
CHAPTER 2
THE MOST FORMIDABLE FORCE, 1905-1914
In the decade before the First World War, Britain
pursued new methods to achieve her traditional defense
objectives. British defense policy rested primarily upon
the twin pillars of command of the sea and a balance of
power in Europe. As the possibility of a major war on the
continent grew less and less remote, the island kingdom
abandoned her policy of non-alignment to join the Franco-
Russian Entente against Germany. The Royal Navy remained,
as it had been for centuries, Britain's foremost line of
defense. The navy experienced a profound transformation,
designed to produce a force prepared to fight the German
High Seas Fleet. The senior service enjoyed considerable
autonomy in its preparation, as a result of widespread
support among the leading elements of British society. In
1914, Parliament felt complete confidence in the ability of
the Royal Navy to defend Britain's national interests.
Leading politicians, regardless of party, adhered to
two constant principles: the balance of power in Europe and
command of the seas.* Britain's island character determined
the primary considerations of her national defense down to
the Great War. Providence provided Britain with a salt-water
barrier to the march of continental armies. The British, in
-Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925 (New
York, 1974), 49.
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order to maintain their sovereignty, needed to prevent sea-
borne invasion and to maintain sufficient trade to feed the
population and to fuel the economy.^ The first priority of
national defense thus involved command of the sea, which
entailed the defeat of the enemy's main naval forces and
provided the subsequent control of maritime communications.^
Command of the sea thus meant control of much of Europe's'
maritime commerce. This control in turn generated for
Britain "a world weight far beyond her resources in manpower
and wealth."^ Britain frequently used this wealth to
intervene in continental conflicts.
Britain traditionally attempted to prevent any power
from establishing its ascendancy over Europe by cooperating
with others to maintain a rough equilibrium, or balance of
power.' Sir Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office, who went on
to serve as permanent under-secretary from 1920-1925, noted
in 1907:
It has become almost an historical truism to
identify England's secular policy with the
Britain lost the ability to feed her population from
her own agricultural production about 1865 and recognized
that enormous disability in 1900. See John Gooch, The
Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence Policy 1847-1942
(London, 1981), 9.
^Kennedy, Naval Mastery . 53.
^Gerald Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy:
Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy (Cambridge, 1965), 9.
^William Strang, Britain in World Affairs: The
Fluctuations in Power and Influence from Henry VIII to
Elizabeth II (New York, 1961), 18.
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maintenance of this balance [of power] by throwing
her weight now in this scale and now in that, but
ever on the side opposed to the political
dictatorship of the strongest single State or
group at a given time.'
Her balancing took two forms, small expeditionary forces
and, of greater importance, economic subsidies to her
continental allies. Such intervention forced her opponents
to focus on military competition and helped Britain maintain
her unrivaled naval position. She remained particularly
sensitive to the potential of the Low Countries to serve as
a
a base for invasion/ The defense of Britain, at the turn
of the twentieth century, began on the Channel ports.
Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century,
British diplomacy inclined towards an unusually favorable
regard for France. In the late nineteenth century, with the
forces of France and Germany in approximate balance, Britain
followed a policy of "splendid isolation." The Boer War,
1899-1902, shocked the British, who began to reconsider the
basis of their national defense. In 1902, Britain
concluded a military alliance with Japan against the menace
"Sir Eyre Crowe, as recorded in Richmond, Statesmen and
Sea Power , 355.
^Stokesbury , Navy & Empire . 106
.
hn the age of sail, Britain fought a series of wars to
prevent France from seizing the Netherlands, which would
have provided "an estimably valuable naval point d 'appui."
See Strang. Affairs , 27.
^Belof f , Imperial Sunset , 79-80
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of Russian expansion in the Far East. A subsequent outbreak
of serious unrest in Morocco led Britain in April 1904 to
reach an understanding with France, the Anglo-French
Entente, in order to reduce colonial differences and to
preclude the possibility of being dragged into war in the
event of a Russo-Japanese conflict.*''
The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 served to cement the Anglo-
French Entente. British Foreign Secretary Henry, 5th
Marquess of Lansdowne described the bombastic pronouncements
of support for the Sultan of Morocco by Kaiser Wilhelm II as
"an extraordinary clumsy bit of diplomacy."" Lansdowne
agreed to support French resistance to German demands for a
Moroccan port. Further German demands for an international
conference to discuss the Moroccan question, later expanded
to include the resignation of French Foreign Minister
Theophile Delcasse, reinforced British suspicions of
Germany's intentions. When the Russo-Japanese War of 1905
revealed the weakness of the Russian war machine, British
leaders feared that the Franco-Russian alliance could no
longer balance Prussian power. Sir Edward Grey, who
'"Cedric Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power
(Boston, 1972), 4-9, 275-77.
"Lord Lansdowne, as recorded in Lowe and Dockrill,
Mirage of Power , 425.
*^Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy:
Background Influences on British External Polic y. 1865-1980
(Boston, 1981), 75-81, 123-24.
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replaced Lord Lansdowne as Foreign Secretary in December
1905, authorized staff talks between the British fighting
services and their French counterparts in January 1906.^^
Germany replaced Russia as the greatest threat to the
British Empire.
The German bullying of France led Britain to consider
the likely course of a Franco-German war. Facing a two-
front war in their struggle with France and Russia, the
Germans adopted a plan devised by Count Alfred Schlieffen,
chief of the German general staff, for a wheeling movement
through Belgium for a knockout blow against France. The
British saw that a successful violation of Belgian
neutrality by the Kaiser's legions would place the southern
shore of the North Sea, the sine qua non of successful
I
A
invasion , under German control . Reginald Brett , 2nd
Viscount Esher , defense expert and confidential advisor to
King Edward VII, wrote to Prime Minister Arthur Balfour:
It is vital to Germany to absorb Hoi 1 and ... there
must come a day when France and England will have
to fight Germany in order to neutralize the Dutch
Kingdom, and this day may not be very far off,
British hegemony at sea thus required British support of
France in the event of German aggression on land.
^^Grey obtained the permission of the Prime Minister but
withheld this information from the remainder of the Cabinet.
Beloff, Imperial Sunset . 108; Wilson, Mvriad Faces. 22.
^^Kennedy , Realities Behind Diplomacy , 12 9.
^^Lord Esher, as recorded in Young, Balfour , 228.
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The rapid expansion of the German navy constituted the
most direct threat to Britain's vital national interests.
At the close of the nineteenth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II
decided that Germany required "world-political freedom,"
which could be supplied only by a powerful navy. In 1897,
the Kaiser appointed a new Secretary of State for the
Imperial Navy, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz.^^ Tirpitz, a
disciple of both Mahan and Prussian historian Heinrich von
Treitschke, shared the Kaiser's dream of a powerful German
fleet. He started to create such a fleet with the German
Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900, which authorized a fleet of 38
battleships, 20 armored cruisers, and 38 light cruisers.
The admiral rationalized the High Seas Fleet in the
following terms:
In order to protect German trade and commerce
under existing conditions only one thing will
suffice, namely Germany must possess a battle
fleet of such a strength that even for the most
powerful adversary a war would involve such risks
as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful.
Tirpitz made clear that his intended target was the British
Grand Fleet. He publicly reasoned that a German fleet
concentrated in the North Sea would cause Britain, for fear
For conflicting views as to the influence of Mahan on
German naval development, see Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of
Sea Power" in Earle, Military Thought from Machiavelli to
Hitler and Growl, "Mahan: The Naval Historian" in Paret,
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age .
'^Admiral Tirpitz, as recorded in Richard Hough, The
Great War at Sea 1914-1918 (New York, 1983), 4.
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of combat which might cripple the Royal Navy, to avoid
confrontations with Germany. He ostensibly accepted
numerical inferiority to the Royal Navy, arguing that
Britain's world-wide naval commitments would insure that the
Royal Navy would never be in a "position to concentrate all
its forces against us." His ultimate goal, kept secret from
the British Admiralty and the Social Democrats in the
Reichstag, involved moving through a "Danger Zone" of naval
competition to superiority over the Royal Navy.*^ While on
other issues the British might have been disposed to
compromise, the notion of command of the sea remained the
cornerstone of their defense policy.
The British traditionally preferred a navy as their
primary means of defense. Their dislike of a standing army
dated from the Stuart drive for absolute monarchy and the
interregnum under Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth
century. In the nineteenth century. Radical leader Richard
Cobden argued that naval strength was necessary for
Britain's protection, because it had never been used "for
repressive purposes in internal struggle" and because the
Navy was cheaper than a combination of conscription and
coastal fortification." The Royal Navy had earned the
-^Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy , 154; Peter Padfield,
The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry. 1900-
1914 (New York, 1974), 42-43.
-'Richard Cobden, as recorded in Bernard Semmel
,
Liberalism & Naval Strategy (Boston, 1986), 80.
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public's confidence, saving England from the depredations of
Philip II in 1588, Louis XIV in 1692, and Napoleon Bonaparte
in 1805. When the growing strength of the major continental
powers threatened the Pax Britannica in the late nineteenth
century, the British turned to the Royal Navy.
In the face of increasing naval competition, the
British embarked on a series of naval building programs.
After the French naval scare in 1888, the government
introduced the Naval Defence Act of 1889, which provided for
a vastly improved fleet at a cost of £21,500,000, and
announced the Two Power Standard, whereby the Royal Navy
would be maintained "equal to the naval strength of any two
other countries . "^^ Covering the naval display which
accompanied the celebration of Queen Victoria's Diamond
Jubil ee ( the sixtieth anniversary of her coronation) in
1897, which included over 160 British warships. The Times
wrote
:
The fleet. ..is certainly the most formidable force
in all its el ements and qual ities that has ever
been brought together, and such as no combination
of other powers can rival. It is at once the most
powerful and far-reaching weapon which the world
has ever seen.
Russian pressure in the Far East led to further expansion in
^^Lord George Hamilton, as recorded in ADM 116/1605:
Oswyn Murray Memorandum, November 21, 1918. The naval scare
of 1888 followed reports by the London Standard of
extraordinary naval activity by the French fleet in Toulon.
'The Times , 25 June, 1897.
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1898. In 1902, Britain possessed 42 first class
battleships, against 44 for France, Russia, and Germany
combined. The presence of the Channel Fleet rendered
impotent the disapproval of the other Great Powers during
the Boer War. Coincident with the Naval Defence Act,
Britain adopted a new prophet of sea power.
The words of Alfred Thayer Mahan permeated the
consciousness of the British naval community. Mahan argued
that command of the sea provided unmatched economic benefits
and that concentration of a superior fleet provided command
of the sea. His second book. The Influence of Sea Power
upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812
. which
appeared in Britain in 1892, received rave reviews from
Professor J.K. Laughton of Britain's naval college at
Greenwich. Arriving in England as part of a lecture tour in
1893, Mahan was, in the words of naval historian Paul
Kennedy, "feted and revered, the more especially since he
had openly expressed his admiration for the Royal Navy."
More important 1 y , according to another student of Britain'
s
navy, Mahan's visit spread "a consciousness of the value of
naval strength" beyond the fleet to the mainstream of
British politics. The increased concern of Whitehall,
Westminster, and Fleet Street for the relative strength of
^^Kennedy , Strategy and Diplomacy , 43
.
^^ough , Great War at Sea , 3
.
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the Royal Navy based on the writings of Mahan would
facilitate the passage of ever-increasing Naval Estimates.
The admiration awarded to Mahan' s theories by leading
statesmen in other capitals--Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered his
work placed in the library aboard each German warship--only
reinforced his acceptance in British circles. Most British
officers drank deeply from Mahan's twin sermons, control of
the sea and concentration of the fleet.
One of Mahan's most devoted disciples was Admiral Sir
John Fisher. "Jackie" Fisher came from a middle-class
family which tended towards clergymen. He joined the Royal
Navy as a midshipman in 1854, at the ripe age of thirteen.
Although his first ship was Nelson's flagship Victory
,
Fisher's evaluation of the potential of the new technology
of the nineteenth century--st eam engines, armour,
electricity, breech-loading guns--led him to become,
according to naval historian Arthur Marder, "an apostle of
unremitting progress, a passionate advocate of the new
against the old."^^ He drilled into his subordinates the
notion that "a Fleet that is always ready to go to sea at an
25
hour's notice is a splendid national life-preserver."
^^Arthur Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought: The
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of
Kilverstone (London, 1952), Vol I, 63.
^Wmiral Fisher, as recorded in Marder, Fear God , Vol
I, 100. Fisher himself reported to work between 04.00 and
05.30 each day.
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Fisher's demonical energy, exceptional memory, and
considerable powers of persuasion carried him to the top of
his profession.
He served from 1904-10 as First Sea Lord, the
professional head of the senior service. The admiral,
invoking Mahan, Nelson, and the old Testament prophets with
equal facility, dragged the navy, encrusted with tradition,
kicking and screaming into the twentieth century. Besides
a host of administrative reforms. Fisher made two major
contributions to the evolution of the Royal Navy: the
development of the revolutionary battleship Dreadnought and
the strategic reorganization of the navy.
Fisher's reorganization of the Royal Navy reflected
Mahan' s emphasis on the concentration of the fleet. Fisher
scrapped 154 small, obsolete cruisers and gunboats on
stations around the globe, since, he argued, "their up-keep
is ruinously expensive, and they militate against efficiency
because those in them are being educated in an obsolete type
27
of ship." With the personnel thus freed for reassignment,
he provided nucleus crews (40% of normal complement) to the
Fisher's habit for disregarding the views of other
senior naval officers created many enemies within the
service, the most bitter and outspoken of whom was Admiral
Charles, 1st Baron Beresford. For a summary of the Fisher-
Beresford feud, see Harder, Fear God , Vol II, 32-44.
^Wmiral Fisher, as recorded in ADM 116/942: Memoranda
compiled during the preparation of naval reorganization. May
1904.
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more powerful ships which constituted the Fleet Reserve.
These ships, augmented by sailors from shore barracks and
training establishments, were available for rapid
reinforcement of the Fleet in commission at sea. Perhaps
Fisher's most important reform involved the concentration of
three-quarters of the strength of the Royal Navy in home
28waters. Mahan had taught him not to divide the fleet,
while an Admiralty memorandum of 1902 emphasized the
importance of retaining control of the North Sea:
It is a fundamental principle of Admiralty policy
that sufficient force shall at all times be
maintained in home waters to ensure the command of
the seas. And in no other way than by defeat can
our naval force be rendered unable to meet the
enemy at sea
.
As a result of his abolition of the Pacific and South
American squadrons and reduction of the number of vessels in
the Mediterranean, Fisher was able to more than double
strength in home waters . The size of the Channel Fleet rose
from eight batt 1 eships in 1904 to seventeen capital ships in
1905.^" In addition to reducing the number of ships in the
Navy, and concentrating them in the North Sea, Fisher also
increased the fighting power of the individual batt 1 eship
.
^°Marder, Fear God , Vol II, 25.
^'aDM 116/900B: Admiralty Memorandum, "Strategic
Conditions Governing the Coast Defences of the United
Kingdom", March 1902.
Kennedy, Naval Mastery , 216-218. Marder. Fear Not ,
Vol II, 25, gives a figure of 18 battleships immediately
available.
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The ninth ship Dreadnought to serve in the Royal Navy
represented the culmination of a series of trends in naval
technology that resulted in a potent combination of speed
and fire-power. Immediately upon assuming office as First
Sea Lord, Fisher established a Committee on Designs with
marching orders to create the world's most powerful ship.
Fisher, writing to the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1901,
explained the need "to have superiority of speed in order to
compel your opponent to accept battle. "^^ Parson steam
turbines drove the 17,900-ton ship at a speed of 21 knots
instead of the maximum 18 knots from contemporary triple-
expansion engines. The Dreadnought fired 850-pound shells
from ten 12-inch guns, in accord with Fisher's determination
to adopt "a uniform armament of the heaviest gun in use."
The elimination of secondary guns (typically 8 to 10-inch
caliber) greatly simplified range-finding and fire control.
The new British battleship fired a broadside of eight 12-
33inch guns, twice as many heavy guns as any ship afloat.
The Dreadnought , at the cost of £1.8 millions, constituted
Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , Vol
I, 177. A decade later. Fisher advised First Lord Winston
Churchill that the speed of his new battleships should
"vastly exceed" that of their possible opponents.
^^Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Peter Kemp, ed. The
Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher (London, 1964), Vol II,
261-62
.
^^The Dreadnought , which mounted a pair of two-gun
turrets forward, one on each beam, and one aft, could thus
fire eight guns to either beam.
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such a quantum leap over its predecessors that it instantly
became the measure of naval strength upon completion in
December 1906.
Fisher fashioned the Royal Navy into an instrument
designed expressly to defeat Germany's High Seas Fleet.
Upon completion of his new battleship. Fisher wrote to King
Edward VII that "Germany has been paralyzed by the
Dreadnought .
" He explained to the First Lord of the
Admiralty in 1906 that "Germany is our only enemy for years
to come!" Later that same year, he explained the focus of
his reorganization plan:
Our onl y probabl e enemy is Germany . Germany keeps
her whole fleet always concentrated within a few
hours of England. We must therefore keep a fleet
twice as powerful as that of Germany always
concentrated within a few hours of Germany.
In order to defeat Germ.an comm.erce raiders, the First Sea
Lord developed a new form of warship, known originally as
the dreadnought armoured cruiser and later as the battle
cruiser . This hybrid cl ass combined the speed (25+ knots
)
37
of a cruiser and the power of a battleship's 12-inch guns.
Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Hough, Great War at
Sea , 2 .
^^Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , Vol
II, 92.
^^ADM 116/942: Fisher Letter to the Prince of Wales,
October 23, 1906.
^"^Anthony Preston, The Ship: Dreadnought to Nuclear
Submarine (London, 1980), 6.
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The First Sea Lord claimed they would devour weak cruisers
like "an armadillo let loose on an ant-hill. "^^
Fisher fought to match every increase in the size of
High Seas Fleet with more and better ships for the Royal
Navy. The admiral, who shared Mahan ' s belief in the value
of superior numbers, explained to Conservative leader Joseph
Chamberlain that "^God is on the side of the big
battalions,' and that Nelson said truly ^Only numbers can
annihilate.'" He saw the answer to German naval expansion:
"Of course lose not a moment building ships bigger and
39faster . " Fisher sought , in terms of dreadnought strength,
at least two British keels for every German--a relationship
quite unacceptable to the aims of Tirpitz. One historian
described the result: "The obtaining of one country's naval
aims meant the failure of the other's: hence a naval
construction race which seemed to have no ending. "^'^ Fisher,
like Tirpitz, understood that naval construction depended
upon Naval Estimates, which required Cabinet approval.
Fisher perfected the art of manipulating the British
naval community in order to secure funds to support the
navy. His experience during the naval scare of 1893 left
Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God . Vol
II, 29.
^'Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , Vol
I, 167; Vol II, 239.
^^Kennedy , Realities Behind Diplomacy , 128
.
him filled with "bitter contempt for politicians and their
lack of principle."^- At the same time, it gave him a deep
appreciation for the power of the press. Lord Esher
reinforced Fisher's recognition of the value of "popular
fears and popular interest, upon which alone rest the Navy
Estimates .An invasion scare is the mill of God which
grinds you out a Navy of Dreadnoughts."^^ During his tenure
as First Sea Lord, he exchanged letters with a host of
journalists, the most favored of whom was freelance Arnold
White. Fisher frequently requested that they produce
articles to order on issues affecting the navy.^^ Admiral
Sir Reginald Bacon noted:
He was the first of our Admirals to make an
"In 1893, the London Chamber of Commerce published a
pamphlet which pointed out that Britain had fewer armoured
ships in the Mediterranean than France and that her total
tonnage of such ships completed and under construction was
less than the combined totals of France and Russia. Sir
William Harcourt, Chancellor of the Exchequer in William
Gladstone's last Cabinet, provided the House of Commons with
an optimistic appraisal of the relative strength of the
Royal Navy and the false impression that the Admiral ty
shared his views. See Padfield, The Battleship Era (New
York, 1972), 145-46; Harder, Fear God . Vol I, 101, 344-45.
Lord Esher/ as recorded in Beloff, Imperial Sunset ,
120.
^•^Fisher also corresponded with James Thursfield of The
Times, J.L. Garvin of the Observer , J. A. Spender of the
Westminster Gazette , and publicists Julian Corbett and Sir
George Clarke. During the invasion scare of 1907, for
example. Fisher wrote to Corbett: "Wouldn't it be a fine
thing for you to have an article in the Nineteenth
Century . . . and it would be peculiarly appropriate if it
appeared in November, as the matter is coming before us at
the Defence Committee [C.I.D.]." See Harder, Fear God , Vol
II, 138.
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intelligent use of the press for the benefit of
the Navy. He was convinced that, in order to gethis various reforms understood and appreciated bythe country, it was necessary to have the Press
primed with the whole truth about them... he did
not hesitate to keep in touch with certainjournalists whom he could trust, and to give them
as much information as official secrecy
permitted .
"
Fisher also used leading members of British society,
including Lord Esher and Francis, 1st Viscount Knollys, the
royal secretary, and even foreign dignitaries in his efforts
to influence Westminster. His most influential supporter
was Edward VII, "a priceless ally." In 1907, Fisher
accepted a royal invitation to Biarritz, where he cultivated
the youngest member of the Cabinet, an ex-Conservative
turned Radical by the name of Winston Churchill.
In that same year, the British Army mounted another
campaign in its long struggle to wrest responsibility for
defense of the home islands against invasion away from the
Royal Navy. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth
century, Britain had endured a series of invasion scares
concerned with the possibility of a "bolt from the blue," or
unexpected attack during temporary loss of naval superiority
over the English Channel.*^ This unlikely scenario received
Admiral Bacon, as recorded in Harder, Fear God . Vol I,
154.
'^Richard Hough, Former Naval Person: Churchill and the
Wars at Sea (London, 1985), 24-26.
^'Gooch, The Prospect of War , 2-13.
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periodic endorsement from service officials desirous of
bigger budgets and journalists in a similar quest. Field
Marshal Frederick, 1st Earl Roberts of Kandahar, with the
able assistance of Colonel Charles A'Court-Repington, the
military correspondent of The Times , propounded the view
that Germany had the ability to breach the navy's defenses.
The Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.), created in 1902,
according to Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, in order "to
survey as a whole the strategic military needs of the
Empire," examined the invasion question. The Committee had
determined in 1903 that a successful invasion required at
least 70,000 troops; that such a force would require at
least 200 boats and 48 hours to conduct a crossing; and that
the navy would have ample opportunity to attempt a riposte.
It also recognized that more serious than the risk of
invasion was the risk of starvation, as Britain had become
dependent upon imports to feed its populace. In 1907, the
defense committee reached the similar conclusion "that so
long as our naval supremacy is assured against any
reasonably probable combination of powers, invasion is
George Chesney's The Battle of Dorking , Erskine
Childers' The Riddle of the Sands , and William Le Quex's The
Invasion of 1910 represent three of the more popular
invasion stories.
^^Arthur Balfour, as recorded in Norman Gibbs, The
Origins of Imperial Defence (Oxford, 1955), 18.
^^Gooch, Prospects of War , 10; Michael Howard, The
Continental Commitment (London, 1972), 21-22.
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impracticable. "5° In 1908, the Reichstag's passage of a
novelle, or supplementary German Naval Law, which authorized
the construction of 3 battleships and 1 batt 1 ecruiser each
year from 1908-1911, threatened that supremacy.
The Anglo-German naval race in 1909 created the most
celebrated peacetime naval scare in British history. London
received indications that Germany's premier manufacturer of
armaments, the Krupp congl om.erate in Essen, had increased
its capacity to produce armour, naval guns, and gun
mountings, while sim.ilar increases in slipways and
shipbuilding capacity led British naval intelligence to
calculate that Germany could equal the British production of
eight capital ships a year.'* The Adm.iralty, working
necessarily by inference and extrapolation, determined that
by 1912 Germany would deploy, instead of the 13 capital
ships authorized under Tirpitz' various naval laws, 17 such
vessels and that 21 German dreadnoughts seemed a
possibility. The Royal Navy, in January 1909, possessed 10
capital ships in various stages of construction, with 2 more
authorized in the 1908 estimates. Fisher informed his
political superior, First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald
McKenna that the navy needed six dreadnoughts in the 1909
^^Sir Charles Ottley, as recorded in Howard, Continental
Commi tment , 40
.
^^Padfield, Great Naval Race . 198-202.
^Wrder, Fear God . Vol II, 206.
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estimates to maintain its position. The First Lord took
Fisher's case to the Cabinet.
The Cabinet under Prime Minister Herbert Asquith
conducted a lengthy and passionate debate on the subject of
naval construction. The Liberal
-Radical element in the
Cabinet, led by David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, and Winston Churchill, President of the Board of
Trade, preferred to support the Cabinet's social programs.
Churchill, who completely accepted the value of British
maritime supremacy, felt that Britain and Germany shared so
many economic ties as to render war unimaginable. In a
speech in Swansea in August 1908, he said:
I think it is greatly to be deprecated that
persons should try to spread the belief that war
between Great Britain and Germany is inevitable.
It is all nonsense.
He thus opposed the naval estimates of 1909 as containing "a
great field for reduction." Lloyd George decried the cost
(almost £3 millions) of Fisher's new program of naval
construction
:
The laying down of the Dreadnought (sic) seemed to
many of us a piece of wanton and profligate
ostentation ... [The Anglo-German battleship
rivalry] was an exhausting drain upon resources
sadly needed for social amelioration and national
devel opment
.
'^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Randolph Churchill,
Winston S. Churchill Volume II. 1901-1914; Young Statesman
(Boston, 1967), 494, 502.
'^David Lloyd George, as recorded in Peter Rowland,
David Lloyd George: A Biography (New York, 1975), 205.
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Churchill and Lloyd George sought to limit the construction
of new capital ships to four, while the big-navy wing of the
Cabinet, led by McKenna and Grey, the Foreign Secretary,
demanded the six requested by Fisher. Asquith, in February
1909, fashioned a compromise. The navy received four
capital ships in 1909, with an additional four in April 1910
contingent on future developments.^^ News that Austria had
commenced a program of capital ship construction led the
Prime Minister in July 1909 to authorize the additional four
dreadnoughts
.
The course of the Cabinet conflict demonstrated the
depth of support for the capital ship in the leading
elements of British society. King Edward VII, the direct
predecessor of George V, explained to his nephew the Kaiser
that "the great increase in building German ships of war"
57forced Britain to reciprocate. In both the House and the
press, the Conservative party adopted George Wyndham's
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slogan: "We want eight, and we won't wait!" An important
'^Marder, Fear God , 207.
^Sjinston Churchill, in defeat, summarized the
compromise: "In the end a curious and characteristic
solution was reached. The admiralty demanded six ships: the
economists offered four: and we finally settled on eight."
See Hough, Great War at Sea , 15-17.
•^Edward VII, as recorded in Padfield, Great Naval Race .
182.
'^George Wyndham, as recorded in Rowland, David Llovd
George , 210-214.
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segment of the Liberal party considered naval supremacy to
be vital to the British Empire. Sir Edward Grey explained
that "if the German Navy were superior to ours... for us it
would not be a question of defeat. Our independence, our
very existence would be at stake."" Opposition to naval
armaments came from a coalition of Radicals and Labourites,
of which a majority were religious Nonconformists with
pacifist beliefs. The very limited realm of discourse in
the debate, 4 dreadnoughts versus 6 versus 8, reflected two
important facts. First, according to historian Howard
Weinroth, "many Radicals and Labour men, traditionally
critics of excess armaments," accepted the prevailing
consensus that "British naval security might be
jeopardized."^ Second, no one (except a few diehard cavalry
colonels) proposed any alternatives to the capital ship as
the basis of Britain's defense.
The Moroccan Crisis of 1911 exacerbated this fear that
British naval security might be jeopardized." It influenced
the future of the Royal Navy in three ways. First, David
Sir Edward Grey, as recorded in Padfield, Great Naval
Race , 220.
^'^Howard Weinroth, "Left-wing Opposition to Naval
Armaments in Britain before 1914" ( Journal of Contemporary
History , VI, 1971).
Unrest in Morocco led France to intervene there
militarily in 1911. Germany, determined to receive
compensation, dispatched the gunboat Panther to Agadir in
order to force the French to negotiate.
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Lloyd George, the Welsh radical and hitherto opponent of all
the Tories held dear, assumed an uncharacteristic
belligerence in response to the arrival of the German
gunboat Panther in Agadir. With the approval of both
Asquith and Grey, he spoke on July 21, 1911 to the assembled
bankers of London at Mansion House:
I can conceive of nothing that could justify
disturbance of international goodwill except
questions of the greatest national moment, but if
a situation were forced upon us, in which peace
could only be preserved by ... al 1 owing Britain to
be treated, where her vital interests are
affected, as if she were of no account in the
Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that
peace would be a humiliation intolerable for a
great country like ours to endure.^
This speech moved Lloyd George, who would later have a
significant impact on the senior service, away from the
Radical camp and toward the mainstream of the political
spectrum.
Second, the British government sanctioned a new role
for the British army in the event of hosti 1 ities with
Germany. At a meeting of the C.I.D. on August 23, 1911,
Asquith met with the services chiefs to consider the
deployment of British forces in case of war. General Sir
Henry Wilson argued that the army should be employed rapidly
to reinforce the left flank of the French. First Sea Lord
'^Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David Lloyd
George , 250. In the debate over the finance bill for 1909-
10, Lloyd George remarked that "a fully-equipped duke costs
as much to keep up as two Dreadnoughts (sic), and they are
just as great a terror, and they last longer."
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Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, on the other hand, advocated "a
close blockade of German ports, the capture of advanced
bases, and possible landings on the enemy's coast. "^^ He
argued that the army would tie down more German divisions if
it retained the potential to conduct major amphibious
operations. Committee secretary Maurice Hankey supported
the admiral, noting that:
if the army has been committed to the centre of
the campaign at the outset of the war, all
possibility of influencing the course of the war
in... a manner which sea power alone can render
possible, disappears, and the great advantage of
sea power is to a great extent thrown away."
The C.I.D. nonetheless approved General Wilson's plan,
leaving the navy the responsibility of ferrying the army to
France. This decision would profoundly affect the British
experience in the First World War.
Finally, the Moroccan Crisis also led to a shakeup at
Admiralty House. McKenna firmly supported Admiral Wilson's
opposition to allowing the army to enter the line in France.
Asquith was further distressed to find at the height of the
crisis that the First Lord and the First Sea Lord had
neither written war plans nor a staff for their creation.
^^ough. Great War at Sea . 24.
^Slaurice Hankey, as recorded in Howard, Continental
Commitment , 43
.
^'The Admiralty had war plans in the sense of general
strategy for a war with Germany. At that time, however,
they did not possess detailed war orders, which allocated
specific missions to particular fleets and squadrons.
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Asquith believed that "the present position in which
everything is locked up in the brain of a single admiral
[the First Sea Lord] is both ridiculous and dangerous . "^^
The Prime Minister thus transferred McKenna to the Home
Office in October 1911 and brought Churchill to the
Admiral ty
.
Winston Churchill carried out the responsibilities of
the First Lord of the Admiralty with more vigor than perhaps
any of his predecessors. Churchill's attitude towards
Germany changed dramatically after the Moroccan Crisis of
1911, when he declared: "If Germany makes war... we shd join
with France."" The day after he assumed office, the new
First Lord opened liaison with Admiral Fisher (retired), who
began sending frequent missives from Lucerne, Switzerland.
Three days later, Churchill finished an imposing memorandum
on the need for a Naval Staff, which he created in January
1912. When First Sea Lord Wilson disagreed, the First Lord
demanded his resignation. Churchill then set off in the
Admiralty yacht Enchantress for a whirlwind inspection of
the fleet. His assaults on the traditions of the senior
^"Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Leslie Gardiner, The
British Admiralty (London, 1968), 314.
^^Winston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill Volume II , 505.
^^The memorandum is reproduced in its entirety in
Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill Companion Vo lume II
(Boston, 1969), Part 2, 1303-1312.
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service earned the distrust of a conservative element within
the naval community.^' His primary accomplishments at
Admiralty House paralleled those of Fisher: a reorganization
of the fleet and a revolutionary new battleship.
Churchill assumed a degree of responsibility highly
unusual for a First Lord in the design of the latest class
of battleships, the Queen Elizabeths . He wrote to Fisher in
April 1912 about the new ships, suggesting a speed of 22
knots and the replacement of the scheduled 13.5-inch guns,
in use on contemporary warships, with an untried 15-inch gun
design. Fisher responded emphatically: "These MUST be the
15-inch gun... there MUST be further VERY GREAT INCREASE IN
SPEED. "•'^ Churchill decided upon 25 knots and the 15-inch
guns, which increased the displacement of the super-
dreadnoughts to 27,500 tons. To reach the goal of 25 knots
required the switch from British coal to the more efficient
fuel oil, which Churchill secured through a Royal Commission
(under the direction of Fisher!) which supported the
decision to switch fuels and led to the creation of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Queen Elizabeth class of
Churchill, for example, proposed to George V to name a
new battleship Oliver Cromwell and, upon rejection,
resubmitted the same name. He dismissed First Sea Lord
Wilson and his replacement Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman
within thirteen months. His decisions to switch from coal
to oil fuel and to reduce the strength of the Mediterranean
squadron also generated distrust.
^^Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Marder, Fear God , Vol
II, 451.
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battleships, which cost £2.5 millions apiece, would prove
their worth in two World Wars.^*
Churchill also modified both the geographical
disposition and the standard of strength of the Royal Navy.
In January 1912, the First Lord became aware of another of
Tirpitz' novelles
.
which increased the authorized German
capital ship strength in the North Sea from 21 to 36 capital
ships. The Naval Law of 1912 provided for the construction
of 3 new battle ships and immediate increase of 12
dreadnoughts through the activation of ships in reserve and
the redeployment of those abroad. Churchill convinced the
Cabinet to accept a modification of the Two Power Standard,
which he announced to the House in March: "Sixty per cent in
Dreadnoughts (sic) over Germany as long as she adhered to
her present declared programme, and two keels to one for
every additional ship laid down by her." To insure an
adequate margin of superiority in home waters, Churchill
sought to recall the last major contingent of British
battleships abroad.
In 1912, the First Lord fought a hard campaign to move
the battleships in the Mediterranean Fleet to the North Sea.
^-Hough, Great War at Sea , 27-28.
^^Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II .
Part 3, 1518.
^H^inston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill Volume II, 548.
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He expressed his conception of strategy in a memorandum
which echoed the phrases of Fisher and Mahan to the Prime
Minister
:
Gt Britain will keep a Navy strong enough to deal
with the strongest probable combination in the
decisive theatres. This means concentration, &
consequent abandonment of all seas except those in
wh the supreme issue will be settled.
The enemy was Germany; the decisive theater, to the First
Lord, was the North Sea. He explained to members of the
C.I.D. that "the German f 1 eet ... exists for the purpose of
fighting a great battle in the North Sea."'- Churchill
recommended that the 6 battleships at Malta be ordered to
the Atlantic Fleet and that "a definite naval arrangement
should be made with France without delay. This
recommendation drew criticism, according to historian
Michael Howard, from Liberals and Radicals "because of the
alliance it implied with France" and Conservatives "because
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no such alliance existed." The C.I.D. reached a compromise
in July: the Royal navy would maintain "a reasonable margin
of superiority in home waters" and "a battle fleet equal to
^Sjinston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill: Companion Volume II , Part 3, 1558.
^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill Volume II , 560-61.
^Slinston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill: Companion Volume II , Part 3, 1567.
Howard, Continental Commitment , 48-49.
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a one-power Mediterranean standard, excluding France. "^^
Churchill then replaced the ships in question with 4 British
cruisers, which in his evaluation equalled twice their
number of Austrian battleships. This easy victory, however,
could not hide the rising cost of the Anglo-German naval
rival ry
.
Naval Estimates placed a steadily increasing burden on
the Treasury after the turn of the twentieth century. In
1903, the year before Admiral Fisher cam.e to Admiralty
House, the Naval Estimates totalled £34.5 millions. Upon
his retirement in 1910, the Estimates reached £40.4
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millions. On December 5, 1913, First Lord Winston
Churchill informed the Cabinet that the 1913-14 Estimate of
£46.3 millions would not suffice to meet the cost of the
navy's operating expenses and that he required a
Supplementary Estimate for 1913-14 of not less than £1.4
millions. At the same time, he proposed a Naval Estimate
for 1914-15 of £50.7 millions, with authorization for 4 new
capital ships. The Cabinet did not appreciate Churchill's
proposal, and a number of junior ministers quickly formed a
bloc in opposition to the Estimates.
''C.I.D. Minute 117, July 4, 1912, as recorded in Lowe
and Dockrill, Mirage of Power , 56.
^Kennedy, Naval Mastery , 193.
^''churchill , Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II,
1819.
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The Naval Estimates of 1914-15 gave rise to serious
division within the Cabinet. On December 16th, Churchill
resisted suggestions for cutting two dreadnoughts and
satisfied the Cabinet by agreeing to reduce the 1914-15
Estimates to under £50 millionsJ^ Two days later, however,
the First Lord notified the Chancellor of the Exchequer that
he would require a Supplementary Estim.ate for 1913-14 in the
amount of £3 millions rather than £1.4 millions as forecast.
The hard-pressed Lloyd George then placed him.self at the
head of the anti-Churchill coalition with a public interview
attacking "the overwhelming extravagance of our expenditure
82on arm.aments." Asquith, in an effort to prevent a split,
announced in a private meeting with the Chancellor and the
First Lord that the consequence of resignation would be an
immediate general election. Churchill then exacerbated the
problem, by increasing his requirement for 1914-15 to £52.8
millions. On January 29th, Asquith warned the Cabinet of
"the disastrous consequences of a spl it" over the Naval
Ministers who opposed the estim.ates included Herbert
Samuel, Postmaster-General; Walter Runciman, President of
the Board of Agriculture; Sir John Simon, Attorney-General;
J. A. Pease, President of the Board of Education; Charles
Hobhouse, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; and McKenna
at the Home Office. See F.W. Weimann, "Lloyd George and the
Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914", in Taylor, Twelve
Essays , 78
.
^^Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David Lloyd
George , 273.
^^eimann, "Lloyd George and the Navy Estimates", in
Taylor, Twelve Essays , 83.
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Estimates and achieved consensus on a figure of £2.5
millions for the supplementary estimates. Asquith privately
asked Churchill to "throw a baby or two out of the sledge,"
whereupon Churchill cut his demand to £51.6 mil lions. The
Cabinet accepted his figure (and 4 new battleships) on
February 11, 1914.
The Estimates Crisis of 1914 revealed the hegemony of
the value of the capital ship within leading Liberal
circles. Three of the more influential members of the
Cabinet, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey; Lord Chancellor
Richard Burdon, 1st Viscount Haldane; and Secretary of State
for War John Seely, supported the First Lord throughout the
crisis. The City merchants at Guildhall unanimously
resolved:
That this Meeting of the Citizens of London begs
to assure the Prime Minister and His Majesty's
Government of the support of the Commercial
Community in any measure--f inancial or otherwise--
that may be necessary to ensure the continued
supremacy of the Navy and the adequate protection
of the Trade routes of the Empire.
King George V wrote Churchill in his own hand that "this
86
year's programme of 4 Battleships must be adhered to." The
Prime Minister later informed his sovereign that the
Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Churchill, Winston S.
Churchill Volume II , 656, 659.
^^Lord Mayor Sir Thomas Bowater, as recorded in
Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II , 1867.
^^George V, as recorded in Churchill, Winston S.
Churchill Volume II, 651.
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opposition objected "not so much to the programme of new
construction, as to the growing cost of maintenance."^^
After Churchill left the Admiralty, Liberal opponents of his
naval estimates revealed they objected more to Churchill
himself than to his proposals.^* One of the leaders of the
economy faction disingenuously argued that "the loss of WC,
though regrettable, is not by any means a splitting of
party--indeed large admiralty estimates may be capable of
being carried only because WC has gone."^^
One member of the economy faction who did object to the
Naval Estimates was Lloyd George. He had consistently
opposed "Tory extravagance on armaments.""' Furthermore,
Churchill's annoying habit of changing his figures played
havoc with the Chancellor's attempts to produce a balanced
budget. The Welsh Wizard, however, realized that opposition
to more dreadnoughts was a weak reed on which to base a
party revolt. One of his biographers admitted "that the
Chancellor's sympathies were never really engaged by this
Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Churchill, Winston S.
Churchill Volume II , 656.
%ost feared Churchill would bolt the Liberal Party
over the issue of Home Rule, while McKenna resented his
replacement at the Admiralty. See F.W. Weimann, "Lloyd
George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914", in
Taylor, Twelve Essays , 77-78.
^'sir John Simon, as recorded in Churchill, Winston S.
Churchill Volume II , 658.
'^David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland,
"David
Lloyd George , 213.
I
particular conflict. "^l Lloyd George thus repeatedly sought
to arrange a compromise at the lowest possible level of
spending. He expressed his capitulation one morning to
Churchi 1 1
:
Oddly enough, my wife spoke to me last night about
this Dreadnought (sic) business. She said, "You
know, my dear, I never interfere in politics; but
they say you are having an argument with that nice
Mr. Churchill about building Dreadnoughts (sic).
Of course I don't understand these things, but I
should have thought that it would be better to
have too many rather than too few." So I have
decided to let you build them.^
The Chancellor's finely tuned appreciation of the
sensibilities of the Liberal Party warned him that in 1914
battleships remained a shibboleth he could not afford to
attack
.
Between 1905 and 1914, the British defense policies of
supporting a balance of power in Europe and maintaining
command of the sea led to an increasingly substantial
commitment to France against Imperial Germany. That
commitment took the dual forms of a small expeditionary
force reserved for the Franco-Belgian border and an
unprecedented period of peacetime expansion for the Royal
Navy. Fisher and Churchill, inspired by the edicts of
Mahan, guided the evolution of the navy toward a fleet of
dreadnoughts concentrated in the North Sea. Despite
^-Rowland, David Llovd George , 272
%avid Lloyd George, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill Volume II, 662.
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challenges from its Radical wing, at no time after Asquith
assumed the premiership in 1908 had the Liberal Party denied
the capital ships demanded by the Admiralty. Nor had the
Asquith Ministry ever seriously considered an alternative
basis for its military preparations. At the onset of the
war, the Royal Navy possessed 31 capital ships of
dreadnought or later vintage (with another 16 building)
supported by 39 older vessels.'^ Parliament obviously
believed at the time that the German fleet presented a real
threat and that capital ships constituted the most secure
means of protection.
Kennedy, Naval Mastery , 229.
CHAPTER 3
A GREAT PASSIVE VICTORY
In August, 1914, Britain faced the outbreak of war with
confidence in the Royal Navy. The opening moves of the war,
however, failed to provide the expected victory. The
Dardanelles Campaign of 1915 would tarnish the reputation of
key members of the naval hierarchy. The Battle of Jutland
in 1916, initially portrayed as a British defeat, would cast
grave doubts on the value of the dreadnought. The
effectiveness of German submarine warfare in 1917-18 would
prove the value of new naval weapons and drag down more
naval leaders. The Great War thus would damage the
reputation of the navy, reducing the fortunes of its
supporters and the perceived value of the capital ship.
At 11.00 PM on August 4th, Winston Churchill signalled
to all elements of the navy: "COMMENCE HOSTILITIES AGAINST
GERMANY." The First Lord of the Admiralty felt confident,
having written to the King on August 1, 1914: "The general
position and strength of the British Fleets Squadrons &
Flotillas is regarded as satisfactory by the Board of
Admiralty."* The officers and men of the Royal Navy
anticipated the coming clash with a massive confidence. The
commander of the Battlecruiser Squadron described the
condition of his unit in the first days of August: "The
^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Churchill, Winston
S. Churchill Volume II, 706, 698.
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enthusiasm was immense. I have never seen such a
magnificent and cheerful spirit. when Londoners heard
about the declaration of war, crowds gathered outside the
Admiralty building to sing "God Save the King."^ The public
expected, according to historian Richard Hough, "an
immediate and glorious victory."*
The Admiralty's strategy for a war with Germany
followed Mahan's general approach of command of the sea
through concentration of the fleet. The Admiralty's
original analysis of the problem had identified the ultimate
purpose of the navy as the control of ocean trade. The
Board, after considering Germany's lack of cruisers, poorly
sited bases, and the fact that German naval "expenditure is
chiefly devoted to battleship construction," had concluded
that "it is their intention to dispute the actual command of
the sea." The Admiralty had intended to concentrate the
Royal Navy off the German coast with instructions "to seek
out the corresponding fleets of the enemy with a view to
bringing them to action." Commerce destruction would remain
"a subsidiary question" until after combat with the High
2Vice-Admiral David Beatty, as recorded in Bryan Ranft,
ed. The Beatty Papers: Volume I. 1902-1918 (Aldershot,
1989), 113.
Dingman , Pacific , 18
.
Slough, Naval Person , 59
.
^ADM 116/866B: Admiralty Memorandum, "The Protection of
Ocean Trade in Time of War", April 31, 1905.
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Seas Fleet had secured "the only really decisive factor--
command of the sea."^
The Admiralty abandoned the traditional British
approach of close blockade of the enemy coast. They saw the
destructive potential of m.ines and torpedoes, particularly
in shallow waters. A staff officer in 1906 thus rejected
the notion of attacking the German coast and recomjnended
that the Royal Navy withdraw across the North Sea in order
to tempt the High Seas Fleet to "attack us in a position of
our choosing and under conditions agreeable to us . "^
Admi ral Sir Arthur Wilson endorsed his analysis, which
formed the basis of the Admiralty's first war plan in 1908.^
In 1912, the Admiralty decided on "a middle course between
the two undesirable extremes of a close blockade of the
hostile coast... and the abandonment of all observation of
the enemy on the other" by effecting a blockade with a line
of cruisers in a relatively safe "intermediate position"
Q
approximately 170 miles from the German coast. In 1914,
ADM 116/866B: Admiralty Memorandum, "The Protection of
Ocean Trade in Time of War", April 31, 1905.
^ADM 116/1036B: Admiralty Memorandum, "War with
Germany"
,
September 1 , 190 6
.
^ADM 116/1043B: Remarks on War Plans by Admiral A.K.
Wilson, May 1907; W.l War Plan Against Germany, June 1908,
'aDM 116/866B: Admiralty Memorandum, "Remarks on War
Orders for an Observation Force in the North Sea in
connection with the lessons of the 1912 Manoeuvres",
September 16, 1912.
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the Admiralty decided to withdraw the cruiser force and
establish a "distant blockade."*^ The Channel Fleet would
close the English Channel, a mere 20 miles wide, in
conjunction with a series of minefields and a small
screening force, the Dover Patrol. The Grand Fleet,
comprised of the bulk of the British dreadnoughts, would
block the larger gap between Scotland and Norway.
The Royal Navy had three important missions upon the
onset of hostilities. Its immediate responsibility was to
insure the safe transport of Imperial forces to France.*^
The quintessential task of the Royal Navy was the protection
of Britain's sea lines of communication, so vital because
the home islands produced less than 70% of the foodstuffs
required for the British populace. The navy also sought to
impose a naval blockade upon Germany, despite German access
to the Baltic and the Balkans. Britain's geographical
advantage over Germany meant all three missions could be
accomplished by blocking German egress from the North Sea.*^
Barry Hunt, Sailor-scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert
Richmond. 1871-1946 (Waterloo, Ontario: 1982), 30.
"Hough, Great War at Sea , 55.
The navy convoyed 120,000 soldiers of the British
Expeditionary Force in August, 50,000 soldiers of the Indian
Corps in September, and 25,000 Canadian volunteers in
October without the loss of a single man. See Martin
Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Volume III, 1914-1916: The
Challenge of War (Boston, 1971), 37.
•H^ilson, Myriad Faces , 77.
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The Grand Fleet, composed of 21 dreadnoughts, 8 older
battleships, and 4 battle cruisers, thus steamed north to
its war stations at Scapa Flow and Cromarty, while the
Channel Fleet, nineteen elderly pre-dreadnoughts
,
slowly
assembled in Portland.*^
During the Great War, the Grand Fleet and the High Seas
Fleet never deliberately engaged in guerre d'escadres
.
British leaders assumed their positional advantage would
force the German navy to contend for control of the
Scotland-Norway passage.*^ One officer wrote that "when the
great day comes it will be when the enemy takes the
initiative,"*^ The High Seas Fleet, however, refused to
compete for command of the seas at unfavorable odds. German
strategy sought instead to engage nothing larger than
isolated squadrons and thus, according to Arthur Harder:
to whittle down the British Fleet through an
aggressive mining and submarine policy as a
prelude to engaging the Grand Fleet under
favourable conditions when an equalization of
forces had been obtained.
The High Seas Fleet at the time possessed 13
dreadnoughts, 16 older battleships, and 5 battle cruisers.
See Arthur Harder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The
Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (London. 1970), II,
4-5.
'Wilson, Hyriad Faces , 77; Alfred Patterson, Jel licoe:
A Biography (New York, 1969), 61.
*^Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers , 303-04.
Harder, Scapa Flow , 45.
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The defensive policy adopted by both navies produced a
stand-off, which depressed the men of the Grand Fleet. One
admiral wrote:
I fear the rascals will never come out, but will
only send their minelayers & submarines .... It is
really very disappointing and looks as if we shall
go through the war without ever coming to grips
with them. Such a thought is more than I can
bear
.
In an effort to relieve the oppressive stalemate, opposing
admirals began to experiment with small operations, such as
raids and ambushes.
The Royal Navy, despite the advantages of numbers and
position, suffered a number of highly visible setbacks
during the opening months of the war. In August, the German
cruisers Goeben and Breslau escaped from a more powerful
British squadron under Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne
in the Mediterranean to reach sanctuary in Turkish waters.
In September, a single German submarine sank three
antiquated Bacchant e- cl ass cruisers, the Abouki
r
, the Hogue ,
and the Cressy , killing over 1400 sailors. In October, the
German liner Ber 1 in slipped out of the North Sea and off the
Irish coast laid a number of mines, one of which sank the
powerful battleship Audacious . Later that month, the sea
plane carrier Hermes fell victim to a German torpedo off the
coast of France. Throughout the fall, German surface
*Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers , 134-35.
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vessels inflicted a rising toll on the British merchant
marine.*^ The German East Asiatic Squadron thoroughly
disrupted Australasian shipping and, before defeat off the
Falkland Islands, sank a pursuing force of two British
cruisers at the Battle of Coronel in November. In December,
German battle cruisers shelled the East Coast towns of
Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby and escaped cleanly.
The officers of the Royal Navy quickly became
disenchanted with elements of their leadership. The escape
of the Goeben and Breslau led one distinguished officer to
write: "To think it is to the Navy to provide the first and
only instance of failure. God, it makes me sick."^^ Fisher
added: "I should have shot Sir Berkeley Milne for the
Goeben.."- The court-martial of one of the officers involved
found the accused not guilty "in view of the instructions
received from the Admiralty" in the form of a telegram from
First Lord Churchill." The prosecutor himself believed that
•q
'The Karlsruhe alone claimed 17 victims August-October,
1914. The raiders Emden and Wol
f
were among the most
successful
.
Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers , 138-139.
^'Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , III,
52. In 1912, Fisher had characterized Milne as "unfitted to
be the Senior Admiral afloat." See Marder, Fear God , II,
451.
^^Troubridge Court-Martial , as recorded in Dan Van der
Vat, The Ship That Changed the World: The Escape of the
Goeben to the Dardanelles in 1914 (Bethesda, MD, 1986), 165.
Churchill's offending telegram, reproduced on p. 65, read as
foil ows
:
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"the Admiralty telegram was badly worded. "^^ The disquiet
within the officer corps of the Royal Navy over the Goeben
mishap quickly spread.
Discontent with the management of the naval conflict
became more commonplace after the loss of three ancient
Bacchante-class cruisers off Holland. Professional
officers, as before, were the first to recognize
incompetence. A Court of Inquiry identified a decision by
the Admiralty to continue the patrol after bad weather had
forced its escorting destroyers back to base as the primary
factor contributing to the loss of the cruisers.
A
submarine commander, who earlier had begged the Admiralty to
"take those Bacchante s away," compared the sinking of those
Should war break out and England and France engage in
it, it now seems probable that Italy also will remain
neutral and that Greece can be made an ally. Spain also
will be friendly and, possibly, an ally. The attitude of
Italy is, however, uncertain, and it is especially important
that your squadron should not be seriously engaged with
Austrian ships before we know what Italy will do. Your
first task should be to aid the French in the transportation
of the African Army by covering, and, if possible, bringing
to action individual fast German ships
,
particul ar 1 y Goeben
who [sic] may interfere with that transport. You will be
notified when you may consult with the French Admiral. Do
not at this stage be brought to action against superior
forces, except in combination with the French, as part of a
general batt 1 e . The speed of your squadrons is sufficient
to enable you to choose your moment. We shall hope later to
reinforce the Mediterranean, and you must husband your
forces at the outset
.
^^Rear-Admiral Sydney Fremantle, My Naval Career, 1880-
1928 (New York, 1949), 174.
^*Marder, Scapa Flow , Vol II, 57-59.
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ships with the stalking of tame elephants chained to trees.
A junior officer at the Admiralty described the decision to
leave the cruisers on station without a destroyer escort as
"the most supreme case of ineptitude . "^^ Fisher called it
"pure murder." Asquith wrote to his confidante: "It is a
blow, particularly as the navy is not doing very well just
now... the Admiralty have not been clever in their outlying
strategy. "^^ This incident, unlike the Goeben fiasco,
reached the public. The press blamed the First Lord:
because, despite the warnings of adm.irals,
commodores and captains, Mr. Churchill refused,
until it was too late, to recall them from a
patrol so carried on as to make them certain to
fall victims to the torpedoes of an active enemy. ^'
Popular backlash from the loss of the Bacchantes thus
reached the Adm.iralty, "the brunt of it falling on
Churchill ."^°
Commodore Roger Keyes , The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of
the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes : The Narrow Seas to the
Dardanelles 1910-1915 (New York, 1954), 77, 106-10.
'^Captain Herbert Richmond, as recorded in Arthur
Harder, Portrait of an Admiral; the Life and Papers of Sir
Herbert Richmond (Cambridge, 1952), 110.
^^Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , Vol
III, 61.
^^Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Martin Gilbert,
Winston S. Churchill, Companion Volume III (Boston, 1973),
I, 127-28.
^^Journalist Thomas Gibson Bowles, as recorded in
Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Volume III , 86.
Harder, Scapa Flow , Vol II, 59.
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During the war, Churchill increased even more than he
had in peacetime his own prerogatives at the expense of the
jurisdiction of the Sea Lords. At the onset of hostilities,
he bypassed the Admiralty Board and replaced Admiral Sir
George Callaghan as commander of the Grand Fleet with Vice-
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.^^ After the war, he explained:
I accepted full responsibility for bringing about
successful results, and in that spirit I exercised
a close general supervision over everything that
was done or proposed. Further, I claim.ed and
exercised an unlimited power of suggestion and
initiative over the whole field, subject only to
the approval and agreement of the First Sea Lord
on all operational orders.
Needless to say, his determ.inat ion and powers of persuasion
rendered imjnaterial the theoretical lim.itation on his
authority which he acknowledged in retrospect. One of his
biographers noted how the professionals at the Admiralty
lamented "the authoritarian and com.pl etely dominating manner
in which he took ... control of the main thrust of events. "^^
The Chief of the War Staff stated that Churchill's m.anner
In 1912, Fisher had proposed to Lord Esher that
Jellicoe serve as wartime commander should hostilities
occur: "If war comes before 1914, then Jellicoe will be
Nelson at the Battle of St. Vincent; if it comes in 1914,
then he'll be Nelson at Trafalgar." Fisher repeatedly wrote
Churchill on the same subject. See Harder, Fear Nought , Vol
II, 440, 443, 450.
^^Winston Churchill, as recorded in Harder, Scapa Flow ,
T T 39
'^Hough, Form.er Naval Person , 58-59.
permitted "very little united decision. Churchill thus
associated himself to an extraordinary degree with the
performance of the navy,
Churchill's attempts to keep the Channel ports in
Allied hands seriously damaged his reputation. His
formation of a naval division for service on the Western
Front led the Assistant Director of Naval Operations to
declare: "I really believe Churchill is not sane."^^ During
the first week in October, Churchill rushed to beleaguered
Antwerp in an effort to stiffen its defenders. He ordered
up two British Naval Brigades and proposed to take comjr.and
of the city, provided he was given "necessary military rank
and authority . "^^ Asquith, who found the proposal from an
ex- 1 ieutenant of Hussars "a real bit of tragi -comedy ,
"
criticized the deployment of "the rawest recruits, m.ost of
37
whom, had never fired a rifle." Lloyd George, to his
conf idant e Frances Stevenson , bitterly condemj?-ed the naval
intervention for causing heavy and unnecessary British
Vice-Admiral Doveton Sturdee, as recorded in Hough,
Great War at Sea , 85
.
^^Captain Herbert Richmond, as recorded in Harder,
Portrait of an Admiral , 100.
%inston Churchill, as recorded in Hough, Former Naval
Person , 62
.
^^Herbert Asquith, Memories and Reflections (Boston,
1928), 50, 54.
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1 38losses. Churchill's former Naval Secretary complained:
If we only had a Kitchener at the Admiralty we
could have done so much and the present state of
chaos in naval affairs would never have existed.
It is inconceivable the mistakes and blunders wehave made and are making.
Churchill's repeated visits to Antwerp led the Morning Post
to level harsh criticism against the First Lord on October
19th:
What we chiefly desire to enforce upon Mr
Churchill is that this severe lesson ought to
teach him that he is not, as a matter of fact, a
Napoleon; but a Minister of the Crown with no time
either to organize or lead armies in the field.
^
The Times
, also part of the Northcliffe press, carried
complaints from Conservative leader Walter Long about the
extensive losses (2700 men) in the operation and the lack of
training given to the troops involved.^* The repeated
attacks of the Morning Post , which demanded Churchill's
resignation, reduced the public's confidence in the navy.'^
Churchill's position became rather delicate at the
close of 1914. The destruction of Admiral Sir Christopher
A. J. P. Taylor, ed, Lloyd George: A Diary by Francis
Stevenson (London, 1971), 6.
^Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers , 144-45.
^''Arthur Gwynne, editor of the Morning Post , as recorded
in Hough, Former Naval Person , 62.
'•Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War (New York,
1971), 192.
^•^Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. Volume III , 125-27,
144.
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Craddock's squadron at the Battle of Coronel led the Cabinet
to censure the navy to the King. Frances Stevenson recorded
Lloyd George's opinion:
Churchill is too busy trying to get a flashy
success to attend to the real business of the
Admiralty. Churchill blames Admiral Craddock for
the defeat in South America--the Admiral ... having
gone down with his ship & so unable to clear
himself .^^
In conversation with editor CP. Scott, Lloyd George
condemned Churchill's decision to bom.bard the Dardanelles as
causing Turkey's entry into the war.'^ Churchill deflected
som.e of the criticism by accepting the resignation of First
Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg, himself under press
attack for his German ancestry, but then bought new trouble
by bringing Fisher back as First Sea Lord. This decision
rankled George V, who described the appointment as "a great
mistake" and vainly sought to reverse it.^^ Pressure mounted
in Parliament for Churchill's removal. The Conservatives
demanded an explanation of the defeat at Coronel, and both
parties questioned his role in the loss of Antwerp.
Frances Stevenson, as recorded in Taylor, Ll oyd
George: A Diary , 10
.
^^Rowland, David Lloyd George , 293.
^^King George V, as recorded in Nicolson, King George V:
his Life and Reign (New York, 1953), 251.
^^Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Volume III , 169-70.
Bonar Law described Churchill as having "an entirely
unbalanced mind." See Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill,
Companion Volume III , 191.
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Any relief provided by Fisher's arrival and the
consequent victory at the Falkland Islands evaporated in the
face of an attack from Secretary of State for War Field
Marshal Horatio Herbert, 1st Earl Kitchener of Khartoum.
The Field Marshal mistrusted Churchill's frequent visits to
General Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief of the
British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) in France. On December
17th, the Earl complained about the "Dunkerque Circus," an
ad hoc military force which Churchill had assembled on the
continent, and presented Asquith a letter ostensibly
proposing that Churchill assume the War Office and Fisher
the Admiralty/' Asquith duly chastised Churchill and
ordered the First Lord's expeditionary force transferred to
the War Office. The cumulative effect of these attacks on
the First Lord from the press, Windsor Castle, the House of
Commons , and the Cabinet shook Asquith' s confidence in
JQ
Churchill's judgment- The Prime Minister wrote in
December
:
Winston came to see me. ..to report progress or
rather (as usual ) the 1 ack of i t • . . I expect the
whole Navy is a little dispirited & chaffing under
the sense of ill "luck and impatience at purely
negative results
.
^'Gilbert, Winston S, Churchill, Volum>e III , 166.
^^Philip Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of an Im.perialist
(New York, 1959) , 307.
^'Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill. Companion Volume III , I, 333.
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Churchill realized full well that it was, in the words of
the Prime Minister, "time that he bagged something, & broke
some crockery. "50 His focus turned away from the trenches of
the Western Front to the more lightly defended reaches of
the eastern Mediterranean.
In the winter of 1914-15, the British government
conducted a review of grand strategy. On December 28, 1914,
Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary of the War Council, presented
that body a m.emorandum which em.phasized "the rem.arkable
deadlock" on the Western Front and advocated the use of "our
sea power and our growing military strength to attack
Germany ... through her allies, and particularly Turkey. "5*
The following day, Churchill denounced any thought of
"sending our arm.ies to chew barbed wire in Flanders" and
proposed am.phibious action against the island of Borkum, off
the German coast. Asquith, who felt "profoundly
dissatisfied" with the prospect of fighting in Flanders,
found himself swayed.
On January 2, 1915, the need for urgency increased when
the Foreign Office informed the War Council that Russia,
^''Herbert Asquith, as recorded in Wilson, Myriad Faces ,
110 .
5*Sir Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill, Companion Volume III , I, 337-43.
^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill, Companion Volume III, I, 343-45.
53Asquith, Mem.ories and Reflections , 62.
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facing offensives from both the Germans and the Turks, had
requested that Kitchener arrange "a demonstration against
the Turk.
. .either naval or military. "^^ Kitchener then
sought French's views on the deployment of troops from
France. The commander of the B.E.F. declared that "so large
a margin of safety is needed that troops could not be
withdrawn from this theater. "^^ Kitchener thus informed the
War Council that the Dardanelles constituted the most
suitable objective for a new offensive but that he had no
forces available for such an operation. On January 13th,
the Cabinet decided to accept an Admiralty proposal for a
purely naval expedition "to bombard and take the Gallipoli
peninsula . "^^
Churchill provided the primary impetus for the
operation. Fisher wrote the First Lord on January 3, 1915
and outlined a plan along the lines of Hankey's analysis for
an expedition of 100,000 troops and a squadron of second
class battleships to force the Dardanelles.'^ Churchill,
under pressure to "bag something," then fired off a telegram
^^Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, as recorded in
Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Companion Volume III , I, 359-
60 .
^^General Sir John French, as recorded in Magnus,
Kitchener , 311.
^^The War Council, as recorded in Wilson, Myriad Faces .
107.
^^Marder, Fear God . Vol III, 121-22.
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to Vice-Admiral Sir SackviUe Hamilton Garden, commander of
the squadron blockading the Dardanelles:
Do you consider the forcing of the Dardanelles by
ships alone a practicable operation. It is
assumed older Battleships fitted with minebumpers
would be used.... Importance of results wouldjustify severe loss.^
Garden responded cautiously that while he did not believe
that the Dardanelles could be rushed, he thought that "they
might be forced by extended operations with large numbers of
ii53ships." Ghurchill then drew from Garden a vague plan for a
purely naval assault on the Straits. Disregarding the
reservations of his naval advisors, he carried the plan to
the War Gouncil, which, in Hankey's words, "turned eagerly
from the dreary vista of a 'slogging match' on the Western
Front to brighter prospects."^'
Vice-Admiral Garden, an elderly officer on the verge of
retirement when the war broke out, opened the bombardment of
the Dardanelles on February 19, 1915. The attacking
squadron comprised 10 old battleships (4 French and 6
British), the battle cruiser Inflexible , and the Queen
'^^inston Ghurchill, as recorded in Hough, Former Naval
Person , 79
.
ice-Admiral Garden, as recorded in van der Vat, Ship
That Ghanqed the World , 206-07.
^^Churchill later implied that he had proposed his plan
for a purely naval assault as the surest means of prying an
army from Flanders. See Magnus, Kitchener . 317.
^-Sir Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Marder, Scapa Flow ,
207.
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Elizabeth
,
the most powerful ship afloat." The Turkish
defenses contained a mixture of permanent fortifications and
mobile field batteries overlooking a series of minefields.
The forts closest to the mouth of the Dardanelles gradually
fell to the more powerful guns of the fleet, which
penetrated four miles up the straits. As the waters
narrowed, however, the minefields became more serious
obstacles, and the Turkish howitzers defeated attempts by a
group of fishing trawlers to sweep the mines. The mounting
difficulties led Garden to resign his command to avoid
nervous collapse in early March.
His successor, Rear-Admiral John de Robeck, attempted
to solve the problem by force majeure . On the morning of
March 18, 1915, he ordered forward his battleships, now
eighteen strong. The result was unmitigated disaster. A
French ship, the Bouvet, struck a mine and foundered with
over 600 hands still on board. More mines claimed three
British ships, two of which sank. Finally, Turkish gunfire
put two more French battleships out of action. Robeck's
squadron suffered three ships sunk and three more forced to
retire (a loss of one-third strength) in return for minor
damage to the Turkish batteries; the minefields remained
"^Hough, Naval Person . 91.
^\^ilson. Myriad Faces , 111-115; Hough, Great War at
Sea. 153-157.
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intact." The naval assault on the Dardanelles drew to an
inglorious close.
Differences over the operation caused a permanent break
between Churchill and Fisher. The First Sea Lord developed
misgivings about the Dardanelles campaign as early as
January 19, 1915, when he wrote:
Now the Cabinet have decided on taking the
Dardanelles solely with the Navy, using 15
battleships and 32 other vessels, and keeping out
there three battle cruisers and a flotilla of
destroyers-- al 1 urgently required at the decisive
theatre at home ! . . . I don't agree with a single
step taken. " [Fisher's italics]
The admiral presented his views in late January to the Prime
Minister, who worried about "the growing friction between
Winston and Fisher.""^ Fisher felt himself in a dilemma: he
sensed the Dardanelles operation would come a cropper; he
regarded inaction as unacceptable; and he knew with
certainty the War Cabinet opposed his plan for an invasion
of the Baltic. After the naval rebuff on March 18th,
Churchill drafted a telegram to Robeck:
You ought to persevere methodically but resolutely
with the plan contained in your instructions .. .You
should dominate the forts at the Narrows and sweep
the minefields and then batter the forts at close
^Sdarder, Scapa Flow
,
245-247; Wilson, Myriad Faces ,
116.
^'Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Marder, Fear God , Vol
III, 133.
"Herbert Asquith, Memories and Reflections , 70.
^^Wilson, Myriad Faces , 200.
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range.
Fisher adamantly opposed the telegram and told his political
superior that he would resign if Churchill were to send it.
Churchill, on that occasion, backed down. Fisher did resign
in May 1915 because the First Lord ordered certain ships to
Gallipoli in excess of a list upon which they had both
agreed
.
Fisher's handling of the Dardanelles operation and its
aftermath cost him his reputation. He had entered the war
as a highly respected, albeit controversial, figure and had
since energized the wartime construction of new vessels and
orchestrated the victory at the Falkland Islands. His
manner of resignation, however, placed him beyond the pale
of responsible employment.'^ On May 15th, when the Cabinet
believed the German fleet to be at sea, he bolted from the
Admiralty to Charing Cross, with plans to go to Scotland,
which only the Prime Minister's directive prevented him from
executing. On May 19th, he put forth a series of
conditions as his price for returning to office: the removal
of Churchill, a guarantee that his replacement would be
restricted to "pol icy and pari iamentary procedure , " and,
above all, a demand for:
^S^inston Churchill, as recorded in Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill. Volume III , 365.
^^azlehurst. Politicians at War , 237-38.
^^Asquith, Memories and Reflections , 109.
93
complete professional charge of the war at seatogether with the absolute sole disposition of'theFleet and the appointment of all officers of all
ranks whatsoever, and absolutely untrammeled sole
command of all the sea forces whatsoever
.
Asquith noted that "his conduct at this critical time
convinced me that it had become impossible that he should
remain responsible for the Admiral ty . "^^ Fisher would never
again hold a position which affected government policy.
Fisher's resignation toppled Churchill from his
position as First Lord. From his hotel room in Charing
Cross, Fisher had written to Conservative leader Andrew
Bonar Law: "I am absolutely unable to remain with W.C. (HE'S
A REAL DANGER !)"^^ When Lloyd George heard Fisher had
resigned, he said of Churchill:
It is the Nemesis of the man who has fought for
this war for years. When the war came he saw in
it the chance of glory for himself, & has
accordingly entered on a risky campaign without
caring a straw for the misery and hardship it
would bring to thousands, in the hope he would
prove to be the outstanding man in this war.
Fisher's resignation, coincident with The Times * dramatic
announcement of a shell shortage in France, led Bonar Law on
7 1
Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , III,
241.
77Herbert Asquith, Memories and Reflections , 113.
George V shared Asquith's opinion. See Nicolson, King
George V , 263.
^^Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , Vol
III, 237.
^^David Lloyd George, as recorded in Taylor, Lloyd
George: A Diary , 50
.
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May 17th to present Asquith with the alternatives of "some
change in the constitution of the Government" or a Tory
attack in the House upon the conduct of the war.^^ The
Conservative price for coalition was the exclusion of
Haldane from the ministry and the removal of Churchill from
the Admiralty, Lloyd George strongly supported accepting
the Conservative proposal and dumping Churchill.''*' The Prime
Minister bowed to the pressure and reconstructed the
Cabinet. Arthur Balfour assumed the duties of First Lord of
the Adm.iralty from Churchill, who received the sinecure post
of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Asquith's
secretary adm.itted to Churchill's wife Clementine that
"Winston has suffered a blow to prestige, reputation and
79happiness .
"
"Andrew Bonar Law, as recorded in Asquith, Memories and
Ref 1 ect ions , 116.
Asquith, Memories and Reflections , 122 ; Tayl or , Lloyd
George: A Diary , 51
.
^^Lloyd George's opposition to Churchill can be traced
through the diary of Frances Stevenson. See entries for
October 9th, 14th, 23rd, 30th, November 5th, December 16th,
23rd, January 21st, April 8th, and May 15th in Taylor, Lloyd
George: A Diary .
^^inston Churchill, over a year later complained to
Hankey that "whenever I open my mouth in Parliam.ent someone
shouts out that I am. the m.an who let us in for the
Dardanelles mistake, and the papers are perpetually
repeating it." See Hough, Former Naval Person , 125.
'^Edwin Montagu, as recorded in Hough, Former Naval
Person , 119.
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Churchill's plan had significant consequences J° First,
the failure of the naval assault led the War Council to
commit an army contingent under General Ian Hamilton to the
Gallipoli Peninsula. That expedition, at the cost of heavy
casualties, failed to take Gallipoli and eventually withdrew
ingloriously .^^ Second, the failure of the battleships to
penetrate the Straits reflected the decline, relative to the
nineteenth century, in the military advantage of the
European powers over the rest of the worldJ^ Third, the
Dardanelles campaign and its afterm.ath destroyed the
cooperation between Fisher and Churchill and ruined their
reputations (at least temporarily). The Dardanelles
campaign thus weakened the credibility of the Royal Navy's
leadership and the public perception of the fleet's ability
to project power.
Students of the Gallipoli campaign have given
Churchill's concept of opening a route to Russia through the
Dardanelles generally positive reviews, while taking an
overwhelm.ingl y negative line on his plan to force the
Straits with a purely naval force. Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill, Volume III , 224-380, supports both Churchill's
strategy and his advocacy of a naval assault to the War
Cabinet; Wilson, Myriad Faces , 103-121, condemns both the
concept and the plan; and Harder, Scapa Flow , II, 259-65,
adopts the prevalent position of admiring Churchill's
strategy while roundly criticizing the First Lord's
impetuous support of a flawed operation.
^-Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (New York, 1956), 80-343,
provides the Dominion perspective of the military engagement
at Gallipoli.
^^In 1807, a British squadron under Admiral Sir John
Duckworth successfully forced the Dardanelles.
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For the first two years of the war, the Royal Navy's
control of the exits of the North Sea remained unchallenged.
In the minds of the officers of the Grand Fleet, only German
passivity prevented a British victory on the scale of
Trafalgar. One officer wrote: "Nothing less than complete
annihilation can or m.ust be allowed to satisfy us . The
fact that the patrolling of the Grand Fleet reduced the
German Navy "to virtual immobility" seem.ed meager
compensation On a single occasion, however, German
m.iscalculation led to the duel between entire fleets for
which the British had longed so earnestly. For a brief
m.oment at Jutland, the dreadnoughts squared off.
Mutual misapprehension contributed to the onset of the
battle. Admiral Reinhard Scheer hoped to lure the British
cruiser force into a subm.arine ambush, using his battle
cruisers under Vice-Adm.iral Franz von Kipper as bait. In
the event that the cruiser forces engaged heavily, he would
bring the main force of German battleships, kept in reserve,
into the fray. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, commander of the
British Grand Fleet, similarly hoped to engage only the
enemy cruisers with his entire force. The Admiralty
misinterpreted certain electronic intelligence and informed
him that Kipper's cruisers, rather than the entire Kigh Seas
33Vice-Adm.iral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beattv
Papers , 167.
ilson. Myriad Faces , 8,
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Fleet, would sortie. He ordered his forces east toward
Denmark in two divisions, sending his cruisers under Vice-
Admiral David Beatty to scout to the south. Beatty's ships
made contact on the afternoon of May 31, 1916.^^
The ensuing battle, fought in four phases, confirmed
British control of the North Sea. In the first, Beatty's
cruisers chased Hipper 's south. The Germans inflicted heavy
damage on the British cruisers before reinforcements forced
Hipper to give way." He then led Beatty's force into the
arms of Scheer and the German battleships. Upon sighting
the main body of the High Seas Fleet, Beatty reversed course
and fled north. During this phase, the British rear guard,
comprised of battleships rather than battle cruisers, gave
better than it received. Meanwhile, Jellicoe deployed his
battleships across the path of the onrushing Germans. In
the third phase of the battle, the fire of the British
Scheer left harbour with 16 dreadnoughts and 9 older
battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 11 light cruisers, and 61
destroyers. British figures were 28 battleships, 9 battle
cruisers, 34 light cruisers, and 78 destroyers. See Wilson,
Myriad Faces , 285.
^^A crucial flaw in the design of the British cruisers,
a lack of baffles between firing turrets and the magazine,
enabled German shells to reach and ignite a ship's
ammunition supply, causing the total destruction of three
vessels. Beatty remarked to his flag-captain: "There seems
to be something wrong with our bloody ships today." See
Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty . the Last
Naval Hero; An Intimate Biography (New York, 1981), 160.
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battleships forced Scheer to seek to break contact. He
used a torpedo attack from his destroyers to gain room in
which to maneuver. The Germans then fled from the British.
In the final phase, which took place after dark, individual
German vessels sought to pass through the British lines in
order to make Wilhelmshaven before daylight. The British
fleet, which lacked training in night operations, failed to
block the German f light.
The Battle of Jutland produced ambiguous military
consequences. The Grand Fleet earned the satisfaction of
seeing the entire High Seas Fleet turn tail and flee for
Wilhelmshaven, but, in accordance with the nature of naval
warfare, retention of any given portion of the ocean's
surface provided no benefit. The British more importantly
won a strategic victory, as they maintained their control of
the Scotland-Norway gap, with its resultant effect on
blockade. Admiral Jellicoe reported operational readiness
on the evening of June 2, 1916, while Admiral Scheer, on
87Correlli Barnett, Swordbearers : Supreme Command in the
First World War (New York, 1964), 182-188, argues that
German naval technology far surpassed that of Britain;
Hough, Great War at Sea , 273-280, suggests that British
equipment had offsetting advantages.
^^The standard account of the battle is Harder, Scapa
Flow , III, 36-160. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty; The
Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York, 1988), 97-155,
emphasizes the destructive nature of combat between
dreadnoughts. Trevor Wilson, Myriad Faces , 283-299, argues
instead that, except for the design flaw in British battle
cruisers, Jutland established the remarkable endurance of
both British and German warships.
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July 4th, was forced to admit that the High Seas Fleet
required at least another five weeks in port J' The design
flaw of the British cruisers, however, prevented the Grand
Fleet from claiming a numbers-game victory.^'' The Germans
thus were able to claim a tactical triumph, since they sank
14 British ships of 112,000 tons while losing only 11 of
62,000 tons.^-
The Battle of Jutland proved bitterly disappointing for
many of Britain's leaders. Jutland failed to produce the
victory of annihilation, with its attendant list of ships
sunk, that the legend of British naval superiority required.
King George V felt st\inned by the Admiralty's first, stark
report
:
Our losses Queen Mary Indefatigable Invincible
Defence Black Prince Sparrow Hawk Ardent Fortune
Tipperary Turbulent also missing at present Shark
Nestor Nomad.
For Hankey, who expected a victory on the scale of
Trafalgar, Jutland was "the most bitter disappointment of
Keegan, Price of Admiralty , 131, 151.
The Germans began the war with a similar flaw, but
identified and corrected the problem earlier. British
losses, except for the three cruisers which suffered
catastrophic explosion, were equal in number but of less
displacement than those of Germany.
a:
Barnett, Swordbearers , 176.
'^Admiralty message, as recorded in Nicolson, King
George V , 278. The first three ships listed were battle
cruisers
.
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this disappointing war."" "The naval battle in the North
Sea", echoed Lloyd George, "is most disquieting."'-
Churchill, from the sidelines, wrote to Asquith that he felt
"profoundly grieved."'^
The officers of the Grand Fleet were uniformly
dissatisfied. Jellicoe, writing to Fisher, cited "bad luck
with the weather and time of meeting" as the primary reasons
for the lack of a decisive victory at Jutland.'^ Beatty, in
a cri de coeur, wrote: "Would that we had been able to make
a job of it. To be so near and yet so far was worm and
gallwood." Captain Herbert Richmond recorded in his diary:
"It is a nasty knock and there is no denying it. We have
engaged an inferior force & got the worst of it." After a
ship-board dinner, he noted: "How unanimous these Captains
all are that Jutland was a failure! They can hardly bear to
speak of it."'^
^'Sir Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Stephen Roskill,
Hankey; Man of Secrets. Volume I 1877-1918 (New York, 1971),
277 .
David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
Lloyd George , 337-38.
^^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill. Companion Volume III , 1511.
Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , Vol
III, 356.
^Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Harder, Fear God ,
Vol III, 357.
^^Captain Richmond, as recorded in Harder, Portrait of
an Admiral , 213, 248.
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The press, at least initially, took a very negative
line on the outcome of the Battle of Jutland. The Times
trumpeted: "Great Naval Battle Heavy Losses", while the
Daily News went so far as to admit "defeat in the Jutland
go
engagement." Barely a week after the battle. Fisher
denigrated "the miserable pessimism that was so ignobly
spread abroad. Beatty, on June 18th, complained to the
editor of the Morning Post that "one did not expect the
Press to put the interpretation on it [Jutland] that they
did. It does not say much for their faith, so long and
frequently vaunted, in the Navy."*''' Public fault-finding
adversely affected the navy's unity.
The search to explain the Grand Fleet's failure to win
the expected victory led to mutual recrimination between
Jellicoe and Beatty. Jellicoe wrote Beatty a week after the
battle:
That difference in reckoning between the Lion &
Iron Duke was most perplexing. Impossible to
avoid, of course, but nonetheless it put me out
very much. Then all or one of your cruisers
turned to port and I could not make out why.
A month later, Beatty's wife wrote that "there seems to very
qqDingman, Pacific , 24-25; Harder, Scapa Flow , III, 196.
'"'^Admiral Fisher, as recorded in Harder, Fear God , Vol
III, 355.
*^*Vice-Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers , 340.
-'•^Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers , 340.
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little to say except to curse Jellicoe for not going at
them."-"^ This disagreement occasioned, according to one of
Beatty's biographers:
the names of Jellicoe and Beatty to become
associated in the public mind with two different
camps of naval opinion. Self-appointed champions
poured forth a stream of calumny and uninformed
criticism upon one or the other of the two
admirals
.
The Battle of Jutland thus opened divisions within the navy
and between the navy and the public. The Royal Navy, as the
bulwark of the British Sm.pire, according to historian
Correlli Barnett, "was never again accorded quite the same
religious faith" by the British public.
Jutland had another result with enormous consequence
for Britain. Scheer reported to Kaiser Wilhelm that he held
little hope of catching and destroying a detached portion of
the Grand Fleet and thus achieving a naval balance which
might permit the Entscheidungsschacht , or decisive battle,
for which Tirpitz had designed the High Seas Fleet. He then
recommended the resumption of unlimited submarine warfare.'"^
The greatest challenge to Britain's command of the seas
came not from the High Seas Fleet but instead from Germany's
'"•^Lady Ethel Beatty, as recorded in Ranft, Beatty
Papers , 369.
'"S^.S. Chalm.ers, The Life and Letters of David Beatty,
Admiral of the Fleet (London, 1951), 266.
'"'Barnett, Swordbearers , 177.
''^^Barnett, Swordbearers
,
177.
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submarines, or U-boats. Germany first initiated
unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1915. German U-
boats began to attack merchant vessels without warning and,
on occasion, from beneath the waves. Before the war, the
British had discounted the idea that submarines would be
used against merchant vessels as "impossible and
1 (17
unthinkable."*" They correctly assumed that the laws or
naval warfare, should the Germans obey them, would render
the submarine ineffective against merchant vessels. Once
war began, however, German tactics quickly shattered the
wildly optimistic British belief that the Kaiser's empire
woul d adhere to such legal restrictions .^^^ The subsequent
months dem.onst rated the destructive power of the
unrest ricted U-boat against undef ended targets. Within 90
days, 22 subm.arines sank 39 merchantmen. By August 1915,
the growing submarine fleet began sinking more ships than
the British shipyards had the capacity to rep lace."* The
Commodore Keyes , Narrow Seas
, 53; Harder, Scapa Flow ^
I, 363-64.
arships were legally requi red to ascertain their
victims belonged to an opposing belligerent, to identify the
presence of contraband, and to provide accommodation to
passengers and crew
.
'^^Admiral W .H . Henderson, for exampl e , did not bel ieve
that in any future war "territorial waters would be
violated, or neutral vessels sunk... No nation would permit
it, and the officer who did it would be shot." See Wilson,
Myriad Faces , 90
.
'Wilson, Myriad Faces , 91-92.
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anti-submarine tactics of the Royal Navy, based upon
"offensive" patrols, proved singularly hopeless. Only the
threat of American intervention following the sinkings of
the British liners Lusitania and Arabic caused Germany to
redirect her efforts into the Mediterranean, where the
danger of killing Americans was remote."*
In 1916, submarine warfare led to a shake-up at the
Admiralty. Admiral Scheer employed his U-boats in the North
Sea against warships, while maintaining a vigorous anti-
shipping campaign in the Mediterranean. The growing German
submarine fleet increased its destruction of commercial
vessels from 113,000 tons per month in 1915 to 192,000 tons
per month in 1916."' Walter Runciman, President of the
Board of Trade warned the Cabinet in November:
My expert advisers believed that I am far too
sanguine in advising the War Committee that the
complete breakdown in shipping will come in June^.
1917; they . .
.
[bel ieve] it will come much sooner."^
David Lloyd George urged the navy to convoy merchant
' ^ i
vessels, but the Admiralty opposed the practice.*
^"Hough , Great War at Sea , 17 5-76.
"Potter, E.B. and Chester Nimitz, eds , Sea Power: A
Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1960), 459.
"^al ter Runciman , as recorded in David Woodward, Ll oyd
George and the Generals (Newark, 1983), 116.
"The Admiral ty had four principle objections : convoys
would be reduced to the speed of the si owest ship ; they
would congest ports; civilian ships could not maintain the
necessary formations ; and lack of sufficient escort vessels.
See Potter and Nimitz, Sea Power: A Naval History, 466.
A
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First Lord Arthur Balfour instead transferred Admiral
Jellicoe from Scapa Flow, where Beatty assumed command of
the Grand Fleet, to Whitehall as First Sea Lord to solve the
submarine problem. A week later, Lloyd George replaced
Asquith as Prime Minister."^ Lloyd George, who regarded
Balfour as possessing "neither the energy, initiative, nor
the administrative gifts requisite for the position of First
Lord of the Admiralty," appointed Sir Edward Carson to the
Admiralty."^ The war immediately tested the new team.
Lloyd George quickly lost faith in his subordinates.
Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in February,
1917, accepting the risk of American intervention. The U-
boats quickly proved they could inflict greater losses than
at earlier stages of the war. Allied merchant losses rose
from 171 ships (49 British) of 370,000 tons in January to
234 ships (105 British) of 500,000 tons in February."^ The
First Sea Lord publicly maintained a particularly glum
attitude, leading a senior Army officer to write: "The
situation at sea is very serious indeed. It has never been
so bad as at present, and Jellicoe almost daily announces it
"^Asquith never served in the Cabinet after his defeat
in December 1916. From the perspective of the Royal Navy,
the resignation of Asquith, who believed that the war would
be decided at sea, was a grave loss. See Taylor, Lloyd
George: A Diary , 19
.
"David Lloyd George, as recorded in Harder, Scapa
Flow , 288.
"^Patterson, Jel licoe , 159; Wilson, Myriad Faces , 429.
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to be hopeless.""^ Jellicoe attacked the problem on two
fronts. First, he sought "to restrict imports and to cut
down consumption drastically." Second, he attempted to
increase the number of escort vessels "acting offensively
against enemy submarines.""^ The Cabinet wholeheartedly
supported the effort to increase the available shipping
tonnage by chartering ships from neutrals, increasing
maritime construction, rationing imports, and increasing
internal production.*^'' As to the use of escort vessels,
however, Lloyd George had come to prefer convoy to offensive
patrolling. In late February, the Prime Minister attempted
to convert Carson and Jellicoe.*^* Carson, however, refused
to overrule his naval advisors. He responded publicly: "As
long as I am at the Adm.iralty, the sailors will have full
scope. They will not be interfered with by me, and I will
allow no one else to interfere with them.." The
"General William Robertson, as recorded in Randolph
Churchill, Lord Derby; King of Lancashire (New York, 1960),
268 .
Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Alfred Patterson,
ed. The Jellicoe Papers (London, 1968), Vol II, 154-56.
^^^Alfred Gollin, Proconsul in Politics: A Study of Lord
Milner in Opposition and in Power (Letchworth, U.K., 1964),
410-413.
*^^Ll oyd George ' s advocacy of convoy ref 1 ected the
counsel of Hankey, who served as a conduit for the ideas of
younger officers . See Roskil 1 , Hankey , Vol I, 356-578.
^^^Sir Edward Carson, as recorded in Gollin, Proconsul
in Pol i tics
,
421.
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Admiralty's continued opposition to convoys exasperated the
Prime Minister.
Yet the Admiralty, for a number of reasons, eventually
adopted the general practice of convoying merchant vessels.
First, Commander Reginald Henderson discovered an error of
methodology in the Ministry of Shipping statistics which
supposedly had shown the number of merchant ships hopelessly
exceeded the available escorts. Henderson's discovery,
combined with the entry of America into the war on April 6,
1917, undermined any argument about the lack of escort
vessel s . Second , Admi ral Beat t y convinced Jellicoe to
impl ement convoys for Scandinavian trade , which had
previously suffered a 25% loss rate. Losses there plummeted
dramatically.* Finally, in April, submarines sank 373
vessels of 870, 000 tons
,
damaged another 300 ,000 tons of
shipping, and reduced the number of neutral merchantmen
calling in Allied ports by 25%. On April 25th, Lloyd George
announced in the War Cabinet his intention of visiting the
Admiralty five days later to review the anti-submarine
campaign. When he arrived, he found Jellicoe determined to
^"^"Rowland, David Lloyd George , 396-98
.
enderson discovered the figure of 5,000 ships per
week using British ports included an overwhelming majority
of coastal vessel s and that the ocean-going steamers which
required escort numbered perhaps 300 per week. See Marder,
Scapa Flow , ISO.
^^^Frederick Dreyer, The Sea Heritage: A Study of
Maritime Warfare (London, 1955), 218.
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give convoy "a thorough and fair trial. "-^^ Convoy, once
implemented, steadily reduced the losses from U-boat
117
attacks.
Lloyd George, in 1917, decided to replace Carson and
Jellicoe. In early June, the Prime Minister took counsel
with Captain Herbert Richmond, one of the navy's most
original thinkers, who criticized Jellicoe's organization of
the Admiralty staff. On June 20, 1917, Jellicoe told the
War Policy Comjr^itt ee that Britain's survival depended on
clearing the Belgian coast and that "we should not be able
to continue the war next year for lack of shipping
.
Lloyd George disliked Jellicoe's pessir.'^.ism and resented the
admiral's support for the Army's proposals for offensives in
'30
Fl anders . * The Prime Minister realized that Carson would
never m.ove against his First Sea Lord and decided that
Carson, therefore, needed to go.'" Alfred, 1st Viscount
Mi 1 ner , who shared Ll oyd George's derogatory opinion of the
1
Admi ral Jellicoe, as recorded in Hough , Great War at
Sea , 308.
son. Myriad Faces , 439; Potter and Nimitz, Sea
Power: A History , 466-69.
'^^Marder, Portrait of an Admiral , 257-59.
^^^Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Roskill, Hankey , Vol
I, 404.
'^^Hankey noted in his diary on July 3rd that Lloyd
George "was hot for getting rid of Jellicoe." See Roskill,
Hankey , Vol I, 406.
-^-Rowland, David Llovd George , 406-07.
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Carson- Jellicoe regime, then suggested "promoting" Carson to
the War Cabinet and making Sir Eric Geddes, Controller of
the Navy, the new First Lord.*^^ Lloyd George proposed the
change to Carson, who accepted in July 1917.
The new First Lord quickly became disillusioned with
Jellicoe. In October, Geddes took counsel with Balfour,
Carson, and Lloyd George as to the advisability of replacing
the First Sea Lord.*" In December, Geddes, upon the
recommendation of Deputy First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Rosslyn
Wemyss, directed Jellicoe to relieve the commander
responsible for the Dover Barrage, Vice-Admiral Reginald
Bacon, a close friend. The First Sea Lord demurred.
Geddes, with Lloyd George's approval, informed Jellicoe on
the evening of December 24th that "a change is desirable in
the position of First Sea Lord."*^^ The news that Admiral
Wemyss had assumed the duties of First Sea Lord pleased the
Prime Minister.*"
The German submarine effort, contributing to Jellicoe's
fall, had far-reaching consequences for the navy. First,
the replacement of Jellicoe and Carson marked the eclipse of
Gollin, Proconsul in Politics , 423-42.
•^^Stephen Roskill, "The Dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe",
Journal of Contemporary History (I, 1966), 69-93.
*^%ir Eric Geddes, as recorded in Patterson, Jel licoe .
203 .
-^-Rowland, David Llovd George , 426.
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two of the Royal Navy's most ardent supporters
. Second,
the destruction wreaked by the U-boats demonstrated the need
to modify Mahan's premise that concentration of a superior
fleet resulted inexorably in command of the sea. The future
role of the capital ship would become the dominant question
in naval circles.
The Great War was not kind to the Royal Navy. Despite
the ultimate defeat of both the High Seas Fleet and the U-
boat threat, the public remained dissatisfied. The
Dardanelles campaign, the damage done by German submarines,
and above all the Battle of Jutland contributed to
"expectations unfulfilled." Admiral Beatty, the day after
the armistice, wrote: "The Fleet, my Fleet is broken-
hearted... All suffering from a feeling far greater than
disappointment, depressed beyond measure.""^ Leading
supporters of the navy, including both civilians (Churchill,
Asquith, and Carson) and sailors (Fisher and Jellicoe) lost
their positions and preeminence. Only debonair David Beatty
remained to carry the torch for the capital ship in a world
characterized by rising idealism and shrinking defense
budgets
.
Carson resigned from the Lloyd George ministry in
January 1918, primarily over issues related to Ulster. See
Gollin, Proconsul in Politics , 464-65.
'^'Admiral Beatty, as recorded in W.S. Chalmers, Life
and Letters of David Beatty , 341.
CHAPTER 4
CONFLICT AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE
At the conclusion of the Great War, the Allied and
Associated Powers gathered in Paris to conclude a peace
agreement. The Fourteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson,
as the basis of the Armistice with Germany, dominated the
early discussions. The British contingent strongly opposed
Wilson's proposal concerning freedom of the seas. The
question of relative naval strength and the fate of the
captured High Seas Fleet further strained relations between
Britain and the United States. Lacking the cement of a
common enemy, the former wartime alliance cracked under the
pressure of divergent national interests.
Although President Wilson first arrived in Europe in
December 1918, his ideas had long preceded him. He
presented his program for the future of Europe in a series
of talks in 1918. The first of these speeches, on January
8, 1918, contained the famous "Fourteen Points."* Wilson's
plan contained three major components. First, it advocated
nationality as the primary basis for the determination of
territorial boundaries.^ Second, Point XIV proposed the
^-he president's Four Principles of February 11th and
Five Particulars of September 27th expanded the original
Fourteen Points. Arthur Walworth, America's Moment: 1918
-
American Diplomacy and the End of World War I (New York,
1977), 283-84, contains Wilson's principles and particulars
2points V, VI, VII, IX, XI, XII, a^J^. XIII- see jJ-A.S.
Grenville, The Major International ^^^^^
History and Guide with r.nmplete Texts (New York, 1974), 57.
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creation of a supranational organization, a "general
association of nations," to arbitrate international
conflict. Third, the plan provided several measures
designed to reduce the possibility of such conflict. These
measures included open diplomacy (Point I), freedom of the
seas (II), the removal of trade barriers (III), and the
reduction of armaments (IV).
David Lloyd George shared Wilson's desire for a world
safe for every peace-loving nation and developed a parallel
approach to post-war security. Knowledge that Wilson
intended to make an address on the subject of war aims
combined with Labour party demands for a Cabinet statement
on the subject spurred the British Prime Minister to reach
the public first. Lloyd George, in a Cabinet discussion of
war aims on January 3, 1918, took a position remarkably
similar to Wilson's only five days before the President
pronounced his Fourteen Points.^ With the aid of Hankey,
the Prime Minister drafted a speech on war aims which won
approval from Asquith and Grey.* On January 5th, the Prime
Minister spoke to a meeting of trade union delegates at
Caxton Hall on the subject of post-war reconstruction and
^e advocated the restoration of Belgium, Alsace-
Lorraine, and Poland, together with "the principle of self-
determination" for German colonies and the Austrian
nationalities. CAB 23/5: War Cabinet 312, January 3, 1918,
as recorded in Lowe and Dockrill, The Mirage of Power . 599-
600.
'Rowland, David Llovd George . 428.
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advocated the right of self-determination, the sanctity of
treaties, and "the creation of some international
organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish
the probability of war."^ The British government, which
thus supported the general tenor of Wilson's proposals,
nonetheless entertained serious reservations concerning
Point II and Wilson's vision of freedom of the seas.
The second of Wilson's Fourteen Points sought to
establish the right of neutrals to trade freely in time of
war. It read:
Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas
outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in
war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or
in part by international action for the
enforcement of international covenants.
Belligerent nations would lose the right to interfere with
the trade of privately-owned vessels, regardless of the
nature and destination of the cargo involved. Wilson argued
that "the freedom of the sea is the sine qua non of peace,
equality, and cooperation." The General Board of the
United States Navy had articulated America's traditional
David Lloyd George, as recorded in George Egerton,
Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations:
Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914-
1919 (Chapel Hill, 1978), 61.
^Point II as recorded in Grenville, International
Treaties , 57
.
'Woodrow Wilson, as recorded in Edward Buehrig, Woodrow
Wilson and the Balance of Power (Bloomington, IN, 1955),
261.
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position on the issue after reviewing the British blockade
against Germany in 1915:
The claim now put forward by the British
government of the right to take neutral vessels
from the high seas and conduct them into a British
port for the purpose of search without capture is
untenable under any law or custom of maritime war
hitherto known, and is one that cannot be conceded
without the gravest sacrifice of the most vital
neutral rights.
In February 1916, Wilson had sent emissary Colonel Edward
House to Europe on a mission, which ultimately proved
futile, to present to both belligerent camps a peace plan
based upon: "(a) military and naval disarmament and (b) a
league of nations to secure each nation from aggression and
maintain absolute freedom of the seas."' Wilson sought to
protect neutrals against the disregard for maritime law
displayed during the Great War by strictly regulating the
right of belligerents to establish future blockades.
Britain viewed the issue of freedom of the seas from
the perspective of a belligerent, rather than from that of a
neutral. In her long series of struggles with continental
states, sea power, to include blockade, had played a crucial
part. British use of blockade in the First World War faced
General Board Memorandum 438, March 3, 1915, as
recorded in Roskill, Naval Policy , 80-81.
^Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson , 213. House contributed to
Wilson's formulation of freedom of the seas, arguing "that
in time of both war and peace a merchantman should traverse
the seas unmolested." See Charles Seymour, The Intimate
Papers of Colonel House (Boston, 1928), Vol III, 327.
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restrictions arising from the Declaration of London (1909),
which divided goods into three categories: absolute
contraband, subject to seizure under all conditions;
conditional contraband, subject to seizure if destined to a
belligerent government; and free goods, which were immune
from blockade.^" Britain resorted, as she had in 1807 after
the advent of Napoleon's Continental system, to a series of
Orders in Council which steadily increased the list of
contraband goods. In 1915, the Cabinet adopted the
principle of continuous voyage, whereby neutral goods
ultimately bound for Germany were subject to seizure,
regardless of their immediate destination. In the same
year, Hankey produced an analysis of blockade which
emphasized the importance of economic pressure in modern
warfare and argued that national interests dictated that the
blockade weapon remain under the control of the Cabinet,
rather than any international body.^^ In early 1916, Robert,
Viscount Cecil assumed control of the Ministry of Blockade
and supplemented the British blockade effort with vigorous
attempts to dissuade neutrals from trading with Germany.
The Liberal Cabinet of Sir Henry Campbel 1 -Bannerman
accepted these restrictions on the right of blockade in the
belief that Britain would remain neutral in the event of a
future European conflict. The Declaration of London never
achieved the force of law because the House of Lords
rejected it. See Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power , 280.
^^CAB 17/130: Hankey Memorandum, "Freedom of the Seas",
June 11, 1915.
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American criticism towards Britain's implementation of
blockade influenced two Englishmen to publish in 1917 essays
concerning the freedom of the seas. Professor Ramsay Muir
labelled the arbitration between belligerent and neutral
rights in wartime as "one of the most vexed and difficult
problems of international law."^^ He asserted that custom
had established two prerogatives for belligerents: the
destruction of the sea-borne commerce of the enemy, subject
to the safeguarding of the lives of non-combatants and
neutral property; and the use of blockade, a practice which
interferes with neutral trade attempting either to run the
blockade or to carry war materials (known as contraband)
destined for the enemy. Muir then criticized the German
naval war effort for seven categories of major violations,
including the destruction of "all shipping, enemy or
neutral, which ventures to traverse any areas of the world's
seas which she [Germany] chooses to indicate" and the
subsequent abandonment of "men, women, and children in open
boats, in stormy seas, and far from land." He admitted that
Britain exceeded customary practice in two respects: forcing
neutral vessels to submit to contraband searches in British
ports rather than on the high seas, thus to avoiding
submarine attack at some expense of time and fuel ; and the
significant extension of contraband lists to include all
^^Ramsay Muir, Mare Liberum: The Freedom of the Seas
(London, 1917), 6-16.
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goods, taken in reprisal for the German policy of
unrestricted submarine warfare. Muir ended with a warning
that "to disarm sea-power while leaving land-power in
possession of all its weapons of of fense. . .would be a
positive danger to the liberties of the world. "-^
Naval historian Julian Corbett sought even more
directly to respond to Wilson's demand for freedom of the
seas. Corbett, who would later write Britain's official
naval history of the Great War, professed that the American
President realized "the impossibility of absolute freedom so
long as naval warfare is admitted as part of the machinery
of international relations." Freedom of the seas, according
to Corbett, thus meant "nothing more than the liberty of
neutrals to trade with belligerents subject to the time-
honoured restrictions of blockade and contraband." He then
noted the complications introduced by advances in naval
technol ogy--the mine, the torpedo, and the submarine--and
the increasingly intimate relationship between war and
industrial society. Corbett concluded by arguing that
restrictions on sea power would adversely affect the
viability of Wilson's proposed League of Nations by reducing
"the executive ability of the Naval Powers," Great Britain
and the United States.**
*Muir, Mare Liberum , 6-16.
•^Julian Corbett, The League of Peace and a Free Sea
(London, 1917), 6.
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While fully cognizant of the value of naval blockade,
the British government also recognized the hazard of
offending neutral opinion on the issue of blockade. In
August 1914, Radical Charles Trevelyan warned President of
the Board of Trade Walter Runciman:
I feel great uneasiness about the trend of action
of the Government towards trying to exclude German
food-supplies passing through neutral
countries
... It would be bad enough to alienate
Dutch opinion. But it will be infinitely worse if
you alienate the U.S.A. Remember that under very
analogous circumstances the U.S.A. went to war
with us against its will.*^
The British government chose to subordinate maximum naval
efficiency to diplomatic relations with neutral powers,
particularly the United States. The Cabinet, over the stiff
objections of Admiral Jellicoe, repeatedly directed the navy
to release neutral vessels loaded with foodstuffs. Captain
Herbert Richmond complained bitterly about the "half-
measures" imposed on the navy's cruisers.*^ Asquith, late in
1916, noted in his diary:
It is highly creditable to the Foreign Office that
during the last two years we have escaped a
breakdown of our blockade policy, which, in spite
of continual obstruction and bad faith, has
produced excellent results; but we have been
within an ace of grave complications with Sweden
and the United States.
*^azlehurst. Politicians at War , 186.
Captain Richmond, as recorded in Harder, Portrait of
an Admiral , 198.
'^Asquith, Memories and Reflections . 170.
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The German decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare
in 1917, which led the United States to join the anti-German
coalition, temporarily eclipsed Anglo-American differences
over the legality of the blockade. Historian Charles
Seymour noted:
After entering the struggle against Germany, the
American Government naturally changed its point of
view and in its efforts to prevent goods from
entering Germany rather improved upon the
strictness of Allied measures."^
Wilson's public address of January 8, 1918 reopened the
issue
.
David Lloyd George fired a counter salvo in the
struggle over freedom of the seas. In a speech in January
1918, he noted:
"Freedom of the Seas" is a very elastic term.
There is a sense in which we would rejoice to
accept it, but we must guard very carefully
against any attempt to interfere with the capacity
to protect our shores and our shipping that has
alone enabled us even to exist up to the present
moment
.
Lloyd George carefully portrayed his concerns with Britain's
ability "to protect her lines of communication" as defensive
in nature, yet Wilson's proposal would have enhanced such
protection. In reality, the proposal restricted the
offensive use of British sea power.
Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House , Vol
III, 193.
*'Beatty MSS: Memorandum, "Freedom of the Seas",
November 29, 1918.
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There the matter rested until October 6, 1918, when
Wilson received a note from Germany asking the President to
invite all belligerents to arrange an armistice on the basis
of his program for peace. Two days later, the President
sent back a note asking whether the German government
accepted the Fourteen Points as a basis for negotiations and
whether the German Army would withdraw from captured
territories. On the urging of Lloyd George, the Supreme War
Council sent two telegrams to Wilson which indicted that any
armistice terms would have to receive the approval of Allied
military experts and that they would appreciate consultation
in advance of further communications with Germany.^' Wilson
decided to send his emissary Colonel Edward House to Europe
to consult with the Allies.
The British government resurfaced its earlier fears
concerning freedom of the seas. On October 12th, Lloyd
George cautioned Geddes, then in Washington seeking to
influence the American naval construction effort, against
any premature suggestion that Britain shared the American
position on freedom of the seas:
You should be careful to express no approval or
disapproval of President Wilson's attitude towards
Prince Maximilian's note about which we were not
consulted. As you are aware we cannot accept his
views about freedom of the seas.
Rowland, David Llovd George , 453.
^*ADM 116/1809: Lloyd George to Geddes, October 12,
1918.
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An informal meeting of a majority of the Cabinet the next
day manifested the British conviction, maintained throughout
the process of peace negotiation, that the Allies could not,
in the final treaties, go much beyond the terms of the
armistice. Lloyd George deftly guided seven leading
officials to a pair of conclusions. First, the Cabinet
members objected to the apparent agreement between Wilson
and Germany that, in Hankey's words, "evacuation of occupied
territory [was] to be the sole condition of armistice."*^
More importantly, the group criticized the Fourteen Points
as unclear and roundly condemned freedom of the seas.
The Admiralty shared fully the Cabinet's opposition to
Wilson's Fourteen Points. British naval leadership had a
clear appreciation of the value of blockade. First Sea Lord
Rosslyn Wemyss objected to the notion that neutral rights
took precedence over those of belligerents in wartime and to
any surrender of British sovereignty to the League. The
Admiralty in October sent a memorandum to the Cabinet:
The British idea of freedom of the seas is free
and unfettered access to all the seas by all... but
in time of war this privilege must be fought for
by belligerent navies, causing as little damage as
possible to neutrals, but maintaining the right of
searching neutral merchant ships... to verify their
nationality and prevent ... aiding a belligerent.
Sir Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Roskill, Hankey ,
Vol I, 613.
^^ADM 116/1771: Admiralty Memorandum, "An Inquiry into
the Meaning and Effect of the Demand for Freedom of the
Seas", October 17, 1918.
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The memorandum argued that restrictions on blockade would
prove detrimental to Britain, since "the value of naval
power for attack and def ence ... would be correspondingly
diminished." The Board contended that the untested League
of Nations could not defend Britain's national interests as
well as British sea power, which "had been exercised
beneficially for centuries."^*
The Board convinced Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour.
He suggested that "if the League of Nations develops into an
efficient instrument for securing international peace," then
Britain might entrust the proposed organization with the
right of blockade and its corollary, the right of search at
sea. Until such time as the peace-keeping mechanisms of the
League became "firmly established," however, Balfour noted
that "every attempt to limit the use of sea power merely
adds to the relative strength of land power." The Foreign
Secretary thus cautioned against accepting Wilson's Fourteen
Points until the League could provide "full security to all
Nations against aggression" and "enforce its own decrees
25
against recalcitrant Nations."
In mid-October, the Cabinet received, in addition to
the Admiralty and Balfour memoranda, reports of two separate
ADM 116/1771: Admiralty Memorandum, "An Inquiry into
the Meaning and Effect of the Demand for Freedom of the
Seas", October 17, 1918.
^^ADM 116/1651: Memorandum, "Freedom of the Sea",
October 23, 1918.
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interviews with Wilson concerning his views on the freedom
of the seas. First Lord Geddes, who had spoken with Wilson
on October 6th, suggested that Wilson's views on sea power
"appeared to be unformed," but that the President desired
the League to exercise control over all wartime naval
action. Foreign Office liaison Sir William Wiseman, who
had talked with Wilson on October 16th, corroborated Geddes
'
notion that the President's views on sea power were elastic
and further indicated that Wilson desired a formula enabling
him to harness British naval power to the League.
The British War Cabinet considered the possibility of
an armistice with Germany at greater length in a meeting on
October 26th. Sir Austen Chamberlain opened the discussion
by complaining that Wilson's position on freedom of the seas
served to shackle sea power while leaving land power
unrestricted. Lloyd George immediately concurred. Next,
Geddes informed the Cabinet that Wilson had placed a request
before Congress for a major increase in the size of the
United States Navy. The Cabinet then voted to reject "the
doctrine of Freedom of the Seas" and decided that "a
notification to this effect must be made in some form to
^^Sir Eric Geddes, as recorded in Roskill, Hankey , Vol
I, 605.
^^Beloff, Imperial Sunset , 272-73.
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Germany before we entered into peace negotiations."^^ The
Cabinet never found cause to reconsider this decision to
oppose freedom of the seas. To surrender the time-tested
weapon of blockade to international action required a faith
in the community of nations with which the British
government was not imbued.
Colonel House, together with naval advisor Admiral
William Benson, arrived in Paris in late October for his
discussions with the Allied Supreme War Council. On October
2 9th, Lloyd George and French Prem.ier Georges Clem.enceau
inform.ed Colonel House that they were not prepared to accept
the Fourteen Points. Lloyd George explained his opposition
to Point 1 1 :
This point we cannot accept under any conditions;
it means that the power of blockade goes; Gerinany
has been broke almost as much by the blockade as
by military methods; if this power is to be handed
over to the League of Nations and Great Britain
were fighting for her life, no league of nations
would prevent her from defending herself.
The Prim.e Minister then relented slightly and admitted his
position on blockade was not unconditional: "I should like
to see this League of Nations established first before I let
29this power go." In the face of this rejection, House
hinted that the United States might end its war effort if
^XAB 23/14: War Cabinet 491B, October 26, 1918, as
recorded in Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage , 717-18.
^^David Lloyd George, as recorded in Seymour, Intim.ate
Papers , Vol IV, 163-64.
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the entire program were not accepted. Lloyd George riposted
swiftly: "We should deeply regret it, but, nonetheless,
should be prepared to go on fighting." He quickly added
that "to give up the right of using its Fleet was a thing no
one in England would consent to."^*^ House then presented the
Allied leaders with a coirjr.entary on the Fourteen Points
which had the blessing of Woodrow Wilson." In the case of a
future war in which a presumed league of nations should
remain neutral, the comji^entary read: "The rights of neutrals
shall be m.aintained against the belligerents, the rights o
both to be clearly and precisely defined in the law of
nations."" House conceded the right to blockade, without
specifying its extent. The m.eeting ended with House's
suggestion that the Allies draft their reservations to the
Fourteen Points.
House cabled the results of the first m.eeting to
Wilson, who replied the next day. The President
dem.onst rated the high m.oral tone which characterized his
'"David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference
(New Haven, 1939), Vol I, 42.
Rowland, David Lloyd George , 455, states that House
produced the commentary at the end of the meeting; Seymour,
Intimate Papers , 153-63, states that House distributed the
commentary at the start
.
'^House Comm.entary, as recorded in Walworth, Am.erica ' s
Moment , 275-283. The comjnentary advocated complete freedom
of the seas in tim.e of peace and in time of war reserved for
the League the right to close the seas to an offending
nation.
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dipl omacy
:
I feel it my soleiryi duty to authorize you to say
that I cannot consent to take part in the
negotiations of a peace which does not include theFreedom of the Seas, because we are pledged tofight not only Prussian militarism but militaris-"
everywhere
.
Wilson ended with a threat to appeal to popular opinion: "I
hope I shall not be obliged to make this decision public. "^^
The second meeting between House and Lloyd George
produced no substantial agreement. The Am.erican warning
failed to m.ove Lloyd George, who insisted on reserving
Britain's acceptance of Point II.-- House then relayed
Wilson's threat to "build up the strongest navy that our
resources permit.""' That, too, failed of effect, as Lloyd
George remained obdurate.
On Novem.ber 3rd, House and Lloyd George m.anaged to find
a form.ula for compromise. The Prim.e Minister started by
restating the im.possibi 1 i ty of accepting freedom, of the seas
and added that Britain "would spend her last guinea to keep
oodrow Wilson, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate
Papers , Vol IV, 168.
The Prime Minister proposed the wording: "that the
freedom of the seas is liable to various interpretations
,
som.e of which we cannot accept." See Roskill, Hankey , I,
623 . France expressed simi 1 ar reservations with regard to
Point VIII, which dealt with reparations. See Rene
Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe (New York,
1958) , 356-57.
^^oodrow Wilson, as recorded in Michael Fry, "The
Im.perial War Cabinet, the United States, and the Freedom, of
the Seas", Journal of the Royal United Service Institute
(XC, 1965), 353-62.
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a navy superior to that of the United States or any other
ti36power. He cited the pressures of British domestic
politics, in which freedom of the seas translated loss of
blockade. The Prime Minister explained:
It's no use saying I accept the principle. It
would only mean that in a week's time a new prime
minister would be here who would say that he could
not accept this principle. The English people
would not look at it. On this point the nation is
absolutely solid. ^'
Wiseman then suggested that the issue could be reserved for
discussion at Versailles without including Germany. Lloyd
George finally wrote House a note stating that Britain
remained willing to discuss freedom of the seas in Paris.
This Anglo-American settlement reflected an agreement to
disagree
.
The second naval issue raised by Wilson's communication
with the German government involved the disposition of the
German fleet. Admiral Wemyss sought Germany's
acknowledgment of defeat at sea in the same degree as defeat
Lloyd George, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate Papers ,
Vol IV, 180-81.
David Lloyd George, as recorded in Walworth, America'
s
Moment , 64
.
The Supreme War Coiincil subsequently agreed that the
"freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations,
some of which [the Allies] could not accept. They must
therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this
subject when they enter the peace conference." See David
Trask, Captains & Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations.
1917-1918 (Columbia, MO, 1972), 341-42.
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on land. 25 The Admiralty desired that the naval conditions
of the armistice include surrender of ten battleships,
including the flagship Baden
, six battle cruisers, and the
entire submarine force, so as to preclude the possibility of
German resumption of hostilities
. Admiral Beatty made a
lengthy presentation to the War Cabinet on October 20th. He
argued
:
To achieve the destruction of German Sea Power and
reduce Germany to the status of a second-rate
Naval Power, it is necessary to lay down in the
Naval Terms of the Armistice conditions which
would be commensurate with the results of a Naval
action
.
To achieve that purpose, Beatty emphasized the need to
obtain the surrender of both the High Seas Fleet and the
German submarine force. Despite the persuasiveness of
Beatty's presentation, the meeting proved inconclusive.
The War Cabinet finally resolved the issue on October
26th. Lloyd George suggested a more conciliatory position on
submarines, but the First Lord stuck to his guns. The War
Cabinet decided:
The naval condition of the armistice should
represent the admission of German defeat by sea in
the same degree as the military conditions
"ADM 116/1771: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Conditions
of Armistice", October 19, 1918.
^'^Marder, Scapa Flow , Vol V, 177.
^'Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Chalmers, Life and
Letters of David Beatty , 333.
129
recognize the corresponding admission of Germandefeat by land.-^
Wemyss recorded his gratification that the War Cabinet had
accepted his position that "as far as the Naval terms are
concerned it is impossible not to embody terms of peace.
Admiral Wemyss took these demands to the Allied Naval
. 44council. French Minister Georges Leygues on October 28th
opened the sixth session of the Allied Naval Council with a
proposal to demand the surrender of a large number of
submarines and surface vessels and to maintain the blockade.
First Lord Geddes then argued that the armistice terms "must
leave the German fleet reduced to impotence and unable at
will to disturb the peace of the world." *^ The Naval
Council accepted the British calculations as a basis for
negotiation and established a committee to determine
specific figures. Admiral Benson, the American Chief of
Naval Operations and a pronounced Anglophobe, sat quietly
through the first meeting. His primary concern involved the
disposition of the German fleet, any distribution of which
*^ar Council 491B, as recorded in Trask, Captains and
Cabinets , 326.
^^Admiral Wemyss, as recorded in Victoria Wester Wymess,
The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wymess (London, 1935),
386.
^^The Allied Naval Council, which comprised the civil
and service chiefs of Britain, France, Italy, and the United
States, met for the first time in November 1917.
^'Sir Eric Geddes, as recorded in Trask, Captains and
Cabinets
,
332.
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he feared would strengthen the Royal Navy against his own
service
Admiral Benson soon shattered the apparent unity of the
Allied Naval Council. On October 29th, he received a cable
from President Wilson which advocated moderate naval terms
in order to avoid unnecessary humiliation of Germany.
Benson then sought, without much success, to persuade his
naval colleagues that the ultimate disposition of the German
fleet could await the peace conference and that the
internment of the submarine force alone would suffice.
Wemyss felt Benson's efforts lacked substance but m.ade the
council meeting "tiresome . "^^ The Naval Council's draft
armistice terms (surrender of 160 submarines, ten
battleships and six battle cruisers, as well as a host of
lesser craft) mirrored the Anglo-American positions on the
14 Points; the position of the Admiralty carried the day,
48
while the United States reserved its views. Admiral Benson
sought help from his superior. Colonel House.
Admiral Benson flatly opposed the British position on
freedom of the seas. The wartime American naval attache in
London, Admiral William Sims, while testifying before
Congress in 1920, reported that Benson had told him: "Don't
let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of
our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We
would as soon fight the British as the Germans." See Mary
Klachko, Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of
Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD, 1987), 58, 97, 122-23.
*Wmiral Wemyss, as recorded in Wester Wemyss, Lord
Wester Wymess , 387.
*^Trask, Captains and Cabinets , 330-334.
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On the disposition of the German fleet, the views of
the political leaders assumed much greater convergence than
those of their naval advisors. Geddes presented the terms
of the Naval Council to the Supreme War Council on November
1st, with the accompanying explanation:
The list of ships to be surrendered has been drawn
up on the basis that if the Grand Fleet and the
High Seas Fleet were to fight a battle, the German
fleet would come out of it with the loss of the
equivalent of these ships. ^
He added that Germany possessed a lead in battle cruisers
which if unchecked would force the Allies to resume
shipbuilding. Allied Commander-in-Chief Ferdinand Foch
attacked these terms as unduly harsh--perhaps so harsh as to
lead the Germans to continue the war. Lloyd George, who
considered the proposals of the Allied Naval Council "rather
excessive," proposed a compromise; surrender of the
submarines together with the battle cruisers and internment
of the battleships.''' This suggestion satisfied the Supreme
War Counci 1
.
The Allied Naval Coxmcil reconsidered the situation the
same day. Geddes explained the compromise worked out by the
Supreme War Council. Wemyss then reiterated the Admiralty
arguments in favor of surrender of a large portion of the
Sir Eric Geddes, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate
Papers , 127.
^^Lloyd George, as recorded in Harder, Scapa Flow , Vol
V, 181.
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German Navy. French Chief of Staff Admiral Ferdinand de Bon
strongly supported Wemyss' position. Only Benson, who
feared a surrender of German battleships would result in a
distribution which would benefit the Royal navy--despite
assurances from Geddes--supported the Lloyd George
proposal. 5^ The Naval Council voted to resubmit its original
recommendation. Geddes privately sent a note to Lloyd
George explaining that if Germany regained the battleships
tentatively scheduled to be interned, she would have twelve
more than she had at the beginning of the war.^^
The Supreme War Council reached a substantive agreement
on the future of the German Fleet on November 4th. Benson
argued that internment of the ten German battleships would
"increase the probability of acceptance of the terms of the
armistice."'^ Foch once again protested that the harsh terms
of the naval experts threatened the armistice in return for
nominal gain. Lloyd George then proposed that Germany
should surrender her submarines, but that all surface
vessels might be interned in neutral ports. This suggestion
won acceptance from all political leaders present.
The Allied Naval Council thus found their room for
maneuver seriously restricted. The politicians told their
^'Harder, Scapa Flow , Vol V, 182.
^^ADM 116/1651: Geddes Note, November 2, 1918.
^Wmiral Benson, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate
Papers , 132.
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service advisors that the only responsibility of the Allied
Naval Council was to draw up the terms of internment. Lloyd
George then somewhat cushioned the blow by announcing that
the Supreme War Council had agreed that Germany would never
recover any of the interned vessels. First Lord Geddes
expressed his reluctant endorsement: "The Naval Council did
not agree but accepted the decision of the Ministers."'^ The
Allied Naval Council subsequently added several minor
modifications to the armistice terms: internment of the
German flagship Baden in place of the unfinished battle
cruiser Mackensen and the provision that if the victors were
unable to find neutral harbors, then they would utilize
Allied ports.
The terms of the armistice profoundly disturbed Admiral
Beatty. During the negotiations in Paris he sent a note to
the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, Sir Oswyn Murray,
opposing any substitution of internment for surrender.
After hearing from Wemyss that the Supreme War Council had
balked at requiring Germany to surrender the High Seas
Fleet, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet sent an
angry missive to the First Sea Lord on November 5th:
I was very perturbed at the underlying tone of
your letter, which indicated that the Supreme
Council might override the Naval Council. You
speak about, "If we are obliged to ease up our
5^Sir Eric Geddes, as recorded in Trask, Captains and
Cabinets
,
348.
55ADM 116/1651: Beatty Note, November 2, 1918.
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Naval terms", also "If our terms are put down bythe Supreme War Council, we can do nothing but
enter a protest."
Beatty's concerns, furthermore, were not limited to the
future of the High Seas Fleet. He also addressed the
absence of any mention of the German island fortress of
Heligoland, "which means that Germany, with any fleet of
battleships at all, can menace the Sea Power of this country
with her submarines . "^^ He even went so far as to suggest
the resignation of the Board of Admiralty in the event the
Supreme War Council decided on further reductions in the
naval terms of armistice with Germany. His anger was only
partly assuaged on November 21st, when he enjoyed the sight
of the High Seas Fleet sailing helplessly into Scapa Flow
under the guns of the Grand Fleet.
Beatty then sought to stiffen the position of the
Admiralty and ultimately the Cabinet on the issue of freedom
of the seas at the upcoming peace conference. In November,
he produced a paper, based on the Admiralty's work, which
portrayed blockade as "an economic weapon for use in extreme
emergencies against predatory continental emperors." He
^^Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Chalmers, Life and
Letters of David Beatty , 337-338.
57The decisions by Norway and Spain to refuse the German
fleet led the Allied Naval Council to decide on November 13,
1918 for internment at Scapa Flow. Detailed procedures for
the internment can be found in Ranft, Beatty Papers , 562-69.
^^Beatty MSS: Memorandum, "Freedom of the Seas",
November 29, 1918.
135
depicted the British blockade as a vital weapon in the
recent struggle with Germany:
The essential facts therefore are that the
blockade, with its kindred operations, has sappedthe vigor of the enemy people, has weakened theirfinancial resources, has killed their hope of
speedy economic recuperation, and has to some
extent impaired the efficiency of their fighting
machine .
^
About a month later, in another memorandum on the same
subject, Beatty condemned the confusion in maritime law
which resulted from the lack of precise definition of
conditional and absolute contraband and predicted that "in
the future, the distinctions between conditional and
absolute contraband will become hopelessly muddled." He
suggested that maritime rules "designed to protect a neutral
assisting a belligerent" (i.e., Wilson's Point II) would
"inevitably break down when vital issues are at stake and
the opposing navy is in a position to dispute them."^*"
The Admiralty, in preparation for the peace conference,
focused on three issues. The Board manifested its
opposition to both freedom of the seas and submarine warfare
in early November.^* Wemyss shared Beatty's belief in the
need to oppose Wilson's position on freedom of the seas.
^^Beatty MSS: Memorandiam, "Freedom of the Seas",
November 29, 1918.
'•ADM 116/1772: Memorandum, "Freedom of the Seas",
December 21, 1918.
"ADM 116/1852: Board Discussions on the Peace
Settlement, November 9, 1918.
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The First Sea Lord contended:
the crux of the matter, as far as we are
concerned, is the proposal with regard to "Freedom
of the Seas." Any limitation of sea-power is
clearly to our disadvantage and should be strongly
opposed.'^
Britain's two leading admirals also held similar views as to
the future of the submarine. Beatty advocated complete
elimination, recommending that:
Great Britain should take a definite standpoint in
the Peace Conference that submarine warfare should
be abolished, and the building of submarines
should be definitively prohibited by International
Law and the League of Nations."
The Admiralty also hoped to eliminate Germany as a
significant naval power. The Board wanted to strip Germany
of her colonies and to sink all German submarines, interned
vessels, and her nine remaining capital ships.
As far as naval arms limitation was concerned, the
Admiralty remained ambivalent. Wemyss, according to his
wife, believed that the League would "sink into a mere
debating society more likely to breed wars than prevent
them."^^ The Board violently objected to any arrangements
Admiral Wemyss, as recorded in Beatty MSS: "Notes on
Naval Interests Connected with the Peace Settlement",
December 1918.
*%eatty MSS: "Notes on Naval Interests Connected with
the Peace Settlement", December 1918.
^^ADM 116/1861: Admiralty Memorandum, "Admiralty Policy
in Relation to the Peace Settlement", January 6, 1919.
'tester Wymess, Wester Wymess , 410.
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which would "place i- the hands of some international
tribunal the responsibility of det errr.ining what force is
required for the protection of the Empire." The Admiralty
tentatively supported naval arm.s reductions (Wilson's Point
IV) so long as the Royal Navy maintained "adequate
superiority for reasonably possible contingencies." The
Board suggested, as a basis for determ.ining relative naval
strength and apportioning reductions, using the value of
overseas trade, a m.ethod which would m.aintain the
"predorr.inant position" of the Royal Navy. The Board
did not believe, however, that the "League would ration the
arrr^s of other nations and let Britain curb herself" and thus
concluded that arms limitation under the auspices of the
League was probably not feasible.
The British government seemed far m.ore concerned with
rapid dem.obi 1 ization of the wartim.e navy than with the
future of bl ockade or submarines . Hankey , on Novem.ber 22nd
,
predicted that the Adm.iralty would "becom.e a sideshow in 3
m.onths." The next day. Chancellor of the Exchequer Andrew
Bonar Law wrote to Sir Eric Geddes
,
strongly urging the
First Lord to reduce costs : "I am most anxious that the
cutting down of unnecessary expenditure should take place at
^^ADM 116/1772: Adm.iralty Mem.orandum, "Naval Aspects of
a League of Nations and Limitation of Arm.am.ents" , December
23, 1918; ADM 116/1863: Naval Sections Paris Records -
League of Nations, undated.
^'Roskill, Hankey , Vol II, 22.
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once." Only Winston Churchill, at that time Minister of
Munitions, sounded a note of warning:
Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think
of, or dream of, or anyone may tell you, no
arguments, however specious, no appeals, however
seductive, must lead [Britain] to abandon that
naval sunremacy on which the life of our countrydepends."
Nonetheless, within a month the Board of Admiralty learned
that the navy's wartime unlimited vote of credit ended with
the fiscal year on March 31, 1919 and that they needed the
blessing of the Treasury before spending money on new
warship construction. " The Admiralty Board therefore
decided not to continue with the construction of their
newest class of battle cruisers.^*
While the British government was reducing the size of
the Royal Navy, the Wilson Administration laid a naval
building program before Congress. At the end of the war,
the United States possessed a navy inferior to that of Great
Britain: 16 dreadnoughts against 42 capital ships
(battleships and battle cruisers). Due to the need for
^^ADM 116/1809: Bonar Law to Geddes, November 23, 1918.
^^inston Churchill, as recorded in Klatchko, Admi ral
Benson , 136.
^^Roskill, Naval Policy , 104.
^*ADM 116/1772: Admiralty Memorandum re Battle Cruiser
Program, January 14 , 1919
.
^^Sprouts , New Order , 51 . Roski 1 1 , Naval Policy , 71
,
credits the Royal Navy with a total of 70 capital ships,
including an unspecified number of pre-dreadnought vintage.
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convoy escorts, the United States had temporarily delayed
work on its 1916 program of 10 battleships and 6 battle
cruisers, together with 3 battleships authorized in 1914-
7315. Completion of these vessels would provide America with
superiority in modern capital ships by 1924, as Britain's
fleet included many older battleships.^* The 1918 program
provided for an additional 10 battleships and 6 battle
cruisers over a three-year period. It also included a
clause that allowed Wilson to cancel the program in the
event of diplomatic agreement. Secretary of the Navy
Josephus Daniels explained to the House Naval Affairs
Committee that Wilson supported the fleet because its
authorization would help him at the upcoming peace
conf erence .^^
Admiral Benson opposed these delays, arguing that the
United States could "expect the future to give us more
potential enemies than potential friends so that our safety
must lie in our own resources." See Trask, Captains and
Cabinets , 48
.
74Admiral Benson fervently hoped that regardless of the
outcome of the peace conference, the United States would
build a navy "equal to or superior to that of any other
country." See Klatchko, Admiral Benson . 130.
75Sprouts, New Order , 58n. The United States Navy
Board, which originally proposed 12 battleships and 16
battle cruisers, viewed "the British Navy as the maximum
possible force which we must be prepared to meet." See
Trask, Captains and Cabinets , 290
.
Ison earlier told Benson that he wanted "to go into
the Peace conference armed with as many weapons as my
pockets will hold so as to compel justice." See Trask,
Captains and Cabinets , 310.
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The 1918 program pointed up a contradiction in Wilson's
position. In the Fourteen Points, he publicly called for
national armaments to be "reduced to the lowest point
consistent with domestic safety. "^^ At the same time, he
recognized the potential value of a maritime police force.
He also wanted to reduce the preeminence of the Royal Navy.
The meeting of the Supreme War Council with Colonel House
had already demonstrated his willingness to use the size of
the American Fleet as a bargaining chip. Historian Mary
Klatchko concludes that Wilson "intended to use the naval
building program as leverage during negotiations in Paris. "^^
In Paris, the issue of freedom of the seas caused
little problem. Wilson's vision of the post-war world
rested upon establishment of a League of Nations. He
understood the intensity of Britain's commitment to
blockade, and he wanted to avoid a battle with London.^" He
also believed that the establishment of the League would
greatly reduce the importance of the issue of freedom of the
77Point IV, as recorded in Grenville, International
Treaties , 57
.
^^Balfour MSS: Derby to Balfour, December 20/23, 1918.
^^Klat chko, Admi ra 1 Benson , 132.
80The Times , for instance, declared on December 11,
1918: "This war could not have been won for civilization but
for the British sea power. There can therefore be no
question, so far as this country is concerned, of
diminishing the sharpness of the weapon that has given us
the victory in this war." See Ray Baker, Woodrow Wilson and
World Settlement. (Garden City, NY, 1922), 381.
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seas. * Furthermore, his own naval advisor, Benson, shared
Beatty's view that legal restrictions on sea power would
operate only in peacetime.*^ When Lloyd George suggested
that "the matter could be left for further consideration
after the League of Nations has been established and proved
in its capacity in actual working," the President agreed.
American legal expert David Hunter Miller subsequently
accepted Australian Prime Minister William Hughes'
suggestion to drop from the draft covenant of the League the
implication that the Permanent Court of International
Justice might exercise jurisdiction over freedom of the
seas. • When Miller presented the revised draft covenant of
the League of Nations to the Peace Conference on February
14, 1919, it contained no reference to freedom of the seas.^'
*In September 1919, Wilson used some verbal
prestidigitation to explain the absence of freedom of the
seas at Paris: "One of the principles I went to Paris most
insisting on was the freedom of the seas. Now, the freedom
of the seas means the definition of the rights of neutrals
to use the seas when other nations are at war, but under the
League of Nations there are no neutrals, and, theref ore . . . by
the very thing that I was advocating it became unnecessary
to define freedom of the seas." See Buehrig, Woodrow
Wilson , 262-63.
01
Dingman, Pacific , 76-77.
^%avid Lloyd George, as recorded in Maurice Hankey, The
Supreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (London,
1963), 16.
^^Egerton, League of Nations . 127.
^Tor the complete text of the compromise draft, see
Baker, World Settlement , Vol III, 144-151.
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Secondary matters, however, proved more difficult to
resolve
.
The "naval battle of Paris" focused primarily upon the
American program of naval expansion. First Lord of the
Admiralty Walter Long, who replaced Sir Eric Geddes on
January 16, 1919, expressed the Admiralty's concern over the
American naval building program to the Prime Minister in
late February:
The Navy... is the very foundation of our existence
as a free people, and we cannot afford to trifle
with our Naval Strength. It may be that the
U.S.A. are bluffing, but we cannot, I submit,
presiime that this is the case, and therefore I
recommend diplomatic action.
British apprehension over the American threat to British
naval superiority was not limited to the Admiralty. Lloyd
George's assistants in Paris, Hankey and Philip Kerr,
portrayed an Anglo-American naval limitation agreement as a
prerequisite for the effective operation of the League:
The first condition of success for the League of
Nations is... a firm understanding between the
British Empire and the United States of
America ... that there will be no competitive
building up of fleets.
They advised making British acceptance of the League
provisional upon American willingness to accept naval arms
limitation.
"•Walter Long, as recorded in Harder, Scapa Flow . Vol V,
230 .
^^Hankey/Kerr memorandiim, as recorded in Egerton, League
of Nations, 158.
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Lloyd George accepted their recommendation to use the
League as a means of forcing the United states to make naval
concessions. Robert, Viscount Cecil, the head of the League
of Nations section within the Foreign Office, explained to
Lloyd George that Wilson required an amendment to the League
covenant protecting the Monroe Doctrine in order to overcome
opposition within the United States Senate. On March 26th,
the Prime Minister explained to Cecil that he was "anxious
to induce the Americans to give up their plans of building
ships against the British" and ordered him to veto the
inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the covenant of the
38League. Cecil informed House the following day that
British acceptance of the League covenant depended upon a
naval arrangement.
The civil and professional heads of the respective
services proved unable to reach agreement. The dispute
nearly reached the point of fisticuffs in late March when
Admiral Wemyss paid an unscheduled visit upon Secretary
Daniels to discuss the 1918 program. Admiral Benson arrived
and felt burdened to correct what he considered as Wemyss'
disregard of diplomatic etiquette. Daniels, some years
later, described the confrontation:
I never saw two men of their high standing so
infuriated as Admiral Benson and Admiral
Wemyss ... They exchanged such bitter comments that
at one time I feared they would pass the bounds
^^Robert, Viscount Cecil as recorded in Egerton, League
of Nations, 161.
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and have an altercation.^^
Daniels and Long subsequently struggled to reconcile the
British aim of naval superiority with the American goal of
naval parity. Daniels, who claimed that "the peace of the
world demanded equality of naval strength" between Britain
and the United States, suggested that passage of the League
covenant might render the 1918 naval building program
super fluous.'^ Long responded by stating that the existing
American building programs precluded British support for the
League. * Benson then went so far as to assert that British
attempts to maintain naval superiority would lead to war.'^
Poor personal relations between Lloyd George and Wilson
complicated attempts to resolve the Anglo-American naval
conflict. Upset with Wilson's condemnation of British naval
practices early in the war, the Prime Minister described the
American President as "so stupidly unpleasant to both sides
that statesmen of the fighting alliances were never quite
Josephus Daniels, as recorded in Klachko, Admiral
Benson , 144.
on
Sprouts, New Order , 65. On January 4, 1918, Daniels
told Wilson that if the Peace Conference failed, the United
States would need the greatest navy in the world. See Seth
Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919 (Princeton, 1961), 288.
'*Marder, Scapa Flow , V, 231.
%latchko. Admiral Benson , 147.
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sure where his sy-pathies lay."^^ Wilson, ir. turn,
complained to Daniels that "I will come out of the war
hating the English."'^ The President offended his British
counterpart at a state dinner at Buckingham Palace in
December 1918, when he failed to pay tribute to the Royal
95Navy. During the peace conference, Lloyd George became
annoyed, according to his confidential secretary, with the
President's habits of returning to issues which Lloyd George
regarded as settled and "preaching the gospel of the League,
while increasing arm.y & navy."'^ Lloyd George thus bypassed
Wilson and turned to Daniels in an attempt to resolve the
naval controversy
.
On April 1st, Lloyd George and Daniels met over
breakfast to try to am.eliorate the Anglo-American tension.
The Prim.e Minister pointedly suggested that the United
States "ought to stop work on your cruisers and dreadnoughts
David Lloyd George, as recorded in Walworth, America '
s
Moment , 5 . Wilson, for example, annul led an arrangem.ent
concluded by Colonel House and Arthur Balfour whereby the
United States would forego the construction of capital ships
during the war in return for an option to buy British ships
at the conclusion of hostilities. Balfour MSS: Cabinet
Memoranda , 1914-18
.
^*Woodrow Wilson, as recorded by Trask, Captains and
Cabinets , 283-84.
^^Lloyd George, Mem.oirs of the Peace Conference . Vol I,
113, called the speech a "blunder."
'^Frances Stevenson, as recorded in Taylor, Ll oyd
George: A Diary , 172-175.
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if you really believe in the League of Nations."'^ Daniels
explained that the United States Navy required the new ships
to fulfill its extensive responsibilities which, he claimed,
exceeded those of the Royal Navy. Lloyd George heatedly
disagreed, and the meeting ended in an impasseJ^ Wilson's
call, on April 6th, for the George Washington to take him
back to the United States made clear to both sides that room
for maneuver was limited.
Cecil and Colonel House, who shared a fierce
determination to reach agreement, finally found an
appropriate formula. Cecil wrote a letter to House on April
8th. He described the American 1918 program as "wholly
inconsistent with the conception of the League of Nations"
and as leading "to a competition in arms." He next asked
House to recognize that "the British sentiment about sea
power ... [was] an article of faith with every British
SB
statesman." Cecil then proposed that, in exchange for
support on the League of Nations, America should agree to
abandon the new naval program and to consult annually with
the British government concerning relative naval strength.
House, with Wilson's approval, agreed the following day to
^ David Lloyd George, as recorded in Tillman Angl o-
American Relations , 291.
'harder, Scapa Flow , Vol V, 233.
^^Robert, Viscount Cecil as recorded in Seymour,
Intimate Papers , Vol IV, 418-19.
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abandon or modify the 1918 program, without mentioning the
1916 program. Upon further discussion. House agreed to
postpone construction under the 1916 program on ships not
yet begun until the signing of the peace treaty.*'^'' As a
result of the Cecil-House compromise, Britain maintained her
existing naval superiority, while the United States retained
the right to achieve parity through completion of the 1916
program.
The potential naval competition between America and
Britain complicated the disposition of German naval
resources. Britain originally desired the wholesale
elimination of Germany's naval strength. The Admiralty
recommended that all German colonial possessions be retained
by the Allied Powers and that all battleships, battle
cruisers, and submarines, together with most of the German
auxiliary vessels "be sunk in deep water within three months
of the signing of the Peace Treaty." In Paris, Benson
concurred on the grounds that distribution of the German
naval assets "makes it impossible during many years to come
'02
for the American Navy to overtake the British Navy.*
France, however, indicated a desire to retain a share of the
-'^"^Egerton, League of Nations , 162. In May, President
Wilson withdrew his support for the 1918 program.
-°-ADM 116/1772: Admiralty Memorandum, "Disposal of
Enemy Ships", January 6, 1919.
-^^Baker, Woodrow Wilson , Vol III, 205.
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High Seas Fleet as compensation for construction prevented
by the war. House, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau accepted
partition of the German fleet on March 7th, under the
condition that Britain, Japan, and the United States would
sink their shares.-^-
This compromise quickly broke down. Lloyd George had
agreed to sink the British share on the understanding that
the United States would cease building against Britain. -'^^
Subsequent discussions revealed that the American delegation
did not share this appreciation. Long then observed:
If the United States were determined to proceed
with their huge program, we should have to
reconsider our position, and might be obliged to
utilize our^^hare for the purpose for which they
were built.
On April 25th, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau again
met to discuss the future of the captured German vessels,
but they were unable to find a formula on which they could
agree. When German sailors of the interned High Seas Fleet
scuttled their ships on June 21, 1919, they effectively
ended the distribution question.
The final question of significance to be addressed at
Paris involved the future of the submarine. The Admiralty
favored "universal prohibition against the building of
-^^Seymour, Intimate Papers , Vol IV, 356-58.
-"^^Roskill, Naval Policy , 264.
'^^Jalter Long, as recorded by Harder, Scapa Flow , Vol
V, 265.
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submarines, together with the general destruction of
existing submarines under international auspices.""^ During
the course of the peace conference, the British had
persuaded Benson and Daniels to support abolition.*" The
Allied naval delegates considered the suppression of
submarine warfare on May 1st. At that meeting, the French
again proved an impediment to Anglo-American cooperation.
Viewing the submarine as a weapon for weaker naval powers,
they opposed any limitation on the relatively inexpensive
alternative to the capital ship. Minister of Marine Leygues
argued that "there is no treacherous weapon, there can only
be treachery in the way the weapon is used.""^ In the face
of French intransigence, the Admiralty failed to secure the
abolition of the submarine.
The delegates at the peace conference terminated the
"naval battle of Paris." Wilson abandoned both his notion
of freedom of the seas and the 1918 program in return for
British acceptance of a League covenant which recognized the
Monroe Doctrine. The scuttling of the High Seas Fleet
obviated disagreement over the distribution of German ships.
Nonetheless, the conference compromises represented a truce,
-^^ADM 116/1772: Admiralty Memorandum, "Freedom of the
seas: The Use of Mines and Submarines in War", January 21,
1919.
"^Roskill, Naval Policy , 92.
•''^Georges Leygues, as recorded in Marder, Scapa Flow .
Vol V, 258.
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not a treaty, with the relative strengths of the Anglo-
American navies still unresolved and the submarine still
considered a legitimate weapon of war, Britain struggled to
determine a post-war naval policy.
CHAPTER 5
TOWARDS A NATIONAL POLICY, 1919-1920
In the aftermath of the First World War, the British
government sought to determine an appropriate naval policy.
The Lloyd George ministry found itself in a milieu that
differed from its pre-war counterpart in two important
aspects: the British populace had developed new views on the
relative importance of armaments and social services, while
the costs of the war had adversely affected the balance of
His Majesty's Exchequer. The Cabinet alternated emphasis
between economy and security. In August 1919, it announced
a drastic reduction in expenditure and ordered the fighting
services to base their estimates on the assumption of no
major war for ten years. With apparent disregard for
budgetary consequences, however, the First Lord of the
Admiralty announced in March 1920 the government's intention
to maintain a navy at least equal in strength to any other.
For nearly two years, the government sought a balance
between the advocates of sea power and the proponents of
"Treasury control."
The Great War accelerated a trend in British domestic
opinion that the Boer War had initiated: a retreat from the
martial bellicosity of the late Victorian period. The
butcher's bill for Britain exceeded three-quarters of a
152
million dead and double that number wounded.^ The officer
corps suffered disproportionate losses, and neither the
royal household nor the Cabinet escaped sacrifice.^ This
terrible loss seared the public consciousness.^ In the fall
of 1918, for example, one of the magazines of the British
Expeditionary Force in France labelled war as "the vilest
disaster that can befall mankind."* One reflection of this
revulsion against war was a growing willingness to see law
replace force majeure as the ultimate arbiter in
international relations
This view found particular favor with the British Left.
A coalition of Liberals and members of the Independent
A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (New York,
1965), 120.
2Deaths from the entourage of George V included three
aides-de-camp, plus the only son of Sir Arthur Bigge, the
King's Private Secretary, while Andrew Bonar Law lost two
sons, Herbert Asquith sacrificed two nephews and oldest son
Raymond, and Cabinet Secretary Sir Maurice Hankey parted
with his brother Donald. See Nicolson, King George V , 253.
Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New
York, 1975), passim , relies on the works of Robert Graves
and Sigf ried Sassoon
,
among others . Al f red Havinghurst
,
Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century (Chicago,
1979), 152-53, develops in related fashion the concept of a
"lost generation," which A. J. P. Taylor points out produced
three Prime Ministers and, moreover, lost fewer men to the
war than the anticipated figure for emigration, running at
300,000 per year before the war.
^The Wipers Times , as recorded in Wilson, Myriad Faces ,
756.
^Gerda Crosby, Disarmament and Peace in British
Politics 1914-1919 (Cambridge, 1957), 95.
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Labour Party formed the Union of Democratic Control (U.D.C.)
in November 1914 in opposition to the British war effort.
The U.D.C. advocated a supranational organization for the
enforcement of international law combined with dramatic
reduction of armaments.* At the conclusion of hostilities,
the Labour Party viewed armaments as a major cause of
international conflict.^ According to Paul Kennedy, a
coalition of organizations, including the Union of
Democratic Control, the League of Nations Union, the
National Peace Council, and the Peace Pledge Union, sought
to impart to the public the belief that:
the pacific settlement of all disputes, the rule
of law rather than the rule of force, the
condemnation of those old-fashioned and patriotic
sentiments, the turning of swords into plowshares
and, above all, the belief in the sanctity and
efficacy of an international 'public
opinion' . . .would deter aggressors by moral suasion
al one
.
The League of Nations Union, through seventy public rallies
held across the nation on the anniversary of the armistice,
Crosby, Disarmament , 17.
^Kenneth Miller, Socialism and Foreign Policy: Theory
and Practice (The Hague, 1967), 106. Sir Edward Grey,
Liberal Foreign Secretary from 1905-1916, later blamed the
outbreak of the Great War on the pre-war arms race: "Great
armaments lead inevitably to war. If there are armaments on
one side there must be armaments on other sides. While one
nation arms, other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by
remaining def encel ess . . . . The enormous growth of armaments in
Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them--it
was these that made war inevitable." See Kennedy, Strategy
and Diplomacy , 165.
^Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy . 26.
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became a leading pressure group on behalf of a new direction
in British foreign affairs.'
Such convictions eroded the previous position of the
Navy as the guarantor of British national security. Changes
in public opinion affected popular perception of the fleet
in two ways. First, advocates of international authority
considered the British Navy a potential stumbling block to
the success of the League. David, Baron Davies, for
example, an ardent supporter of the League, argued that "the
prevention of war depends upon the ability of the League to
secure justice" and "that justice cannot be achieved without
disarmament." In his opinion, Britain's ratification of the
Versailles Treaty severely restricted the scope of the navy,
which could best be used as part of an international police
force under the auspices of the League. Davies asserted
that "it is not, however, enough to sheath the sword: it
must be handed over for safe keeping to an international
authority."^" Second, a union of Radicals and Labourites,
such as Ramsay MacDonald, who argued against the utility and
morality of national armed forces, also tended to oppose the
notion that any people could hold another in subjugation.^^
Egerton, League of Nations , 175.
^"oavid Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth Century: A
Study in International Relationships (London, 1930), 54,
646-49.
^^A.P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies
(Garden City, NY, 1959), 302.
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As the defense of the British Empire constituted one of the
primary justifications for the maintenance of the Royal
Navy, the rising strength of anti-imperialist sentiment
signified, in some measure, a decline in support for naval
predominance
.
While popular opinion, particularly among the Left,
became increasingly enamored with the notion that the
arbitration of international disputes might replace war,
Parliament took scant notice of the new organization. The
1918 Election produced a House of Commons that contained an
unusually large number of businessmen, 260 against an
average of 200, giving rise to Lloyd George's description of
Commons as "the Trades Union Congress on the opposition
benches and the Chamber of Congress on the governm.ent
side."* The domestic and commercial orientation of Commons
led one historian to describe it as "certainly one of the
most insular and ignorant in British history." The lack of
concern with foreign policy (Ireland excepted) in the House
left such policy in the hands of the Lloyd George ministry.
David Lloyd George, as recorded in T.O. Lloyd, Empire
to Welfare State; English History, 1906-1967 (London, 1970),
100. Conservative Stanley Baldwin described the House of
Commons as a group of "hard-faced men who looked as if they
had done well out of the war." See Taylor, English History ,
129.
*'F.S. Northedge, as recorded in Havinghurst, Britain in
Transition , 151. The "Coupon" election, so-called after
Asquith's epithet for the letter of support issued by Lloyd
George and Bonar Law to approved Coalition candidates, gave
the Coalition 520 seats out of 707.
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A majority of senior policy makers remained unconvinced
of the soundness of the public's faith in the League of
Nations.-^ Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office felt that the
League would disrupt economic cooperation within the British
Empire. Leo Amery worried about the undue influence of
small states, pointing to the prospect of "Great Britain and
the United States together being outvoted by a com.bination
of Liberia, Montenegro, and Guatemala."'^ Sir Eyre Crowe,
who rose from assistant under-secretary to permanent-
undersecretary of the Foreign Office in 1920, believed that
unwarranted aggression in Europe could not be prevented by
economic blockade or boycott--the methods of collective
security--but only by "real military preponderance," which
included numbers, cohesion, efficiency, and geographical
location (i.e., the balance of power)." The reservations
held by most diplomats and servicemen stemmed from, similar
'Lord Cecil remained the only senior British official
who vigorously supported the League; his most powerful ally
was General Jan Christian Sm.uts of South Africa, who joined
the Imperial War Cabinet in July 1917. After these two , one
must look to such relatively obscure civil servants as
Arthur Salter and Frank Walters. See Egerton, League of
Nations , 177.
'^Belof f , Imperial Sunset , 292-93 .
^^Leo Amery, War and Peace 1914-1929 . 162.
'7
**Sir Eyre Crowe, as recorded in Harnett, Collapse of
British Power , 245. Crowe's 1907 memorandum on the balance
of power remains the classic application of that doctrine to
British policy. See Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power , 355-
56.
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coricerns with the League's inability to enforce its decrees
on recalcitrant states.-^ Chief of the Imperial General
Staff Sir Henry Wilson, for example, declared that "to build
on the League was to build on shifting sands. "^^
Sir Maurice Hankey, the secretary to the Cabinet,
regarded the League in a manner representative of many other
leading members of the Coalition government. During the war,
he criticized Lord Robert Cecil's proposals for a League of
Nations on the grounds that it would "create a sense of
security which is wholly fictitious." He continued
prophetically that the League:
will only result in failure and the longer that
failure is postponed the m.ore certain it is that
this country will have been lulled to sleep. It
will put a very strong lever into the hands of the
wel 1 -m.eaning idealists who are to be found in
alm.ost every Government, who deprecate expenditure
on armaments
,
and, in the course of time, it wil
1
almost certainly result in this nation being
caught at a disadvantage
.
Later, he decided that a League based on the Supreme War
Counci 1 might serve as a useful cl earinghouse for
ministerial exchanges, but he never believed it could
substitute for military preparedness. He therefore declined
Beloff, Im>perial Sunset , 295. Even Lord Davies, one
of the League's most ardent supporters, worried about this
problem. See Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth Century ,
54.
-^General Wilson, as recorded in Egerton, League of
Nations , 159.
Balfour MSS: 49704, Hankey to Balfour, May 25, 1916.
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an appointment as the League's first secretary general after
a survey of Britain's leading statesmen, including an
extensive interview with the Prime Minister, convinced him
that the fledgling organization would prove ineffective."
The Cabinet itself reflected the traditional British
appreciation for the role of force in international
relations. In 1917, the Cabinet discussed the future of
the League, guided by papers from Lord Robert Cecil and Sir
Eyre Crowe. Thomas Jones, one of Hankey's assistant Cabinet
Secretaries, recorded the following discussion of the
League
:
The members ranged between those who hope for m.uch
and those who hope for little. The latter fear
danger of being lulled into false security by a
League , and the danger of com.prehensi ve and
am.bitious projects. Are you going to have a
general conference to interfere in the affairs of
the world? Think of the agenda and what a field
day the sm.al 1 Powers will have • Even the Hague
Conferences have 1 ed to anim.osi ties . Conferences
will lead to the nursing of grievances, aj^d to
instability. Who will be our next enem.y?"
The Cabinet shared Hankey ' s opinion that whi 1 e the League
Egerton, League of Nations . 167-68
.
^^The Coalition Cabinet, formed in January 1919,
included Prime Minister David Lloyd George; Lord President
Arthur Balfour; Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon; Lord Privy
Seal Andrew Bonar Law; Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen
Chamberlain; Colonial Secretary Lord Milner; Secretary for
War and Air Winston Churchill; First Lord of the Adm.iralty
Walter Long; and Minister of Transport Sir Eric Geddes.
Taylor, English History , 646, lists the com.plete Cabinet.
^"Thom.as Jones, as recorded in Keith Middlem.as, ed,
Whitehall Diary. I: 1916-1925 (London, 1969), 32-33.
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might serve a useful function, it was no substitute for
military preparedness. One British historian regards the
Lloyd George governm.ent as am.ong the last in which:
Britain's policies were decided by a select group
of aristocrats, country squires and men of
comjT.erce, who argued without m.uch concern for the
views of the m.asses about the 'national interest'
and who usually displayed a wish to preserve that
interest energetically, if need be by armed
f orce
Lloyd George, for exam.ple, ordered im.perial forces to
support the Greek expedition to Turkey. He wrote: "I
certainly m.eant to fight and I was certain we would win.""
Winston Churchill, in a sim.ilar vein, wanted Britain to
intervene "thoroughly with large forces, abundantly supplied
with mechanical appliances" against the Bolsheviks .^^
Churchill hated Russian Corrjr^.unisrr., which he believed had the
potential to cause "universal coll apse and anarchy
11
"Kennedy, Naval Mastery , 271. Wilson, Myriad Faces ,
7 57 , shares Kennedy ' s view that Pari iament rejected the
public's repudiation of force as a legitimate tool of
foreign policy,
David Lloyd George, as recorded in F.S. Northedge, The
Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers 1916-1939
(New York, 1966), 151. The Greek occupation of Smyrna in
1919 inspired Turkish resistance under Mustapha Kem.al . When
Kem.alist forces routed the Greeks and approached
Constantinople, Lloyd George directed land and naval forces
to Chanak to keep the Turks in Asia.
^S^inston Churchill, as recorded in William Manchester,
The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Visions of Glory,
1874-1932 (New York, 1983), 679.
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throughout Europe and Asia."^" More co-pel ling for
-en of
their character was the state of British national finance.
The precise i-pact of the Great War on the British
economy remains unclear. That the war brought some distinct
gains can hardly be denied. An endless stream of orders
from, the Ministry of Munitions, combined with the loss of
5.7 m.illion m.en m.obilized in the fighting services, forced
the industrial sector towards greater efficiency : the
standardization of com.ponents, the recycling of metals, the
modification of factory interiors, up-to-date accounting
m.ethods, increased use of unskilled labour, and the
im.plem.entation of new processes discovered under the im.petus
of wartim.e requirem.ents .^^ The British shipbuilding
industry, for exam.pl e, adapted to m.erchant vessel
construction a system, of autom.atic welding devel oped for
warships, whose rivets had tended to x^ork loose under the
vibration of naval gunfire . Increased cooperation between
firm.s m.ultiplied the im.pact of each new devel opm.ent
,
Winston Churchill, as recorded in Kenneth Young,
Churchill & Beaverbrook: A Study in Friendship (London,
1966), 55. Lloyd George appointed Churchill Minister of
Munitions in July 1917 , despite the nearly universal
opposition to the return of the m.an responsible for the
Dardanelles fiasco, prim.arily out of fear that Churchill, if
left out of the government, would combine with Sir Edward
Carson to sweep Lloyd George from office. See Rowland,
David Lloyd George , 407-09.
"Tol lard, British Sconom.y , 53-62
.
^^ilson. Myriad Faces . 782-83.
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according to econorr.ic historian R.H. Tawney, "by breaking
down trade jealousies and secrecies and accustoming firrr.s
engaged in the same industry to joint action. "^^ The British
government, furtherm.ore
, aggressively supported new or
previously insignificant industries, such as aircraft, dye
stuffs and optics, in its drive for autarky. British
industry, as a result, emerged from the war with its
productive capacity enhanced
The impact of the war was not, however, entirely
beneficial
.
Britain lost the potential contributions of
over two m.illion workers killed or m.aim.ed during the
conflict
. Rol ling stock and physical plant suffered
deterioration due to inadequate m.aintenance . Additionally,
some of the new construction palliated wartim.e requirements
without addressing 1 ong-term. needs . New steel m.il Is , for
exampl e , were bui It in existing industrial centers , such as
Cumber 1 and and Sheffield , rather than in the vicinity of the
iron ore fields, where transportation costs, and hence
production costs, would have been reduced,' Wartim.e
expansion
,
according to econom.ic historian Duncan Burn , "put
new obstacles in the way of radical adaptation to changed
%,H. Tawney, as recorded in Pollard, British Economy .
55.
-*Lloyd, Sm.pire to Welfare State , 440 ( chart ), reveal s
that the total value of British industrial production in
1920 surpassed that of any previous year.
'^Taylor, English History , 122.
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circumstances of raw-material supply, technique, and
competition" and thus reinforced som.e of the ingrained
inefficiencies of British industry.
Of greater im.port to Britain's economic future, the war
proved detrimental to her position as a supplier of finished
goods on the international m.arket. During the war, British
shops and British shipping diverted their efforts from
customary comjr.ercial orders in order to supply the incessant
dem.ands of the armed services. Developing nations, finding
Britain unable to satisfy their needs, turned to alternative
sources, such as Japan or the United States. Britain's
share of the world's shipping construction, for exam.ple,
fell from 58.7% in 1909-14 to 35% in 1920.-- In related
fashion, the wartim.e dem.and for military and naval armam.ents
stimulated world-wide expansior* in steelworks."" British
staple industries after the war thus found themselves faced
with markets characterized by over-capacity. Yet, from the
Arm.istice until the spring of 1920, a post-war boom,
stimulated by the pent-up dem^ands of domestic consumption,
masked the structural weaknesses of the British economy
.
33Duncan Burn, as recorded in Wilson, Myriad Faces . 790.
Kennedy , Naval Mastery , 260
.
^"Pol lard, British Economy , 57 , notes that during the
war the steel -m.aking capacity of both Britain and the United
States increased by 50%.
""Havinghurst , Britain in Transition . 158
.
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The war did surprisingly little damage to Britair/s
favorable position with regard to capital investinent abroad.
Before the war, Britain invested in foreign ventures over
£150 millions per year. By 1914, British overseas
investments exceeded £4,000 millions, of which the share in
the United States (£850 millions) alone produced an annual
income of about £85 millions. During the course of the war,
on governm.ent urging, private investors liquidated some £550
m.illions, a figure partially offset by £250 m.illions of new
investm.ent, so the net reduction totalled only £300
37
m.il 1 ions . The British governm.ent , the financial m.ainstay
of the Allied coalition, lent £1,741 m.illions to co-
belligerents: £171 millions within the Em.pire, £412.5
m.illions to Italy, £434.5 millions to France, and £568
m.il 1 ions to Russia . Against these 1 cans she borrowed
£1, 3 65 m.i 1 1 ions , of which £1,027 m.i 1 1 ions cam.e from the
United States."' Britain thus raised m.ore than the cost of
her own war effort from internal resources, as the net loans
to her Al 1 ies si ight 1 y exceeded the sale of foreign
securities
.
"Pol lard , British Sconomy , 72 ; Tayl or , English History ,
123.
^^The Bolshevik government subsequently repudiated the
debt contracted by the tsarist regim.e.
•-Pol 1 ard , British Econom.y , 7 4 ; Tayl or , English History ,
123, lists British lending as £1,825 millions and British
borrowing as £1,340 millions.
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The greatest and most detrimental impact of the war
with respect to finance involved a massive increase in the
size of the National Debt. To raise the revenues necessary
to support imperial forces in the field, the Asquith
ministry sought to augment both tax assessments and
government borrowing. After an initial attempt to raise the
duty on beer and tea, the Exchequer relied primarily on
increases in direct taxes, including income tax, supertax,
and excess profits duty, to render the necessary income.
The yield from these taxes increased dramatically, from £94
millions in 1913-14 to £721 millions in 1919-20.*^
Nonetheless, tax revenues paled in comparison to the
expenses of the war, which cost Britain about £7,500
42millions. Britain raised only 30.5% of her income through
Taxation would have been higher except for the
influence of Chancellor of the Exchequer Andrew Bonar Law.
Civil servant J.C.C. Davidson explained that "McKenna and
Lloyd George had both been exponents of higher taxation, but
with Bonar the policy changed and taxation was held at a
steady level." See Robert Rhodes James, ed. Memoirs of a
Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs and Papers, 1910-
1937 (New York, 1970), 52.
*^Pollard, British Economy . 64, notes that income tax
rates rose from Is. 2d. in the pound in 1913-14 to 6s. by
1918-19, while the number of taxpayers increased from 1.2
million to 7.8 million in the same period.
*^Henry Grady, British War Finance 1914-1919 (New York,
1968), 122-23. Grady lists total expenditure from August
1914 through September 1919 as £10,271 millions and then
subtracts £1,000 millions for estimated normal expenditures,
£870 millions for recoverable Allied loans, £221 millions
for Imperial obligations, £425 millions for war stocks, and
£240 millions of tax arrears.
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taxation between August 1, 1914 and September 30th, 1919.-^
At that mo-ent, the National Debt, which before the war
totalled about £650 millions, thus approached £7,800
millions.- The service of the National Debt, which consumed
about 14% of the pre-war budget, swallowed two-fifths of
Britain's post-war tax revenues/'^
At a time when the cost of the war strained the
national Exchequer, Britain found that peace brought with it
additional expenses. During the 1918 Election, Lloyd George
him.self promised "to m.ake Britain a fit country for heroes
to live in."^-^ The public then dem.anded that the governm.ent
assum.e responsibi 1 ity for an increased array of social
services, such as public education and subsidized housing.
Grady , War Finance , 75 ; Bunselmeyer , Cost of the War ,
137, gives a figure of 28% through 1918. Grady, War
Finance , 121; and Pol lard, British Economy , 66-67 , describe
the m.echanisms (Treasury bills. War Bonds, and Ways and
Means Advances) through which the Treasury funded the debt.
it
"Grady , War Finance , 123 ; Pol lard , British Economy , 66
,
201; and Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy , 97, treat the
post-war Debt som.ewhat differently. Pollard notes the Debt
reached a maximum of £7,830 millions in March 1920, while
Kennedy simply lists the Debt as £7,400 millions,
^^Taylor, English History . 124; Pollard, British
Economy , 201. Taylor argues that the Debt "did not diminish
the wealth of the community at all," as it m.erely
transferred wealth from those who paid taxes to the holders
(approximately 17 million) of War Loans.
^^David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
Lloyd George, 467
.
'^Lloyd, Empire to Welfare State , 105-10. The Labour
Party supported these demands, but the Asquithian wing of
the Liberal Party did not.
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Popular dissatisfaction peaked in May 1919, when a mob of
ex-servicemen attempted to storm the House of Commons. The
Lloyd George ministry hastily announced plans for 300,000
new homes, with a supplemental program, of public relief."
The funding of various social services, which in 1914
consumed about 4% of Britain's gross national product,
required double that level of pecuniary resources during the
interwar years. ^'
The Cabinet adopted a two-fold approach to the budget
deficit. The Lloyd George ministry moved to increase tax
revenues while slashing governm.ental expenditures
Successive Chancellors of the Exchequer adopted "anti-waste"
campaigns to elim.inate unnecessary expenses. Particularly
lucrative marks for Treasury knives were the service
estimates, described by one historian as "clearly the Number
One target for public and politicians alike."'* Fortunately
Rowland, David Lloyd George , 510.
^^ilson. Myriad Faces , 800.
^"crady. War Finance , 284. Wilson, Myriad Faces , 799-
800, notes that the war made "available to the central
government a much larger proportion of the community's
wealth than had previously been at its disposal." The
Labour Party manifesto of Decem±)er 1918 championed "heavier
taxation of big incom.es" and "a levy on capital." See
Bunselmeyer, Cost of the War , 138.
'-Kennedy, Naval Mastery , 270. Kennedy notes that the
Gladstonian economic theory then prevalent at the Treasury
regarded as anathema the deficit spending which in the
following decade reduced unemployment and stimulated new
industrial techniques in Britain, Germany, and the United
States
.
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for the senior service, the Prime Minister considered the
Army Estimates as m.ost suitable for reduction. He directed
Churchill to cut the War Office Estimate on the grounds
that:
the highest expenditure is still military
... [and]
the largest immediate reductions which could be
affected without damage to the public welfare are
foreseeable in the activities controlled by your
department
.
Nonetheless, the Navy also faced the cuts which
traditionally followed the conclusion of hostilities.
The British governm.ent at the conclusion of the Great
War thus moved quickly to try to reduce expenditure linked
to the Royal Navy. On November 23, 1918, Chancellor of the
Exchequer Andrew Bonar Law wrote a s em.i - f o rm.a 1 letter to Sir
Eric Geddes , the First Lord of the Adm.iralty. Bonar Law
strongly urged Geddes to reduce costs, adding: "I am m.ost
anxious that the cutting down of unnecessary expenditure
should take place at once."" Within a month, the Board of
Admiralty learned that the navy's wartime unlimited vote of
credit would end with the fiscal year on March 31, 1919 and
that pending the 1919-20 estimates they would need the
blessing of the Treasury before spending money on new
David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
lloyd George , 502-03.
^'ADM 116/1809: Bonar Law to Geddes, November 23, 1918.
The Revised Statement of Revenue and Expenditure for 1919-
20, released the same day, revealed an estimated deficit of
£474 millions.
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warship construction. 5- In March 1919, Bonar Law warned
Churchill that the public must be convinced that Britain
could not afford a big army and navy and jokingly suggested
that the combined service estimates might be reduced to £20
millions per year.''
The Admiralty cooperated after a fashion. First Lord
Geddes, the day before Bonar Law's request, suggested
reducing the size of the Royal Navy by a "20% cut on man-
power on the pre-war numbers. "^^ The Board subsequently
agreed to reduce the number of naval personnel on active
duty from 148,000 officers and other ranks to a combined
strength of 136,000.^'' The Admiralty next concurred with the
cancellation of three new battle cruisers--sister ships to
the Hood--al ready under construction in March 1919.'^ In
May, as they met to consider the Navy Estimates for 1919-
'^oskill. Naval Policy . 104.
''Wddl em.as , Whitehall Diary , 82. Bonar Law may have
been trying to needle Churchill, as the two were on very
poor terms about this time. In fact, Bonar Law suggested to
Churchill, in front of the Cabinet, that he resign. See
Young, Churchill & Beaverbrook , 57-58.
^^ADM 116/1605: Geddes Mem.orandum, November 22, 1918
'ADM 167/56: Board Minute 629, February 6, 1919.
'^ADM 167/53: Board Minutes 553, December 28, 1919;
Minute 658, February 27, 1919; and Minute 676, March 6,
1919; ADM 116/1773: Admiralty Memorandiun "Battle Cruiser
Programme", March 13, 1919. Reasons for cancellation
included the destruction of the German fleet, the need to
use the slips that the cruisers occupied for merchant
construction, and their outdated (pre- Jutland) design.
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1920, the members of the Admiralty Board recognized the need
to establish, in conjunction with the Cabinet, a post-war
naval policy. They agreed that "it should be possible in
coming years to reduce the Fleet below its 1914 strength."-'
For the present, however, "in view of the current
uncertainties of the International situation," Britain's
naval leadership felt the need to maintain "a relatively
strong fleet in a state of readiness for action."^" The
Admiralty thus proposed a fleet of twenty-two capital ships
in full commission, supported by nineteen more in various
degrees of reserve. Walter Long, who replaced Sir Eric
Geddes as First Lord in January 1919, submitted the Navy
Estimates for 1919-1920.'* In June, he asked the Cabinet for
£171 millions, m.ore than three tim.es the highest pr9-v;ar
estim.ate
.
The Navy Estimates provoked a Cabinet quarrel in July.
Long presented his colleagues with a paper that stressed the
"ADM 167/56: Board Minute 802, May 29, 1919.
^'ADM 116/1773: Admiralty Memorandum on Fleet Strength,
June 19, 1919. Britain at that time had armed forces
operating in Russia, the Middle East, India, and Ireland.
See Anthony Clayton, The British Empire As a Superpower
1919-39 (Athens, GA, 1986), 45-249, for a detailed
discussion of British interventions world-wide.
^*A Conservative politician who held his first Cabinet
post. President of the Board of Agriculture, in 1895, Long
nearly captured the party leadership in 1911. After
supporting Lloyd George during the resignation of Asquith in
1916, he became Secretary of State for the Colonies from
1916-19.
170
importance of command of the seas and described the Navy as
"the cheapest and most efficient police force that the
Empire can possess."" The First Lord then explained that
the swollen size of the estimate resulted from two causes:
non-recurrent wartim.e expenses (£75 millions) and pay
increases previously sanctioned by the Cabinet (£45
millions), implying that he was operating the Navy on
roughly the same budget as required by the pre-war fleet
(£51 mil lions)
Austen Chamberlain, who replaced Bonar Law as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, then submitted a memorandum
attacking the navy's failure to accept greater reductions."^
"Long later adm.itted that identifying the force against
which Britain should build was "a very difficult,
indeed ... almost an impossible question." He contended that
the duty of the Admiralty was not "to search for possible
enemies," but instead to provide "a Navy, sufficient in
strength, and efficient for any duty which it may reasonably
be called upon to perform." See Walter Long, Memories
(London, 1923), 269.
CI
"ADM 116/1773: Admiralty Memorandum, "Navy Estimates,
1919-20", July 5, 1919. The Admiralty normally began work
on the Estimates in the early summer and submitted them to
the Treasury in December; the Cabinet discussed the figures
in January and the First Lord of the Admiralty presented
them to the House of Commons early in March in preparation
for the ensuing financial year, which runs from April 1st to
March 31st. See Roskill, Naval Policy , 204-09, for a
complete discussion of the process of developing of the
Estimates
.
^Wring the naval scare of 1908 (see pp. 48-51 above).
Chamberlain assured the Second Sea Lord that "if the Naval
Lords stand firm, and are prepared to resign together, they
will get their way." See Sir Charles Petrie, The Life and
Letters of Austen Chamberlain (London, 1940), Volume I, 224.
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He argued that only Japan and the United States possessed
sufficient naval strength to threaten Great Britain and,
given Britain's existing superiority in capital ships, that
placing more ships into reserve would not endanger her
national interests. The Chancellor recommended that £110
millions be cut from the Navy Estimates.
"
The issue remained temporarily undecided, however,
because Number 10 Downing Street sat empty at the time these
papers were submitted. Lloyd George spent 5-18 July
visiting his constituency in Criccieth, Wales." Assistant
Cabinet Secretary Thomas Jones, in Hankey's absence, thus
decided to delay consideration of the Navy Estimates by the
Cabinet until the Prime Minister's return, as the Admiralty
and Treasury memoranda raised issues "of the first
importai^ce.""
Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey then provided Lloyd
George an important analysis of Britain's strategic position
in 1919. Hankey, who had accompanied the Prime Minister to
Criccieth for a conference on the coal industry, prepared
^'MacDonald, "Post-War Naval Policy", 197; Dingman,
Pacific , 108.
^^During the Prime Minister's visit to Wales, Churchill
pressed the case for the creation of a unified Ministry of
Defence. See Rowland, David Llovd George , 511.
^'Middlemas, Whitehall Diary , 89. Jones sided with
Chamberlain: "The crux of the matter--as it seems to me--is,
having squashed Germany are we now going to start building
against America? It is clearly in the minds of the Sea
Lords .
"
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for the latter an essay entitled "Towards a National Policy,
July 1919." He launched his appraisal by addressing
domestic policy. He focused on "our dependence on imports"
and the war's detrimental impact on Britain's ability to
maintain a favorable balance of payments. He then urged
that
:
non-productive employment of man-power and
expenditure, such as is involved by naval,
military, and air effort, must be reduced within
the narrowest lim.its consistent with national
safety
.
With this line of reasoning the Cabinet Secretary
foreshadowed Sir Thomas Inskip's argument that the economy
was Britain's "fourth arm of defence.""'
Next, Hankey gave his attention to British foreign
policy. He began with his evaluation of the League of
Nations. He declared that Britain would have to support the
League, but that it remained "an experiment on the success
of which we cannot yet afford to base our national
security." The only potential threat he could see from
Europe rested in a possible combination of Germany and
Russia, which he judged as far distant and, with proper
policy, preventable. Hankey maintained that Japan lacked
"the mineral and manufacturing resources to sustain war with
^CAB 21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
^'Sir Thomas Inskip, as recorded in Kennedy, Strategy
and Diplomacy , 100-01.
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a Great Power on the modern scale" and indicated that
Britain should seek to reduce tensions between Japan and
China. Having eliminated all other threats, the Secretary
turned to "the most powerful nation in the world," the
United States.
Hankey considered war with the United States "almost
unthinkable." American military and economic strength meant
that "it is quite impossible that we could make successful
war against her," while the lack of antagonism towards the
United States in British policy-making circles rendered
improbable the onset of hostilities between the Atlantic
powers. Although he considered war with the United States
"the maximum danger" that Britain might face," Hankey
believed it to be "an extremely remote contingency.""
The Cabinet Secretary nonetheless displayed a marked
disinclination to base British national security on the
basis of Anglo-American cooperation. He pointed out the
"antagonism towards the British Empire among important
elements in the United States." Hankey insisted that the
Royal Navy "should not be allowed to sink below the level of
the United States fleet" lest some "truculent, overbearing
•CAB 21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
^-CAB 21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
'^CAB 21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
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and anti-British president" subject Britain to "unbearable
pressure." To reconcile his desire for "real savings in
Navy estimates" with his determination not to abandon
"general command of the sea to the United States," he urged
that "no opportunity be lost to induce the United States to
abate their armaments in accord with us." Hankey then
suggested that the first step in naval disarmament:
should be to invite all the Naval Powers to
concert a scheme, reducing to an absolute minimum
the number of ships in commission and in immediate
reserve, thereby reducing personnel to the lowest
possible limit
.
As an interim measure, he advocated as public policy a Two
Power Standard of naval strength "excluding the United
States" which would both protect Britain against the remote
yet dangerous possibility of war with America and avoid
offending "the mass of public opinion.""
Hankey ' s anal ysis contained two interesting
impl i cat ions . First, his discussion of naval disarmament
involved the downgrading of capital ships from full
commission status into various degrees of reserve, rather
than destruction. This treatment would enable Britain, in
the event of future threat, to rapidly regain her existing
naval superiority over all nations not signatory to the arms
control agreement. Second, he above all sought to avoid
provoking the United States into a naval competition, which
"CAB 21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
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would have forced a choice between naval supremacy and
economy. Yet he gave no direct indication of priority
between those goals. Surely he realized that naval
disarmament required Washington's active cooperation,
something in short supply during the Wilson Administration.
His differentiation between "published policy" and national
policy which "could never be alluded to in public, and
should only be spoken in the most secret and intimate
conversations" indicates that he was willing to run
considerable risks of antagonizing the United States.'^
On July 16th, the First Lord warned his colleagues of
the Admiralty Board that when the Cabinet debate resumed
upon the Prime Minister's return to London, the government
would probably press for severe reductions. He explained
that he was prepared to propose that the Cabinet arrange a
vote on account (temporary spending authority) of £70
millions to carry the service through December, until which
time the Admiralty would search for further reductions. *
Despite the expected assault from the Treasury, Long
convinced his ministerial associates to approve a revised
Estimate of £171 millions. When the First Lord presented
''CAB 21/159: Hankey Memorandum, "Towards a National
Policy, July 1919", July 17, 1919.
'ADM 167/56: Board Minute 871, July 16, 1919.
'^CAB 27/71-72: Finance Committee Memorandum 23,
November 11, 1919.
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the Estimates to the House of Commons on July 24th, he
avoided mentioning rivalry with America or even articulating
a naval strategy and instead emphasized the process of
demobilization. A week later. Long informed his fellow
members of the Board of Admiralty that the Cabinet had
indeed pressed for "most drastic reductions in expenditure,"
for which purpose the Board would establish a Committee on
Naval Expenditure.'' Following a recommendation of the
previous First Lord, the Admiralty would also establish a
"strong, critical, and. .. independently-minded" commission,
known as the Post-War Questions Committee, to consider the
lessons of the war for the navy of the future." Admiralty
House, in the sunder of 1919, looked to the future with the
knowledge that sacrifices would have to be made but
nonetheless with confidence that the Navy could control its
own destiny-
Lloyd George, however, had other plans. He attempted
to pursue Hankey's recommendation "to induce the United
States to abate their naval armaments in accord with us."
He arranged for Lord Haldane to ask former Foreign Secretary
Sir Edward Grey, recently elevated to the peerage as 1st
" Parliamentary Debates , Commons , vol. 118, cols. 1597-
1609.
•^ADM 167/56: Board Minute 890, July 31, 1919. Long may
have been influenced by a second missive from the Treasury
demanding reduction of the service estimates.
°ADM 167/57: First Lord Memorandum, December 17, 1918.
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Viscount Grey of Fallodan, to serve as an envoy to
Washington. Haldane and Grey discussed the idea with
Colonel House, who sent to the failing Wilson the following
record of Grey's proposal:
That in no circumstances would Great Britain build
against the United States no matter how many keels
we laid. However, England would hold herself free
to build against any European Power in any
quantity that seemed to her best. On the other
hand, the United States could exercise her own
judgment about building...
Grey further shared with House his belief that war between
Britain and the United States was "inconceivable."^' He
decided to agree to the Prime Minister's request, providing
the Cabinet pursued a naval policy which included reduction
in the estimates and avoided any reference to rivalry with
America. Lloyd George, before consulting the Cabinet,
concurred
.
On August 11th, the Prime Minister met with the War
Cabinet Finance Committee, which included Lord Privy Seal
and Leader of the House of Commons Andrew Bonar Law,
Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain, Colonial
Secretary Alfred, Viscount Milner, and, of course, the
Lord Grey, as recorded in Seymour, Intimate Papers ,
IV, 496. Grey's scheme, which implied that both Britain and
the United States would refrain from considering the other's
navy in their calculations, provided no indication of what
to do in case this happy state of affairs failed to
material ize
.
^'MacDonald, "Lloyd George and Post-War Naval Policy",
203-06.
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ubiquitous Hankey. This meeting represented the nadir of
the influence of the advocates of sea power. The Finance
Committee, in the absence of the responsible civil and
professional heads of the Royal Navy, considered ways to
reduce naval expenditure. They discussed halting naval
construction and reducing "the number of ships in commission
at least to the pre-war standard." Recognizing the adverse
effect on public opinion if the United States were to
maintain a larger fleet than Britain, the Committee proposed
approaching the United States government "with a view to an
arrangement for a reduction of the number of ships
maintained in commission." They also established a series
of guide 1 ines for the f ormul ation of future service
estimates, the most important of which directed the fighting
services to "proceed on the assumption that no great war is
to be anticipated within the next ten years." The Finance
Committee further agreed that the services ought to be able
to frame estimates at a combined figure of £135 mi 1 1 ions , of
which £60 millions would be earmarked for the navy. These
momentous decisions, reached without the benefit of naval
counsel, would occupy the full Cabinet four days later.
Before the Cabinet coul d consider the decisions reached
by the Finance Committee, however, the First Lord submitted
a paper concerning "Post-war Naval Policy." Long requested
"^CAB 27/71: Finance Committee Minute 2, August 11,
1919.
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the Cabinet to declare a naval policy "as regards supremacy
of the seas: a) over the United States of America or b) over
any probable combination." He implied clearly that
supremacy resulted from possession of the world's strongest
fleet. The First Lord then addressed the policy of "showing
the flag," abandoned before the war in the face of the
German threat. The deployment of additional light cruisers,
Long suggested, would prove beneficial to British trading
interests. ' Finally, Long requested for planning purposes
"the period of time during which we may reckon on immunity
from war with a Great Power?"^'
The Cabinet gave scant consideration to the Admiralty's
petition for the command of the seas. Instead, the Lloyd
George ministry quickly reached a series of decisions that
reflected the findings of the Finance Committee. The
Cabinet agreed that "for framing revised Estimates ... the
British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during
the next ten years." The Cabinet then added the
stipulation that "no alteration should be made without
Long later described the policy of "showing the flag"
by means of independent cruisers and small squadrons as "the
most potent influence which can be used to maintain the
great position of our Empire, and to secure peace, progress
and good trade." See Long, Memories , 283.
'•ADM 116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum, "Post-War Naval
Policy", August 12, 1919.
••The "ten year rule" was repeatedly extended and in
1929 made sel f -perpetuating . See Roskill, Naval Policy,
215 .
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Cabinet authority in the pre-war standard governing the size
of the Navy." The government also established a spending
limit of £60 millions on the Navy's Estimates. As a logical
extension of the cap on the service estimates and the "ten
year rule," the Cabinet concluded that "no new naval
construction should be undertaken."" These decisions,
fulfilling the conditions laid down by Lord Grey, enabled
the British government to explore more fully the possibility
of a naval accord with the United States.
The Lloyd George ministry moved promptly to facilitate
Lord Grey's mission to Washington. Less than a week after
promulgating the "ten year rule," the Cabinet approved the
terms of his instructions. The letter maintained that the
British government, as it had before the war, sought to
avoid rivalry with the United States. As proof, the
instructions noted that "the strength of the British Navy
next year will be based upon a standard of security that
does not take account of the United States Navy as a
27possible enemy." In late September, Lord Grey sailed for
Washington, where he quickly discovered that President
Wilson's illness precluded any meeting between the two, let
alone extended discussion of an naval arms limitation
"ADM 167/56: War Cabinet Minute 616A, August 15, 1919.
^Rohan Butler and J.P.T. Bury, eds , Documents on
British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (London, 1966), 1st Series,
Volume V, No. 360, 998.
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9Bagreement. Grey relayed the unfortunate news to Lloyd
George: "Within a week... of my arrival, the reason for my
coming has disappeared. For some time, with no one to take
the place of the President, there will be chaos in American
policy."- Thus died any hope of an Anglo-American naval
accord, at least until another president assumed office in
1921.
Lloyd George accepted another of Hankey's
recommendations by instituting a series of reforms designed
to restore the Treasury to its pre-war preeminence.'" The
Prime Minister, who disliked the unwieldy size of the full
Cabinet, utilized the Finance Committee to dictate national
policy through the management of pecuniary resources . Under
the auspices of "Treasury control," the spending departments
detailed officers to the Treasury to devel op retrenchment
programs . " More significantly, they had to justify all
go
Seymour , Intimate Papers
,
IV, 499-500.
39Lord Grey, as recorded in MacDonald , "Post -War Naval
Policy", 209.
The Chancel lor of the Exchequer bears the
res pons ibi lity to insure that spending departments disbursed
the moneys allocated by the House of Commons for the
appropriate purposes and in a frugal manner. Higham, Armed
Forces
,
278-79, notes that "just as in production and in
contractual arrangements there are cycles of equilibrium and
disturbance, so in treasury control. In wartime the Navy,
for instance, could spend its annual peacetime budget in six
days, but the instant the Armistice was announced, the
Treasury leaped, and by mid-1919 was proudly explaining how
it resumed supreme command."
''Dingman , Paci f ic , 107 .
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expenditures to internal representatives of the Treasury.'^
That ministry, according to Roskill, "had only to declare a
proposal ran counter to the Ten Year Rule to render it
nugatory."' Secretary of the Treasury Warren Fisher, who
controlled these budgetary commissars, thought the Treasury
should determine the funds available for each department.''
In September, the Chancellor of the Exchequer provided
the Finance Committee an analysis of national expenditure.
The Treasury divided the total budget of £1,490 millions
into four categories: irreducible - £518 millions; fighting
services - £503 millions; loans and subsidies - £326
millions; and other costs - £143 millions. The memorandum
noted that "expenditure will almost certainly exceed the
£1,500 millions already voted for this year."^^ The Treasury
identified the fighting forces as the primary field for
'^CAB 27/71-72: Finance Committee Minute 3, August 20,
1919. At its second meeting, the Committee decided that the
Treasury shoul d prepare an analysis of the spending of the
various departments ; that the departments should justify
their expenditures; and that the Treasury should indicate
where savings could be realized.
'"Roskill, Naval Policy , 211-15. This practice
contributed to the marked antagonism with which both the
naval and civilian members of the Admiralty viewed the
Treasury during the inter-war period. The Board objected to
bearing the responsibility for naval defense without even
the opportunity to explain to Parliament why funds were not
available to remedy known deficiencies.
^^Higham, Armed Forces , 123-24
.
'"CAB 27/71-72: Treasury memorandum re National
Expenditure, September 20 , 1919
.
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retrenchment and declared that "it is imperative to fix the
peace strength of the forces, to impose limits of numbers
and expenditure, and to hasten demobilization." The
Chancellor's analysis included a review of the state of the
Exchequer. A projected deficit of £250 millions for 1919-
1920 would increase the National Debt from £7,435 millions
to £7,685 million on March 31st, 1920. A smaller deficit
projected for the following year would increase the Debt to
£7,885 millions.
Turning to the Royal Navy, the paper noted that
projected expenditure for 1919-20 (£171 millions) exceeded
the March figures (£149 millions) by more than £21 millions.
It then claimed that financial exigencies mandated deep cuts
in the size of the fleet:
Prima facie it is difficult to understand what
menace to the external security of this country or
to the freedom of the seas exists comparabl e in
gravity to the financial danger. If this be
admitted it should surely be possible to make--
wi thout 1 osing command of the sea --very large
reductions of ships in commission and a more rapid
demobilization of superfluous personnel.'
The Treasury analysis then changed focus from the number of
ships needed in the post-war fleet to an attack on the
capital ship, questioning "whether capital ships are ever in
'XAB 27/71-72: Treasury memorandum re National
Expenditure, September 20, 1919. Although the naval annex
was unsigned, it was probably prepared by G.L. Barstow, the
Treasury's Controller of Supply Services and naval expert.
''CAB 27/71-72: Treasury memorandum re National
Expenditure, September 20, 1919.
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the future going to repay the cost of maintaining them."
The memorandum baldly asserted that such vessels "are not
likely to be required to repel invasion." With somewhat
greater justification, the Treasury paper stated that
capital ships "are probably vulnerable to torpedo attack by
submarine, motor boat or aircraft" and added that "their
value in diplomacy would probably be seriously discounted by
their vulnerability."'^ This initial criticism of the
capital ship, however valid, lacked the imprimatur of naval
expertise and utterly failed to impress the naval staff.
Coming after a naval budget "victory" in July, the
Cabinet eruption of August 15th combined with the subsequent
rumblings of the Finance Committee must have struck
Admiralty House like a broadside from the Hood.'^ At a
meeting on August 18th, the First Lord explained to his co-
workers on the Board that Lloyd George intended in the
directive that "no alteration should be made... in the pre-
war standard governing the size of the Navy" to exclude
'OP
comparison with the fleet of the United States.'" The Board
CAB 27/71-72: Treasury memorandum re National
Expenditure, September 20, 1919.
''The First Lord subsequently wrote to Admiral Beatty
that "in consequence of the changed conditions resulting
from the defeat of Germany and the heavy financial burden we
have to bear, it is necessary to effect great economies in
the estimates." See Charles Petrie, Walter Long and His
Times (London, 1936), 226.
•ADM 167/56: Board Minute 924, August 18, 1919.
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members concluded that the "ten years rule" rendered
superfluous new building programs for the next six years and
agreed to stop work on all ships not due for completion
before November 1919. Then they mapped out damage control
operations. Financial Secretary Thomas MacNamara undertook
to try to prevent the Prime Minister from announcing any
definite estimate to the House. The Board also agreed to
prepare a memorandum to the Cabinet showing how the navy
would comply with the decisions of August 15th and the
consequences thereof.*^*
The Board finally produced the memorandum on October
24, 1919. The Admiralty determined that the minimum fleet
consonant with safety would include sixteen battleships and
four battle cruisers in full commission and thirteen
battleships and three battle cruisers in reserve. Such a
fleet would consist of 126,000 sailors and cost £75 millions
in 1920-21.* The paper revealed the Admiralty's continuing
faith in the doctrines of sea power. The planned reductions
would leave Britain "supreme in European waters" but
relinquish overall maritime superiority. Without a building
program, Britain would fall to the position of second naval
power by the end of 1923. The Board then invoked the logic
^'^-ADM 167/56: Board Minute 924, August 18, 1919.
"^The Board explained the sum as £58-59 millions, plus
£12 millions for "dead-weight" wartime expenditure and £4-5
millions for separation allowances currently established.
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of Mahan:
The Board believes ... that Britain owes her leading
position among the nations to her long-maintained
pre-eminence upon the sea. They believe this
preeminence cannot be relinquished without her
ability to hold her position being profoundly
affected, with all that position involves in
respect of prestige, authority, and commercial
advantage
.
The Admiralty touted the benefits of sea power and urged
that Britain's command of the sea "should not be
sacrificed."^"
The Board, worried about the growing challenge of the
American fleet, believed that Britain had two alternatives:
to induce the United States to modify their 1916 program or
to undertake a program of construction within twelve months.
The naval staff then attacked the notion that the United
States played no part in pre-war "comparisons of Naval
strength." Instead, the Board contended:
All that was ever laid down by any Government was
that in applying the "Two Power-Standard" the
United States, owing to their distance from
Europe, should not be counted as one of the two
principal BPwers against whose combination we were
providing
The Admiralty clearly demonstrated their faith in the
capital ship and their reluctance to ignore developments
across the Atlantic. From the perspective of the Board,
*"^ADM 116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum "Naval Policy and
Expenditure", October 24, 1919.
•°^ADM 116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum "Naval Policy and
Expenditure", October 24, 1919.
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Britain needed new capital ships because America was
building them.
The Lloyd George ministry proved unable to produce a
unified naval policy in 1919. The Treasury made only too
clear the need to reduce expenditure, particularly the naval
budget. Lord Grey's mission to Washington established the
futility of negotiations with the United States. The
Admiralty's memorandum on "Naval Policy and Expenditure"
demonstrated the Board's unwillingness to contemplate a
surrender of naval superiority to the United States or a
fleet based on anything other than the capital ship. Lloyd
George, despite the Chancellor's insistence that Admiralty
House refused to obey the directives of the Finance
Committee, had no desire to incur the political liability of
surrendering Britain's traditional command of the seas.^"^
News from America suggested a way to break the deadlock.
In late November, the Finance Committee received
reports, unconfirmed by the Admiralty, that the United
States Navy had been demobilizing at an unexpectedly rapid
rate. While proclaiming that "the standard of the United
States was not the standard by which our fleet had to be
reckoned," the members of Lloyd George's inner circle
CAB 27/71-72: Finance Committee Memorandum 22,
October 29, 1919. The Finance Committee decided not to
announce the "ten year rule" in Parliament. See also
Dingman, Pacific, 110; MacDonald, "Post-War Naval Policy",
206-08.
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admitted that significant changes in the size of that force
"would not be without influence on our own measures." They
instructed Lord Grey to determine the actual state of the
American demobilization and intended building program.
Awaiting his reply, the Finance Committee took up some
unfinished business with the First Lord, attending by
special invitation. One of the committee members asked Long
"whether the time for the abolition of large ships was not
approaching." The First Lord replied that the Sea Lords
unanimously disagreed, but the issue was being studied
(apparently in reference to the Post-War Questions
Committee). The Finance Committee then discussed the
Admiralty's revised Navy Estimates for 1919-20.*''' Subject
to some trifling conclusions, the economic council accepted
the new figure of £158 millions.* The Finance Committee's
acceptance of a reduction of only £13 millions from the July
Estimates is evidence of the quality work put forth by the
Admiralty's Committee on Naval Expenditure and of the
failure to consider adequately wartime residues in their
decree of £60 millions annually for the Navy.
*''"'CAB 27/71-72: Finance Committee Minute 16, November
24, 1919.
''^CAB 27-71/72: Finance Committee Memoranda 29, October
31, 1919 and 23, November 11, 1919, contain the revised Navy
Estimates and the Treasury analysis thereof, respectively.
*'^CAB 27/71-72: Finance Committee Minute 16, November
24, 1919.
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Grey's response, three days later, proved a
disappointment. The envoy stated that the United States
Navy intended to maintain a large fleet: sixteen modern
battleships, twenty-five older battleships, and eight
armoured cruisers. Man-power shortages (107,400 men against
an authorization of 177,500) temporarily weakened the
American fleet, leading Grey to comment: "The United States
Navy cannot in its present state be raised to a really
efficient state for at least a year."*^^ He then admitted
his inability to elicit any sort of assurance as to the
nature of future American naval policy. Grey's failure
ruled out any possibility that the Admiralty might
voluntarily cooperate with the Finance Committee's plans for
retrenchment
.
The First Lord presented the revised Estimates to
Parliament in a cautious manner. Speaking on December 10,
1919, Long made no major pronouncements on the future of the
Royal Navy, but instead presented the figure of £158
millions as a compromise between the Government's desire to
economize and the need to conclude wartime obligations. In
response to questions from the floor, he promised to expound
more fully with the 1920-21 Estimates in March."
"^CAB 27/71-72: Finance Committee Memorandum 38,
January 26, 1920; Documents in British Fore ign Policy, V,
No. 412, 1038-39.
••^Parliamentary Debates , Commons, vol. 122, cols. 1367-
1497.
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Admiral David Beatty then threatened to destroy the
Cabinet's fragile consensus on naval policy."* Lloyd George
had satisfied both the Treasury and the Admiralty as long as
the naval superiority with which Britain had emerged from
the Great War obviated the need for new naval construction.
But Beatty, who replaced Admiral Wemyss as First Sea Lord
and Chief of the Naval Staff in November 1919, worried about
the inexorable growth of the United States Navy.-*^ Learning
of the American proposals, he prepared in January 1920 a
paper on naval policy which argued that Britain had two
al ternatives
:
a) For a definitive approach to be made by the
British Government to the Government of the United
States with a view to a limitation of Naval
Armaments: or b) Ourselves to embark
on a further building program which will insure
that we are at least equal in material strength to
the United States Navy as at present budgeted
for."^
He then convinced the Board to call upon the First Lord to
prepare a memorandum concerning the size of the fleet for
1 1 •
'"Before he assumed office, Beatty assured Long: "I
fully understand the necessity of effecting great economies
and that the naval estimates have to be considerably reduced
to meet the altered circumstances," See Petrie, Walter
Long , 227.
*-^Sprouts, New Order , 73-79, discuss the progress of
American naval construction, 1919-1920. In December 1919,
the United States Navy Department requested two battleships
and one battle cruiser to be laid down within the fiscal
year, a considerable advancement over the 1916
authorizations
.
'^^^ADM 116/1677: Chief of Naval Staff Memorandum, "Naval
Policy", January 7, 1920.
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the Cabinet."^ Beatty next persuaded Long to incorporate
much of the First Sea Lord's paper into the First Lord's
communication to the Cabinet.
Long, however, decided not to include funding for a
program of capital ship construction in the Navy Estimates
for 1920-21. Instead, he reiterated the warning of the
previous October that continued expansion of the American
fleet would require either an arms accord or a British
program of capital ship construction if Britain were to
avoid losing command of the sea."^ The First Lord's
decision not to include a building program undoubtedly
reflected the fact that Britain still had about a year
before new construction would be critical. It may also have
reflected his desire to place on record, well in advance of
potential budgetary conflict, the naval staff's appreciation
of the battleship and the battle cruiser.
In the spring of 1920, the Admiralty publicly affirmed
its faith in the capital ship. In the preparation of the
Navy Estimates for 1920-21, the First Lord rebuffed the
''6
Chancellor's efforts to put more capital ships in reserve."
*--ADM 167/60: Board Minute 1117, January 14, 1920.
"^ADM 116/1775: First Lord Memorandum, "Naval Estimates
and Naval Policy", February 13, 1920.
""ADM 167/60: Board Minute 1154, February 18, 1920.
Long compromised by reducing the amount of fuel oil the Navy
planned to stockpile that year. See CAB 27/71-72: Finance
Committee Memorandum 43: February 20, 1920.
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His stance was strengthened by the conclusions of the Post-
War Questions Committee. That group examined "the military
uses and values of the different types of vessels" and
concluded that "nothing has happened to displace the
Battleship from her position.""^ The First Lord's request
for £84 millions without any provision for new construction
sailed smoothly through the Cabinet. Long used the
accompanying White Paper to identify the capital ship as
"the unit on which sea power is to be built up.""^ The
First Lord then made his case before the House of Commons.
Speaking at Westminster on March 17th, Long
unequivocally pronounced the capital ship to be the bedrock
of British naval policy. He affirmed the government's
adherence to a One Power Standard, whereby the strength of
the Royal Navy--meaning the number of capital ships in full
commission--"should not be inferior in strength to the navy
no
of any other Power."** He immediately sought to downplay
the possibility of rivalry with the United States by
announcing that "the idea of competition in armaments ... is
"'ADM 1/8586/70: Interim Report of the Post-War
Questions Committee, December 22, 1919.
"^Beatty MSS: Naval Estimates, March 12, 1920. Beatty
argued that the "abandonment of the capital ship... would
leave the British nation destitute of sea power."
"'
parliamentary Debates , Commons, vol. 126, cols. 2296-
2347; 2442-2550. Long's budget speech, without the
subsequent debate, can also be found in Petrie, Walter Long ,
258-277
.
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repugnant to us all." The First Lord concluded his
presentation by rebutting the notion that "the day of the
capital ship is over." Long stated that his naval advisors,
along with their counterparts in every other great naval
country, believed that the capital ship, in time of war:
would prove again, as it has proved before, to be
the predominant factor in naval warfare, and that
in the end the weight of metal would tell, and
that therefore the big ship must, at all events
for some time to come, be preserved as an
important part of our naval equipment.
He further dismissed the possibility that the Air Force
could as yet fulfill the functions of the Navy, and added
that for the proper training of officers and seamen, "the
big ship is absolutely essential .
"
Subsequent to the approval of the Navy Estimates for
1920-21, Beatty resumed his efforts to preserve Britain's
precarious maritime supremacy. In late March, in a speech to
the Highland Society, the First Sea Lord cautioned against
budgetary savings at the expense of naval strength . He
said : "The economical side requires a note of warning . You
cannot have a valuable thing without paying for it."*^ In
July
,
Beatty introduced a new 1 ine of argument . He
contended that the Hood , in a manner similar to the
Parliamentary Debates , Commons , vol. 126, cols. 2296-
2347; 2442-2550. Long's budget speech, without the
subsequent debate, can also be found in Petrie, Walter Long ,
258-277
.
^^'Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Chalmers, Life and
Letters of David Beatty, 359.
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Dreadnought
,
had established a new standard of naval
strength. To compare properly the Royal Navy to its
Atlantic rival, he wrote:
It is not sufficient to consider total numbers.
The far more important consideration is the
comparison between the respective numbers laid
down as a result of the Battle of Jutland.
The First Sea Lord then advanced the idea of "replacement
based on war experience" as a means to avoid open
competition with the United States. Beatty suggested 15
years as a life-span for vessels completed before the war
and twenty for post-Jutland ships. On that basis, he
calculated that Britain required four new capital ships in
1921 with a further four in 1922,'^'^ The First Lord relayed
Beatty's arguments to the Cabinet, warning that American
naval construction threatened Britain with "a position of
absolute and marked inferiority at sea by the 1924." Long
even went so far as to suggest providing naval contractors
with confidential warning, "such warning of course not
binding . "' For the first time since the Armistice
,
Admiralty House formally requested a program of capital ship
construction
.
In the summer of 1920, the Cabinet remained divided
over the issue of naval policy. The advocates of sea power
-^^ADM 1/8602/54: Beatty Memorandum, July 8, 1920.
-^^ADM 116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Construction", July 23, 1920.
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demanded a fleet not less than that of the other leading
naval power, the United States. The Admiralty argued that
American progress on the 1916 program constituted a grave
threat to Britain's maritime supremacy. Therefore, in order
to maintain the One Power Standard, Britain required either
a program of naval expansion or an arms limitation agreement
with the United States. The physical condition of President
Wilson precluded agreement with Washington. The proponents
of "Treasury control" forbade costly new construction
programs. The two planks of British naval policy no longer
seemed compatible.
CHAPTER 6
THE PARTICULAR WEAPON
In the winter of 1920-21, the British government
continued its search for a naval policy. As the British
naval community reviewed the lessons of the war in 1919-20,
the "Jutland controversy" and its aftermath damaged the
reputation of the Admiralty. In December 1920, Lloyd George
established a committee to investigate the appropriate type
of vessel for the future of the Royal Navy. During the
course of that investigation, several committee members
revealed a marked reluctance to accept the testimony of the
Admiralty's expert witnesses. The conclusions of the
committee
, which issued two opposing reports , demonstrated
the government ' s 1 oss of confidence in the value of the
capital ship
.
Post-war study of the Batt 1 e of Jut 1 and 1 ed to the
"Jutland controversy," which still continues today. The
origins of the controversy are two-fold. First, the
technology available in 1916 for plotting the movement of
ships appears primitive by modern standards.^ Thus, wide
disagreement existed and continues to exist over the actual
and relative position of ships at various times during the
battle. Admiral Jellicoe, in his own account of the battle,
stated that "the conflicting reports [of the positions of
various ships] added greatly to the perplexity of the
^Roskill, Last Naval Hero , 322-23.
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ft 2situation." Second, the overwhelming majority of the
British naval commiinity regarded the battle, in the words of
one of Jellicoe*s biographers, as "a big disappointment
after the high expectations that had been entertained of the
long-awaited meeting with the High Seas Fleet. Not
unnaturally, the leading participants became concerned to
portray their own actions in the most favorable light. The
Jutland controversy, therefore, involved not only the
conduct of the battle but also the degree to which the
protagonists sought to influence its historiography.
Admiral John Jellicoe, who commanded the Grand Fleet
during the battle of Jutland, initiated the battle's post-
war review. In February 1919, he published The Grand Fleet,
1914-16: Its Creation. Development, and Work , in which he
explained his unwillingness to close with the High Seas
Fleet for fear of losing command of the North Sea. Jellicoe
revealed a longstanding concern with the possibility of a
torpedo attack by German destroyers against the Grand Fleet.
The admiral explained that "the element of chance enters
very largely into torpedo warfare" and noted that "our enemy
was almost certain to possess a very considerable
superiority over us in the number of destroyers likely to be
^Admiral Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 1914-16: Its
Creation, Development, and Work (London, 1919), 344. See
also Chalmers, Life and Letters of David Beatty , 265;
Barnett , Swordbearers , 148
.
^Patterson, Jel 1 icoe , 135
.
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present during a Fleet action." He fought the Battle of
Jutland not as a man determined to win, but rather as a man
determined not to lose, constrained by:
the necessity for not leaving anything to chancem a Fleet action, because our Fleet was the one
and only factor that was vital to the exist ence of
the Empire, as indeed to the Allied cause.'
[Jellicoe's italics]
Jellicoe's cautious approach reflected his beliefs that the
High Seas Fleet, under certain circumstances, had the
potential to defeat the Grand Fleet and that defeat would be
much more damaging to Britain than to Germany.
Carlyon Bel lairs, a former naval officer turned Member
of Parliament, joined the debate in the same month with The
Battle of Jutland: The Sowing and The Reaping . He savagely
attacked British naval leadership, claiming:
Since the British Government refused to adopt
Chatham's policy in regard to the American
colonies there has been no lost opportunity to
equal in its consequence pur failure in leadership
at the Battle of Jutland.^
Bellairs personally blamed Jellicoe for "a narrow conformity
to defensive tactics which could never achieve victory," in
sharp contrast to Nelson's adage that "the boldest measures
are the safest; nothing great can be achieved without risk."
In summation, the ex-Commander presented an eleven-step
indictment against the Admiralty, starting with "defective"
^Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet , 393-98.
^Carlyon Bellairs, The Battle of Jutland: The Sowing
and the Reaping (London, 1919), xii.
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preparations for war and concluding with the failure to send
out the Harwich force to reinforce the Grand Fleet.
^
From that point, the controversy over Jutland
intensified, and many critics began to impute blame to
either Jellicoe, for his caution, or Beatty, for his failure
to keep Jellicoe better informed of the position of the High
Seas Fleet. One of Beatty's biographers notes: "Self-
appointed champions poured forth a stream of calumny and
uninformed criticism upon one or the other of the two
admirals." The effect of this public criticism, according
to one of Jellicoe's biographers, was to open even wider
"the schism that disputes over the action were already
creating in the Navy."^ The division between the followers
of Jellicoe and Beatty soon deepened.
Carlyon Bellairs, The Battle of Jutland: The Sowing
and the Reaping (London, 1919), 268, 272. The complete
indictment includes: (1) defective preparations for war; (2)
not being inspired by the offensive spirit; (3) failure to
hold courts-martial on superior officers; (4) Jellicoe's
failure to establish communications with Beatty; (5)
Jellicoe's deployment to port, rather than to starboard; (6)
failure to seek close action; (7) lack of British destroyer
attacks; (8) the turning away of battleships from destroyer
attacks; (9) failure to maintain contact with the German
fleet during the night action; (10) failure to seek the
German fleet the following morning; and (11) failure to send
out the Harwich force.
'see William Jameson, The Fleet that Jack Built: Nine
Men Who Made a Modern Navy (London, 1962), 205; Dingman,
Pacific , 114.
^Chalmers , The Life and Letters of David Beatty , 266.
^Patterson, Jellicoe Papers , Vol II, 399.
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The Jutland controversy took a decisive turn with the
appointment of Admiral Beatty as First Sea Lord on November
1, 1919. In January 1919, his predecessor. Admiral Rosslyn
Wemyss, perhaps influenced by the imminent publication of
Jellicoe's memoirs, appointed Captain J.E.T. Harper to
prepare a chronological record of the battle. On March 26,
1919, First Lord Walter Long announced to the House of
Commons that Captain Harper and four subordinates had been
attached to the War Staff "for the purpose of collecting
from official records the narrative of the Battle of
Jutland."^" Harper submitted his report on October 24, 1919,
to the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Osmond
de Beauvoir Brock. He decided that approval should rest
with Beatty, who would assume the post of First Sea Lord in
a week. On October 29th, Long promised publication of the
report to the House of Commons. Beatty, however, disagreed
with the findings of the Harper record, particularly the
charting of various ships. The new First Sea Lord, a firm
believer in both battleships and battle cruisers, found the
Iter Long, as recorded in Bellairs, The Reaping , xi
.
Bel lairs suggested that Harper was not up to the task,
noting that Harper had never been a staff officer and that
he had served as navigating officer aboard the Royal Yacht
from 1911-14 and thereafter as assistant Harbour Master at
Portsmouth.
^^One reads with reservation the words of Beatty's
biographer. Rear Admiral Chalmers, The Life and Letters of
David Beatty , 267: "It is a measure of Beatty's greatness
that he forbore to reply to his critics, being content to
abide by the judgment of his countrymen and history."
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report unduly critical of the performance of the Battle
Cruiser Force during the Battle of Jutland.
Beatty ordered Harper to amend his account, thus
initiating the process of official interference in the
history of Jutland that excited much Parliamentary and
public attention.^ Harper made the directed changes, with
the result that the report protected the reputation of the
Battle Cruiser Force and hence its commander, Beatty.*^ Long
then directed Harper to cancel the changes, which appeared
detrimental to Jellicoe. The harried captain tried to
accommodate the First Lord. As a result, the report that
went forward for printing in May 1920 was a compromise
between the original narrative and the modified version that
Beatty desired. The First Sea Lord pressed First Lord Long
to accept further changes. He in turn consulted the Board,
which on June 21st authorized a preface desired by Beatty.^*
The Harper report generated Parliamentary discussion
on at least twenty-two occasions between 1919 and 1927,
according to Roskill, Intimate Biography , 324.
%arper published his own record of the Battle of
Jutland and the process of official interference with his
report as The Truth about Jutland in 1927. Several of
Harper's papers can be found as an appendix to Patterson,
Jellicoe Papers , Vol II, 458-490. Harper criticized Beatty
for "attempts to neutralize the effect of the plain,
unvarnished chronological Record of Facts" and described
Bel lairs' work as "the most unscrupulous attempt to
influence the public and disparage the Official Record."
^^Both the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief
of Staff had previously served under Beatty. The text of
the preface can be found in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, Vol
II, 469.
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Long forwarded the edited version to Jellicoe, who objected
to the alterations ordered by Beatty and strongly opposed
the Admiralty's preface, which he described as "distinctly
inaccurate as to facts [Jellicoe's italics]."'^ The Board,
under Beatty's direction, objected to Jellicoe's objections.
Long now sought to escape the crossfire of the admirals
by seeking an alternative introduction from Sir Julian
Corbet t, the eminent naval historian. Corbet t referred Long
to his publishers, Messrs. Longm.an. In August 1920
,
they
requested that the First Lord withhold the m.anuscript as
detrim.ental to the sale of the Official History of the war,
to which they possessed exclusive rights.*^ The First Lord
and the First Sea Lord then agreed to turn Harper's report
over to Corbett to assist in his preparation of the official
history. Beatty, not entirely satisfied, comjnissioned a
fresh study of the Battle of Jutland.*
The Adm.iralty's conduct drew considerable notice, m.ost
of it critical. In Novemijer and December 1920, the House of
Commons repeatedly requested publication of the Official
Record and dem.anded the Government's reasons for suppressing
"Adm.iral Jellicoe to Long, July 5th 1920, as recorded
in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers , Vol II, 406-10.
-^Chalmers, The Life and Letters of David Beatty , 357-
58.
%he staff appreciation prepared by Captains Kenneth
and A.C. Dewar focused on the lessons of the battle, in
contrast to the Harper Report, which provided strictly a
description of the action.
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Harper's work.'^ Admiral Wemyss publicly attacked the
integrity of the First Lord. The Times abused the prime
minister for failing to provide the full story to the
public. Arthur Pollen, a naval reformer, dem.anded a court-
m.artial investigation of the conduct of the Battle of
Jutland.* The enormously influential Northcliffe press,
which included The Times and the Daily Mail
. even-handedly
blasted Jellicoe's handling of the battle and Beatty's
handl ing of the report
.
Fleet Street, after tarnishing the Royal Navy's past
and present, turned its attention to the naval warfare of
the future. The press carried the letters of retired Rear
Admiral Sir Percy Scott, the gunnery expert who had shocked
the service in 1914 with a letter to The Tim.es which stated
that the subm.arine and the airplane had "driven the
battleship from, the sea.' Scott pronounced absolutely that
the war had proven him. correct: "I regarded the battleship
as dead before the War, and I think her more dead now if
that is possible." The Times featured the essays of Rear-
atterson, Jel licoe Papers . Vol II, 476-77.
TO
Dingman , Pacific , 115
.
A copy of Scott's letter is located in Charl es
Domvil le-Fif e. Submarines and Seapower (London, 1919), 71.
A synopsis, together with a surprising number of replies,
can be found in Scott's mem.oirs. Fifty Years in the Royal
Navy (New York, 1919), 263-268.
^'Scott, Fifty Years , 332. See also Kennedy, Naval
Mastery , 199, 282.
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Admiral Sydney Hall, who focused on the inability of capital
ships to protect Britain's sea lines of communication. Hall
cited Admiral Jellicoe's statement that the submarine
cam.paign of 1917-18 placed the British people "closer to
ruin than we had been for 200 years" and an Admiralty
m.emorandum from 1910 which warned that "the really serious
danger that this country has to guard against is not
invasion, but interruption of trade and destruction of our
merchant m.arine." The admiral predicted that future
subm.arines would possess m.uch greater range and mount guns
capable of sinking m.erchant vessels. Against these
submarine cruisers. Hall concluded that "in any naval war
that can reasonably be forecast, capital ships can do
nothing to assist in the protection of trade. "^^
The Daily Telegraph serialized The Submarine in War by
Charles Dom.vi 1 1 e-Fif e , a form.er naval officer with
experience in anti-subm.arine warfare. In 1919, Dom.ville-
Fife published a m.ore serious work, Subm.arines and Seapower
.
in which he predicted--sim.ilarly to Hall--the evolution of
submarine cruisers with increased displacement, speed, range
(surface and submerged), and armament. He then envisioned
the development of wolf pack tactics, "the employment of more
than one submarine in an engagement with a heavily armed
''^CAB 37/2: N.S.C. Memorandum 2 contains articles
appearing in the Tim.es from December 10-14, 1920, by Rear-
Admiral S . S . Hal 1
.
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surface ship, the under-water attack being delivered from
two or more points simultaneously." He also anticipated the
maturation of specialized anti-submarine craft equipped with
hydrophones and depth charges and emphasized the need to
protect capital ships with these auxiliaries. Domvil le-Fif
e
expected that "it will become a rule of naval warfare that
battleships should never be without a guard of destroyers . "^^
Magazines from all political persuasions joined the
chorus against the capital ship: the Conservative Spectator
.
Labor's New Statesm.an
. The Nation of Liberal persuasion,
even CP. Scott's Manchester Guardian , the pre-war advocate
of naval suprem.acy
.
On December 14, 1920, the Times
announced that "the country has recognized during the last
fortnight that the future of the Navy is foremost among the
problems that confront it." After noting the Admiralty's
comjTiitment to a program of naval construction, the paper
continued: "But so strong is the case for keen and expert
inquiry before entering into warship construction that the
It
government have yielded to the demand for investigation."
The genesis of that investigation had occurred a mere
fifteen days previously.
^Domvil le-Fif e. Submarines and Sea Power, 10-11, 58-63,
77-82
.
Dingman, Pacific , 115-16
.
^^Beatty MSS 8/2: Clipping from the Times , December 14,
1920.
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In the fall of 1920, the Admiralty drive for a new
program of capital ship construction temporarily stalled.
In July 1920, Admiral Beatty had written a memorandum
calling for four replacement capital ships in 1921 and
another four in 1922, upon which the First Lord had based
his own missive to the Cabinet. In August, Financial
Secretary to the Admiralty Sir James Craig provided the
Cabinet the projected cost of the Admiralty's construction
program: £84.5 millions. The Cabinet took scant notice of
the Admiralty iTiemo r andum except to concl ude there was no
commitment to expenditure.^ The issue of naval construction
then entered a hiatus of several months
.
When the Cabinet ignored their entreaties, the Board
waited unti 1 November and returned to the same argument
.
The Admiralty submitted another memorandum calling for the
construction of four capital ships in 1921-22 and another
four in 1922-23, The m.emorandum restated the First Lord's
position , taken during the presentation of the Navy
^^ADM 1/8602/54: Beatty Memorandum, July 8, 1920; ADM
116/1775: First Lord Memorandum, "Naval Construction", July
23, 1920.
^^ADM 1/8602/54: Financial Secretary Memorandum, August
10, 1920. The program included four capital ships in 1921-
22 , one minel ayer , two carrier conversions , and compl etion
of ancillary craft, together with four additional capital
ships in 1922-23, for £81.7 millions. Additional carrier
work and a floating dock brought the total to £84.5
mi 1 1 ions
.
^^CAB 23: C. 48(20), 7: Naval Construction, 13 August
1920 .
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Estimates in March 1920, that "our Navy should not be
inferior in strength to the Navies of other Powers." The
Board argued that the United States had increased her forces
and that as a result Britain "had reached the critical time
previously forecasted" when she must "act or fall behind."
The argument possessed a new note of urgency. Even the
prompt construction of the desired vessels, according to the
Admiralty's calculations, would leave a "window of
inferiority" in 1923-25 below the One Power standard.^' The
Director of Naval Construction, Sir Eustace Tennyson
D'Eyncourt, passed this argument to Lloyd George via Lord
George Riddell during the first week of November.
Two days before the completion of the Admiralty paper,
the Treasury produced a mem.orandum. of its own. Chancellor
of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain focused on the failure
of the fighting services to adhere to estimates in
accordance wi 1 1« 1 1^e so-called normal year total of £135
millions established in August 1919. The Chancellor noted
that the cost of the Navy depended largely upon its size,
which remained the prerogative of the Admiralty. He
complained that "there is no satisfactory evidence that the
normal year basis is regarded by the Admiralty as the limit
^^ADM 116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920.
^^George Riddell, Lord Riddell 's Intimate Diarv of the
Peace Conference and After (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock),
246.
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to which Navy votes should be reduced in the near future"
and also pointed out that the Navy's dockyard strength
greatly exceeded pre-war figures. Chamberlain then
presented opposing methods for resolving the size of the
Navy Estimates: Cabinet agreement upon a specific sum or
Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) determination of a
scale of naval strength necessary for national defence,
without regard to cost. In conclusion, the Chancellor
stated that if Britain entered into a building competition
with America, then "all prospects of reduction on Navy votes
must disappear for an indefinite time and huge liabilities
instead be contemplated."'*
The Cabinet Finance Comjnittee, on November 29th,
surveyed the position of the Exchequer. The Treasury
reported that the revised Estimates for 1920-21 were better
than expected, as "the balance for redem.ption [of the
National Debt] being slightly larger than the earlier
estimate. This was due to larger receipts on miscellaneous
revenue."' Opposing this bit of good news, however, was the
report that Debt redemption for 1921-22 appeared to be down
from a previous estimate of £250-300 millions to about £221
millions. The Government failed to meet its "normal year"
^*CAB 27/71+72: Finance Committee Memorandum 52:
November 20, 1920.
'^CAB 27/71+72: Finance Committee Minute 28, November
29, 1920.
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expenditure of £850 millions by £250 millions, as the
original figure did not include subsequent expenditure
decisions, such as doubling Old Age Pensions, extending
Unemployment Insurance, and the increases in the Service
33Estimates. The Admiralty paper on Naval Policy and
Construction raised the possibility that the Navy Estimates,
instead of falling from the £90 millions of 1920-21, might
have to be increased. The Finance Committee expressed
unhappiness with Service Estimates and agreed that the
Treasury should prepare, as a starting point for discussion
with the Fighting Services, a drastic curtailment of at
least £100 millions from the present total of £255
millions.^ In the wake of this meeting, the Prime Minister
devel oped a possible resolution to the conflicting demands
of economy and security.
Some tim.e between November 29th and December 7th, 1920,
David Lloyd George decided to form a committee to
investigate the role of the capital ship in future naval
7^
^"The increases in revised Service votes constituted
about 10% of the total shortfall (£24.5 millions out of £250
mi 1 1 ions )
:
Original Increase Revised
Army £125.0 millions +£15.0 millions £140.0 millions
Navy £84.5 millions +£5.5 millions £90.0 millions
Air Force £21.0 millions +£4.0 millions £25.0 millions
Total £230.5 millions +£24,5 millions £255.0 millions
^^CAB 27/71+72: Finance Committee Minute 28, November
29, 1920.
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operations. In this decision, he was probably influenced by
Hankey, his Cabinet Secretary, who received some time before
December 8th a similar proposal from Archibald Hurd, the
naval correspondent of the Daily Telegraph ."^ The Prime
Minister's course of action carried the immediate benefit of
delaying major expenditure on naval construction. In
addition, it held the potential for reducing the cost of the
fleet if the investigation revealed that some com.bination of
submarines, airplanes, and smaller ships could replace the
capital ships which the Admiralty demanded. Such a finding,
unthinkable in 1914, seemed far more reasonable in light of
the Jutland controversy and the recent campaign by Scott,
Hall, and others against the capital ship.
The Welsh Wizard demonstrated his vast political acumen
through the manner in which he pursued his plan for a
committee to investigate the capital ship . Whi 1 e pointing
to the public debate over the value of the capital ship as a
rational e for conducting a governmental inquiry , Ll oyd
George carefully avoided backing any specific weapons system
as a better alternative. In lieu of battleships and battle
cruisers, he suggested "small ships" and "lesser craft,"
ambiguous terms broad enough to encompass submarines
,
torpedo boats, destroyers, light cruisers, and even pocket
"'Hurd also suggested that announcement of an inquiry
into the future of the capital ship might delay American and
Japanese building programs. See Roskill, Hankey , Vol II,
205 .
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battleships.- Furthermore, the Prime Minister carefully
selected the venue for the initial presentation of his
proposal. Before subm.itting his idea to the full Cabinet,
he first broached the proposition for an investigation of
the capital ship in the Cabinet Finance Committee, a body
far more concerned with ledger balances than with the
nuances of naval construction.
In the next meeting of the Finance Committee, on
December 7th in Andrew Bonar Law's room in the House of
Commons, Lloyd George introduced his plan for an inquiry
into the role of the capital ship. He reminded the
committee, which did not contain a single representative of
the fighting services, of the country's need to pay out
heavy obligations with respect to maturing debt and that
major reductions were possible only in the service
estimates. He then addressed the Admiralty's request for a
naval building program. Lloyd George expressed reservations
as to whether "the experience of the Great War" supported
the Navy's claims as to the value of the capital ship and
37proposed an inquiry. The Prime Minister recommended to the
Finance Committee that the Cabinet should release a
statement to the effect that:
Great Britain did not propose to embark on a big
^^CAB 27/71: Finance Committee Minute 29, December 7,
1920; CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
"cab 27/71: Finance Committee Minute 29, December 7,
1920 .
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Naval Programme without a full and careful
investigation of the relative merits of big and
small ships, in light of the lessons of the las^-
war
.
He also recommended including a reminder that Britain was
committed to maintaining "a Fleet stronger than any other
Power." Lloyd George asserted that if the Government
reaffirmed the One Power Standard, in conjunction with the
proposed inquiry, then "public opinion would be satisfied"
and the Wilson Administration would probably defer their
naval program "pending knowledge of the action taken by
Britain." The Prim.e Minister's proposals struck a
responsive chord with the Finance Comjnittee, which in its
previous meeting had balked at the size of the service
estimates . " Ll oyd George thus secured the support of key
members of the Cabinet, including Andrew Bonar Law and
Austen Chamberlain, before Admiralty House had any
opportunity to rebut his arguments
.
The f ol lowing day, the Prime Minister had little
difficulty convincing the Cabinet of the wisdom of his
proposal. Armed with the support of the Finance Committee,
Lloyd George persuaded the full Cabinet to establish a
committee to investigate the place and usefulness of the
capital ship in the future of the Navy. In line with the
^^CAB 27/71: Finance Committee Minute 29, December 7,
1920.
^'CAB 27/71: Finance Committee Minute 28, November 29,
1920.
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Prime Minister's reasoning before the Finance Committee, the
Cabinet embraced the One Power standard while questioning
the role of the capital ship. The Lloyd George ministry
agreed "to maintain the Navy at a standard of strength which
shall adequately secure the safety of the Empire and its
maritime communications." At the same time. His Majesty's
Government concluded that they were "bound to satisfy
themselves that the lessons of the war have been
definitively ascertained" before "sanctioning a new program
of construction."-^ The cabinet then agreed to suspend the
question of naval construction pending the upcoming
investigation
.
On December 14th, the Prime Minister carried his plan
for a committee to investigate the capital ship to a
different forum, the Committee of Imperial Defence . The
C.I.D. provided the cabinet a valuable means of securing
inter -service cooperation . Ll oyd George pursued a strategy
developed two nights before, over dinner with Hankey and
•^CAB 23: Cabinet Minute 67(4), December 8, 1920.
^"During its first post-war meeting, the C.I.D.
established a sub-committee which included the Prime
Minister, the First Lord and First Sea Lord, the Secretary
of State for War and the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, the Under Secretary of State for Air and the Chief of
the Air Staff to handle routine matters. Winston Churchill
held the combined office of Secretary of State for War and
Air from January 1919 to February 1921. See CAB 2/3: C.I.D.
Minute 133, June 29, 1920; Roskill, Naval Policy, 256.
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Lord Haldane.- He opened by announcing his regret over the
absence of First Lord Walter Long, due to ill health, on a
day when the members of the C.I.D. were to discuss "about
the most important question that had ever been submitted to
them." The Prime Minister then identified the issue as the
type of Navy needed in the future. He questioned the need
for "a great constructive programme" and stated "the kind of
ship they were to select" was a decision that "required both
political and expert [i.e., naval] opinion."-"
Lloyd George then asked the assembled experts to
identify the "probable enemy." Europe, he suggested, could
be ruled out; the only powers with formidable navies were
Japan and the United States. He described these nations as
"friendly" but noted that they were building against one
another, forcing Britain to consider the uses to which their
fleets could be put." The Prim.e Minister then insisted that
Britain could not fight the United States for economic as
well as military reasons. Canada, he contended, had "an
indefensible border," while a shipbuilding competition
"might be ruinous" and would reduce the possibility that the
Hankey recorded that "we arranged the general lines of
the Naval Inquiry viz: -first consider what enemies we are
prepared to fight; second how; and third with what weapons
so far as the Navy is concerned." See Roskill, Hankey , Vol
II, 206.
'CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
"CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
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United States would press for the repayment of £1,000
millions in war loans."' In something of a non sequitur . he
suggested the possibility of naval spheres of influence,
with Britain taking the Mediterranean, the North Sea, and
the Indian Seas, among others/'^
Lloyd George then raised "the very important question
of the particular weapon to be employed" by the Royal Navy
in the future. He noted that the submarine "nearly became a
determining factor in the war" and speculated as to the best
method of establishing "the proportion between capital ships
and lesser craft." After reiterating the need to ascertain
the most likely future opponent and "the means with which to
fight," the Prime Minister ended by emphasizing the
importance of the experts to be consulted.-^
Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for War and
Air, joined in to argue that Britain must remain the
strongest naval power. He reviewed the history of previous
standards of naval strength and suggested that, in line with
traditional practices, Britain should "avoid direct
application" of the One Power standard "to any particular
For the American perspective on Britain's ability to
defend Canada, see William Braisted, "On the American Red
and Red-Orange Plans, 1919-39", in Gerald Jordan, ed. Naval
Warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900-1945; Essays in Honour
of Arthur Marder (New York, 1977), 167-185.
•^CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
•CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
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Power." He rejected as fallacious thinking Lloyd George's
notion of regional sea supremacy, since "the seas were
indivisible." Churchill then recommended that sea power be
measured, not in terms of post-Jutland capital ships alone,
but including man power and the fire power, armor, and
handling of vessels of every class.
Admiral Beatty then provided the Navy's position.*^ He
noted that the Admiralty had pointed out in October 1919 the
need for either an arrangement with the United States or a
new program of capital ship construction.^" He then
explained that in the absence of any diplomatic agreement
the Admiralty Board had planned a building program which
sought equality in sea power. The Board of Admiralty had
considered the lessons of the Great War and were unanimous
"CAB 2/3; C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
49Beatty was well aware of the Cabinet decision to
commission an enquiry into the role of the capital ship,
which he had briefed to the Admiralty board five days
earlier. See ADM 167/60: Board Minute 1281, December 9,
1920.
^"adM 116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
Expenditure", October 24, 1919.
^^Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Bellairs, The Sowing
and The Reaping , 15, made the point that the Navy had a much
easier time obtaining funds for battleships than for smaller
classes of ships: "'Dreadnoughts' had caught on, and if you
wanted money, you were pretty sure, with a certain amount of
pressure, to get it for 'Dreadnoughts.' But in the shout
for 'Dreadnoughts' people forgot that there were other
classes of craft that were necessary for other purposes. If
money was asked for those craft there was not quite the same
response .
"
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in their belief that the basis of sea power remained the
capital ship.^^
Responding to Churchill's argument, Beatty claimed the
Admiralty's program did not measure naval strength purely in
"post- Jutland battleships." The Admiralty could accept a
ratio of twelve such American ships to nine British vessels,
compensated by "superior design and a better proportion of
other types of vessels. "^^ The admiral avoided stating the
obvious: if the Admiralty's program were not approved, the
ratio of post-Jutland capital ships would be twelve American
and eight Japanese to one British vessel (the Hood ) .^^
Beatty concluded by emphasizing the urgency of the
situation. The Admiralty had already made clear to the
Cabinet that a failure to build in the near future would
result in a de facto abandonment of the One Power Standard.
Beatty then addressed a new issue, the adverse impact of
^^CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
%his ratio came from a table of projected strength for
1924-25 presented in the Admiralty's latest request for a
building program. Class A ships were those of post-Jutland
design over 40,000 tons; Class B ships were capital ships of
at least 30,000 tons with gxms of at least 14"; Class C
ships were capital ships of at least 25,000 tons with guns
of less than 14":
Britain US Japan Britain with Program
Class A 1 12 8 9
Class B 13 11 . 4 13
Class C 4 4 4 4
See ADM 116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920.
^*CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
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post-war retrenchment on the ship-building industry. On
December 10th, he had prepared a short memorandum for the
Cabinet that stated that one large armaments firm had closed
and another had accepted a foreign order. The admiral had
explained that further delay on the construction of capital
ships threatened the livelihood of naval contractors and
thus endangered Britain's capacity to build warships.'^ The
First Sea Lord warned the C.I.D. that Britain's capacity to
manufacture armor plate was disappearing.^^
After Beatty's discussion, the C.I.D. committee focused
on the naval rivalry between Britain and the United States.
Austen Chamberlain urged the avoidance of a building race
with America. Andrew Bonar Law observed that the United
The Director of Naval Construction had first raised
this issue with the Admiralty Board a year earlier: "The
drive for economy may lead to the shutting down of new
construction, which would be deleterious to the navy. We
must review our designs annually and construct at least one
new ship of each type. We must keep the necessary staff of
designers, draughtsmen, and skilled workers on tap. We must
enter some arrangements with the contractors to ensure the
capacity to build does not become lost. See D'Eyncourt MSS
21: D'Eyncourt Memorandum, "Naval Material", September 8,
1919.
^^The Armstrong works at Openshaw, near Manchester, had
closed, and Vickers had contracted to supply 7,600 tons of
armor plate to the Japanese Government.
^^ADM 116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Construction", December 10, 1920.
^^CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
Beatty's prediction had some validity: during Britain's
rearmament in the 1930 's, the lack of native armament
producers forced Britain to order armor plate from the
Czechosl ovakian firm of Skoda.
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States was having difficulty manning her fleet and declared
that British naval construction would arouse American pride.
He counseled the acceptance of some risk in terms of naval
security and then suggested a diplomatic solution to obviate
"battleship building on a large scale." Lloyd George
swiftly concurred. Before adjourning, the C.I.D. agreed
that the Foreign Secretary would consult Auckland Geddes
,
Britain's Ambassador to the United States, regarding the
prospects of the "limitation of armaments."-'
The Prime Minister's position regarding the capital
ship controversy meanwhile crystallized. If there had been
any doubts in his mind during the first week of December,
they disappeared during the public debate on the issue. On
December 20th, Hankey recorded in his diary:
The P.M. rather irritable. I felt instinctively
that he was rather cross with me - I think over
the Naval Inquiry. He wants to be able to prove
that the Capital Ship is doomed.
Hankey himself believed that the capital ship remained
viable, forwarding the latest Admiralty memo to his chief
with a minute stating "their arguments appear
incontrovertible."^*^ Within two days of discussing the
future of the capital ship with Hankey, Lloyd George told
Lord Riddel 1 that "it would be a great mistake for the
-^CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 134, December 14, 1920.
''Maurice Hankey, as recorded in Roskill, Hankey , Vol
II, 207.
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country to engage in a big ship-building programme at the
moment." The Prime Minister indicated his desire to reduce
"the size of ships and the weight to be carried.
On December 23, 1920, at the next meeting of the
C.I.D., Churchill proposed the formation of a subcommittee
that would collect and lay evidence before the full
Committee of Imperial Defence. He suggested evidence from
eight or nine individuals from different points of view,
with cross examination by the Admiralty. The Secretary of
State for War and Air explained that he tended to support
the views of the Admiralty, but that he believed a hearing
would simplify the task of refuting the opinions in the
press
.
The Prime Minister immediately supported Churchill's
recommendation for a committee to investigate the capital
ship, the idea that he had first proposed to the Cabinet
Finance Committee over three weeks before. He added that
"it was very necessary to obtain the views of men who
favoured the Mittle ship'."" Lloyd George then asked
Beatty whether Tyrwhitt, Keyes
,
Duff, and Richmond-all of
whom were officers known for accomplishments apart from
"David Lloyd George, as recorded in Riddell, Intimate
Diary , 255.
^^CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.
^^CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.
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capital ships--would be available to testify.^* Beatty
answered that the Admiralty "had always considered
themselves the advisors of the Cabinet on naval matters" and
in turn asked the Prime Minister whether the Government
still adhered to the One Power standard. Lloyd George
stated that "no alteration had been made in the Government's
policy" but refused "to consider the question of taking
immediate steps" regarding the construction of capital ships
pending further deliberation. On that note, the C.I.D.
agreed to form a subcommittee to investigate the role of the
65capital ship. David Lloyd George would provide this group,
known officially as Naval Shipbuilding Subcommittee
(N.S.C.), the maximum opportunity consonant with the
appearance of open-mindedness to limit the role of the
capital ship.
On December 29th, the prime minister commissioned
Andrew Bonar Law (Lord Privy Seal) as chairman of the
N.S.C., whose members included Beatty, Churchill, Sir Eric
"Rear-Admiral Reginald Tyrwhitt during the war
commanded the Harwich Force, where he earned a thrusting
reputation with light cruisers and destroyers. Vice-Admiral
Roger Keyes , who commanded the Dover Patrol in a manner
similar to Tyrwhitt, led the daring raid on Zeebrugge
harbour which featured destroyers and blockships. Admiral
Sir Alexander Duff, who served with the Admiralty as the
Director of the Ant i -Submarine Division, influenced Jellicoe
to institute the convoy system in 1917. Rear-Admiral Sir
Herbert Richmond, the President of the Naval War College at
Greenwich, earned distinction as naval historian,
strategist, and tactician.
"cab 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.
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Geddes (Minister of Transport and former First Lord), Sir
Robert Home (President of the Board of Trade), and First
Lord Walter Long. At first glance, the Bonar Law Enquiry,
as the N.S.C. was informally known, seemed evenly balanced
between the advocates of naval security (Beatty, Churchill,
Long) and those of economy (Bonar Law, Geddes, Horne) . In
reality, however, the dynamics of the subcommittee
discreetly favored the supporters of naval limitation.
Bonar Law, who as chairman was responsible for drafting the
subcommittee's report, generally lacked interest in defense
matters." In addition, he disliked and distrusted Winston
Churchill." When Lloyd George had asked the Chancellor of
the Exchequer-designate his opinion of keeping Churchill in
the Cabinet in December 1916, Bonar Law had responded: "I
would rather have him against us every time."' Long was too
ill to attend most of the N.S.C. meetings. He and
Churchill, furthermore, were bitter political enemies.
Admiral Beatty fought doggedly to insure the Bonar Law
Enquiry accepted the primacy of the capital ship in the
""Kobert Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1966), 20.
%obert Blake, Unrepentant Tory: The Life and Times of
Andrew Bonar Law (New York: St. Martin's, 1956), 232-34;
James, J.C.C. Davidson , 53.
'^Andrew Bonar Law, as recorded in Blake, Bonar Law .
234.
^'Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill. IV: The Stricken
World 1916-1922 (Boston, 1975), 29.
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future of the Royal Navy. The First Lord's rapidly failing
health left to the First Sea Lord the primary burden of
protecting the interests of the Royal Navy, a responsibility
that the admiral took deeply to heart. One diarist
recorded Beatty's determination "to resign rather than go
down to posterity as the First Sea Lord in office at the
time such a shameful decision" [the abandonment of the
capital ship and with it, naval supremacy] was implemented.*-
The First Sea Lord built his case on the premise that for
the life of a new battleship (approximately 20 years), it
would remain the predominant weapon of naval warfare.
Beatty took care to use all of the tools at his disposal: at
Cabinet meetings he habitual 1 y appeared impeccably dressed
in morning coat, striped trousers, and a satin cravat
adorned with a single pearl, while at night he carefully
rehearsed his arguments with his secretary, who played the
role of devil ' s advocate
.
Beatty orchestrated the Admiral ty ' s case , sel ecting the
expert witnesses and producing five documents for the
"Roskill , Naval Policy , 224, notes that although Long
was unable to attend the meetings of the N.S.C., he reviewed
all the papers presented to it, and even prepared two of his
own. See CAB 16/37: N8-First Lord Memorandum, "Subcommittee
on the Capital Ship in the Navy", January 28, 1921 and N9-
First Lord Memorandum, "Naval Policy and Shipbuilding",
January 31, 1921.
'*Bryan Godf rey-Faussett , as recorded in Roskill, Last
Naval Hero , 302-03.
^^Chalmers, Life and Letters of David Beatty , 363-64.
224
committee on which he sat. He expanded his oral argument
for the preservation of naval armament firms and recommended
the adoption of a slow yet steady building program. Such a
course, he argued, would serve not only to maintain naval
production lines but also to reduce production costs. He
pointed out the extensive capital ship construction of the
United States Navy and reminded the committee of the
Government's professed adherence to the principle that the
Royal Navy "should not be inferior in strength to the Navy
of other Powers."^' Beatty also reiterated his judgment that
only the immediate construction of four new capital ships
would suffice to maintain Britain's position of equality.'^
In a progress report to the ill First Lord, the First Sea
Lord wrote that he had pointed out to the Bonar Law Enquiry
that:
time was of the utmost importance ... that unless we
were authorized to commence bui Iding ships in the
summer of 1921 we should drop from the position we
have hel d for the past three hundred years to that
of taking third place in the world.
•"CAB 16/37/3: N2-Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Construction", December 10, 1920; N4-Admiralty Memorandum,
"Naval Construction", December 14, 1920; N6-Admiralty
Memorandum, "Naval Construction-Armour Plate", December 15,
1920.
'•First pronounced by Walter Long in March 1920 and last
reaffirmed by David Lloyd George in December 1920. See
Parliamentary Debates , Commons, vol. 126, cols 2296-2347;
CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.
"cab 16/37/3: Nl-Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy
and Construction", November 22, 1920.
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Beatty added that the Royal Navy would "never be able to
regain our present position without incurring great cost."^-
Finally, the First Sea Lord introduced a new line of
argument regarding imperial naval defense. The Admiralty
previously had recommended to the C.I.D. that "the Dominions
and colonies limit their shipbuilding programmes to the
provision of light cruisers and submarines," develop bases,
and build up fuel supplies. The Royal Navy would serve as
an imperial fire brigade, rushing as a whole to any
threatened location. Such a strategy, the admiral argued,
required a fleet of speedy capital ships: "the mobility of
the main body is a very important factor." The eight
proposed capital ships would form the backbone of the rapid
response force. Beatty indicated that the projected
division of labor would reduce the Royal Navy's ancillary
77
costs
.
Beatty discounted the threat from the sky, knowing that
air power enthusiasts could make only limited claims for the
fledgling Royal Air Force based on actual performance.' The
Admiralty's Post War Questions Committee had reported less
Admiral Beatty, as recorded in Chalmers, Life and
Letters of David Beatty , 363.
^^CAB 16/37/3: NlO-Admiral ty Memorandum, "Naval
Shipbuilding Policy", February 23, 1921.
^^Geoffrey Till, "Airpower and the Battleship in the
1920's", in Brian Ranft, ed. Technical Changes and British
Naval Policy 1860-1939 (London, 1977), 108-122.
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than a year before that aircraft could not threaten the
capital ship "until the capabilities of aircraft increase
beyond anything that appears probable in the near future. "^^
Chief of Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard suggested that the Air
Force could be expanded to assume the Navy's mission of
preventing invasion, but for the present would go no further
than to claim:
if we can concentrate on the development of the
aircraft, the importance of the capital ship must
be greatly reduced and will become an insurance
for which we cannot afford to pay the premiums.^'
Stronger claims for air power were made by retired Major-
General Sir Frederick Sykes, who stated: "All forms of
warship will soon become obsolete, and by the time a
programme of battleship construction is completed new
factors may have arisen which render them useless,"
Retired Rear-Admiral Charles de Bartolome, wartime Third Sea
Lord, strongly supported Sykes's views concerning the
enormous potential of air power. He asserted that the new
technologies "are so promising that we should be well
82
advised to defer the building of capital ships,"
^ADM 1/8586/70: Final Report of the Post-War Questions
Committee, March 21, 1920.
^^CAB 16/37/2: NSC-22, Testimony of Air-Marshal
Trenchard
•
^-CAB 16/37/2: NSC-24, Testimony of Ma jor-General Sykes.
^^CAB 16/37/2: NSC-23, Testimony of Rear-Admiral de
Bartol ome
.
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The Admiralty's counterattack included a memorandum
which addressed the future of air/sea combat and the
testimony of Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Ernie
Chatfield. ' Chatfield identified numerous difficulties that
air power would face: the problem of locating targets, the
need to mass sufficient aircraft, the limited pay-load of
ship-borne bombers, and the inability of contemporary bombs
to penetrate armor before detonation (thus much of their
explosive power was wasted on a ship's superstructure,
rather than concentrating against its vitals). An Admiralty
paper highlighted the vulnerability of aviation to inclement
weather, promised that anti-aircraft fire would render air
attacks useless, and flatly stated that "there is nothing in
the present offensive qualities of aircraft which render
them a menace to the existence of the capital ship." The
memorandum also predicted that naval count ermeasu res woul
d
progress in step with advances in aviation.^^
The First Lord concentrated his efforts on discrediting
the value of the submarine. In order to impeach the
credential s of Rear -Admiral Hall, Beatty arranged for the
appearance of Captain Max Hor ton , who successful ly commanded
three submarines and 1 ater a submarine flotilla during the
^^A synopsis of Chatfield's testimony can be found in
Till, "Airpower and the Battleship", in Ranft, Technical
Change , 112.
^^CAB 16/37/3: N5-Admiralty Memorandum, "Retention of
the Capital ship", December 14, 1920.
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war.- In response to a series of questions from Sir Eric
Geddes concerning the potential of the magnetic torpedo,
Horton emphasized the operational difficulties involved with
deploying futuristic weapons. He deprecated the theoretical
capabilities of the submarine touted in the press as:
out of all proportion to the damage which these
weapons will actually inflict under wartime
conditions, and the difficulty of bringing them
into action is not appreciated by the 'Material
School '--of little sea experience--who are
conducting the newspaper campaign against the
Capital ship."
Rear-Admiral Keyes advised Vice-Admiral Brock against the
possibility of testimony from Admiral Freemantle: "I don't
think he would be a good witness until he has made up his
mind that the submarine is not going to take sea supremacy
37from the Battleship." In his own memorandum, Beatty argued
that during the war improved anti-submarine warfare
techniques "sensibly eased the submarine menace." German U-
boats neither deterred the Grand Fleet from proceeding to
sea nor sank "a single capital ship in the main fighting
go
fleet." His task was made easier by the refusal of Sir
''Beatty MSB 8/2/4: Hankey prepared the list of
witnesses after discussion with Beatty.
^-Beatty MSS 8/3: NSC-19, Testimony of Captain M.K.
Horton
.
^^Admiral Keyes, as recorded in Paul Halpern, ed. The
Keyes Papers. Volume II: 1919-1938 (London: Allen & Unwin,
1980), 49.
^^CAB 16/37/2: N2-Admiralty Memorandum, "Retention of
the Capital Ship", December 14, 1920.
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Percy Scott, with his cry of "What is the use of a
battleship?," to appear before the Committee J'
One of the interesting features of the Bonar Law
Enquiry was the absence of oral or written testimony from
the Director of Naval Construction (D.N.C.), Sir Eustace
Tennyson D'Eyncourt. Probably the leading naval architect
of his day, D'Eyncourt held the responsibility for
incorporating the lessons of the war into the design of His
orMajesty s warships.'^ In the face of the German submarine
menace, the D.N.C. arranged for a series of experiments
involving the use of torpedoes against a target ship
equipped with bulges, which consisted of external watertight
compartments filled with air and inner compartments filled
with water. At the conclusion of the trials, he wrote:
With ships of this character [possessing bulges
]
the supremacy of the Battleship against the
submarine can be taken as reestablished, a
Scott viewed the invitation to testify as an Admiral ty
trap to 1 imit his freedom to speak out on the future of the
capital ship. See Hunt, Sailor-Scholar . 121. Beatty
considered 1 egal proceedings against Scott for his
disrespectful references to the Admiralty in The Times . See
Beatty MSS: 8/2/4.
'^After an apprenticeship with Armstrong, the Royal
Naval College, and Fairchild, D'Eyncourt served as the
Director of Naval Construction from 1912 until his
retirement in 1924
.
'^Professor Hopkinson of the War Committee of the Royal
Society conducted these experiments at Cambridge, Chatham,
and Portsmouth.
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supremacy which at the earlier period of the war
seemed to be threatened.'^
Wartime experience strengthened D'Eyncourt's faith in the
value of bulges. The battleship Marlborough , torpedoed at
Jutland, subsequently remained in the fight for a
considerable time and returned safely to port. In 1917, the
cruiser Grafton in the Mediterranean received a torpedo full
amidships, but the ship made way safely back to Malta. At
the height of the public controversy involving the
submarine, D'Eyncourt made the following comparison:
Of Edgar class light cruisers, unbulged Hawke was
torpedoed and sank rapidly with great loss of
life, while sister ships Edgar
. Grafton
. and
Endymion
, all with bulges, returned safely to
harbour after being torpedoed.
The summer of 1920 he developed the designs for the Royal
Navy's next capital ships, the first British vessels to
exceed 100' of beam in order to provide adequate anti-
torpedo bulges.
Why, then, did the First Sea Lord not invite his
Director of Naval Construction to educate the other members
of the Bonar Law Enquiry as to the degree of protection
D'Eyncourt MSS 31: D'Eyncourt Memorandvim, January 1,
1915.
"D'Eyncourt MSS 31: D'Eyncourt to Sir Philip Watt,
November 15, 1920.
'^D'Eyncourt MSS 27: Goodall Memorandum, "Battleship
Design", July 1, 1920. The complete dimensions of the
vessels were length, 760'; breadth, 112'; draft, 32';
displacement, 48,000 tons.
231
provided by anti-torpedo bulges? Beatty's wholehearted
efforts throughout the work of the committee strongly
indicate the omission did not stem from a sense of
hopelessness or futility. One possibility is that Beatty
may have suffered from tunnel vision: he was so convinced
that the capital ship was safe from the submarine that he
may not have seen the potential impact of D'Eyncourt's
testimony on the other committee members. Another
possibility involves the secondary effects of constructing
capital ships equipped with bulges. Bulged vessels were
necessarily broad of beam--D' Eyncourt ' s latest design called
for a width of 112 '--and required very large docks. None of
the royal dockyards were capable of handling ships wider
than 100', and only four private yards (Armstrong, Brown,
Cammell, and Fairfield) could service vessels of such
dimension." The Admiralty's cost estimate for their
construction program of eight new capital ships included
£400,000 for the enlargement of a captured German floating
or
dock. The maintenance of those vessels, furthermore, would
undoubtedly have entailed more than one such dock. Beatty
thus may have feared closer investigation into the ancillary
costs associated with bulged ships.
D' Eyncourt MSS 27: D' Eyncourt Memorandum to the
controller, June 14, 1920.
'^ADM 116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920.
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Three members of the committee repeatedly challenged
the professional judgments of the Admiralty experts. Sir
Eric Geddes, who served as First Lord of the Admiralty from
June 1917 through January 1919, strongly opposed the
Admiralty experts who claimed that "by the autumn of 1918
the submarine menace was practically overcome." In the face
of Rear-Admiral Keyes' testimony that the Royal Navy's first
line of defense against the submarine was the mine rather
than the use of convoy, supplemented by depth-charges,
Geddes burst forth:
I do not want to give evidence before the
committee, but when the Admiral [who after all was
in charge at Dover, and succeeded at Dover] says,
that he considers in this War we overcame the
submarine menace, I am amazed...! consider the
submarine was temporarily held up to May, 1918,
but was getting more dangerous in the later
months, and everything in the Admiralty will
support that
.
Geddes also chal 1 enged the judgment of naval witnesses
regarding the value of the magnetic torpedo.
Sir Robert Horne, who along with Bonar Law could make
no claim to any expertise in naval matters, rejected the
proposition that future air defenses for capital ships would
develop to counter air attack. He predicted that "a
concerted attack by ten or fifteen torpedo carrying
98
machines" would defeat the Hood class battle cruisers.
Beatty MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute 3, January 7, 1921.
'Beatty MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute 4, January 7, 1921.
233
Horne swept aside the notion that fighter planes would be
able to defend capital ships, provided the attacking bombers
themselves had a fighter escort "to take care of your
[defensive] fighters.
Committee chairman Andrew Bonar Law led overmatched
Rear-Admiral Keyes, the Admiralty submarine expert, to
discuss the course of a hypothetical war with America.
After Keyes stated that he would take a fleet of capital
ships to Bermuda, the Lord Privy Seal asked an important
question: "Do you think it would be possible under any
circumstances, with or without the equality of battleships,
to keep the Canadian trade route open?" The admiral
admitted that the Navy could not keep the sea line of
communication at all times, but contended that the fleet
could escort a large convoy. Bonar Law then pronounced:
"You would lose the war and lose Canada for the time being.'
He next continued the attack on the capital ship with a
series of questions:
What purpose would the fleet serve to protect our
trade?... How could the American fleet interfere
with our trade? ... Could not smaller ships, planes,
and submarines constitute the same threat to
American trade as the fleet?
He concluded by asking a final question which demonstrated
that he shared the viewpoint of Prime Minister David Lloyd
"Beatty MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute 4, January 7, 1921.
-'^Beatty MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute 4, January 7, 1921.
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George: "Did not those smaller craft offer a more efficient
alternative than the batt 1 eship?"^"^
The advocates of economy listened closely to the
testimony of Rear-Admiral Herbert Richmond, President of the
Royal Naval College at Greenwich. His reputation as a naval
theorist had led Admiral Beatty in November 1920 to ask him
for arguments in favor of funding capital ships. '"^^
Richmond's diary reflected his belief that a rigorous a.
posteriori investigation would serve Britain better than the
First Sea Lord's abiding faith in the capital ship:
He wanted arguments to shew [sic] that battleships
were necessary. I thought he was going about
investigation the wrong way. One should not try
to prove what needed proving in one's own mind,
but to find out what was right. The Post-war
[Questions] Comm.ittee had merely made statements,
assertions, had not examined the war to find out
what the influence of [the] big ship was or
whe.t|ier she was still in the position she used to
The President of the Royal Naval College had his own vision
of the navies of the future, in which technological
developments and financial constraints would lead to more.
-"*Beatty MSS 8/3: N.S.C. Minute 4, January 7, 1921.
''^^Richmond' s talents were universally recognized; his
intolerance and scathing criticism for those with differing
views alienated many contem.poraries . Eminent naval
historian Arthur Harder considered Richmond the ablest naval
officer of the day, while Admiral Ernie Chatfield, who
eventually rose to the position of First Sea Lord, called
him. the m.ost irresponsible. See Higham, Military
Intellectuals , 32 .
-''^Rear-Admiral Richm.ond, as recorded in Marder,
Portrait of an Admiral
,
364.
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yet smaller ships:
The Fleet may then [1930] consist of very few
ships of the line and a host of cruisers. Toimagine that we are going to see fleets of 30 or
more ships of the line, each costing 8 million
pounds, is to imagine that the purses of the
nations are bottomless - which they are not. We
may see a core of heavy ships - a nucleus, with a
host of lesser vessels.
Rather than giving this answer to Beatty, however, six weeks
later, in December 1920, he provided his views to Hankey for
transmission to Lloyd George."'
Richmond's failure to work through his superiors or
even to inform them of his actions, which the typical Royal
Navy officer would have found reprehensible, was not unique.
Richmond had once before communicated his views on naval
matters to the Prime Minister, to whom he had turned in 1917
in order to force the Admiralty to the use of convoy against
submarines.*'^ His actions can best be explained by his
biographer
:
He was a man of strong views which did not always
coincide with those of his seniors, and he was apt
to be impatient and to show his annoyance when,|^his
views on any matter were not accepted by them."
By 1920, he had become disillusioned with the Beatty regime,
"*Rear-Admiral Richmond, as recorded in Harder,
Portrait of an Admiral , 364.
'^'Roskill, Hankey , Vol II, 207-08.
-"^^unt, Sailor-Scholar , 56-67; Harder, Scapa Flow . Vol
IV, 154.
"^Harder, Scapa Flow . Vol V, 20.
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particularly the Admiralty's inability to articulate and
implement a clear-cut policy for naval defense. -^^
Rear-Admiral Richmond provided support to both sides of
the capital ship debate. He began by agreeing with Beatty's
long parade of wartime veterans as to the value of capital
ships. He testified that "the capital ship still remains
the basis of sea power, cannot be seriously interfered with
by submarines in open waters, and must be included in the
British fleet. Sea power, he continued, encompassed more
than simply battleships; it stemmed from balanced fleets,
supported by adequate bases, from locations with positional
advantages
.
Richmond next addressed the impact of national finance
on naval strength. The Royal Naval College president stated
that Britain's position "depends upon the restoration of our
credit and also the devel opment of our trade . He
therefore strongl y recommended against the Admiral ty '
s
building program based on the cost of new capital ships and
the dockyards and smaller craft on which they relied. He
argued: "If we cannot at the same time afford the great
^%unt , Sailor-Scholar , 109.
•^^CAB 16/27/3: Summary of Evidence.
**''CAB 16/37/3: NSC-27, Testimony of Rear-Admiral H.W.
Richmond
.
*^*CAB 16/37/3: NSC-27, Testimony of Rear-Admiral H.W.
Richmond
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ships and the cruisers, flotillas, and bases, the great
ships will be useless." The admiral's analysis rested upon,
but did not explicitly refer to, the existing distribution
of capital ships which provided virtually no threat outside
of Japan and the United States, faithful wartime allies.
Richmond then put forth his recommendations for naval
defense. He urged a policy of research work and experiment
with new technologies and tactical combinations. He
contended that:
if the battleship programme hinders our research
work it will do harm.
. .merely to build ships of a
larger and more heavily armed type than those of
the United States does not solve the problem.
He also suggested that the Royal Navy might adopt a much
smaller battleship, "a more efficient instrument." The
savings created by downsizing new capital ships would in
turn enable Britain to "create a sufficient number of units"
to fulfill its global obligations.*"
The idea of a smaller vessel which would fulfill most
of the functions of the capital ship and do so in a more
efficient manner attracted other naval thinkers."^ Admiral
"•'CAB 16/37/3: NSC-27, Testimony of Rear-Admiral H.W.
Richmond
.
"^CAB 16/37/3: NSC-27, Testimony of Rear-Admiral H.W.
Richmond
"^It is interesting to speculate whether Richmond
served as the source for Lloyd George's interest in "smaller
ships." This researcher, however, cannot document any
linkage between the two from the submarine crisis of 1917 to
the campaign for an investigation of the capital ship.
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Mark Kerr, who published his memoirs in 1933, lamented the
size of post- Jutland capital ships, which, as they became
larger, grew "more vulnerable to gunfire, torpedoes, or
bombs. "^^^ The German Navy enjoyed considerable success
during the Second World War with their three pocket
battleships. Admiral Graf Soee . Admiral Scheer . and
Deutschland. At 12,000 tons displacement, these ships
weighed less than a third as much as the British King Georae
V class battleships, at 38,000 tons each.^^^
Given the conflicting testimony, the Naval Shipbuilding
Committee could not agree on the value of the capital ship.
Bonar Law, supported by Geddes and Horne, prepared a report
that found "no evidence adequate to support the contention
that the capital ship is obsolete," but that emphasized "the
doubtful expediency of deciding to build big and costly
117
vessels at the present time."^^ The Bonar Law-Horne-Geddes
report called particular attention to the evidence of Rear-
Admirals Richmond and Bartolome, who both gave credence to
the potential of emerging weapons systems. The chairman's
Mark Kerr, The Navy in My Time (London: Rich and
Cowan, 1933), 227; 242.
^^^For the technical specifications of these ships, see
Cajus Bekker, Hitler's Naval War (New York: Kensington,
1977), 379; Wi 1 1 iam McMahon , Dreadnought Battleships and
Battle Cruisers (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1978), 54-55.
*^^CAB 16/37/3: "Report of the Subcommittee on the
Capital Ship", March 2, 1921.
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report accepted the conclusion of these officers, who both
advised against the construction of new capital ships.
Churchill vehemently disagreed, noting that Bonar Law's
summary laid "an undue emphasis on any evidence which may
have been obtained against the capital ship." The Secretary
of State for War and Air claimed that the Admiralty had
"made out an overwhelming case for the retention of the
capital ship as the foundation of sea power. ""^ He wrote in
a similar vein to Arthur Balfour on February 26, 1921, when
he pointed out that: "Britain is in danger of becoming not
only the second but third naval power in a few years time."
Churchill advocated a program of four capital ships to be
built every year for four or five years "on the lines I
declared against Germany in 1912."
Beatty, adamantly opposed to Bonar Law's findings,
wrote a separate report. The adm.iral maintained that the
advocates of the new technologies had in no way undermined
the position of the capital ship as the predominant weapon
in naval warfare for the foreseeable future. His report
concluded that "the capital ship remains the material basis
of sea-power" and "that to maintain the one-Power standard
""cab 16/37/3: "Report of the Subcommittee on the
Capital Ship", March 2, 1921.
^^'seatty MSS 8/4: Churchill Note, February 13, 1921.
*^°Winston Churchill, as recorded in Young, Balfour ,
419.
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in accordance with the policy adopted by the Government, it
is necessary to lay down capital ships without delay."
Churchill and Long concurred with Beatty's findings.*^*
The N.S.C. issued its divided report in March 1921.
The body of the report comprised the opposing conclusions of
the committee; those written by Bonar Law were printed on
the left-hand pages of the report, while those written by
Beatty were printed on the right hand pages for direct
comparison. The remainder of the report gave no cause for
controversy. Appendix I listed the fourteen witnesses
before the committee, together with their present and
wartim.e appointments. Appendix II provided a summary of
evidence. On the last page of that appendix was a
discussion of the contingency of a war with Japan. The
committee agreed that "for such a war a British naval base
111
at Singapore was essential,"
Although the very constitution of a committee to
investigate the role of the capital ship in the navy
reflected the Admiralty's loss of hegemony in naval affairs,
the reports of the Naval Shipbuilding Subcommittee served to
strengthen marginally the position of the Admiralty. The
Jutland controversy and the ensuing media debate influenced
CAB 16/37/3: "Report of the Subcommittee on the
Capital Ship", March 2, 1921.
*^^CAB 16/37/3: "Report of the Subcommittee on the
Capital Ship", March 2, 1921.
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certain members of the Cabinet to reject the Admiralty's
assurances on the continuing value of the capital ship. The
oral arguments of Bonar Law, Geddes, and Horne demonstrated
the battleship no longer enjoyed the position of
unquestioned predominance it had had before the war. None
of the witnesses before the committee, however, established
a credible alternative to a fleet based on the capital ship.
Nor had any of them challenged the Admiralty's claim that
the construction of four capital ships was necessary to
maintain equality with the fleet of the United States. In
the spring of 1921, the Cabinet nonetheless remained
unconvinced as to the value of such a fleet.
CHAPTER 7
IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1921
The course of the Imperial Conference of 1921 reflected
one of the major changes wrought by the Great War, the
increased strength of the Dominions, Japan, and the United
States. As the Angl o- Japanese Alliance came due for renewal
in 1921, the British government pursued the cautious policy
of seeking renewal under the covenant of the League of
Nations. Independently, the Admiralty dispatched Admiral
Jellicoe on a tour of the Pacific in order to evaluate the
strategic requirements for imperial defense in that region.
At the Imperial Conference of 1921, Australia and New
Zealand supported renewal of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance in
order to avoid offending the Japanese, while Canada sought
abrogation to avoid offending the Americans. Lloyd George
brought the Imperial Cabinet to agreement on two decisions:
the development of a naval base at Singapore and Britain's
acceptance of an American invitation to discuss disarmament
and Pacific security.
Early in 1921, the British government began its
preparations for the forthcoming Imperial Conference. In
order to develop an agenda for the conference, the prime
minister created a planning committee under the direction of
Leo Amery. On February 4, 1921, the Amery committee
submitted its report, which identified for the conference
four major issues, of which the two most important were
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imperial defense and renewal of the Anglo- Japanese
Al liance
Britain had concluded a defensive alliance with Japan
on January 30, 1902, primarily from concern with Russian
imperialism. British interests in the region included the
defense of India and trade in China's Yangtze Valley.^ In
the wake of the Boer War, Britain had felt isolated and
threatened by Russian territorial aggrandizement as well as
the expansion of Russian sea power. ^ The original Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, valid for five years, allowed each
signatory to remain neutral in a war between the other
nation and a single belligerent but required intervention if
the other party faced two or more powers.^ London also
agreed to maintain a certain level of naval strength in Far
Eastern waters.^ Britain avoided the need to join a purely
ADM 1/8611/151: Imperial Conference Agenda, February
4, 1921. The committee, comprised of representatives from
the Board of Trade, the Air Ministry, and the Colonial,
Foreign, India, and War Offices, included Captain Barry
Domville of the Admiralty Plans Division.
Lowe and Dockerill, Mirage of Power , 275-76.
^eloff. Imperial Sunset , 100-01, notes that in the
search for an ally against Russia, Britain first looked to
the United States.
^Kennedy , Realities Behind Diplomacy , 116-17 . Belof f
,
Imperial Sunset , 75, points out that the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance represented the only diplomatic undertaking before
the First World War in which Britain agreed to go to war
upon a specified condition, regardless of other
circumstances
.
^Belof f , Imperial Sunset , 101.
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Russo-Japanese conflict, but secured Japanese assistance
against a possible Franco-Russian combination in the Far
East. Continued fears of Russian menace against India,
fueled by the completion of the Transcaspian and Orenburg-
Tashkent railways, led the Balfour Government to revise and
renew the Angl o- Japanese Alliance on August 12, 1905, for a
period of ten years. ^ The terms of the revised Alliance,
which became operative in the event of a signatory engaging
in hostilities with a single belligerent, served to bolster
the defenses of India against invasion by land and to
facilitate the concentration of British naval strength in
European waters against the growing German fleet.
The British government again revised and renewed the
alliance on July 13, 1911, for another period of ten years.
The incompatibility of an Anglo-American treaty of
arbitration proposed by American President William Taft in
July 1910 with the existing terms of the treaty caused
Britain to review the treaty four years ahead of schedule.
The Asquith Government decided to renew early and to revise
the agreement to accoimnodate Taft's proposal. In May 1911,
at a special meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence,
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey briefed the Dominion Prime
Ministers on the alliance and requested indorsement of the
'Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power . 279.
^lan Nish, Alliance in Decline; A Study in Anglo-
Japanese Relations 1908-23 (London, 1972), 41-77.
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proposed renewal, which he received unanimously.^ Article
IV of the 1911 treaty absolved either signatory of the need
to conduct hostilities against any third party with whom
they had contracted a treaty of arbitration.' Although the
refusal of the United States Senate to ratify an Anglo-
American arbitration treaty in August 1911 left Article IV
temporarily inoperative, Britain announced to Japan that the
peace commission treaty of September 15, 1914, constituted
such an arbitration agreement. *° After 1914, then, the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance specifically relieved Britain of any
obligation to support her ally in the event of hostilities
between Japan and America.
The Angl o- Japanese Alliance, which in 1905 facilitated
the concentration of British naval strength in European
waters against the growing German fleet, served to protect
British interests in a region Britain could not defend
militarily at the conclusion of the Great War. The
concentration of imperial forces against the German threat,
which forced Britain to denude her overseas defenses, caused
London to insist on the renewal of the treaty in 1911
'Beloff, Imperial Sunset , 149, indicates that Britain
would have renewed even without Dominion concurrence.
'For the text of the 1911 treaty, see Nish, Alliance ,
66-68.
*^Nish, Alliance in Decline , 110-111.
246
despite the objections of Australia and New Zealand.^* In
the spring of 1920, the British Fo'reign Office conducted a
study which identified seven points of divergence between
British and Japanese interests, including the autonomy of
China, economic competition, and the racial policies of
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Nonetheless, one
senior Foreign Office official concluded that "it is
essential for us, owing to our naval weaknesses in the
Pacific, to have a friendly Japan. "^^ The value of the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance was also clear to his Department
chief, the Foreign Secretary.
George Nathaniel Curzon, K.G.
,
P.O., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., F.R.S., Baron Curzon of Kedleston, Baron
Ravensdale, Viscount Scarsdale, and 1st Earl of Kedleston,
assumed duties as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in
January, 1919. The Foreign Secretary remained a staunch
imperialist, concerned always to strengthen the bonds of the
British Empire, particularly British control over Persia and
the Middle East. He visited Mesopotamia in 1889 and wrote
Dominion reservations concerned their right,
unrestricted by the revised alliance, to enact
discriminatory legislation against Japanese immigrants. See
Beloff, Imperial Sunset , 148-49.
^^James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the
Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (Oxford,
1981), 38.
Assistant Secretary John Tilley, as recorded in Nish,
Alliance in Decline, 277.
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Persia and the Persian Question , which became a standard
work in England.^* In his book, Curzon explained his
view of diplomacy, which involved making decisions based
upon accurate information and then conveying his positions
clearly:
There are two constituents of successful
diplomacy, which seem to me sometimes in danger of
being forgotten. One is knowing one's ownjnind,
the other is letting other people know it.^^
In August 1917, CP. Scott, editor of the Liberal Manchester
Guardian
, noted in his diary that "Milner and Curzon were
powerful, but useless--their minds were closed. Curzon
lived in the year 1902 (when Britain sent gunboats to the
Persian Gulf)."^^ After the conclusion of the Great War, the
Foreign Secretary sought to establish a bulwark of Moslem
states to protect the British possessions of India and his
beloved Persia against Russian imperialism. The success of
Bolshevik propaganda at stirring nascent Moslem nationalism
caused Curzon in 1920 to warn his Cabinet colleagues: "The
Russian menace in the East is incomparably greater than
anything else that has happened in my time to the British
^*David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace; The Fall of
the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Modern Middle
East (New York, 1989), 455.
^^Lord Curzon, as recorded in Nicolson, Curzon . 42-43.
^^C.P. Scott, as recorded in Trevor Wilson, ed. The
Political Diaries of CP. Scott 1911-1928 (Ithaca, NY,
1970), 301.
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Empire. "^^ He gave liberally of his time and attention to
the issue of Angl o- Japanese relations, although it never
stirred his passions as did questions involving Persia.
Curzon guided the British Cabinet meeting of May 30,
1921, in its consideration of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance.*^
The Foreign Secretary began by providing a history of the
development of the alliance, including the 1905 renewal and
the 1911 modification. He then reminded those present that,
in accordance with the provisions of Article IV of the
revised treaty, the peace commission treaty of September
1914 constituted an arbitration agreement and that Britain
hence was no longer obligated to support Japan in a conflict
with America.^'
The Foreign Secretary then followed with the arguments
for and against renewal . The case against renewal , he
reasoned, rested upon three points: the causes for its
Lord Curzon, as recorded in Fromkin, To End All Peace ,
461.
18Curzon lacked the authority of previous Foreign
Secretaries in dealing with the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, in
part because Lloyd George distrusted the professional
diplomatic machinery of the Foreign Office and in part
because Curzon refused to confront the Prime Minister for
fear of being dismissed from office. See Roberta Warman,
"The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of
Foreign Policy, 1916-1918", ( The Historical Journal , XV,
1972); Kenneth Morgan, "Lloyd George's Premiership: A Study
in 'Prime Ministerial Government'", ( The Historical Journal ,
XIII, 1970); Craig and Gilbert, The Diplomats , 33; Nicolson,
Curzon , 31
.
^^CAB 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
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creation no longer endured, it offended American opinion,
and it alienated Britain from China. Curzon argued that the
arguments for the treaty "on the whole made out the stronger
case." He presented numerous justifications: the alliance
had been a substantial success for both parties; it served
as a barrier against a revitalized Russia (and possibly a
revived Germany); it served as a brake on the rapacity of
Japan; it precluded the need to maintain large forces in the
Far East; and it was favorably regarded by Britain's allies,
France, Holland, and Japan herself. The Foreign Secretary
then suggested that non-renewal would prompt "considerable
resentment" among the Japanese, who might adopt "a spirit of
retaliation."^" He noted that both the Admiralty and the War
Office favored renewal, as did Australia and New Zealand,
while Canada strongly opposed, and South Africa had not yet
made her position clear. Curzon added that Auckland Geddes
,
the British ambassador to Washington, favored renewal as a
means to quiet extremists who demanded additional armaments.
To round out his presentation, he mentioned the idea of
replacing the alliance with a tripartite pact which included
America, but suggested the possibility of the United States
Senate passing such an agreement was slim. The Foreign
Secretary recommended renewal for a period of four or five
years in a form modified to conform with the Covenant of the
^"cAB 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
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League of Nations, after consultation with the United States
and China. ^'
Winston Churchill and Arthur, 1st Viscount Lee of
Fareham, argued against the treaty as poisoning relations
with the United States. Churchill, who traded his portfolio
as Secretary of State for War and Air for the office of
Colonial Secretary in February 1921, contended that the
Foreign Secretary had misstated the positions of the
22Dominions. Canada, he indicated, had even gone as far as
to suggest an independent arrangement with the United States
in case of renewal, while Australia and New Zealand
supported the alliance only out of fear. He suggested there
would undoubtedly be several advantages arising from an
agreement with both Japan and America. Lord Lee, who
replaced the failing Walter Long as First Lord of the
Admiralty in February 1921, asserted that political
relations with the United States were of transcendent
importance. In his opinion, based upon conversations with
American Admiral William Sims, public opinion in the United
States violently detested the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. Lee
suggested a conference on Pacific affairs that would
culminate in a tripartite pact between Japan, the British
^^CAB 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
^^Beaverbrook, Fall of Llovd George . 40-42, notes that
Curzon and Churchill were fighting over whose Department
should exercise control of Egypt.
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Empire, and the United States--a solution he believed would
incidentally provide a political framework within which the
armed services could complete their military planning. He
concluded by emphasizing the need to avoid a split in the
British Empire.^*
A greater share of the Cabinet worried more about the
effect of abrogation upon Japan than that of renewal upon
the United States. Austen Cham.berl ain , who had assum.ed the
office of Lord Privy Seal upon the tem.porary retirement of
Andrew Bonar Law in March 1921, raised the specter of a
disaffected Japan drifting into a Russo-German combination.
Lord President Arthur Balfour pointed out the existing anti-
Japanese legislation in Australia, New Zealand, California,
and the Philippines and then declared that attempts to keep
Japan out of China were unreasonable. Edwin Montagu, the
Secretary for India, noted that although Japan was not
popular in India, the Alliance was, both for security
reasons and as a means of legitimizing British interests in
the Far East. The Prime Minister concluded the discussion
by echoing the arguments of the Lord Privy Seal. Lloyd
George asserted that failure to renew would alienate the
Japanese and, as a result, British prestige in the Far East
would suffer. He gave credence to the prospect of a Russo-
Fry, I 1 lusions , 113.
CAB 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
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German combination. Should these two possibilities
materialize, he believed that Tokyo would fall into the
Berlin-Moscow orbit. Lloyd George characterized Japan as
faithful to her treaty obligations and indicated that he
would not oppose a Pacific conference, but that
consultations with Japan must take precedence .^^
The Cabinet then reached four conclusions. First, at
the upcom.ing Imperial Conference, Britain would ask the
Dominions and India to support a proposal asking the
President of the United States to summon a conference of
Pacific affairs, but only after informing Japan and the
other nations that Britain had no intention of dropping the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance. Second, the Alliance should be
renewed, albeit for a period shorter than the previous term
of ten years, in a form, com.patible with the Covenant of the
League of Nations, and inoffensive to American
sensibilities. In order to accomplish the latter goals,
Britain should enter discussions with China and the United
States, while keeping Japan fully informed of any
developments. Third, in order to gain time, Britain should
renew provisionally the Angl o- Japanese Alliance in such
three month increments as were necessary. Finally, the
Admiralty and the War Office should prepare memoranda
showing the assistance given by Japan during the Great War,
"cab 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
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while the C.I.D. should prepare a study of the strategic
situation in the Far East.^^
The Anglo- Japanese Alliance affected the second topic
identified by the Amery Committee, imperial defense. The
Great War had overturned the strategic situation in the
Pacific. The German presence had vanished, while the
(Bolshevik) Russian hold over Siberia remained tenuous for
several years after the war. The United States, by 1919 the
world's second naval power, appeared poised to advance in
the Pacific. At the same time, Japan, in the words of one
historian of Far Eastern affairs, "emerged from the war as
third in the table of world powers. "^^ The strength of the
imperial forces needed in the region would depend to a large
degree on the intentions of Japan and the Dominions.
During the Great War, the leaders of the British Empire
had begun to look ahead to the problem of imperial defense
in the post-war era. The Imperial War Conference of March
1917 passed a resolution which requested the Admiralty "to
work out after the conclusion of the War what they consider
28
the most effective scheme of naval defence of the Empire."
Pre-occupied with the German submarine campaign, the
Admiralty staff took over a year to prepare their answer.
"cab 23/25: Cabinet Conclusion 43 (2), May 31, 1921.
^^Nish, Alliance in Decline , 261.
%DM 116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.
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The history of imperial naval defense had involved a
continuous struggle between Dominion concerns for control
over local defense forces and the Admiralty's doctrine of
"one ocean, one fleet, one flag" inspired by Mahan. Naval
defense had first assumed an imperial, as opposed to purely
British character, in the wake of the Australian naval
agreement of 1887. In return for an annual subsidy of
£126,000 from the colonial government, the Royal Navy
created and maintained in the south Pacific an auxiliary
squadron of ships "for the protection of floating trade in
Australian waters." Subsequently, the control of these
vessels proved controversic.1 --the colonials expected them
permanently assigned to local waters, while the Admiralty
considered them available for use world-wide. In 1906, the
C.I.D. reiterated Admiralty opposition to the localization
of naval forces:
The policy of devoting the entire naval forces of
the Empire to seeking out and destroying the ships
of the enemy, wherever they may be, is that which
will best ensure not only the safety of floating
trade, but also the immunity from attack of coast
towns and harbours ... if this policy is to be
properly and efficiently carried, the Royal Navy
must be one and undivided.
During the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, at the
height of the naval crisis with Germany, the Admiralty
gratefully accepted the offers of New Zealand and Australia
^'adm 167/56: Appendix to Admiralty Memorandum, "Past
History of Dominion Contributions to the Naval Defence of
the Empire", September 25, 1919.
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to pay for the cost of construction of a new battleship for
the Royal Navy.
At the same time, Canada and Australia had proposed
creating their own naval forces, based on small vessels
designed for local defense. The Admiralty reversed its
earlier position and supported the notion that each of the
Dominions "might be made responsible for the maintenance of
a certain naval strength in its own sphere of influence,
thus relieving the imperial fleet of direct responsibility
in distant seas."^"^ The Adm.iralty suggested these fleet
units would include a battle cruiser, with supporting
cruiser, destroyer, and submarine elements, together with
port facilities. Australia chose to include a battle
cruiser in her squadron, while New Zealand and Canada agreed
to lesser flotillas.
By 1912, however, the Adm.iralty had returned to its
earlier insistence on a unified fleet. In July 1913, the
C.I.D. invited Canadian Prim.e Minister Robert Borden to
contribute three new battleships to offset German
construction. Borden guided a naval bill through the
Canadian House of Commons, but it died in the Senate.^*
"'"Admiralty Memorandum, July 13, 1909, as recorded in
Donald Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense,
1870-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1965), 237.
^-Gilbert Tucker, "The Naval Policy of Sir Robert
Borden, 1912-14", ( Canadian Historical Review , XXVIII,
1947) .
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Canada proved unable to agree on any program of naval
defense. In the spring of 1914, First Lord Winston
Churchill unilaterally abrogated the 1909 agreement to
station modern capital ships in Dominion waters. Coincident
with his announcement of the withdrawal of the new battle
cruisers, the First Lord praised New Zealand's donation of a
capital ship as the most effective contribution to the
security of the British Empire. Both the decision and the
lack of consultation with London created significant
resentment in Melbourne and Wellington. These differences
were suspended, but not forgotten, with the outbreak of
hostilities in Europe.
The Admiralty's wartime planning had reflected
sustained faith in the maintenance of sea power as taught by
Mahan: balanced fleets, based on capital ships adequately
provided with bases. The Board recognized that "money
contributions have always been unpopular" and that "fleet
units are not within the reach of some of the Dominions."
The Board, with Lloyd George's approval, therefore submitted
to the Imperial War Conference of 1918 a memorandum which
recommended the establishment of a unified imperial fleet:
The whole naval force of the Empire to form one
Navy, all effective units being under the control
of an Imperial Naval Authority, both in peace and
''Gordon, Dominion Partnership , 290-296.
^^ADM 116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.
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war. Ships to be available to serve in any
waters, and officers and men in any ship. *
Under this plan, each of the Dominions would assume
responsibility for all local naval establishments, including
dockyards and the recruitment and training of naval
personnel
.
In recognition of Dominion sensitivities about
domination from London, the Admiralty had indicated that the
Dominion Naval Ministers should visit London "whenever
possible. .. for the consideration of the annual estimates and
deliberation on large matters of policy." At other times,
the Dominions "could be represented generally by the First
Lord of the Admiralty," who would consult them "on the
distribution of naval forces and other important questions
affecting the squadrons in their waters." The Board further
suggested that the staff of the proposed single navy "would
gradually become fully representative as officers from the
overseas nations acquired sufficient naval experience" for
leadership positions. On the critical issue of funding,
the Admiralty recommended that:
Each nation would decide, with due regard for its
resources, the extent to which it would share in
the total cost of the navy, and, as far as
"aDM 116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.; ADM 116/1603:
The First Lord discussed the Admiralty memorandum with the
Prime Minister, who liked the concept of Dominion ships as
part of an Imperial Navy.
^^ADM 116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.
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possible, control the expenditure of the money it
provides
.
After each member indicated the size of its voluntary
contribution, the Imperial Naval Authority would develop a
unified budget proposal, "subject to the approval of the
respective Parliaments."^^
During the Imperial Conference of 1918, the Dominion
premiers had firmly rejected the Admiralty's proposal for a
single Imperial Navy under a single Imperial Authority. Sir
Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, took the lead
in drafting a memorandum to First Lord Sir Eric Geddes which
flatly stated that from the perspective of the Dominion
Ministers "the proposals set forth in the Admiralty
Memorandum for a single navy at all times under a central
naval authority are not considered practicable."'^ The Prime
Ministers asserted that the Admiralty's arguments for "a
single navy... under a central naval authority, are strong
but not unanswerable." They pointed to the example of the
Australian Navy in the recent conflict as proving that
Dominion units could "operate with the highest efficiency"
in concert with the Royal Navy. The memorandum acknowledged
the value of commonality in "the character of construction,
armaments and equipment and the methods and principles of
^^ADM 116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval
Defence of the British Empire", May 17, 1918.
"^ADM 116/1815: Memorandum from the Dominion Prime
Ministers, cover letter dated August 15, 1918.
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training, administration, and organization." The Dominions
indicated their desire for a visit from "a highly qualified
representative of the Admiralty" for technical assistance.
Perhaps as a consolation to the Admiralty, the memorandum
concluded by agreeing to the possibility of a wartime
"supreme naval authority" provided that "each of the
Dominions would be adequately represented." Borden's cover
letter noted that the memorandum expressed the sentiment of
all of the Dominion Prime Ministers with the single
exception of Newf oundl and
.
The Admiralty had responded to this memorandum by
selecting Admiral Jellicoe to undertake the mission of
advising the Dominions on efficiency and commonality.''
Within three months of the Dominions' memorandiim rejecting a
single imperial navy, both Australia and Canada made further
requests for Admiralty assistance with their fledgling
fleets. Geddes consulted with Colonial Secretary Walter
Long as to the wisdom of including New Zealand and South
Africa on the admiral's itinerary. They agreed that New
Zealand should be approached about a naval assistance visit,
but that, for fear of adversely affecting public opinion.
South Africa should merely be informed that Jellicoe might
'Vdm 116/1815: Memorandum from the Dominion Prime
Ministers, cover letter dated August 15, 1918.
^'ADM 116/1770 + 116/1815: Admiralty Memorandum,
"Proposed Visit of Lord Jellicoe to the Dominions and India
to Advise on Naval Matters", December 17, 1918.
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visit in order to gather information regarding naval
defenses there
On December 23, 1918, Admiralty Secretary Sir Oswin
Murray issued Admiral Jellicoe instructions to visit
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, with the possibility of
additional calls at South Africa and India. The Admiralty
instructions indicated that the primary purpose of the
mission was "the promotion of uniformity in naval
organization and training and types of naval material."
They also included the provision that:
Should Dominion Authorities desire to consider how
far it is possibl e . . . to take a more effective
share in the naval defence of the Empire, he
[Jellicoe] will give assistance from the naval
point of view in drawing up a scheme for
consideration.
This proviso created the potential for a serious
misunderstanding between the Admiralty Board, which expected
the admiral to deal with finite matters such as ship design
and squadron tables of organization, and Jellicoe, who
interpreted the last paragraph as authority to develop and
discuss a comprehensive strategy for the post-war naval
defense of the British Empire. In February 1919, the
admiral, accompanied by his former flag captain. Commodore
^^Geddes to Long, November 25, 1918; Long to Geddes,
November 28, 1918; Geddes to Long, November 30, 1918, as
recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers . Vol II, 287-288.
*^ADM 116/1815: Admiralty to Jellicoe, December 23,
1918.
261
Frederic Dreyer, together with a small staff, sailed in the
battle cruiser New Zealand on a cruise that would last a
year
.
In March, from Port Said, Egypt, he sent his
appreciation of post-war naval requirements to the
Admiralty. The admiral acknowledged the difficulty of
framing imperial naval requirements since previous standards
of naval strength were based on that of possible opponents
and "our late enemies were practically powerless and we are
allied to, or working in co-operation with, the rest of the
world." Jellicoe admitted the delicacy of planning a naval
strategy based on opposition to the United States, but
asserted "the safety of the British Empire should rest
securely on the might of the British Navy and should not be
dependent on the goodwill of other nations." The "enormous
program of warship building" projected by the Wilson
Administration would give the United States Navy 41 modern
capital ships by 1925. As the width of the Atlantic Ocean
would enable the Royal Navy to defend Britain with a fleet
of capital ships "of a strength of 70% of that of the United
States," Britain required at least 30 capital ships by 1925,
which required 12 new capital ships, hence a building
program of three new ships per year.*^ Such a fleet would
^^Jellicoe Memorandum, "Post-War Naval Requirements",
March 3, 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers,
Vol II, 290-95.
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also be able to deal with "any likely combination of
European Powers." The admiral also indicated the need for a
force of cruisers and aircraft carriers for the protection
of trade.
Jellicoe next stopped in India from mid-March through
the end of April. While most of his recommendations for
that region dealt with reforms limited to the Royal Indian
Marine, he raised one issue of greater import. In terms of
potential enemies, the admiral switched his focus from the
United States to Japan, which he labelled "as much a bogey
to India as it is to Australia." Given the possibility of
conflict in the Far East, Jellicoe concluded that "it will
be necessary before long to construct a dock in the Far East
that will accommodate our largest ships" and to improve "the
anti-submarine defenses of Singapore . "^^
In June 1919, the admiral reached Australian waters, of
which he began a careful inspection. Jellicoe rendered his
next reports in August. In a lengthy paper to the Governor-
General , he framed the naval requirements of the Pacific and
Indian Oceans as a single problem which required a Far
Eastern fleet. He reviewed the latest developments in naval
*^Jellicoe Memorandum, "Post-War Naval Requirements",
March 3, 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers ,
Vol II, 290-95.
"Jellicoe to the First Lord of the Admiralty, May 2,
1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers , Vol II,
296-97
.
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technology and concluded that "the wise course to pursue is
to build capital ships until, if ever, it is shown that some
other weapon has been found which permanently renders them
inefficient." Jellicoe also emphasized the importance of
proper docking facilities, without which the latest capital
ships "cannot be sent to the Far East except under the
gravest disadvantage." He suggested that the cost of these
defenses "should be provided by those constituent parts of
the Empire, including Great Britain, for which it is of
vital necessity."^'
Jellicoe considered the likeliest potential enemy to be
Japan, "the only nation in the Far East, except the United
States, which would be in a position to inflict any
permanent injury on the British Empire." He noted "the ill-
feeling against Britain" prevalent in the Japanese Press and
cited the resentment throughout the Eastern portions of the
British Empire against Japanese commercial expansion into
India, China, the Dutch East Indies, and Australia.*^ He
concluded:
It is, therefore, almost inevitable that the
interests of Japan and the British Empire will
clash, and the two parts of the empire most
^'ADM 116/1834: Jellicoe to the Governor-General of
Australia, August 12, 1919. RoskiU, Naval Policy , 281,
notes that Jellicoe quietly approached the Australian
Government about assuming responsibility for warships that
the Royal Navy had placed on the Disposal List as excess
during the post-war consolidation.
%DM 116/1834: Jellicoe to the Governor-General of
Australia, August 12, 1919.
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affected are Australia and India. For this
reason, the potential enemy in the Pacific is
taken as Japan.
The admiral then conveyed the latest reports of a Japanese
capital ship building program, which aimed for a fleet of
eight battleships and eight battle cruisers by 1924. As a
result, he recommended: "the fleet of capital ships of the
British Empire stationed in the Pacific should be composed
of not less than eight battleships and eight battle-
cruisers." He stated "the proper strategy of the British
Empire" involved two planks: the provision of "an adequate
fleet in the Far East" and the defense of "Singapore and
Hong Kong (in that order). "^^
In a letter to the First Lord the following week,
Jellicoe provided a summary of his appreciation of
Australian defense, in which he identified Japan as "the
possible enemy of the future." He predicted that the
Admiralty would "strengthen the fleet in the Far East." The
admiral emphasized the importance of "docks, naval bases,
and local defence flotillas" to support the capital ships
48that would constitute the backbone of naval defense. He
admitted his inability to establish local support for the
idea of a single Imperial Navy and advised the Admiralty "to
*'ADM 116/1834: Jellicoe to the Governor-General of
Australia, August 12, 1919.
^^Jellicoe to the First Lord of the Admiralty, August
20, 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers , Vol II,
312-13
.
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accept the inevitable and make the best of it" with regard
to an independent Australian Navy.^'
After delivering his appreciation of New Zealand
defense requirements, which scarcely differed from his
report on Australia, Jellicoe sailed to Canada, arriving in
November 1919. There he found Prime Minister Sir Robert
Borden desirous of his assistance with the task of
establishing a Canadian Navy in the face of opposition
within the Government.^'' In December 1919, Jellicoe provided
the Governor-General of Canada his survey of the Canadian
situation, which differed markedly from India and the
Australasian Dominions. The admiral noted that Canada's
location, isolated from most threats and proximate to the
United States, provided a degree of protection which allowed
Canada to choose either of two lines: "in the light of
Canada's own requi rem.ents . . . [ or ] in the broader light of the
security and safety of the Empire as a whole. Thus Canada
could choose either a small force designed for coastal
defense (a flotilla of light cruisers, torpedo boats and
submarines) or a squadron built around a modern battle
Jellicoe to the First Lord of the Admiralty, August
20, 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers , Vol II,
312-13
.
^"Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, I:
Origins and Early Years (Ottawa, 1952), 309-23.
"Jellicoe to the Governor-General of Canada, 31
Decem.ber 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers ,
Vol II, 369-90.
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cruiser. The admiral reiterated his opinion that Japan was
the most probable enemy of the British Empire and predicted
that in the course of such a conflict, Japan would refrain
from landing on the North American continent and would limit
her attacks to Canadian trade in the Pacific. Canadian
bases would probably not host imperial fleets, which "would
in all probability be working, not from the Canadian Pacific
coast, but from Singapore or Australia." Jellicoe's report
also included a section entitled "Naval Co-operation on a
Wider Basis," which explained the enormous costs associated
with the Royal Navy and which emphasized the per capita
contributions to naval defense made by the Australasian
Domini ons.^^
During his stay in Ottawa, the admiral finally
established communications with Admiralty House. Jellicoe
received notice from London that the Admiralty had renounced
its plan for a single Imperial Navy and now supported his
proposals for Dominion naval forces.'^ The Board also
endorsed his proposal to give warships on the Excess List to
the Dominions, who would bear the cost of their operation.^*
^^Jellicoe to the Governor-General of Canada, 31
December 1919, as recorded in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers ,
Vol II, 369-90.
-^ADM 167/56: Board Minute 958, September 25, 1919;
Patterson, Jellicoe Papers , Vol II, 267.
^^ADM 116/1774: Admiralty Memorandum, "Gift of Surplus
Warships to the Dominions", September 16, 1919.
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On a less agreeable note, however, the Board sharply
criticized his formulation of an imperial strategy based on
a Far Eastern fleet prepared to oppose Japan. After
reviewing Jellicoe's report to Australia, First Sea Lord
Wemyss wrote to the First Lord: "A preliminary survey of
Lord Jellicoe's report shows that he has entered a sphere
never contemplated by the Admiralty and far beyond his terms
of reference. Long agreed, and Admiralty House sent
Jellicoe a telegram admonishing him for submitting proposals
to the Dominion governments without staffing them through
London for approval
:
it was not the intention of the Admiralty for your
views on the strategic arrangements of the future
to be presented to the Commonwealth Government
without submitting them to the Admiralty. This
procedure should be followed as regards any future
reports to other Dominions.
The Admiralty, at the last stop of Jellicoe's world tour,
for the first time provided him with guidance on imperial
naval defense.
Upon his return to Portsmouth, England, Admiral
Jellicoe submitted his final report to the Secretary of the
Admiralty. He explained that his efforts had been hampered
"adM 116/1815: First Sea Lord Memorandum, "Lord
Jellicoe' s Report to the Commonwealth Government of
Australia", October 3, 1919.
^^ADM 116/1815: Admiralty Board to Jellicoe, November 3,
1919.
'^ADM 167/56: Admiralty Memorandum, "Imperial Naval
Defence", Board Minute 958, September 25, 1919.
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by a lamentable series of political developments: the
absence during his visit of the Australian Prime Minister
and Minister of the Navy, the break-up of a coalition
government in New Zealand upon his arrival, and the ill
health of the Canadian Prime Minister and Minister for Naval
Affairs during his stay in Ottawa. Jellicoe then stated his
mission as one of "inducing the Dominions to co-operate in
the naval defence of the Empire" and developing a scheme of
cooperation which ensured commonality and at the same time
rem.oving party politics from Dominion considerations. The
adm.iral noted disparagingly that he had had difficulty
obtaining information from the Admiralty and thus had had
"to form my own opinion as to the future necessary naval
strength of the Empire and to base my recomm.endations on
this opinion." He saw "no difficulty in deciding on the
source from which danger might come" and assumed that sooner
or later "a fleet of a definite strength would be required
either in the Pacific or in the vicinity." Jellicoe also
explained that he had disregarded the official Admiralty
policy--in effect, to the best of his knowledge, until
December 1919--which called for a single unitary Imperial
58
Navy as hopelessly at odds with Dominion intentions.
The Admiralty, meanwhile, had been striving to
formulate and receive Cabinet approval for a post-war naval
^'ADM 116/1831: Jellicoe to the Secretary of the
Admiralty, February 3, 1920.
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policy. In the wake of "the ten year rule" promulgated in
August 1919, and in search of a justif ication--and perhaps
even funding--for the Royal Navy, Admiralty House shifted
its focus from British to imperial affairs. The Board
conducted a review of imperial defense in September. With
respect to the role of capital ships, the Admiralty declared
that "a superior fighting force must be maintained in the
main theatre of operations."^' The Board emphasized
cooperation with the Dom.inions rather than dictation by
London, particularly "as greater financial obligations are
likely to be maintained," and then announced that "the
Dominions can now best contribute to the naval defence of
the Empire by building up their own Navies," which might
include capital ships. The Adm.iralty, influenced by the
need for fiscal restraint, as well as Admiral Wemyss'
personal animosity towards his predecessor as First Sea
Lord, repudiated Jellicoe's recommendations for a Far
Eastern Fleet, regardless of size.^" The proposal for a
naval base at Singapore, however, attracted a more favorable
reception. As their opponent's strategy in an Anglo-
'''^ADM 167/56: Admiralty Memorandum, "Imperial Naval
Defence", Board Minute 958, September 25, 1919.
^^ADM 116/1815: First Sea Lord Memorandum, "Lord
Jellicoe's Report to the Commonwealth Government of
Australia", October 3, 1919; ADM 116/1815: Admiralty Board
to Jellicoe, November 3, 1919; Roskill, Naval Policy, 279-
282, notes that Wemyss frequently criticized Jellicoe to the
First Lord.
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Japanese conflict would probably feature an offensive thrust
into the south Pacific, Admiralty planners had earlier
concluded:
the imperial fleet should be provided with a
secure base well to the southward of Hong Kong,
and no more suitable position can be suggested
than Singapore.
The Board accepted the Naval Staff analysis and recommended
to the Cabinet that "if it is decided that the Empire should
be prepared for a war with Japan, Singapore and Sydney
should be considered the two primary imperial bases in the
Pacific.""
In a subsequent memorandum to the Committee of Imperial
Defence, the Board reviewed the naval situation in the Far
East. The Admiralty memorandum emphasized the crucial
nature of Anglo- Japanese relations and inquired as to the
intentions of the Government regarding the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance. The Board presumed that the Cabinet would be
hesitant "to prolong an alliance which might cause them to
be embroiled with the United States. "^^ The Board also
projected a reduction in the niomber of British capital ships
in full commission, in an effort to free money for other
£1
Naval Staff Paper, "Imperial Naval Defence", August 4,
1919, as recorded in Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base , 31.
^^ADM 167/56: Board Minute 958, September 25, 1919.
%DM 1/8571/295: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Situation
in the Far East", October 21, 1919. Accepted as C.I.D.
Paper No. 119-C, October 31, 1919.
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purposes.^- Placing almost half of the Royal Navy's capital
ships into reserve would affect the naval situation in the
Pacific in two ways: during peacetime, Britain would not be
able to match Japanese naval strength in the region; and in
wartime, reinforcements would take longer to arrive. In
consequence, if war with Japan did break out, "a period of
three months might elapse before our Naval supremacy in the
Far East could be established. During this period, Japan
might have practically a free hand." Reinforcements should
not plan on assembling at Hong Kong, which would be too
vulnerable. The best base for the task force would be
Singapore, which "may be considered sufficiently far from
any Japanese possessions to make an attack on it in force
improbable during the period before the Fleet arrives."'^
This analysis rested upon two assumptions: first, that
Britain would always possess in other waters sufficient
naval strength to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy, and
second, that Japan could not inflict irreparable damage on
the British Empire during its window of superiority.
The Admiralty subsequently began to take steps to
facilitate the development of Singapore. Early in 1920, the
Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base , 35, notes that the
budgetary constraints of the Ten Year Rule led the Admiralty
to place 16 of 36 capital ships from full commission into
reserve
.
^^ADM 1/8571/295: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Situation
in the Far East", October 21, 1919. Accepted as C.I.D.
Paper No. 119-C, October 31, 1919.
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Board dispatched H.M.S. Merlin to Singapore to ascertain if
any of the anchorages there could support a fleet. By
January 1921, Admiralty interest extended to the details of
the Johore Causeway, to ensure that capital ships would be
able to put rapidly to sea.'^ Later that month, the Board
formally requested that the Colonial Secretary maintain a
close hold over the Royal Navy's interest in Singapore in
order to keep its development as a naval base secret from
Japan as long as possible. The Admiralty also made
arrangements with the War Office for a joint service study
of the defense of southern Malaya against attack by land.'^
These efforts to expand and develop Singapore as a
major fleet base complemented the Board's strategic thought
in early 1921. In preparation for the coming Imperial
Conference, Admiralty House in February prepared for the
Cabinet a memorandiim which surveyed imperial naval defence.
The Board still lauded the concept of a single imperial
navy, but admitted that the Dominions would not support such
an arrangement. Given the current situation (separate
Dominion fleets supporting a reduced Royal Navy), the
Admiralty stressed the need for thorough coordination. The
Board also emphasized the importance of capital ship
"aDM 116/2100: Admiralty Telegram, January 12, 1921.
^ADM 116/2100: Admiralty Telegram, January 20, 1921.
%oskill. Naval Policy , 291.
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mobility, which rested upon pre-positioned fuel reserves:
Here then is a matter of first importance to the
naval policy of the Empire. The expenditure
necessary to put the reserves in a satisfactory
condition is very great, and the Dominion
Governments would be affording valuable assistance
to the naval defence of the Empire if they would
accept the liability for the installation in the
regions for which they are responsible,
respectively, of the fuel reserves which are
considered essential by the Naval Staff on
strategic grounds.'^
The Admiralty undoubtedly realized, but did not state, that
trying to persuade the Dominions to pay for fuel rather than
new capital ships carried two advantages: the costs involved
were lower (and, to a large degree, non-recurring) and any
use of those fuel reserves would be in direct support of the
Dominions. Three months later, a Naval Staff study, working
on the assumption of a war with Japan in 1930, developed
these general concepts into specific proposals. Additional
fuel depots in the Red Sea and off Ceylon would enable the
fleet, given fair weather and three days warning, to move in
40 days from the Mediterranean to Singapore, where some 1.2
million gallons of fuel should be stored, with an additional
730,000 tons in the East Indies. The Board accepted these
proposals in late May 1921. *
''^ADM 1/8611/151: Admiralty Memorandum, February 1921.
^^ADM 1/8607/98: Director of Plans Memorandum, "Proposed
Redistribution of the Fleet on Strategic Principles", May
12, 1921.
-Roskill, Naval Policy , 290
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The Committee of Imperial Defence became increasingly
interested in the future of Singapore between 1919 and 1921.
A subcommittee of the C.I.D. entitled the Overseas Defence
Committee (O.D.C.) considered the development of Singapore
in over 12% (9 of 77) of its meetings between April 1920 and
August 1921. The O.D.C. heard Admiralty testimony "strongly
in favour in any scheme which will improve and increase
facilities for oiling at Singapore," while the Air Council,
the counterpart of the Admiralty Board, urged development of
Singapore as a regional air junction. In the spring of
1920, the O.D.C. received the Navy's judgments that the Old
(Johore) Strait at Singapore would form sufficient anchorage
for a fleet and that the defense of Singapore would rest
upon command of the seas, as the Malayan jungle would
"render military operations on a large scale extremely
difficult and tedious."'^ In May, the O.D.C. reviewed a
Naval Staff appreciation of the defence of Singapore,
described as occupying "the corresponding position to the
British Empire in the East that Gibraltar does in the
West."^* The Naval Staff labelled the development of
Singapore "a necessity in any sound Empire Naval Policy" and
'^CAB 8/8: O.D.C. Minute 11, April 14, 1920; O.D.C
Minute 33, September 27, 1920.
^^CAB 8/8: O.D.C. Minute 49, March 3, 1921; O.D.C.
Minute 57, April 27, 1921.
^^CAB 8/8: O.D.C. Minute 63, May 6, 1921.
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ascribed previous inaction to "our preoccupation in Home
Waters and the comparative weakness of the Japanese Fleet."
On June 7th, the O.D.C. forwarded to the Standing Defence
Sub-Committee a report that endorsed the analysis of the
Naval Staff and provided a cost estimate of £4.9 millions
for the development of Singapore over a period of eight
75years
.
The Standing Defence Sub-Committee (S.S.) of the C.I.D.
held its first meeting of 1921 on May 2nd, four months after
the decision to investigate the capital ship. From 1920-22,
this body, in the words of the leading historian of the
C.I.D., functioned as "the virtual replacement of the full
C.I.D."^^ The S.S. considered the naval situation in the
Pacific in light of the findings of the O.D.C. and decided
that Singapore would replace Hong Kong as the focus of
imperial defence, since Britain's foothold in China could
not be adequately defended and the loss of the latter port
would "almost irretrievably damage the British position in
the Far East." The senior defense council directed the
O.D.C. to investigate the measures necessary to develop and
defend that port.^^
"Neidpath, Singapore Naval Base , 42-54; W. David
Mclntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base.
1919-1942 (Hamden, CT, 1979), 29.
^^Franklin Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British
Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959 (London, 1960), 170.
^'CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 136, May 2, 1921.
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Two meetings and ten days later, the Standing Defence
Sub-Committee continued its review of imperial naval defense
in rehearsal for the imminent Imperial Conference. During
that review, discussion touched upon the development of
Bermuda as a base against the expanding United States Navy.
Realizing that strategic planning against America was bound
to offend Canadian opinion, the committee agreed that the
less reference made to Bermuda as a naval base the better.
The S.S. concluded:
That in any such statements the desirability of
concentrating discussions on Pacific rather than
North American problems should be borne in mind,
and the whole trend of the discussion should be
steered in that direction.
The Roy^il Navy, at least, still took Atlantic considerations
seriously; the First Sea Lord personally reviewed the Naval
Staff's war plans for a conflict with the United States in
January 1921. Subsequent discussion of imperial naval
defense must be examined in light of this agreement to frame
all requirements and justifications in purely Pacific terms.
In June 1921, less than two weeks before the Imperial
Conference, the Standing Defence Sub-Committee revisited the
question of the development of Singapore as a major fleet
"cab 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 138, May 12, 1921.
^'fieatty MSS 8/1: Plans Division Memorandum, January 4,
1921. This document anticipated a separation of the United
States Navy into a fleet on each coast, thus inviting defeat
in detail by a concentrated British force based at Bermuda
and Halifax.
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base. On the 10th, after reviewing the 7 June report of the
O.D.C., the coiranittee members agreed that from the strategic
point of view, the arguments in favor of development were
irrefutable. They also considered Dominion opinion. The
Dominions were loyal in part because of British sea power;
the loss of which "would be disastrous to the prestige of
Great Britain." The S.S. noted at the same time that
development would be expensive at a time when economy was
needed. A leak to the public of large expenditure on a
naval base "might not only embarrass the Government but
might even occasion their fall." The meeting ended
inconclusively, the proponents of "Treasury control" having
checked the adherents of sea power.
Arthur Balfour swiftly engineered a compromise. He
suggested that Britain should formal 1 y indicate an intention
to develop Singapore, while deferring any immediate
financial commitment. The Standing Defence Sub-Committee
quickly agreed to submit this proposal to their political
superiors. The committee made four recommendations to the
Cabinet. First, the S.S. noted that the basis of any system
of imperial defense must be the maintenance of British sea
power. Second, the Standing Defence Sub-Committee
indicated that the most pressing question [in accordance
°CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 140, June 10, 1921.
•Roskill, Naval Policy , 291.
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with the agreement of May 12th] involved the Pacific.
Third, they advised the Government that "it is essential
that Singapore should be available as a base of
concentration." Fourth, the senior defense advisors urged
that while Britain could not afford to spend much
immediately, owing to existing economic conditions, the work
should be done and "the greater the assistance that can be
rendered by the overseas Governments in this connection the
sooner will the necessary programme be completed. "^^
Three days later, the Cabinet considered the proposals
of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee. Balfour guided the
discussion. He maintained that the renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, although reducing the immediate danger,
would not remove the need for developing the base, because
"whatever fleet we might maintain, it was almost
inconceivable that we could not use it in those waters where
it was most likely to be needed." The Lord President
explained that the project would take five years to complete
and that British interests in the region were very likely to
continue far longer. The Cabinet recognized the value of
having a plan for the Pacific, as Washington was constantly
suggesting that the United States Navy could protect whites
in that region, and that Singapore incidently would protect
the west coast of Canada. The Government directed the
CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 141, Jxine 13, 1921
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O.D.C. to prepare a detailed plan for the development of
Singapore. On the condition that there would be no major
expenditure for two years--in accordance with Balfour's
plan--the Cabinet agreed to develop Singapore and raise at
the Imperial Conference the question of Dominion
assistance
Lloyd George officially convened the Im.perial
Conference at 10 Downing Street on June 20, 1921. In
addition to the Prime Minister, the British contingent
included Austen Chamberlain; Winston Churchill; Edwin
Montagu; Sir Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary at the
Foreign Office; Sir Henry Lambert of the Colonial Office;
and Sir Edward Grigg, a personal advisor to Lloyd George.
The Dom.inions all sent their Prime Ministers: William Hughes
from Australia; Arthur Meighen from Canada, together with
his advisor, Loring Christie; William Massey from New
Zealand; and Jan Smuts from South Africa. Lloyd George came
quickly to the heart of the matter, "the most urgent and
important of foreign questions--the relations of the Empire
with the United States and Japan." He indicated his
aspirations "to m.aintain peace and fair play for all
nations" and additionally "to avoid a competition of
34
armaments .
"
^^CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 50 (3), Jiine 16, 1921.
^*CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 1, June 20, 1921.
280
The Prime Minister began his discussion of Anglo-
Japanese relations by paying tribute to the Alliance. He
characterized Japan as "a faithful ally, who rendered us
valuable assistance in an hour of very serious and critical
need" and mentioned the Japanese escorts which had protected
imperial troop transports from German cruisers. He
expressed his desire "to preserve that well-tried friendship
which has stood us both in good stead, and to apply it to
the solution of all questions in the Far East." Lloyd
George concluded by mentioning Japan's "special interests"
in China and Britain's wishes for an "open door" policy,
thus tacitly acknowledging disagreements with Japan.
The Prime Minister then addressed Anglo-American
relations. He adopted a somewhat warmer tone, stating that:
friendly co-operation with the United States is
for us a cardinal principal, dictated by what
seems to us the proper nature of things, dictated
by instinct quite as much as by reason and common
sense
.
Lloyd George then reiterated his opposition to "the growth
of armaments, whether in the Pacific or elsewhere" and
praised American public opinion "for showing so much
8fi
earnestness" over the issue of disarm.ament .
'
The British Prime Minister concluded with a brief
discussion of imperial defence. He proclaimed his
CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 1, June 20, 1921.
CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 1, June 20, 1921.
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willingness to discuss any proposal for the limitation of
armaments. At the same time, however, he paid tribute to
the value of sea power:
We cannot forget that the very life of the United
Kingdom. indeed, the whole Empire, has been built
upon sea power--and that sea power is necessarily
the basis of the whole Empire's existence.
Having concealed his own positions, the Welsh Wizard closed
the first meeting and waited for the Dominion premiers to
take sides. °'
Prime Minister William Morris Hughes took the lead at
the second meeting. His wel 1 -publ icized position on the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance involved renewal "in such form--
modified if that should be deemed proper--as will be
acceptable to Britain, to America, to Japan, and to
ourselves.' He placed Australia squarely on the side of
go
renewing the alliance, subject to two conditions. The
alliance must "conform to the requirements of the League of
Nations" and "specifically exclude the possibility of war
with the United States of America." He contended that "a
**'CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 1, Jxine 20, 1921.
illiam Hughes, as recorded in J.C. Vinson, "The
Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance", ( Pacific Historical Review . XXXI, 1962).
^'d.K. Dignan, "Australia and British Relations with
Japan, 1914-1921", ( Australia Outlook , XXI, 1967), argues
that Hughes' support for the Angl o- Japanese Alliance stemmed
from Curzon's deliberate manipulation of the Foreign Office
documents available to the Dominion leaders.
^^CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 2, June 21, 1921.
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treaty will help us influence Japanese policy" and suggested
a conference with both Japan and the United States.'*
Hughes next addressed the issue of naval disarmament,
which he linked to the diplomatic situation. He desired "an
agreement among the great naval powers" which would enable
the participants to eliminate "naval expenditure other than
that necessary for the maintenance of existing units." He
refused, however, to hazard Australia's security to the
oscillations of foreign relations:
We must have such naval defence as is adequate for
our safety... In our case, sea power is, and must
always be, the determining factor in our foreign
pol icy
.
Hughes then admitted the need for Dominion contributions to
the cost of imperial defense and suggested per capita shares
applied to Dominion naval forces.'^
William Massey of New Zealand echoed the sentiments of
his neighboring Prime Minister. He stated his belief that
the Pacific would be the site of the next great war and
pointed to the Japanese assistance to the Australasian
Dominions during the conflict past. He championed the
renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, "with whatever
modifications may be necessary." Massey also supported the
93idea of Dominion contributions to imperial naval defence.
CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 2, June 21, 1921.
CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 2, June 21, 1921.
'cab 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 2, June 21, 1921.
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Jan Christian Smuts, the most experienced of the
Dominion representatives, proposed a compromise diplomatic
arrangement. He adopted the role of mediator, perhaps from
his desire to persuade the Conference to adopt his proposals
for constitutional development within the framework of the
94Empire. Knowing that Meighen of Canada opposed any renewal
of the treaty with Japan, Smuts suggested replacing the
Alliance with a trilateral pact:
But supposing some specific arrangements could be
made with America which would deal both with Japan
and America in regard to disarmament, and which
involved the League of Nations, and that America
were to agree to come in^ then you solve the whole
sum of problems at once."
The prerequisite for the success of Smuts' proposal, of
course, was the cooperation of the United States.
The idea of expanding the Anglo- Japanese Alliance into
a broader arrangement including the United States was not
original. The Foreign Office had first suggested such a
course in an analysis of the Alliance written in February
1920: "Some sort of tripartite understanding in the Far
East, to which France might also adhere, would indeed be an
'*W.K. Hancock, Smuts. II: The Fields of Force. 1919-
1950 (Cambridge, 1968), 40-49. Smuts' proposals anticipated
the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of
Westminster of 1931, which provided equality of status
between Britain and the Dominions.
^'CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 3, June 21, 1921.
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ideal situation. In January 1921, the Anglo- Japanese
Alliance Committee of the Foreign Office had again
recommended that "a Tripartite Entente between the United
States, Japan, and Great Britain" replace the existing
97Alliance. The Foreign Office regretfully shared the
opinion of Britain's Ambassador to Washington, Sir Auckland
Geddes, that there was "little chance of the Senate agreeing
to anything of the nature of an Anglo-American Alliance,"
let alone a tripartite pact involving Japan. The United
States, in fact, had rebuffed Britain's latest overture
towards such an agreement. Hughes' support for
modification to exclude war with America rather than
modification acceptable to America thus reflected both
Washington's reluctance to enter a tripartite pact with any
defense obligations and his pref erence--if forced to choose-
rs
'F.O. Memorandum, "Effect of Angl o- Japanese Alliance
upon Foreign Relationships", February 28, 1920, as recorded
in Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy
. 1st
Series, Vol VI, 1016-1023.
97F.O. Memorandum, "Report of the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance Committee", January 21, 1921, as recorded in Butler
and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series,
Vol XIV, 221-227.
P.O. Memorandum, "Respecting the Anglo- Japanese
Alliance, September 1, 1920; Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon,
NovemJDer 15, 1920, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents
on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 106-13 and
177-178
,
respectively.
'Vinson, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance", notes that the State Department
rebuffed inquiries from Britain's Foreign Service concerning
a tripartite pact in May 1921.
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-for a meaningful agreement with Japan rather than a vague
understanding with the United States.
The day after Smuts' proposal, Curzon answered with an
appraisal of American diplomacy. In the morning, he stated
that the peace of the world could only be maintained by the
"continued cooperation of the Great Powers," from the ranks
of which the United States had defected. He added that "the
influence of a powerful Empire like Great Britain... is most
potent for good or evil" and asserted that "it ought to be
used." He continued:
There can be no doubt that while the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance has lasted, whether we continue
it or not, it has enabled us to exercise a very
controlling influenj^e on the sometimes dangerous
ambitions of Japan."
In the afternoon, the Foreign Secretary explained that the
rift between the Senate and the Wilson Administration had
led to a collapse in Anglo-American relations. He stated:
"Official relations with the American Government almost
ceased to exist, and for ten months we practically did no
business with America at all".*''* He briefly touched on
America's 1916 naval construction program, designed to
CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 4, June 22,
1921.
'"'Curzon could have mentioned that the Harding
Administration had ignored two invitations from First Lord
Lee, during his address to the British Institute of Naval
Architects on March 17th and an interview with Adolph Ochs
of the New York Times on April 22nd, to discuss naval
disarmament. See Sprouts, New Order , 129.
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produce "the most powerful fleet that the world has ever
known." Curzon ended in a more positive fashion by noting
that the Senate had recently authorized President Warren
Harding to discuss disarmament with Great Britain and
r 102Japan.
At the sixth meeting of the Imperial Conference, on
June 24th, Prime Minister Arthur Meighen made his first
major contribution to the discussions. In February 1921, he
had suggested to Lloyd George the desirability of replacing
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a multi-lateral pact and
suggested that a Canadian envoy approach the Harding
Administration about scheduling a conference on Pacific
'03Affairs.* At the Imperial Conference, Meighen sought to
establish an entente between the British Empire and the
United States so as to ensure America would remain an active
force in the League, which he and his advisor Loring
Christie believed was essential to the peace and security of
the post-war world. '"^^ He also desired to consolidate, and
if possible, advance, the gains made by his predecessor in
Canada's pursuit of recognition as a fully autonomous
CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 5, June 22,
1921.
*^^Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen (Toronto, 1960), Vol II,
70-72.
'^^Fry , "The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation
of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance".
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nation.-" The Canadian Prime Minister recoiranended frequent
imperial conferences; a single imperial foreign policy,
administered by the British Foreign Office; and, with regard
to issues bearing on the Dominions, that their opinions be
given weight commensurate with their interest. For issues
affecting Canada and the United States, he claimed that "the
Dominion should have full and final authority." Without
addressing the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, he then stated:
The maintenance, and if it is by any means
possible, the betterment, of relations between the
British Empire and the United States of America
should be, as the Foreign Secretary has well said,
'the pivot of Britain's world policy'.
Meighen concluded by urging, in support of Curzon, a policy
of intervention in Europe in order to avoid "isolation full
of menace not only to ourselves, but also to the world. "-^^
On June 28, 1921, the conference focused on the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. Curzon began by reminding those present-
-Lloyd George was absent due to a coal strike--that Article
IV of the Alliance contained a provision which removed any
obligation of either signatory to go to war with any third
J.W. Dafoe, "Canada and the Peace Conference of
1919", ( Canadian Historical Review . XXIV, 1943), notes that
in 1919, Sir Robert Borden had secured separate
representation for Canada at the Paris Peace Conference.
For a contemporary Canadian perspective on Meighen and the
Imperial Conference, see Ramsey Cook, ed. The Dafoe-Sifton
Correspondence. II: 1919-1927 (Altona, Manitoba, 1966), 69-
79.
*^'CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 6, June 24,
1921.
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party with which they had a treaty of arbitration; that
Britain regarded the Anglo-American Peace Commission Treaty
of September 1914 as such a treaty; and that Britain had
communicated her position to both Japan and the United
States. He noted that the American press suggested
nonetheless that the Alliance contained "seeds of possible
conf lict
.
"^"^ Curzon next announced that the treaty would
expire on July 13th, in consequence of the Angl o- Japanese
notice to the League of Nations in July 1920, which stated
that the Angl o- Japanese Alliance was incompatible with the
Covenant of the League. He then duplicated his earlier
presente^tion to the Cabinet. He included the opinion of Sir
Charles Eliot, Britain's Ambassador to Japan: "If the
present alliance is replaced by an Anglo-American
understanding, at the expense of Japan, the Japanese will no
108doubt cast about for new allies." Curzon concluded that
to expand the alliance into a tripartite agreement was
reasonable but hardly feasible. He recommended that "the
agreement should be renewed in a different form" after
consultation with the United States and the League.
^"'CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 8, June 28,
1921.
^^^Sir C. Eliot to Earl Curzon, December 12, 1920, as
recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign
Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 194-196.
^"XAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 8, June 28,
1921.
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Balfour, as chairman of the Standing Defence Sub-
Committee, added the perspective of the C.I.D. He noted the
relative decline of British naval strength in the Pacific
and declared that "it is, from a strategic point of view, of
very great importance that the Japanese Alliance should be
maintained." He also explained that the bulk of the Royal
Navy would remain in European waters. In order to increase
the mobility of Britain's capital ships, which would act as
an imperial fire brigade, Britain "must develop a base at
Singapore with the capacity of storing significant
quantities of oil." Until the completion of Singapore,
Balfour admitted that the British Empire was vulnerable to
naval attack in the Pacific and so should attempt to
maintain good relations with Japan.
The next meeting contained the expected confrontation
between the representatives of Australia and Canada.
Meighen flatly rejected renewing the Alliance in any form
whatsoever. He argued that it had not served to restrain
Japan's exploitation of China. He claimed that Canada had a
special interest in Anglo-American relations, which would be
ruined by renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. He said:
if we now... renew a confidential and exclusive
relationship with Japan it is wholly impossible to
argue convincingly, to my mind, that it is not
going to affect detrim.ental 1 y our relations with
the United States, no matter how steadfastly the
British government sets its face to keep those
"^CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 8, June 28,
1921.
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relations good.
Meighen asserted that the abrogation of the Alliance would
facilitate an arms control agreement with America, where the
new administration was open to fresh initiatives. He
recommended a conference involving America, China, Japan,
and the Empire. He asserted that non-renewal would not
estrange Japan, provided a multi-lateral agreement was
reached. Meighen concluded by stating Canada would not
participate in an Alliance aimed at the United States.
Hughes immediately reduced Meighen' s argument to "listen to
America." He claimed that Canada's interests were smaller
than those of Australia, for which national survival could
be at stake. The Australian prime minister mentioned
Am.erica's rejection of the League and stated that he would
vote "against any renewal of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance
upon one condition and one only... that America gives us the
assurance of safety which our circumstance absolutely
demands . ""^
The next meeting of the Imperial Conference, which took
place the same afternoon, produced little more than heated
rhetoric. Curzon suggested two alternatives: a renewal of
'"Lower, "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the
Washington Conference", notes Meighen based his arguments on
a paper prepared by Loring Christie, the Legal Advisor to
Canada's Department of External Affairs.
"^CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 9, June 29,
1921.
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perhaps five years in consonance with the Covenant of the
League or a temporary renewal of a year in order to hold an
international conference on the Pacific. Hughes supported
the former and argued that "a nation who rejects the League
cannot fault those whose work falls entirely within the
arrangements of the League." He further deprecated the
possibility of diplomatic relations with a country whose
policy rests on "shifting quicksands of faction or public
opinion." Smuts then turned Hughes' tactic of paraphrase
against him. The old Boer restated Hughes' position as:
"Japan is the bigger danger and, therefore, we should
control her by keeping up the Alliance." Massey occupied
the rest of the session with a pronunciation of loyalty to
the British Empire.***
The next morning, Lloyd George convened a meeting of
his Government. Curzon briefed the Cabinet regarding the
Dominion posi tions : Meighen opposed
,
possibly to the degree
that Canada would disassociate from any decision to renew;
Hughes and Massey strongly in favor; with Smuts balancing.
The Foreign Secretary then discussed the latest report from
Washington, received five days before. Geddes, who had
**^Fry, 1 1 lusions , 136, notes that the Foreign Secretary
was handicapped by the conflicting reports he was receiving
from Ambassador Harvey in London and from Auckland Geddes in
Washington as to the American position on renewal of the
al 1 iance
.
"*CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 10, June 29,
1921.
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originally advised for renewal but later recommended the
substitution of a tripartite pact, relayed a conversation
with the Secretary of State. The Secretary had explained
that public opinion opposed renewal and that the Senate was
unlikely to ratify any tripartite arrangement, but that he
personally favored "a declaration of policy embodied in
identic notes" between the American, British, and Japanese
Governments."^ The Cabinet, however, did not believe that
an exchange of notes constituted an adequate substitute for
the existing Alliance.**^ Lloyd George emphasized the twin
pillars of British policy: the avoidance of any dispute with
the United States, and the avoidance of any insult to Japan.
The Cabinet subsequently agreed that the British delegation
at the Imperial Conference had the authority to propose or
assent to negotiations with both Japan and America."^
The Cabinet then considered a suggestion from Lloyd
George, to the effect that the Lord Chancellor might re-
examine the case for the termination of the Alliance. Only
three days before, Curzon had informed the Japanese
Ambassador that the British Government considered that the
"^Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon, June 24, 1921, as
recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign
Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 311-12.
"Vry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation
of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance".
"^CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 56 (3), June 30, 1921;
Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power , Vol I, 652-656.
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Anglo- Japanese notice to the League constituted a
denunciation of the Alliance, which would therefore expire
on July 13th, and had requested a second joint notification
to the League of a prolongation until October. A ruling
to the reverse effect would mean that the Alliance would
continue indefinitely, thus buying time for diplomatic
conversations before any potentially divisive action
regarding the Alliance."^ The Cabinet promptly agreed that:
The Lord Chancellor should be asked to give an
opinion as to whether the notice given to the
League of Nations in regard to the Anglo- Japanese
Alliance must... be held as equivalent to a
denunciation of the Treaty of 1911.
The Lord Chancellor, F.E. Smith, Viscount Birkenhead,
obligingly ruled that the joint notice to the League did not
constitute denunciation and the Treaty thus would remain in
effect.*2D
Late that afternoon, Lloyd George reconvened the
Imperial Conference and moved to break the deadlock between
Meighen and Hughes. He started by reminding the delegates
* Note from Earl Curzon to the Japanese Ambassador,
June 21 , 1921/ as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 313.
"^Frances Stevenson recorded in her diary: "It suddenly
occurred to D. [Lloyd George] that under international law
the League of Nations ruling did not hold good, & on looking
it up found that instead of renewing the agreement this
year, it had never been legally terminated & no notice had
yet been given. It would therefore leave a whole year in
which to make up our minds." See Taylor, Lloyd George: A
Diary , 225.
CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 56 (3), June 30, 1921.
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that:
Friendship with America was fundamental. It is adominant principle in all British policy, and it
IS inconceivable that we should embark upon anypolicy that would involve a breach with the UnitedStates
.
The British Prime Minister then advanced the claim that "a
refusal to renew would involve a breach with Japan." After
insisting that "we must not insult Japan," Lloyd George
advocated consultation with America and support for China.
All of these laudable intentions, he suggested, might be
achieved at a conference, the forum in which one might
"reconcile the irreconcilable." Then he asked for an
opinion of the status of the alliance from Lord Birkenhead,
who replied that "no denunciation has taken place." Upon
realizing that Birkenhead's legal opinion upset the basis of
the previous discussion by removing the immediacy of a
decision regarding the Angl o- Japanese Alliance, the
delegates adjourned.*^*
The next day, Meighen commenced discussion by restating
the situation: the Treaty ran indefinitely, and Japan and
Great Britain were under obligation to the League to revise
the Alliance. He claimed his views regarding Japan had been
misstated and recommended that the Treaty be limited to one
year. The Canadian Prime Minister then urged a
communication to China, Japan, and the United States,
*^*CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 11, June 30,
1921; Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage of Power , Vol I, 652-656.
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proclaiming friendship and inviting a conference. Lloyd
George opposed his effort to limit the Anglo- Japanese
Alliance but supported calling a conference immediately.
Hughes again attacked Meighen's unwillingness to understand
the vulnerability of the Australasian Dominions and demanded
that the Imperial Conference determine the Empire's policy
at the proposed international conference, which Australia
and New Zealand would not, in all probability, be able to
attend. Curzon sought agreement on five points: a) telling
Japan that the Alliance remained in force; b) telling the
League that the Covenant superseded the Alliance; c)
approaching Japan, America, and China regarding a
conference; d) not denouncing the Alliance, which would
remain in effect if the conference failed; and e) meeting
again. The group adjourned without reaching consensus
.
That afternoon, the late session of the Imperial
Conference marked the apex of agreement among the conference
delegates. Smuts warned the group against publicizing the
understanding that the alliance would remain in effect
unless the proposed conference reached agreement to the
contrary as providing Japan an incentive not to cooperate.
Hughes immediately countered by pointing out that the
opposite position gave the United States a similar
inducement, whereupon Massey concurred. All present then
"^^CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 12, July 1,
1921.
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agreed to contact China, Japan, and America concerning a
conference, that the Alliance stood until denounced, and to
consider whether or not to announce the default future of
the Alliance.*"
The Dominion representatives then heard a series of
briefings on imperial defense. First Lord Arthur Lee
analyzed the British Empire's strategic naval situation. He
noted that despite the destruction of the German High Seas
Fleet, Britain's command of the seas was "challenged as
never before." The First Lord stated that Admiralty was
willing to accept a One Power standard but admitted:
There is, however, very grave doubt whether we can
afford to maintain even a one-power standard at
the present time unless the whole Empire
combines ... to assist us in sharing the burden and
responsibi 1 i ty
.
He provided a spirited defense of the capital ship, together
with the proper ancillaries, as the basis of sea power. Lee
revealed the details of the American and Japanese naval
construction programs, which forced Britain to lay down four
new capital ships within a year. He explained that the
British Cabinet intended to develop strategic oil stockpiles
and a base at Singapore. The First Lord then made a pointed
comparison, between Britain and the Dominions, of per capita
CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 13, July 1,
1921.
*^'cAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 14, July 4,
1921.
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spending on naval defense. He stated that the most helpful
contributions would take the form of "assistance in the
creation of oil storage in these [Pacific] regions, the
maintenance of oil reserves, and the development and
maintenance of the chief naval bases in these waters."
Beatty joined the discussion to emphasize three points:
Britain needed a centrally located fleet; the fleet required
mobility, which rested upon oil supplies; and operations in
the Pacific required a base at Singapore. Lloyd George
concluded by claiming the Navy was not aimed at any
particular opponent: "We are just building in order to be
equal to anybody, so as not to be in a position to be
dictated to diplomatically by anybody. "-^^
Lloyd George and Curzon then gave thought to the
mechanics of the proposed conference. When the Prime
Minister suggested the British capital for the site, Curzon
predicted that a conference held in London would struggle to
overcome the isolationist sentiment in America. The
Foreign Secretary, after meeting with the Japanese and
Chinese Ambassadors, asked the American Ambassador on July
5th to propose to his government that President Harding
extend invitations to a conference on Pacific affairs which
•''^CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 14, July 4,
1921.
-^'Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the
Washington Conference."
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might also eliminate naval competition.*^^ Curzon
subsequently asked Ambassador Harvey whether he might obtain
an answer before July 11th in order that Lloyd George might
provide it to Parliament. The Foreign Secretary added that
the agreement desired from the proposed conference would
bring an end to the Angl o- Japanese Alliance.
On July 11th, Lloyd George informed the Imperial
Conference that the previous day President Harding had
invited the Allied and Associated Powers to a disarmament
conference, to be preceded by a Pacific conference of the
British Empire, China, Japan, and the United States. While
there was no question of anything but acceptance, Hughes and
Massey strongly desired a preliminary consultation in London
before mid-August, in order to attend without extending the
length of their visit. To the vast irritation of the
delegates, however, the United States refused to accommodate
by date or location the Australasian premiers.*^' On July
18th, Lloyd George wrote scathingly to Churchill:
I agree with you that the venue is immaterial, but
time and the composition of the conference are
essential. To hold a meeting in Washington in
November with a mob of delegates who have only a
remote interest in this question. .. would be fatal
Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes, July
9, 1921, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 336-38.
Charles Spinks, "The Termination of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance", ( Pacific Historical Review , VI, 1937).
*^^CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 25, July 19,
1921.
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to our interests. Australia and New Zealand could
not be present.
. .The whol e,,American concept is
amateurish in the extreme.*-'"
In frustration, the diplomats authorized Curzon to
coordinate with the various governments involved and
establish the conditions of the conf erence(s
)
On July 19th, the conference delegates entertained
discussion of imperial defense. Lee reiterated the British
Empire's greatest priorities: "the urgent necessity of
replacing the obsolete units of the Empire battle fleet,"
followed by "the provision and maintenance of adequate bases
of operation for the Empire fleet in the Pacific" and "the
supply and maintenance of the necessary oil fuel
reserves."* He then asked what contributions the Dominions
were prepared to donate to those projects. Hughes suggested
that amount borne by the Dominions should be divided "on a
white per capita basis." Massey quickly agreed to accept
proportional shares in the cost. Meighen, however,
dissented. He had left Canada with instructions from the
House of Commons not to accept any defense commitments.
* David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
Lloyd George , 541-42.
*^*CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 27, July 22,
1921.
* CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 26, July 19,
1921.
*^^Philip Wigley, Canada and the Transition to
Congnonwea Ith (New York, 1977), 127; Graham, Meighen , 63-66.
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He refused on the grounds that Canada was not threatened and
that the Canadian electorate saw no reason to support
expenditure on imperial defense. Meighen's refusal to
contribute caused Hughes and Massey to withdraw their
offers. The delegates ultimately affirmed the One Power
Standard, but would go no further toward providing
assistance to either the Admiralty or the Exchequer than to
agree "that the method and expense of such [imperial
defense] cooperation are matters for the final determination
of the several Parliaments concerned . "-^^
The Foreign Secretary proved unable to persuade the
United States to accommodate the concerns of the Empire
representatives. On 27 July, Auckland Geddes told American
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that a British party
including Lloyd George, Curzon, Meighen, Hughes, and Massey
was prepared to arrive in Bar Harbor on August 18th for
preliminary discussions. Hughes replied that he was
absolutely opposed to such a meeting. On August 2d, the
Imperial Conference viewed with displeasure the American
rejection of a preliminary conference. Lloyd George stated:
*
'CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 26, July 19,
1921.
1, 1C
CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 33, August 2,
1921.
*^'Sir A. Geddes to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, July
29, 1921, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 355.
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"I think it will be a gross waste of time to go [to
Washington]. "-37 Nine days later. President Harding issued a
formal invitation to Bri tain--none of the Dominions was
invited--to attend a Conference on the Limitation of
Armament and Far Eastern Affairs to convene in Washington on
November 1, 1921.-3^
Shortly after this invitation reached Britain, the
Imperial Conference ended. Its delegates reached remarkably
few specific agreements. The Dominions affirmed the One
Power Standard and the concept of base development without
providing any material assistance. Britain, without the
Dominions, would attend an upcoming conference on
disarmament and Pacific affairs, pending which the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance would remain in effect. One historian in
fact states that "the concrete results achieved in the field
of naval policy and defence were very small."*
Nonetheless, the Imperial Conference had important
ramifications, if only in terms of options rendered
untenable. The positions taken by Meighen and Hughes
precluded Dominion contributions toward a naval building
program and any possible implementation of the Jellicoe plan
* CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 34, August 2,
1921.
"^Merze Tate and Fidel e Foy, "More Light on the
Abrogation of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance, ( Political
Science Quarterly , LXXIV, 1959).
-%oskill. Naval Policy , 298.
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for a Pacific fleet, thus sustaining both British strategic
weakness in the Far East and the Empire's resulting
dependence upon Japanese goodwill. The Dominion leaders
also ensured that a united Imperial Conference could neither
renew nor abrogate the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. Britain
prepared for the Washington Conference with imperial unity
apparently depending upon the willingness of Japan and the
United States to enter a multi-lateral security pact.
CHAPTER 8
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
The Washington Conference rendered compatible the
Cabinet's desires to maintain the Royal Navy at a strength
at least equal to that of any other power and to prevent the
cost of a naval building program from increasing the size of
naval estimates. The British Empire Delegation arrived in
Washington prepared to accept virtually any program of
disarmament that maintained the right of blockade, the
development of Singapore, and approximate parity with the
American fleet. When the sweeping American proposals to
combine a 5:5:3 ratio of fleet strength for the primary
naval powers with an interlude in naval construction
encountered resistance from France and Japan, Balfour
labored to induce the participants to compromise. After
laying the groundwork for the successful transformation of
the Angl o- Japanese Alliance, he facilitated a series of
disarmament settlements that preserved the American
framework while providing Britain an advantage in cruiser
strength and a small program of battleship construction.
British preparation for the Washington Conference
lacked the gravity normally associated with British
diplomacy. Lloyd George himself set the tone at the end of
the Imperial Conference when he refused to attend and
predicted the delegates would spend their time "blowing off
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hot air."' Churchill, at the same meeting, ridiculed the
American concept of open diplomacy:
Fancy conducting a discussion like that if it is
open to the public, and with stating the facts
that, while the British Empire were straining
every effort to secure universal peace, the
Americans were building sixteen battleships and
they stood out from the League of Nations, and
were starting to arm by land and sea.^
American intransigence toward British proposals for a
preliminary conference in London regarding a settlement of
Pacific and Far Eastern problems aggravated rather than
assuaged the attitudes in Whitehall.^ To Churchill, Lloyd
George described the American proposals as "amateurish in
the extreme" and complained that if the American government
had even "one man with any experience of international
affairs they would not have made this muddle."* Leading
statesmen, including Bonar Law and Curzon, declined to
attend. On August 15, 1921, the Cabinet assigned
responsibility for coordinating the British positions to the
C.I.D. and thereafter displayed little interest in the
preparations until the eve of the B.E.D.'s departure for the
*CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 34, August 5,
1921.
^CAB 32/2: Imperial Conference Minute 34, August 5,
1921.
^Sprouts, New Order , 135-36. The London location would
have enabled the Australasian Prime Ministers to attend.
*David Lloyd George, as recorded in Rowland, David
Lloyd George , 542.
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Conference.^ Even the pace at which the Departments
forwarded the typical memoranda to Hankey's secretariat
lagged in comparison to the staff work produced in
preparation for the Armistice.
A memorandum from the Committee on National Expenditure
(C.N.E.) shattered any feelings of complacency in Admiralty
House.
^
The C.N.E. comprised a committee of businessmen
under Sir Eric Geddes appointed in 1921 to suggest economies
of some £100 millions in the budget.^ The C.N.E., also
known as "the Geddes Axe," sought to force the Board to
accept reduction in the Navy Estimates. The C.N.E. compared
the Estimates for 1921-22 (£82.48 millions) to 1922-23
(£81.18 millions) and observed that a decrease in general
expenditure of over £11 millions was due primarily to
deflation and that it was offset by an increase of nearly
£10 millions due to capital ship construction, with a net
decrease of only £1.3 millions. The Geddes committee
further noted that the Navy's personnel strength of 121,000
was only 27,000 less than that of 1914-15. The C.N.E.
wanted a definition of the One Power Standard, together with
'CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 67 (3b), August 15, 1921.
^ADM 1/8614/187: Oswyn Murray note indicated the
importance of a response, October 13, 1921; /8615/200:
Director of Statistics minute described C.N.E. proposals as
"unthinkable," October 28, 1921.
^Pollard, British Economy , 210; Taylor, English
History , 184.
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any plans for the placing of ships into reserve. The
deficit commission inquired as to whether the seventeen
capital ships already in reserve could be relegated to care
and maintenance parties. The C.N.E. suggested postponing
new construction until after the conference and requested an
evaluation of the risk of laying down only two vessels and
the docking requirement involved.^
In response. Admiralty House prepared a memorandum
designed to set forth clearly the premises under which the
Board was operating. The Admiralty noted that the
Government's expressed naval policy was still the One Power
Standard, which, according to the Admiralty, meant that "the
Navy should be maintained at sufficient strength to ensure
the safety of the British Empire and its sea communications
as against any other Naval Power. The Board stated that
"more than absolute equality" would be desirable, but
recognized "this is not attainable in the present difficult
times, and we shall be put hard to it to obtain absolute
equality." The Admiralty made no objections to the concept
of naval limitation provided Britain retained, if not her
present relative advantage, at least a position of equality.
From the Board's perspective, two issues complicated the
ADM 1/8614/187: Observations by Committee on National
Expenditure, October 1921.
^ADM 1/8615/200: Admiralty Memorandum, "One Power
Standard", October 1921.
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problem of finding an acceptable level of reduction. The
first involved the protection of sea-borne commerce, the
defense of which required a substantial number of cruisers.
At the hub of a maritime trading network, Britain's
livelihood depended on sea communications. The Admiralty
considered the Navy's responsibilities in this area to be
"infinitely greater than those of any other Power" and that
Britain required a larger number of cruisers than other
nations. The second issue concerned "modern capital ships,
which are the gauge of a country's Sea Power. "*° The Board
worried that equality in numbers of ships would leave
Britain at a marked disadvantage, as all of the Royal Navy's
battleships were of pre-Jutland design.*^
The Admiralty plan for retaining at least equality in
capital ship strength involved the construction of eight new
vessels. The Board hoped to lay down four battle cruisers
in 1921-22, followed by four battleships in 1922-23. The
battle cruisers, carrying 16-inch main guns, would displace
48,000 tons apiece, while the battleships, armed with
enormous 18-inch weaponry, would displace 48,400 tons each.
A new pattern of inclined armor, concentrated only over the
^"adM 1/8615/200: Admiralty Memorandum, "One Power
Standard", October 1921.
"Chalmers, Life and Letters of David Beatty . 366.
Britain's sole post-Jutland capital ship was the battle
cruiser Hood , as her sister ships Anson , Howe , and Rodney
had been cancelled shortly after the Armistice.
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vitals of the ships, would be raised higher to provide
better protection against aerial bombing and plunging fire,
while a novel system of "water protection" sandwiched
between the side of the ship and her anti-torpedo bulkheads
afforded increased safety from submarines. The designs of
the new ships, developed in 1920-21 and incorporating
lessons from the Battle of Jutland and the newest German
battleship Baden
, represented a quantum leap past the ships
of the American 1916 Program, which were designed before
Jutland.* These eight vessels would cost some £75 millions,
at roughly £15 millions per year over 5 years. *^
The Cabinet at least partly assuaged the fears of
Admiralty House on the issue of capital ship quality during
the closing days of the Imperial Conference. On July 19th,
the conference delegates reached unanimous agreement to
uphold the One Power Standard. Funding, however, proved to
be more difficult to resolve. When Hughes of Australia
proposed that the Dominions accept shares in the imperial
naval budget on a per capita basis of white population.
D'Eyncourt MSS 22: A.C.N. S. Memorandum, "Main
Requirements of Design", June 11, 1920; D'Eyncourt MSS 27:
Goodall Memorandum, "Battleship Design", July 1, 1920;
Preston, The Ship , 24-26.
-^ADM 116/1775: Admiralty Memorandum, "Naval Policy and
New Construction", November 22, 1920. The projected annual
costs (in millions of pounds) broke down as follows:
Ship\Year '21-22 '22-23 '23-24 '24-25 '25-26 Total
Battle Cruisers, 4 9.0 15.5 13.0 0.0 0.0 37.5
Battleships, 4 0.0 2.5 7.5 14.5 13.0 37.5
309
Meighen of Canada and Smuts of South Africa demurred.** The
following day, the delegates agreed to a division of a
portion of German reparations payments amounting to over £16
mi 1 1 ions
:
Country Share Amount
Britain 86. 85% £14,200,000
Canada 4.35% £740 ,000
Australia 4.35% £740,000
New Zealand 1.75% £295 ,000
India 1. 20% £204,000
Minor Colonies 0.80% £136,000
South Africa 0.60% £102,000
New Foundland 0 .10% £17 ,000
Beatty then briefed the delegates on the Adm.iralty's
proposed capital ship building program. Despite further
opposition from Meighen, the group adopted Smuts' suggestion
to use German reparation payments towards the cost of the
proposed capital ships." That afternoon, the Cabinet
considered the Admiralty request for approval to start
building the four capital ships for which the preliminary
funding had been approved on March 17th by the House of
Commons during the presentation of the Navy Estim.ate.*^ The
Cabinet agreed that four new capital ships were necessary to
meet American and Japanese ships under construction.
CAB 32/4: Imperial Conference (Prime Ministers) Minute
26-A, July 19, 1921.
"CAB 32/4: Imperial Conference (Prime Ministers) Minute
26-B, July 20, 1921.
*^House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates , 5th Series,
Volume 126, Columns 2296-2347, 2442-2550.
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Despite warnings from the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to
the heavy expenditure involved, the Cabinet granted
Admiralty House the authority to build the four ships in the
1921-22 naval program.*^
The First Sea Lord delegated the primary responsibility
for crafting the Admiralty's proposals for naval lim.itations
to Adm.iral Ernie Chatfield, the Assistant Chief of the Naval
Staff. As Chatfield felt that no proposals for arm.s
limitation were proof against deliberate subterfuge, he
sought to determ.ine the "least objectionable."" He ruled
out the use of either budgetary or manpower cei 1 ings as too
easily evaded. Limitation based on the displacement of
ships seem.ed to the admiral sim.ilarly susceptible to
cheating
, so he sett 1 ed on num.be r of capital ships as the
most easily enforced measure for naval arm.s limitation.
Chatfield saw aircraft carriers as a m.ixed blessing.
He was keenly aware of the potential value of naval air
support . At the sam.e tim.e , the admiral perceived aircraft
carriers as a potential focus for future naval building
^^CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 60 (6), July 20, 1921.
*^ADM 1/8615/200: Chatfield Memorandum, October 14,
1921.
^^The Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff reversed the
position taken in 1919 by the Director of Plans, who
suggested that the limitation of ship size was the m.ost
prom.ising m.ethod. See ADM 116/1863: Director of Plans
Memorandum, "League of Nations: Reduction in Naval
Arm.am.ents" (attached minutes dated July 1919).
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corr.peti tion
:
The nur?JDer of Aircraft Carriers present in a Fleet
Action will decide who is to coirar.and the Air, and
as Command of the Air is likely to be vital in the
next Naval Battle, competition in Aircraft
Carriers may, unless regulated, supplant
competition in Capital Ships.
Certain that capital ships would be regulated, Chatfield
therefore suggested limiting carriers to a percentage of
capital ship strength.^''
The Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff hoped to
elim.inate submarines as a lawful weapon of naval warfare.
He realized, however, that the smaller powers, particularly
France, viewed the submarine as an inexpensive method of
coastal defense. As a result, he feared "the whole problem,
of subm.arine abolition was so involved as to be
im.practicabl e . " His concern on the issue had abated after
British experiments indicated that a new underwater
detection system., known to the British as ASDIC and the
Am.ericans as SONAR, proved increasingly able to locate
submerged submarines.
By the end of SeptemJDer, while Chatfield labored to put
the finishing touches on his argum.ents, Adm.iralty House
reached a consensus on the two principal naval issues at
*^ADM 1/8615/200: Chatfield Mem.orandiim., October 28,
1921.
^-Ernle Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (London, 1947),
6.
^^ADM 1/8609; Chatfield Minute, July 27, 1921.
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Washington: arms limitation and the Far Eastern question.
The Board wanted to prevent Japan from advancing any further
south than Formosa and advocated "an international guarantee
of the territorial status quo" while preserving Britain's
right to develop Singapore. The Adm.iralty dealt at greater
length with the question of naval lim.itation. The Board
recognized that "Capital ships and their accessories run
away with the money and necessitate undesirable reductions
in other im.portant naval services" and concluded that "a
substantial reduction should suit our policy." The
Adm.iralty developed a plan for naval limitation based on two
prem.ises: that naval strength rem.ained prim.arily a function
of post-Jutland capital ships and that rules for limitation,
in order to be effective, m.ust be sim.ple and designed to
prevent duplicity. The Board presented a five point plan.
First, naval limitation should be based on a limited number
of capital ships. Second, the British Em.pire and the United
States should have a m.argin over Japan of 3:2 (this point
implied naval equality between Britain and Am.erica). Third,
only post-Jutland capital ships should be counted. Fourth,
ships should be replaced after twenty years of service.
Fifth, the abolition of subm.arines should be favorably
considered. The First Lord sent a memorandum containing the
23
views of the Admiralty to the C.I.D. in early October.
^^CAB 21/218: Admiralty Mem.orandum, "Washington
Conference", October 5, 1921.
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On October 14th, the Standir.g Defence Sub-Conmi ttee
(S.S.) of the C.I.D. considered those recoranendations
. The
subcorrroittee completely agreed with the Board's analysis.
The S.S. endorsed the Admiralty position that the
development of Singapore and the right of blockade were non-
negotiable, and further agreed that Britain should not
accept close technical inspections of her warships. The
subcomjp.ittee also concurred with the Board's judgm.ent that
naval reduction should be based on numbers of capital
ships
.
Later that week, the Cabinet also provided the C.I.D.
some guidance. The Cabinet m.emJDers had strongly desired the
presence of the Prim.e Minister at the beginning of the
Conference, even though they recognized that at best he
could stay only a few weeks. By the m.iddle of the m.onth,
however, the press of Par 1 iam.entary business, m.uch of which
dealt with Ireland, led Lloyd George to decide that he would
have to m.iss at least the initial phase of negotiations. On
October i7th, the Cabinet agreed that in his absence, Arthur
James Balfour, Lord President of the Council, would head the
British Empire Delegation (B.E.D.). Lee, the First Lord,
and Geddes, the Ambassador to the United States, would
constitute the remainder of the political team, while the
naval section com.prised Beatty, the First Sea Lord, and
•CAB 21/218: S.S. Minute, October 14, 1921
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Chatfield, the Assistar.t Chief of the Navai Staff. The
ubiquitous Hankey would manage both secretariats. The Prime
Minister would join as soon as the Par 1 iam.entary and general
situations all owed.
Four days later, Winston Churchill broached an idea to
the Standing Defence Sub-Committee. He suggested the
adoption of a paper program, of naval construction as a
bargaining chip. The Adm.iralty's request for a second
installm.ent of four new capital ships (i.e., the 1922-23
battleship com.ponent of the proposal that Beatty briefed at
the Im.perial Conference), as yet unauthorized by the
Cabinet, constituted the obvious basis for such a program..
The former First Lord explained that the tactic had proved
successful in his dealings with Germ.any before the Great
War. Lord Lee quickly supported Churchill's proposal, which
the S.S. then approved. The authorization of four post-
Jutland battleships, for a total of eight new capital ships,
would provide a significant counter to the American 1916
Program, of sixteen capital ships, for which the Harding
Administration still possessed only partial funding.
The following day, the Foreign Office provided the
3.S.D. a memorandum that contained its latest appraisal of
the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. The F.O. cited communications
^'CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 80 (7), October 17, 1921;
Cabinet Conclusion 77 (5), October 7, 1921.
^-CAB 21/218: S.S. Minute, October 21, 1921.
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from Geddes ir. Washington and Eliot in Tokyo to the effect
that both the United States and Japan were favorably
inclined towards the transformation of the existing treaty
into a tripartite agreement. The memorandum reminded the
B.E.D. of the need to remove from any draft treaty all
m.ilitary commitments, "for otherwise the United States can
never be induced to become a party." The Foreign Office
suggested that "the advisability of admitting other parties
(especially China) having interests in the Pacific may well
be considered" but cautioned that "a multilateral agreement,
which does not include the United States, would be of no
value to us at all." The m.emorandum advised the B.E.D. of
the desirability of having the Am.ericans "first suggest a
formula" for replacing the Alliance but enclosed two
separate draft treaties, one by Sir Auckland Geddes and the
other by Sir John Jordan of the Foreign Off ice.
On October 24th, the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of
the C.I.D. sent a m.emorandum. to the Cabinet that defined its
aim in preparing for the Washington Conference as achieving
"the largest possible reduction in expenditure on armaments,
subject to two fundamental considerations." First, any
Foreign Office Memorandum respecting a Tripartite
Agreement, October 22, 1921, as recorded in Butler and Bury,
Docum.ents on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV,
448-50.
^^CAB 21/218: C.I.D. Memorandum. 280-3, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armam.ents", October 24, 1921.
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agreement must safeguard "the vital interests of the British
Empire." Second, any treaty must possess "a stable
character" in order to avoid being:
dislocated by any miscalculations of national or
political elements concerned, such as occurred
after the Paris Peace Conference, owing to the
refusal of the Government of the United States to
ratify the instruments drawn up.
The C.I.D. accepted the Treasury's position that failure to
achieve an immediate reduction of expenditure on the armed
services would eliminate any real possibility of balancing
the budget without raising taxes, "which would be
politically most undesirable and econom.ical 1 y m.ost
prejudicial to the nation's interests." The
C.I.D. 's concern for budgetary consideration, however, did
not translate into a defeat for the Navy.
The Standing Defence Sub-Committee accepted completely
the Admiralty's viewpoint as presented by Admiral Osm.ond
Brock, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff. The S.S. agreed
that the development of Singapore "should not be interfered
with by any agreement reached at the Conference . "^'^ The
subcommittee further accepted the Navy's view on the
importance of retaining unrestricted use of blockade, so
that any "question of the regulation or limitation of
"CAB 21/218: C.I.D. Memorandum 280-B, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", October 24, 1921.
^'CAB 21/218: C.I.D. Memorandum 280-B, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", October 24, 1921.
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methods of warfare should be resisted," and shared the
Admiralty's view that a total ban on submarines was "a
policy of perfection not very likely to be realized." The
S,S. labelled the limitation of naval armaments as "by far
the most important task of the Conference at Washington" and
agreed with the Board's position "that the only method which
is sufficiently simple as to be really practicable is an
international agreement as to the limitation of the number
of capital ships." The subcomjv.i ttee decided the best way to
achieve their goals was "to allow the other delegations to
put forward their proposals, and submit them to criticism."
The S.S. also endorsed Churchill's idea "as to putting
forward a paper program of capital ship construction , as
likely to be undertaken by the British Governm.ent . " The
Standing Defence Sub-Comm.i t tee concl uded by recommending to
the Cabinet "that a wide measure of discretion m.us t be left
to the B . E . D . " on the understanding that m.ajor policy
questions would be referred to the Empire government
concerned
.
On November 1st, the Cabinet gave its first collective
consideration to major policy decisions for the Washington
Conference. The Lloyd George Ministry decided that if
•"CAB 21/218: C.I.D. Memorandum. 280-B, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", October 24, 1921;
Nish, Al liance , 364, suggests that the Cabinet acted in
deference to Lloyd George, tentatively scheduled to visit
the conference
.
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France sought a renewal of the British guarantee of French
territory, the B.E.D. would seek to promote American
ratification and would further seek to use French support
for the guarantee to move toward a limitation of aerial
armaments. The Cabinet then endorsed Churchill's scheme for
a program of naval construction designed as a bargaining
chip. The Cabinet agreed that, while adhering to the One
Power standard
:
full discretion should be given to the principal
British Delegate, according to the circumstance of
the Conference, to adopt [Churchill's suggestion]
in regard to having a paper programme of capital
ship construction, to be used for bargaining with
a view to inducing the other Powers to reduce
their building programmes
•
In consonance with the C.I.D.'s determ.ination to react to
the proposals of other nations, these decisions represented
the extent of the guidance provided to the B.E.D prior to
the Conference.
The B.E.D. sailed to Washington in the first week of
November, under the direction of Arthur James Balfour, Lord
President of the Council. Balfour at the time was seventy-
three years of age and tired from his labors with the League
of Nations. Dining with the Prime Minister, Churchill had
laughingly remarked that "if you wanted nothing done, A.J.B.
was undoubtedly the best man for the task."^^ Upon receiving
^CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 83 (2), November 1, 1921.
^Riddell, Intimate Diary . 325.
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initial notification from Hankey that he would be asked to
lead the B.E.D., Balfour himself replied that he "hoped very
much hoped the Prime Minister will think better of it."
After suggesting that Bonar Law was better fitted to the
task, the Lord President responded to the call of duty: "If
there is an important reason for my going, I am ready to
r,^ "34go
.
Born to immense wealth and political influence as the
nephew of Robert, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, Balfour had
held political office, including the premiership, almost
continuously since 1874, when he had first won election to
Parliament in the family borough of Hertford. Yet Balfour
disguised his capacity and willingness for work behind an
artful facade of intellectual dilettantism. Underneath his
studied detachment, he remained convinced that the
aristocracy should play a leading role in British
35government. The Lord President also held firm views about
the value of sea power.
Throughout his career, Balfour advocated a strong
defense policy. As Prime Minister, he had established the
C.I.D. to improve the coordination among the armed services.
He had also sponsored the eighteen-pounder gun, which gave
^^Arthur Balfour, as recorded Roskill, Hankey , Vol II,
236.
^-Dugdale, Balfour , 17-19; Piers Brendon, Eminent
Edwardians (Boston, 1980), 68-86.
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Balfour's greatest legacy to*Britain's defense involved the
support for Fisher's revolutionary battleship that had
earned him the sobriquet "Godfather of the Dreadnought."
During the naval crisis of 1909, he had described "the
maintenance of a powerful Fleet" as "the first duty of a
Government."'^ When the Asquith Ministry considered in 1912
a proposal for universal service, designed to produce a mass
army, Balfour had objected to the cost and had asked:
Would not this money be much better spent, from
the point of view of national security, upon
increasing the Navy? ... Remember that a sufficient
Navy not only =^ecures your shores, but secures
your commerce."
As Foreign Secretary, during the preparations for the
Armistice, Balfour had sharply attacked President Wilson's
call for freedom of the seas. He had contended that until
such time as the League became "firmly established," that
"every attempt to limit the use of Sea Power" merely added
"to the relative strength of Land Power: and that in the end
militarism would be the only gainer."'
Despite this opposition to Wilson's policy, Balfour
possessed a profound sympathy for the United States and
hoped to see close cooperation between America and Britain.
In 1913, he had written:
^'Arthur Balfour, as recorded in Dugdale, Balfour , 31.
^Arthur Balfour, as recorded in Dugdale, Balfour , 53.
'^ADM 116/1651: Balfour Memorandum, "Freedom of the
Seas", October 23, 1918.
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In 1913, he had written:
I am moved by a feeling especially patriotic in
Its character, for the group of nations who are
the authors and guardians of western civilization,[and] for the sub-group who speak the English
language
With friends in the Republican party of the United States,
Balfour had served as vice-president of the Anglo-American
Society and as British empire president of the English-
Speaking Union. One historian of Anglo-American relations
writes: "To Balfour, Anglo-American co-operation was not
merely a temporary or tactical expedient but a fundamental
policy. "^^ With his beliefs that Britain would require both
the friendship of America and the protection of a fleet,
Balfour was thus well-suited for his responsibilities as
head of the B.E.D. to Washington. Moreover, he had some
previous experience with delegations to Washington.
In April 1917, shortly after the United States had
entered the war, Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, sailed for
America on the S.S. Olympic with some twenty-two specialists
from the Foreign Office, the fighting services, and the
supply departments. The Balfour Mission was originally a
technical delegation designed to increase the efficacy of
mobilization efforts within the United States. During his
visit to l^merica, the Foreign Secretary met with President
Arthur Balfour, as recorded in Dugdale, Balfour . 66.
'Fry, 1 1 lusions , 15-16.
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Wilson to discuss war aims and the various secret treaties
of the Allied powers.*^
Under the pressure of unrestricted submarine warfare,
Britain also sought to influence the course of American
naval expansion so as to obtain the greatest possible
assistance in the struggle to protect Atlantic shipping.
Balfour himself later noted: "Things were dark when I took
that trip to America ... The submarines were constantly on my
mind. I could think of nothing but the number of ships which
they were sinking."*^ Balfour consulted Wilson's adviser
Colonel House, while Rear-Admiral Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de
Chair met with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Benson.
The Balfour Mission requested the diversion of American
naval construction from, capital ships to anti-submarine
vessel s
.
The Wilson Administration then balanced the immediate
gain of additional anti-submarine assets against the
reduction in the post-war capital ship strength of the
United States Navy. House believed that the United States
should help the Allies, in exchange for British guarantees
43
of capital ship support in case of American difficulties.
Benson, however, worried about the possibility that America
''Dugdale, Balfour , 141-45.
^^Arthur Balfour, as recorded in Klachko, Admiral
Benson , 68
.
*^Seymour, Intimate Papers , Vol III, 67.
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might have to carry on the struggle against Germany alone
should the Allies collapse.^* His reluctance to accept a
loss of capital ship production prevented any immediate
decision
.
After Balfour's return to Britain in May 1917, the
Cabinet requested that he pursue the issue. The following
month, the Foreign Secretary submitted a memorandum to the
Cabinet for consideration. Balfour noted that the United
States Navy was worried about post-war ramifications if they
did not build capital ships and Germany and Japan still
possessed significant fleets. He suggested that for four
years after the war, ample time in which to build new
capital ships: "Am.erica should have a right to call upon
other Fleets to her assistance, in case of maritime
attack. "^^ Balfour raised and rejected the possibility of a
mutual defense treaty between Britain and the United States.
He described a bilateral agreement as both simple yet
adequate and added:
I confess, for reasons of high policy, there is
nothing I should like more than a defensive
alliance with America, even for four years, as
would be capable of extension and development,
should circ\imstances prove auspicious.
Balfour then identified the major flaw with his proposal:
"The objection to it arises out of our existing Treaty with
"Klachko, Admiral Benson , 69.
^^Balfour MSS 49699: Balfour Memorandum, "Future Naval
Construction in the United States", June 22, 1917.
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Japan."** The Japanese government, unfortunately, was not
likely to cooperate.
Balfour wrote that there was no logical incompatibility
between the Anglo- Japanese Alliance and the suggested
arrangement, but predicted that an Anglo-American "treaty
would produce a very unpleasant feeling in Tokio" (sic). He
lauded the Angl o- Japanese Alliance as contributing "to
stability in international relations in the Far East." He
reasoned that the best way to avoid offending Britain's
longtime ally was "to try to associate Japan from the
beginning with the new arrangem.ent . " Balfour then
conjectured that a mul ti - 1 ateral agreement "would have the
triple effect of allaying Japanese fears, of engaging
Japanese support, and of advertising the treaty as a
prot.ection against Germany."*^ Balfour admitted the
difficulties of lim.iting any m.ul ti-1 ateral treaty. He
pointed out that if Japan was brought in against Germany,
Britain could hardly avoid asking France, and if France was
asked to join the arrangement, Italy. He concluded by
advocating a very broad arrangement. He recommended, in
return for the diversion of American shipbuilding resources
from the construction of capital ships to the building of
*°Balfour MSS 49699: Balfour Memorandum, "Future Naval
Construction in the United States", June 22, 1917.
^^Balfour MSS 49699: Balfour Memorandum, "Future Naval
Construction in the United States", June 22, 1917.
325
destroyers, that:
the Governments of the United States of America,
Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan
engage singly and severally to assist each other
against any maritime attack for a period of four
years after the present war.
The Foreign Secretary relayed his proposals, with Cabinet
approval, to House, only to have Wilson categorically reject
any formal alliance with the Allied powers/' Balfour's
proposal for a general maritime alliance thus proved
fruitless. Nonetheless, it indicated both his desire to
develop closer relations with the United States and his
willingness to see Britain retain her naval superiority.
Circumstance provided Balfour the opportunity to play a
major role in Washington. The civilian members of the
delegation. Ambassador Geddes and First Lord Lee, were
clearly figures of the second rank, while Lloyd George was
never able to leave the press of responsibilities in London.
Additionally, Admiral Beatty returned to London shortly
after the conference opened, leaving Chatfield in charge of
the British Naval Section, Washington (BNSW). More
importantly, the Cabinet had decided against "a precise and
detailed mandate" for the del egation . Thus, Balfour
possessed an unusual m.easure of autonomy at the conference.
^^Balfour MSS 49699: Balfour Memorandum, "Future Naval
Construction in the United States", June 22, 1917.
^•'Trask, Captains and Cabinets . 119-20.
^^CAB 23: Cabinet Conclusion 83 (2), November 1, 1921.
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On November 11th, the day after he arrived in
Washington and the day before the Conference opened, Balfour
sent his appreciation of the situation to Lloyd George. The
Lord President defined the ultimate aim of the B.E.D. as
"the largest possible limitation of armaments consistent
with the safety of the British Empire," with the
understanding that "satisfactory and durable results"
regarding naval disarmament rested upon the resolution of
diplomatic issues. Balfour identified the Ang 1 o- Japanese
Alliance as "first and foremost" among the obstacles to
successful arms limitation, along with "a number of problems
regarding China." Balfour explained his intention "to deal
with the political side of the Pacific question" before
taking on "the subject of naval diminution of armaments."""^
The head of the B.E.D. addressed the future of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance and China in two separate treaties- -which
he had drafted during the Atlantic crossing- -whi ch he
attached.
"The Foreign Office was concerned not so much that the
discussion of the Angl o- Japanese Alliance precede naval
limitation talks as that the discussion take place "only
among the parties concerned." See F.O. Memorandum, "General
Survey of Political Situation in Pacific And Far East with
reference to the forthcoming Washington Conference", October
20, 1921, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on
British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 434-448.
"cab 21/218: Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George,
November 11, 1921; the cable is also recorded in Butler and
Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1st Series, Vol
XIV, 466-70, although without the draft treaties.
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Balfour sought to replace the Anglo- Japanese Alliance
with a tripartite agreement between Britain, Japan, and the
United States. His draft comprised three brief clauses: the
first called for the three signatories to respect territory
in the Pacific and to preserve peace through consultation in
case of threat; the second allowed any two of the powers to
establish a defensive alliance, provided they notified the
third; and the last stated the proposed treaty would replace
all existing arrangements. Balfour explained the draft
treaty would serve numerous purposes:
(a) To enable the Americans to be party to a
tripartite arrangement without committing
themselves to military operations.
(b) To bring the existing Angl o- Japanese Alliance
to an end without hurting the feelings of an Ally.
(c) To leave it open to us to renew a defensive
alliance with Japan if she should be threatened by
Germany or Russia
.
(d) To frame a treaty which will reassure our
Australasian Dominions.
(e) To make it impossible for American critics to
suggest our Treaty with Japan would require us to
stand aside in the case of a quarrel between them
and Japan, whatever the cause of the quarrel.
Balfour sought to square the circle of diverging opinion
expressed at the Imperial Conference, bringing America into
an arrangement without any military commitments, but
retaining with Japan a relationship which held the
possibility of military assistance. The junior members of
^-CAB 21/218: Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George,
November 11, 1921; the cable is also recorded in Butler and
Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol
XIV, 466-70, although without the draft tripartite treaty.
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the E.E.D. raised no objections to Balfour's proposals when
he presented them informally over dinner.^-
On the eve of the Conference, the Lord President met
with American Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes,
primarily to discuss the future of the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance. Balfour presented Hughes a copy of the draft
treaty, explaining that it had not been approved by the
Cabinet and hence was unofficial. He agreed to Hughes'
request to show it to the American contingent, provided it
was described as unofficial yet held in secrecy. Balfour
then asked Hughes whether he (Balfour) might share the draft
with the principal Japanese delegate on the same conditions.
Hughes demurred, on the grounds that the term "treaty" would
inflame American public opinion should word of the
discussions leak out. Balfour then substituted the word
"arrangement" every place the word "treaty" appeared in the
text. Hughes refused to discuss his remarks at the opening
of the Conference, but in all other respects the
conversation remained cordial.'' Balfour accordingly left
the meeting still under the impression that a resolution of
the political questions of the Pacific remained a
prerequisite to a naval arms limitation agreement.
"Vry, Illusion, 163-64.
'^Hankey Memorandum, November 11, 1921, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Doc^oments on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 470-71.
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Contrary to the Lord President's expectations,
Secretary Hughes presented the first plenary session of the
Conference on Limitation of Armaments on November 12th with
a comprehensive and detailed set of proposals for the
reduction of naval strength. He listed four principles for
arms reduction:
(1) The elimination of all capital ship building
rograms, either actual or projected;
2) Further reduction through the scrapping of
certain of the older ships;
(3) That regard should be had to the existing
naval strength of the conferring powers;
(4) The use of capital ship tonnage as the
measure of strength for navies and a proportionate
allowance of auxiliary combatant craft
prescribed.
Hughes proposed a curtailment to current construction
combined with an aggressive program of scrapping existing
vessels, amounting to 30 capital ships of almost 850,000
tons for America, along with smaller cuts for the other
powers. The Secretary then proposed specific future
strengths by numbers and tonnage for the American, British,
and Japanese fleets according to a 5:5:3 ratio, with capital
ship totals of 500,000 and 300,000 tons respectively. He
continued by proposing a replacement schedule for capital
ships which included both a ten year "naval holiday" from
new building and a life cycle of twenty years per vessel.
'•CAB 33/ lb: B.E.D. Memorandum 76, "The Proposal of the
United States for a Limitation of Naval Armaments"; also
published in United States, Department of State, Conference
on the Limitation of Armament: Washington November 12 , 1921
- February 6. 1922 (Washington, D.C., 1922), 78-93.
330
New ships would be limited to a maximum displacement of
35,000 tons. Hughes then announced similar provisions for
the reduction of auxiliary combatant craft, including escort
vessels, aircraft carriers, and submarines. Hughes
concluded by forming the chief delegates of the five major
powers (America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) into a
Committee on Limitation of Armaments and, together with the
primary representatives of the four smaller nations
attending (Belgium, China, Netherlands, and Portugal), into
another for Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. The
delegates agreed to hold the next plenary session on
November 15th.
Hughes stunned his audience with the boldness and
specificity of his proposals. The American plan, known to
only eleven men before its public disclosure, reflected the
work of a small bipartisan committee, appointed by President
Harding, which included Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and
Theodore Roosevelt." Harding had excluded Anglophobic
Admiral William Benson from the planning process after the
former Chief of Naval Operations wrote Secretary Hughes a
-'CAB 33/lb: B.E.D. Memorandum 76, "The Proposal of the
United States for a Limitation of Naval Armaments"; also
published in United States, Department of State, Conference
on the Limitation of Armament: Washington November 12, 1921
- February 6. 1922 (Washington, B.C., 1922), 78-93.
-^Thomas Buckley and Edwin Strong, American Foreign and
National Security Policies, 1914-1945 (Knoxville, 1987), 65-
66.
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memorandum accusing the Lloyd George Government of using
"propaganda for disarmament and other features tending to
keep the United States in a position subordinate to the
British Empire."^' Benson fought long and hard to prevent
any reduction in the American 1916 building program, but
kept his struggle strictly within official channels. As a
result, no word reached British naval circles of the Hughes
plan. Two naval historians record a contemporary account of
the impact of the Secretary's proposals on Admiral Beatty,
who reputedly leaned forward in his chair like a:
bulldog, sleeping on a sunny doorstep, who has
been poked in the stomach by the impudent foot of
an itinerant soap-canvasser seriously lackijj^g in
any sense of the most ordinary proprieties
.
The admiral noted that Hughes' proposals "certainly caused
considerable surprise in many quarters, not excluding the
American naval clique."^* Arthur Willert, in charge of the
Publicity Section of the B.E.D., later wrote that "the
suggestion knocked everybody backward by its brutal
simpl icity . "** Bal f our was also surprised , but took careful
"William Benson, as recorded in Klachko, Admiral
Benson, 189. Benson argued in vain against the 5:5:3 ratio,
suggesting that France should be allowed the same strength
as Japan in order to prevent an Anglo- Japanese combination
against America.
""Sprouts, New Order , 155.
^'David Beatty, as recorded in Roskill, Last Naval Hero .
308.
"Arthur Willert, Washington and Other Memories (Boston,
1972), 157.
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notes on the back of a number of envelopes supplied by
Hankey ."^
Balfour and Hankey immediately departed for lunch.
They discussed Hughes' speech, and Balfour laid out the
basic outline of his reply based on the notes taken that
morning. He would approve the spirit and principle of the
speech but suggest certain reservations as to specific
detail. These reservations would focus on the abolition of
the submarine, the strength of the auxiliary vessels, and
the replacement schedule for capital ships."'
Admiral Beatty gave Hughes' proposals a mixed review.
He accepted the multi-lateral cuts in existing naval
strength. Beatty strongly opposed the ten year hiatus in
capital ship construction, however, on the grounds the war
had forced Britain to forego heavy ships in order to produce
the necessary anti-submarine vessels, and in consequence,
the suppliers of capital ships were in desperate economic
straits.^' He wrote: "The difficulty will be in carrying out
the proposed 10 years Naval Holiday" as "we have
al ready ... had a holiday of 5 years the result of which has
"'Dugdale, Balfour , 236; Riddell, Intimate Diary , 335-
36.
'•Roskill, Hankey , Vol II, 241-42.
^'Beatty was following a line of argument he had
presented to the Cabinet in December 1920. See CAB 16/37/3:
N2 + N4, Admiralty Memoranda, "Naval Construction", December
14 and 20, 1920.
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almost broke the armament firms of the Country." The
admiral extrapolated that "another 10 years would require a
large subsidy from the government which would defeat the
Economical objective." In addition, the inevitable result
at the end of the proposed holiday would be "a hectic period
of feverish building" by all parties concerned, which would
prove "greatly more expensive than a steady but very small
building programme."" Beatty made no issue of the 35,000
ton size limit for capital ships, despite its
incompatibility with the Admiralty's battle cruiser design
(48,000 tons). He may have worried about the adverse
publicity that opposing the constraint could have created,
or, more likely, he may have believed that D.N.C. Tennyson
D'Eyncourt would successfully modify his designs to meet the
reduced limit. Beatty 's criticisms would color the thinking
of the B.E.D. during the early part of the Conference.
The Admiralty team rapidly prepared for the B.E.D. a
paper along similar lines. The memorandum stated that the
British delegation was in complete agreement with the
proposals of the United States Government with regard to the
capital ships to be retained, arrested in construction, and
"^David Beatty, as recorded in Roskill, Last Naval Hero .
308-09.
'"^The similarity between Balfour's initial reactions and
Beatty's detailed analysis is remarkable. Willert,
Washington , 157, notes that Beatty passed Balfour "an
obviously anxious note," which probably contained Beatty's
thoughts, during Hughes' speech.
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scrapped respectively by the British Empire, the United
States and Japan. The paper then described the proposed
naval holiday as neither "in the best interest of the
economical conditions of the countries concerned" nor
"likely to lead to a stable and durable condition of
armament reduction." The BNSW surmised that at the end of a
ten year building holiday, governments would desire to
replace their aging vessels only to find their construction
capacity atrophied:
There would follow, therefore, a period of
feverish activity in the shipbuilding world.
Armour plate and gun manufactories would be
revived at great cost and all other specialized
concerns whose products are required to bring to
life a modern capital ship would once more be
brought to life, the process of revivification
being attended by considerable outlay.
Such a period might last six or seven years, with as many as
six ships under construction at the same time. Thus,
"spasmodic" cycles would cost more than the same
construction stretched across the entire life cycle of the
fleet. The Admiralty section instead recommended "the
substitution of a low and steady rate of ship construction,"
which would reduce the expenditure necessary for a given
size fleet. Furthermore, in the eyes of the BNSW, such a
policy would have the added benefit of "diminishing the
warship-building potentialities" of the nations involved
"cab 30/la: B.E.D. 1st Conference, Appendix I, November
13, 1921; ADM 116/2149: Views of the Admiralty Section
regarding the American Proposals, November 13, 1921.
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(e.g., two docks continuously occupied, rather than six
docks used seven years of twenty), thus being more likely to
produce feelings "of mutual confidence" than "intermittent
outbursts of naval rivalry."^'
The BNSW also introduced some additional reservations.
They agreed to the 5:5:3 ratio, with the proviso that it
remained "subject to revision" in case Germany or Russia
showed "any tendency to recreate their naval power." The
memorandum then argued that the safety of the British Empire
depended on the ability of the Royal Navy to secure
Britain's sea lines of communication, particularly as
pertained to foodstuffs, a task that required numerous
cruisers beyond those allocated to the battle fleet. Such
cruisers, the BNSW argued, constituted "a purely defensive
requirement" and hence should be excluded from any
71limitation imposed on fleet strength. The memorandum
closed by advocating "the total abolition" of the submarine,
72
although recognizing the difficulty of such a course.
CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 1st Conference, Appendix I, November
13, 1921; ADM 116/2149: Views of the Admiralty Section
regarding the American Proposals, November 13, 1921.
^^The BNSW here reflected arguments produced earlier in
the Admiralty memorandxim, "One Power Standard", October,
1921.
^*At that time, the Royal Navy possessed 322,000 tons of
fleet auxiliary tonnage and 180,000 tons dedicated to the
protection of sea communications. See ADM 116/2149: Notes
on Auxiliary Combat Craft, November 13, 1921.
^^CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 1st Conference, November 13, 1921.
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Beatty and Lee met with the B.E.D. on the afternoon of
November 13th, when the First Sea Lord presented the views
of the naval staff. In the process of discussion, the
B.E.D. agreed that the naval force of France and Italy
"could not be regarded as negligible," as Hughes had
implied. The British commission then considered and
rejected any possibility of limiting the operating range of
submarines. The British delegation generally accepted the
views expressed by Admiral Beatty. After the meeting,
Hankey prepared a summary of Beatty 's analysis for the
Foreign Secretary. At the conclusion of the telegram, which
would reach London the next morning, Balfour indicated his
intention of accepting Hughes' proposal "as regards numbers
of capital ships" while emphasizing the "widespread and
special responsibilities of British Navy" and pointing out
that "certain aspects of the scheme require further study"
73
and therefore "should be referred to a commission."
Alexander Flint, secretary to the BNSW, separately sent a
precis of the American proposals directly to the Admiralty
Board.
On November 15th, Balfour presented the views of the
B.E.D. to the Conference. He began by reminding those
'^CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 1st Conference, November 13, 1921.
The telegram alone is recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents
on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 472-73.
^^ADM 1/8 615/207: BNSW Memorandum S-1, November 13,
1921.
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present that "the British Empire and Great Bri tain ... are
more profoundly concerned with.
. .matters naval than it is
possible for any other nation to be" because of Britain's
dependence on sea-borne transport of foodstuffs. He then
expressed "admiration and approval" for the general nature
of the proposal, but noted that it skipped over any
discussion of the navies of the smaller European powers and
avoided the question of land armaments to focus on the
battle fleets of the major powers. He described the
American proposition as "reasonable" and, playing to the
audience, pronounced: "We think it should be accepted; we
firmly believe it will be accepted."^-
The elderly British statesman then made clear that the
B.E.D. was not rendering unqualified approval. During his
summation of Hughes' plan, the Lord President noted that it:
omits all consideration for the time being of
those European nations who have diminished their
fleets, and who at present have no desire, and I
hope never will have any desire, to own fleets
beyond the necessities that national honor and
national defense require.
He was obviously referring to the absence of naval quotas
for France and Italy. After stating that the occasion was
ill-suited for going into detail, Balfour added: "There are
'XAB 30/3: 2nd Plenary Session, November 15, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament , 96-104.
^^CAB 30/3: 2nd Plenary Session, November 15, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, 96-104.
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details which can only be adequately dealt with in
committee." He discussed at length Britain's desire to
limit more severely the tonnage allocation for the submarine
class and perhaps the size of individual submarines. Before
closing, the Lord President briefly noted the B.E.D.'s other
two major concerns: "questions concerning replacement" and
"questions concerning cruisers which are not connected with
or required for fleet actions." Balfour's mention of the
need for technical experts foreshadowed the difficult
negotiations ahead.
The remainder of the Conference featured the process of
negotiation whereby Britain, Japan, France, and Italy became
reconciled to the American proposals and, to a lesser
degree, those proposals evolved to conform to specific
national interests. The British position, as stated by
Balfour, involved a willingness to accept the Hughes plan
conditional upon resolution of five issues: integration of
France and Italy into the allocation of capital ship
strength; acceptance by those nations and Japan of their
allotted strengths; the replacement scheme; recognition of
the British requirement for cruisers dedicated to the
protection of sea lines of communication, apart from those
serving with the battle fleet; and limitation of submarines.
''CAB 30/3: 2nd Plenary Session, November 15, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, 96-104.
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France desired a return to her pre-war position as third
naval power, and her unwillingness to accept Hughes'
decision to base future allocations on current strength
levels would nearly wreck the Conference. In the words of
the British naval attache in Paris, France "quite agrees to
everyone else reducing their navy but do not think it should
I 78apply to them." Moreover, she saw submarines as an
inexpensive, efficient means of coastal defense, a position
that greatly bothered Britain. Italy simply desired naval
equality with France. Japan strongly desired multi-lateral
naval limitation, but believed her national interests
required, and her present strength justified, a ratio of 70%
of the Anglo-American fleets, rather than the 60% that
Hughes proposed. As neither the French nor the Japanese
showed any immediate desire to accept the proposals of the
United States, the B.E.D. initially spent much of its time
analyzing the issues of submarines, capital ship
replacement, and cruiser allocation.
The B.E.D. held its second formal session on the
afternoon of November 15th. After settling details of
procedure regarding meetings and the press, the delegates
discussed the proposals by Secretary Hughes. Responding to
a comment from Australian delegate Senator George Pearce on
the importance of cruisers "over and above the ships
^^ADM 116/2150: Alexander Ramsay to Admiralty, December
21, 1921.
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required as complementary to the battle fleet," Beatty
explained that "the Naval Staff had carefully considered the
essential need of stationing cruisers and auxiliary vessels
abroad for the protection of Imperial communications." it
was essential, from the Navy's viewpoint, that the B.E.D.
"insist on a ^ration' of auxiliary vessels over and above
those required for the main fleets. "^^ gg^tty's comments
received general concurrence. The Canadian representative.
Sir Robert Borden, then inquired as to the feasibility of
modifying the proposed ten year holiday into a five year
holiday. Beatty fended him off by stating that he was
waiting for information from London, but that he thought "in
the course of detailed expert examination the disadvantages
of the American proposal would become obvious."^'' The B.E.D.
finished their meeting with a discussion of how to limit the
submarine. Beatty made the point that limiting a certain
class of vessel by size, according to national advantage,
might lead to a competition in terms of alternative
proposals for reduction and that total abolition might be
easier to defend. *
'CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 2nd Conference, November 15, 1921.
The BNSW separately recommended criticism of the
spasmodic building that would result at the end of a naval
holiday, together with an invitation to the Americans to
draft new proposals. See ADM 116/2149: Note to First Sea
Lord for Technical Committee, November 15, 1921.
^*CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 2nd Conference, November 15, 1921.
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Later that evening, the B.E.D. received guidance from
the Prime Minister. Lloyd George stated that the C.I.D had
considered the Hughes proposals the day before (November
14th), and that the Cabinet had reviewed the C.I.D.
conclusions, which were being relayed separately, that
morning (November 15th). He firmly rejected Beatty's call
for a slow and steady approach to naval construction: "The
sovereign virtue of the naval holiday consists in the fact
that there will for ten years be a complete cessation of
capital shipbuilding."^^ Using the Admiralty's claim that
Jutland had given rise to a new standard of capital ship
against them, the Prime Minister noted that a construction
freeze would prevent the "existing fleets" from being
"rendered obsolete by the appearance of superior capital
vessels." Furthermore, he claimed, such an advantage "far
outweighs the convenience of keeping armament plants in
moderate activity by spreading replacements slowly over the
ten years' holiday period." Lloyd George valued the naval
holiday so highly as to assert that it "also outweighs the
inconvenience of having to make a sudden expansion of
shipbuilding plants at the end of the period." He then
opined that he would rather "keep the necessary plant in
existence by subsidies than mar the effect to world peace of
Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
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the ten years' holiday by building new battleships."^^ The
Prime Minister concluded the first portion of his telegram
with a blunt warning to his First Sea Lord: "We should
regret our country taking the lead in such a proposal [the
slow, steady construction alternative]."^*
Lloyd George then addressed the consequences in light
of "possible building of submarines and aircraft." He
noted
:
Britain and the United States will be committed to
powerful, costly, but obsolescent fleets of
battleships almost all of pre-Jutland design.
These battleships will run much greater risks even
from existing submarines than would the new ships
which were projected.
The Prime Minister then observed that the Hughes plan would
restrict the development of capital ships, while "submarine
development in numbers may still be considerable and in
design unlimited." Nor did he think that the implementation
of the Beatty plan would improve the situation, since "the
bulk of the ships constituting the British and American
Both the BNSW and the Board of Trade desired to
maintain a large ship-building capacity in the private
sector in order to retain the element of competition. See
ADM 116/2149: Naval Holiday and Arms Subsidies, November 14,
1921; Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 484-85.
^^Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
'^Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
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lines of battle would still remain at a disadvantage
compared to the constantly improving submarines." Lloyd
George therefore recommended that "acceptance of the
American proposal ... carry with it the most rigorous
restriction of submarine construction, if not indeed their
complete abolition." The Prime Minister conceded the
impossibility of regulating developments in air power
because of the close relationship between civil and military
aviation.
In this cable from London, Lloyd George displayed once
again his lack of faith in the battleship. His description
of capital ships as both "powerful" and "costly" hearkened
to the Fisher era, when such vessels were regarded almost as
a strategic panacea. His use of the word "obsolete" to
describe the proud squadrons that had accepted the surrender
of the High Seas Fleet, however, revealed the shift in naval
defense paradigm that marked the thinking of the British
Cabinet. In 1919, Lloyd George had convinced Bonar Law that
spending money on the construction of battleships would be
"a big mistake." After launching an investigation into the
Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
97Clark Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and
Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York, 1974), 402-35.
David Lloyd George, as recorded in Riddell, Intimate
Diary , 255.
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future role of the capital ship, the Prime Minister had
insisted that "it was very necessary to obtain the views of
men who favoured the Uittle ship'."^^ November 1921, he
had highlighted the vulnerability of capital ships to
submarines. Lloyd George believed that the development of
capital ships would inevitably fall further behind advances
in submarine and aerial technologies. He curtly dismissed
the future of existing battleships, which ran "much greater
risks" from submarines.''^
The Prime Minister's assessment, while probably
exaggerating the vulnerability of the capital ship to the
submarine, nonetheless reflected the inability of capital
ships to protect shipping from submarine attack. After all,
at the height of the German submarine campaign in 1917, the
First Sea Lord had informed him:
We are absolute masters of the situation as far as
surface ships are concerned, but it must be
realized. .. that this is all quite useless if the
enemy's submarines paralyse, as they do now, our
lines of communications.
Lloyd George recognized quite rightly that while new
construction techniques might reduce the vulnerability of
capital ships, command of the sea's surface was not
"'CAB 2/3: C.I.D. Minute 135, December 23, 1920.
'^Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 475-76.
"Admiral Jellicoe, as recorded in Patterson, Jel licoe
Papers , Vol II, 160-62.
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sufficient to enable Britain to conduct the sea-borne trade
necessary for her survival. This concern for the security
of Britain's international commerce also appeared in the
considerations of the C.I.D., which followed within a day.
The C.I.D. provided the B.E.D. four primary
conclusions. First, the committee supported "the limitation
of the number of capital ships." The C.I.D. skirted the
issue of "the ten years' holiday" versus "a slow and
continuous replacement policy" as "a matter for the Cabinet
to decide." Second, the defense advisory panel exhorted the
B.E.D. "to minimize the activities of submarines, if not
secure their total abolition." Third, the C.I.D. recognized
that the Washington powers had to be concerned with the
naval developments of "non-signatory Powers" (i.e., Germany
and Russia)
.
Fourth, the committee voiced concern over any
limitation of Britain's cruiser strength. The C.I.D. wrote:
The number of British cruisers must be based not
upon the number of cruisers maintained by other
Powers but upon the length and variety of sea
communications over which food and other vital
supplies for the United Kingdom must be
transported.
This final reservation concerning the Britain's need for
additional cruisers reinforced earlier analysis by the naval
staff of the B.E.D.'^
^^Marquess Curzon to Sir Auckland Geddes, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 476-77.
"See p. 335 above.
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The early communications between the B.E.D. and the
Cabinet established a pattern that later events seldom
disturbed. Both sides agreed to accept capital ship
limitation, to limit submarines insofar as possible, and to
seek an extra allowance of cruisers beyond those needed for
duty with the fleet. The major dispute within the British
government concerned the wisdom of the naval holiday. The
Cabinet, lacking naval representation, opposed any
expenditure of funds on a technology distrusted by many,
including the Prime Minister. The B.E.D. and the Admiralty
opposed the holiday for several reasons. First, they
worried about its effect on the ship-building industry and
unemployment. After polling the major naval arms
manufacturers, the Admiralty endorsed a continuous program
of two ships every three years as the most effective means
of reducing subsidies and unemployment.'^ Second, both the
B.E.D. and the Admiralty were concerned with the
difficulties of meeting the replacement schedule, which
called for Britain to lay down fourteen ships between 1932
and 1934. The First Sea Lord explained to the rest of the
delegation that "it was impossible even at present to build
AC
fourteen ships simultaneously." Third, capital ship
'^ADM 1/8615/206: Admiralty telegram, November 15, 1921.
^'CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 3rd Conference, November 16, 1921.
At the naval subcommittee meeting that day, the United
States recognized that other nations might have difficulty
maintaining armament plants. See ADM 116/2149: Note to
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supporters feared that a naval holiday would preclude
improvements in the capital ship and soon "the position of
the capital ship will have depreciated enormously in
comparison with new submarines and aircraft."'^
On November 17th, Balfour cabled the views of the
B.E.D. on the naval holiday to the Foreign Secretary. The
Lord President acknowledged the popular support evoked by
the holiday, but emphasized the need "to examine the dangers
involved in it and not to imperil the security of the
British Empire. "^^ He indicated that the American Navy was
having second thoughts about the implications of their own
proposals, and that Japan, France, and Italy would raise
separate objections. Balfour made two observations on the
Prime Minister's reference to government subsidy of armament
firms: first, that costs would be high and future ministries
might not be able to sustain such a course; and second, that
other countries might nationalize their naval construction
plant and thus maintain a superior ability to produce
warships. He noted the holiday would probably produce
"periodic and violent spells of armament activity at immense
First Sea Lord for Balfour's Committee, November 16, 1921.
^^ADM 116/1776: Admiralty Memorandum, "United States
Proposals for the Reduction of Armaments", November 21,
1921.
^^Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 480-81.
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cost." The Lord President then suggested that if the
holiday were to eventuate, it should be extended to "all
other combat craft as well as to capital ships" in order to
prevent the Americans and Japanese from improving their
positions with regard to auxiliary craft. Balfour also
rebutted the notion that a slow and steady building program
would not improve the survivability of capital ships against
air and submarine attacks. He assured the Cabinet that his
naval experts had been instructed to avoid making premature
commitments with regard to the proposed naval holiday.''
This telegram from Balfour clearly indicated that opposition
to the ten years' holiday was not limited to crusty admirals
whose visions extended only as far as the view from the
bridges of their battleships.
In a separate telegram that night, Balfour gave the
Cabinet a general review of the progress of the Conference.
He explained the division of the Conference into two main
branches: one dealing with China and the Pacific, and the
other with naval limitation. He also described the
establishment of a technical subcommittee of naval experts.
The BNSW originated the idea on November 16th. See
ADM 116/2149: Note to First Sea Lord for Balfour's
Committee, November 16, 1921. When Beatty proposed it to
the B.E.D., they concurred. See CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 4th
Conference, November 17th, 1921.
^^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 480-81.
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Balfour concluded by explaining that the involved nature of
committee work on the American proposals "renders difficult
any forecast at the present time."-°^ He correctly assessed
the obstacles in the way of any naval agreement.
The following afternoon, Balfour and Beatty met with
Hughes in an attempt to resolve the capital ship question.
The immediate issue concerned the advisability of permitting
the technical subcommittee to discuss capital ship ratios
for France and Italy. The British delegates explained their
position that the size of the Royal Navy "cannot be
considered without relation to possible French and Italian
navies." Hughes agreed, but pointed out that Japan's
consent to the 5:5:3 ratio was the sine qua non of a lasting
agreement and should be secured before "embarking on any
subsidiary problems."*^* The three agreed that Hughes and
Balfour would discuss the relative strength of the three
major powers with Baron Kato. Hughes recognized that while
Britain had agreed to a naval strength relative to that of
America and Japan, the absolute strength of the Royal Navy
was "subject to satisfactory arrangements being reached in
regard to numbers of French and Italian capital ships."
Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 482-83.
•'^'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 486.
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Finally, the Anglo-American delegates decided to move very
cautiously with regard to the proceedings of the technical
subcommittee—in effect, reserving the crucial decisions at
the diplomatic level. Balfour subsequently reported the
contents of the meeting to the Foreign Secretary . -"^^
On November 18th, Balfour met with Hughes and Baron
Tomosaburo Kato. The chief delegate from Japan, who also
attended the naval subcommittee, stated his dissatisfaction
with Hughes' proposal that Japan accept 60% of the capital
ship strength of the Atlantic powers and demanded an
'03increase.' Hughes explained that his plan reflected
existing strengths rather than national requirements, which
could be subject to "endless and inconclusive discussion."*''*
He then stated that according to his experts, Japan was
entitled to only 50% of the Anglo-American strength.
Balfour declared his support for the American approach,
despite his opinion that "the British Empire stood more in
need of battleships than the United States." Kato, tacitly
Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 486.
The B.E.D. had known for three days Japan desired a
capital ship ratio of 10-10-7, together with a strength in
aircraft carriers equal to the United States and Britain,
and that Japan was not prepared to scrap either the Mutsu or
the Aki . See CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 3rd Conference, November 16,
1921.
''^^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 489.
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accepting Hughes' methodology, then expressed his desire to
check the accuracy of the American calculations. The
meeting ended on a cordial note.*^^
That same day, Kankey met with Sadao Saburi
, the
Secretary-General of the Japanese delegation, to discuss the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Balfour had wanted to cover the
Alliance with his counterpart. Baron Kijuro Shidehara, but
the latter's illness had prevented a meeting. The Lord
President thus authorized Hankey to discuss the issue with
Saburi, who indicated Japan's willingness to transform the
Alliance into a tripartite arrangement. Hankey explained
the American concern to avoid security commitments and
delivered numerous documents outlining the British
position.* The timing of these meetings reinforced the
relationship between any future naval limitation agreement
and the ultimate disposition of the Alliance.
Diplomatic talks thus proceeded in parallel with naval
discussions. On November 23rd, the Lord President provided
Baron Kato--Shidehara had not yet recovered--copies of the
Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 489.
''''Hankey to Balfour, in Enclosure 1, Arthur Balfour to
Marquess Curzon, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents
on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 505-09.
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draft tripartite agreement given to Hughes.*'^' Shidehara
then modified the proposal into a purely consultive pact.
After receiving Shidehara' s scheme on the morning of
November 26th, Balfour discussed it with Root and Lodge that
afternoon. The Americans were inclined to accept but
suggested that the arrangement be modified to include
C3France.
^
By this time, each of the three major naval
powers had proposed slightly different versions of a multi-
lateral agreement designed to replace the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance, the latest (American) version requiring the
participation of France, as yet unaware of the negotiations.
The Japanese naval section, meanwhile, continued to
oppose the capital strength ratio of 5:5:3. They pressed
for a definition of existing strength, explained by their
American counterparts as post-dreadnought ships with keels
laid, by percentage complete. The Japanese were not
satisfied with the American decision to include ships under
construction (i.e., not yet prepared to fight). Vice-
Admiral Hiroharu Kato's naval section disputed the figures
provided by the United States Navy, with regard to
compl eteness and to the exclusion of pre-dreadnought ships
.
Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 505-08.
*^^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 512-13.
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The American delegation gave some ground and raised their
calculation of Japan's existing strength from 49% to about
58% of the U.S. Navy, but refused to agree to Japan's
desired 70% ratio.
The B.E.D. considered the discussions between Japan and
the United States on the afternoon of November 28th.
Chatfield briefed the delegates on the latest developments
in naval arms limitation. American naval authorities, after
a careful refutation of Japanese objections, thought that
Japan might accept the Hughes proposals. The admiral
anticipated being asked at the next subcommittee meeting to
evaluate the 5:5:3 ratio. He intended to answer that the
proposal seemed reasonable from "a world-wide point of view'*
and that Japan "could accept the 5:5:3 ratio safely and
remain as strong as any of the Western Powers would be in
the Pacific Ocean. ""'^ Chatfield then turned to the latest
sticking point between the United States and Japan, the fate
of the Mutsu . The Japanese, who claimed the battleship was
fully complete and practically in commission, certainly
wanted to retain their newest capital ship. The Americans,
Chatfield estimated, would want to keep as compensation two
-^'ADM 1/8615/207: BNSW Memorandum S-2, November 24,
1921.
"'CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 8th Conference, November 28, 1921.
This presentation reflected views expressed in a paper that
Chatfield wrote the previous day. See ADM 116/2149:
B.N.S.W. Memorandum, "The 5-5-3 Ratio", November 27, 1921.
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more battleships of the Maryland class, each almost 90%
finished, thus retaining a 3:2 advantage in post- Jutland
capital ships completed. Britain would probably receive
authority "to design and build two new capital ships of
35,000 tons."^" The three major naval powers were thus on
the verge of a naval limitation agreement. Balfour sent
Curzon a telegram which apprised the Cabinet of the
situation on November 30th.
Balfour called on Baron Tomosaburo Kato, the chief
delegate from Japan, early the afternoon of December 1st to
discuss naval limitation. Kato explained that he was
personally convinced of the need for naval limitation, but
that he needed some assistance in order to portray
concession of the 60% ratio of capital ships to Japanese
public opinion as something other than capitulation.*'^ The
Japanese delegate explained to Balfour that his naval
advisors still believed Japan was entitled to a ratio of 70%
based on the American f ormul a of existing strength . Bal f our
***CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 8th Conference, November 28, 1921.
This presentation reflected views expressed in a paper that
Chatfield wrote the previous day. See ADM 116/2149:
B.N.S.W. Memorandum, "The 5-5-3 Ratio", November 27, 1921.
Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 524.
"Japanese naval historian Hiroyuki Agawa, in The
Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Japanese Navy ,
notes that Kato felt obliged to accept naval limitation due
to the rising cost of the Japanese battlefleet, which in
1921 absorbed one-third of the national budget.
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noted that if Japanese recalcitrance caused the Conference
to fail, the United States would surely embark on a large
program of capital ship construction that would worsen
Japan's strategic position. Kato then discussed the
strategic position in the Pacific and suggested that
"Japan's objections would be removed if America would
undertake to observe the status quo as regards
fortifications in the Pacific," mentioning Manila, Guam, and
Hawaii by name. Balfour immediately pointed out that "there
was a distinct difference between Manila and Guam, which are
respectively within 1,318 and 1,360 miles of Japan, and
Hawaii, which is 3,374 miles distant." Kato conceded the
point and then emphasized the political difficulty of
scrapping the battleship Mutsu
, paid for by the savings of
Japanese schoolchildren and already serving with the fleet.
Balf our then obtained Kato's permission to share his views
with Hughes -'"^ At no point in the conversation had either
delegate referred to the development of Singapore.
Balfour facilitated the unraveling of the tangled skein
of security issues. Armed with Kato's concessions to
Hughes' proposal, the Lord President called upon the
Secretary of State. After Balfour recounted his
conversation with Kato, Hughes noted that allowing Japan to
retain the Mutsu "would make a bad hole in the American
**^CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 10th Conference, Appendix I,
December 2, 1921.
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proposal" and that America also had several ships close to
completion, to which Balfour agreed. Hughes then suggested
a new arrangement whereby:
America and Japan should reciprocally agree thatif either one or the other were to desire to erectfortifications in the Pacific, the opposite party
should be notified, and should then have the right
to terminate the whole of the naval agreement.
Balfour gently dismissed the Secretary's counter-proposal as
introducing "a certain element of instability" and induced
him to carry the Japanese proposal to President Harding."'
The Lord President then sent a report of his discussions to
the Foreign Secretary."^
Balfour then received London's comments on his report
dealing with the deadlock between America and Japan. The
Prime Minister related the C.I.D.'s conclusions. First,
Britain should accept Japanese retention of the Mutsu , with
the United States and Britain each being allowed two new
vessels in compensation, as the British fleet would gain the
greatest relative strength and the new construction would
reduce unemployment on the Clyde and Tyne. Second, despite
Admiralty objections, Britain should accept the naval
holiday with regard to capital ships. Lloyd George here
again demonstrated his loss of faith in the capital ship:
CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 10th Conference, Appendix II,
December 2, 1921.
"'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 529-30.
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We cannot exclude from our minds the possibilitythat in ten years time the march of science inaviation, m submarines, torpedoes, shells and
explosives may render it impossible to construct
an inexpugnable capital ship especially within thetonnage limit governing replacements.
Third, Britain would not necessarily replace capital ships
as fast as the Hughes plan allowed, when minor delays would
allow far more economical construction by obviating the need
for retaining excessive construction capacity. The C.I.D.
also agreed that Britain should press for the abolition of
submarines and, if frustrated, retain "entire freedom in
building anti-submarine craft.""'
With these instructions, Balfour met with Kato and
Hughes on December 2nd. Kato repeated at greater length his
presentation of the previous afternoon, with the distinction
that Japan desired the status quo with regard to bases as
well as fortifications. Hughes replied in great detail. He
linked American acceptance of the status quo in the Pacific
to Japanese acceptance of both the capital ship agreement of
15:15:9 (end state) and a four power treaty in the Pacific
to replace the Angl o- Japanese Alliance. Hughes further made
clear that America could not accept any limitation of the
development of Hawaii, which he described as too far from
Japan to serve as an offensive base. Balfour reiterated his
advocacy of the capital ship agreement "on the grounds of
"Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 526-28.
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general policy." He supported Japan's proposal to maintain
the status quo in the Pacific as reasonable and opined the
effect of those two proposals together with the quadruple
Pacific arrangement would be to ensure the safety of Japan.
The meeting ended cordially, Kato reserving acceptance
pending word from Tokyo.
The following day, Balfour dispatched a pair of
telegrams to Curzon. The first one reported the State
Department meeting with Hughes and Kato. The second one
related a brief conversation at the end of the meeting
between Hughes and Kato concerning the proposed four power
treaty intended to replace the Angl o- Japanese Alliance.
Kato had explained that he was waiting on instructions from
his government, but that the Japanese delegation to the
Conference accepted the quadruple arrangement and that he
saw no reason to believe he would receive instructions to
the contrary. They had discussed approaching French
delegate Rene Viviani, whom Hughes described as quite
sensitive at the relatively minor role thus far allowed to
France. Balfour also sought confirmation of his authority
to accept the proposed four power treaty.
Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 533-34.
"'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 535.
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On the afternoon of December 7th, the B.E.D. met for
the eleventh time. Balfour informed the delegation that he
had received from Hughes a draft agreement regarding the
Pacific. He described the quadruple treaty, involving the
United States, Britain, Japan, and France, as closely
resembling the British proposals. He had a meeting
scheduled with Hughes and Kato, and, if the latter agreed,
Hughes would ask France to associate. After minor revision,
the B.E.D. accepted the draft four power treaty.*^-
That night, the Foreign Secretary sent guidance to the
B.E.D. regarding the four power arrangement for the Pacific.
Curzon welcomed the enlargement of the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance to include IVmerica. He noted that Britain had
"always contemplated a tripartite arrangement with the
United States."** He took a less positive view, however,
toward other participants. The Foreign Secretary predicted
"the admission of France, although tolerable if required to
secure the adhesion of America, will probably seriously
diminish the value of the proposed substitute for alliance
in Japanese eyes." Curzon flatly opposed including Italy,
who had "no substantial interests in the Far East and whose
inclusion, in the Foreign Secretary's opinion, "would in all
* CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 11th Conference, Appendix, December
7, 1921.
'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 539-40.
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probability lead to similar and embarrassing requests" by
other small powers."^
The following day, December 8th, Admiral Chatfield
received a visit from a Japanese naval officer, Katsunoshin
Yamanashi."- Yamanashi
, at the behest of Japan's senior
naval representative. Vice Admiral Hiroharu Kato, wanted to
discuss matters concerned with Pacific security. He
suggested that Japan would accept the status quo with regard
to bases and fortifications if the United States did so at
Manila, Guam, and Hawaii, whereupon Chatfield told him, as
Hughes had told Kato, that the United States might agree to
Manila and Guam, but not to Hawaii, which was at least 3,000
miles from Japan. Yamanashi then asked about Singapore and
Hong Kong, probably the real reason for the visit.
Chatfield told him Britain would probably agree to leave
Hong Kong as it was, but not Singapore. Yamanashi seemed
satisfied with this, and suggested that the delegates could
move quickl y if the admi ral s agreed
.
Two days 1 ater
,
Secretary Hughes convened the 4th
Plenary Session of the Conference on the Limitation of
Armament. He then yielded the floor to Senator Henry Cabot
Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 539-40.
'^"Chatfield refers to him as a captain, while the
conference record lists him as a rear admiral.
^^'ADM 116/2149: Chatfield Note, December 8, 1921.
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Lodge, who read to the assembled delegates the text of the
Four Power Treaty between the United States, Britain,
France, and Japan. The first clause called for the
signatories, in the case of controversy among themselves, to
"invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint
conference." The second clause required the participants to
"communicate with each other fully and frankly" in the case
of outside aggression. The third clause defined the life of
the treaty as ten years and thereafter until one year beyond
denunciation by one of the contracting parties. The final
clause established that ratification of the treaty by all
parties would terminate the Angl o- Japanese Alliance.
Balfour rose to deliver a eulogy to the Angl o- Japanese
Alliance. He noted that the Alliance, which he had
concluded originally in 1902, had "been the cause of much
searching of heart, of some suspicions, of a good deal of
animadversion in important sections of opinion in the United
States." Balfour acknowledged that 2^merican opinion could
rightly point out that the original conditions that had
given rise to the agreement no longer endured, but then
asked that same opinion to recognize that the ties forged
CAB 30/3: 4th Plenary Session, December 10, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament , 146-180.
-^^CAB 30/3: 4th Plenary Session, December 10, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, 146-180.
between Britain and Japan had "stood the strain of common
sacrifices, common anxieties, common efforts, common
triumphs" through two wars. He explained that Britain,
faced with the choice of offending America by retaining the
Alliance and offending Japan by denouncing it, had long
desired to replace the existing treaty with one "which
should embrace all the Powers concerned in the vast area of
the Pacific." Balfour concluded by manifesting his hope
that the Four Power Treaty would facilitate a naval arms
agreement
.
That same day, Balfour received a pointed cable from
Curzon asking for information concerning the status of the
ten years' holiday. The Foreign Secretary claimed that the
Cabinet was concerned about American press reports "to the
effect Hhat the British naval experts have pointed out to
the American naval experts that the scheme as announced by
Mr, Hughes, however well meant, will not work in
practice.'"*" He further declared that the Cabinet had
received little information about developments at the
-^'CAB 30/3: 4th Plenary Session, December 10, 1921.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament , 146-180.
'^^arquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 544-45.
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Conference beyond a letter from Hankey.*^^ Curzon flatly
stated
:
The ten years' absolute naval holiday in capital
ship construction originally proposed by the
United States ought to be accepted definitely as
the policy to which Great Britain will subscribe.
He then criticized the notion of British naval experts
helping out their American counterparts, an action that he
described as "a gratuitous and even a wanton task." Curzon
went so far as to suggest that "admirals on both sides" were
pursuing a joint game to frustrate the desires of their
"governments and peoples."*^'
The Foreign Secretary was careful to explain, however,
that the naval holiday did not extend to "cruisers and small
craft."--- He stated that "the purely naval interests of
Great Britain" would be satisfied by "a ten years' absolute
naval holiday in capital ship construction" and either
-'That statement appears very curious in light of
Balfour's frequent cables to Curzon. The Lord President
first raised the subject on November 17th and on the 28th
had provided a significant analysis of both the Mutsu
arrangements and the "exceptional difficulties" of
implementing the ten years' holiday. Balfour had at that
time written to the Cabinet that the "Americans admit
mistake of launching the idea before realizing
impracticability." Roskill, Hankey , Vol II, 253, notes that
Churchill originally drafted the telegram and probably
supplied the bombastic tone.
-^'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 544-45.
-"-Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 544-45.
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"perfect freedom in the construction of smaller craft" or
"the abolition of submarines plus a limited construction of
smaller craft." Curzon concluded by suggesting the House
would not be pleased if the B.E.D failed to secure a naval
' 32holiday.* These instructions from London once again
indicated a greater concern for anti-submarine capability
than for battleships.
The Cabinet cable elicited a double response. First,
Beatty submitted a note denying the charge of
insubordination. He wrote:
I have read Telegram No. 101 to Mr. Balfour with
the utmost amazement, and I desire to place on
record that there is no foundation in fact for the
statements therein made, that the British Naval
experts are working in collusion with the United
States Naval experts to frustra|:e the views of the
Governments of both countries.
Two days later, Balfour sent Curzon a telegram with greater
explanatory value. He stated that on the evening following
Hughes' proposals, Lord Lee had dined with the Secretary of
the Navy, who "had already realised holes in 10 years'
holiday and was much disturbed by discovery," while the
Cabinet's views had not reached the B.E.D. In that
Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 544-45.
-"adM 116/1176: Beatty Note, December 10, 1921.
•^^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 552.
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circumstance, Balfour judged, discussions were inevitable,
and he had in fact approved of them. He refrained from
pointing out the obvious falsehood of the charge of failing
to keep London informed. On November 17th and 28th, he had
submitted detailed analyses of the naval holiday to the
Foreign Secretary. In the latter telegram, Balfour pointed
out the ludicrous situation that would come to pass under
the Hughes plan, whereby the three major powers would have
to begin constructing 27 capital ships within a two year
period.-" The Lord President refused to endorse the naval
holiday. He claimed that "refusal of Japanese to surrender
Mutsu.
. .destroys 10 year holiday at least in its original
form.""' From that point forward, however, Balfour no
longer attempted to sway the Cabinet to oppose the naval
building holiday.
On the afternoon of December 12th, the Committee on
Limitation of Armament met briefly. The delegates modified
the naval subcommittee to include the heads of delegations
"'CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 8th Conference, November 28, 1921.
Also recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on British
Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 519-21. In a separate
paper to the Cabinet, the Admiralty argued the difficulties
of expanding Britain's naval building capacity after a long
dormant period. Capital outlay for armor plate plant would
cost some £30 millions, with annual subsidies for slips,
plate, and gun mountings running to £5-6 millions per year.
See ADM 116/1776: Admiralty Memorandum, "American proposals
for the Limitation of Naval Armaments", November 30, 1921.
"^^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 552.
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as well as both a civilian and a naval expert. In practice,
that meant the head of delegation plus his naval minister
and senior admiral. The new group was called the
Subcommittee of Fifteen on Naval Limitation.*'^
The new arrangement served to allow the naval experts to
modify Hughes' proposals for capital ship retention and
scrapping in order to accommodate Japan's desire to retain
the Mutsu while preserving the 5:5:3 ratio.
Theodore Roosevelt, the American naval expert,
developed a naval limitation proposal that would enable
Japan to retain the Mutsu. The three major naval powers
would agree to the 5:5:3 ratio for capital ships while
maintaining the status quo in the Pacific with regard to
fortifications and bases. In order to retain the Mutsu
,
Japan would agree to scrap the Settsu , thus retaining 10 (2
post- Jutland) capital ships of 313,300 tons. The exchange
would increase the total displacement of Japan's fleet by
13,600 tons. In compensation, the United States would
receive permission to complete two ships of the 1916
Program, Col orado and Washington , and scrap the older North
Dakota and Del aware . America would thus retain 18 (3 post-
Jutland) ships of 525,850 tons, increasing her total capital
ship tonnage by 25,200 tons. Britain in turn would be
"'CAB 30/9: 3rd Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 12, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation o f Armament, 442-
444.
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allowed to construct two new vessels of 35,000 tons and then
to scrap 4 ships of King Georas V type: Ajax
. Centurion
.
and King Georas V. Britain would then possess 20 (3
post-Jutland) ships of 578,050 tons, a reduction in her
fleet displacement of 26,400 tons. This proposal would
increase the end state tonnages authorized to 525,000 tons
for the British and American fleets and 315,000 for Japan
and, with Mutsu arrangements excepted, maintain the ten
years' naval holiday. The entire proposal was contingent
upon successful incorporation of France and Italy.
The B.E.D. did not immediately agree to Roosevelt's
proposal, as British naval experts sought a displacement
larger than the 35,000 ton standard for their two
compensatory ships. Capital ship design, for any given
size, involves trade-offs between hitting power, armor
protection, speed, and range. Increased displacement allows
improved performance in any of the above qualities (larger
vessels, surprisingly, move through the water more
efficiently). British designers traditionally chose
relatively large ships in order to obtain the offensive
power and the range necessary for their naval doctrine. The
Hood , for example, exceeded 41,000 tons, while the newest
American battleships displaced only 32,600 tons each. Given
the need to protect capital ships against the airplane and
"'ADM 1/8615/207: BNSW Memorandum S-9, December 21,
1921.
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the submarine in the relatively enclosed waters of the
Mediterranean and the North Sea, the Admiralty chose a
displacement of 45,000 tons for Britain's newest capital
ships. On November 21st, in response to a query by Beatty,
the Controller had opposed the 35,000 ton limit on capital
ships and stated that 45,000 tons "is considered minimum to
meet satisfactorily attacks from existing guns, torpedoes
and aircraft, and to embody adequate speed and radius of
action for British Empire needs." On December 7th, the
Admiralty informed the BNSW that ships of 35,000 tons, with
adequate protection against torpedoes mounting 750-lb
warheads, could carry only nine 15-inch guns, rather than
the 16-inch guns specified in the 45,000 ton designs.*^' On
December 13th, Balfour therefore argued to Hughes and Kato
that Britain should receive permission to build two
battleships of 45,000 tons, on which much money, time, and
labor had been expended, while scrapping four ships of the
King George V class. Kato agree, but Hughes demurred. They
adjourned to consult their naval advisors.
The following day, Balfour, Hughes, and Kato met again
to discuss compensation for the Mutsu. Balfour reiterated
his arguments of the day before, emphasizing that within the
'•^'ADM 1/8615/207: Admiralty telegram, December 7, 1921.
-•^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 556.
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classes being scrapped, British ships were both heavier and
newer. In the newer classes, however, advantage rested with
the American vessels. The three leaders agreed that if
Britain were to build two ships comparable to the Hood
, she
would have to scrap a battle cruiser in addition to the four
King George Vs. Britain would retain an advantage of 50,000
tons (575,000 versus 525,000) to compensate for the age of
her pre-Jutland ships. Discussion then focused on the
impact of the super-Hoods on the replacement schedule. The
extra displacement of those vessels would force Britain to
choose between new capital ships of less than 35,000 tons
displacement or maintaining only fourteen full size vessels.
Hughes then repeated Roosevelt's original proposal, whereby
Britain would retain a similar advantage of 53,000 tons
(578,000 to 525,000). The three men then took a brief
recess to consider the two alternatives in conjunction with
their naval experts. Lee and Chatfield suggested that the
matter should be referred to London.*'*
Balfour raised a new issue upon resumption of the
discussion. On Chatfield's urging, he brought to the
attention of the American and Japanese delegates the
difference between British and American methods of
determining displacement. American displacement figures
-'•'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 558-59.
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included fuel oil and water, while British legend tonnage
did not.--^ Thus the British figures represented a slightly
larger vessel (35,000 legend tons equals 37,000 tons by the
American standard). Balfour explained the additional weight
would enable designers to provide additional protection
against air and sea menaces and that British experts
considered the difference essential to the construction of
the properly balanced ship.*-" This line of argument
impressed neither Hughes nor Kato. The meeting thus ended
without resul t
.
On the morning of December 15, Balfour amplified his
argument about the importance of the difference in tonnage
calculations. Hughes accepted the British position, and
then appealed to Balfour to forego the super-Hoods as
violating the spirit of the limitation agreement. Balfour
accepted the standard size limit of 35,000 tons (now 37,000
tons ) for Britain 's compensatory ships . Chatf ield,
however, remained dissatisfied and continued to press his
• Ernie Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (London,
1947), 5.
-*^ADM 116/2129: BNSW Memorandum, "Naval Staff Coxznter
to Mutsu", December 14, 1921.
'"Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Doc^oments on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 559-60.
'^^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 560-61.
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view that tonnage limitation remained susceptible to
subterfuge and that numbers of capital ships were much more
easily verified. --^ The three major naval powers thus agreed
to Roosevelt's scheme, as modified by the change in tonnage
standard (5:5:3 ratio, capital ship limitation of 35,000
tons, the ten year naval holiday, Mutsu arrangements
excepted, and status quo in the Pacific), conditional upon
the inclusion of France and Italy.
The Conference had its first major indication of the
attitude of France toward arms limitation on November 21st.
Aristide Briand, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
spoke eloquently of the desire in France for peace, a
prospect impaired by "the moral aspect of the problem in
Germany." He quoted extensively from a recent publication
by General Erich Ludendorff, who described war as "a natural
phenomenon" and "the last and only decisive factor in the
settlement of political questions," Briand addressed the
German capacity for rearmament, including factories, war
materials, and seven million trained soldiers. He concluded
by explaining that France requested the Conference to
declare its understanding of French intentions to maintain a
sizeable army.**^ France thus asked the delegates to exclude
land armaments from limitation.
••^ADM 116/2149: Chatfield Memorandum, December 16,
1921.
-^^CAB 30/3: 3rd Plenary Session, November 21, 1921.
That same day, the British Cabinet received two
divergent communications regarding the intentions of France
From Washington, Balfour sent record of an interview in
which Briand expressed the view that the American
participation in the naval conference was motivated
primarily by the Harding Administration's desire for
political gain that would result from tax reductions
following naval disarmament. Briand further declared that
Hughes was ignorant of conditions in Europe and the Far
East. Balfour therefore concluded that Briand had realized
that "France had nothing to hope for from the United States
and that "co-operation with Britain was essential for
France. "'"^
From Paris, however, the British Ambassador had a very
different outlook. Lord Hardinge explained that French
public opinion had viewed the Washington Conference "with a
certain amount of apprehension" as France appeared to lack
prominent position in disarmament discussions.**' The best
France could hope for was a divergence of American and
British interests requiring the services of a mediator.
Balfour's response to the Hughes plan, however, had
Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 489-90.
^^^Lord Hardinge to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 490-93.
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virtually eliminated that possibility. The Hughes plan
itself had caused the greatest unrest. French defense
needs, dictated by a large coastline and overseas colonies,
necessitated a large force of "light cruisers and, above
all, submarines." British attempts to abolish these craft
had been aimed at France, with a view to dominating the
Mediterranean. The Senate Naval Committee had thus
increased the number of submarines authorized over the next
three years from 36 to 60. In Hardinge's opinion, France
would demand authorization to build to the position of third
naval power.*"
The second meeting of the Committee on Limitation of
Armament took place on the morning of November 23rd. In
accordance with guidance from Lloyd George, Balfour raised
the question of the limitation of land armaments."* Briand
replied that France constituted a special case--since the
Conference was unwilling to guarantee assistance, France
would decide her own requirements. He countered by
suggesting subcommittees on aircraft, gases, and the laws of
war. Briand refused to accept any limitation on French
military strength without international guarantees, however.
''"Lord Hardinge to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 490-93.
-•-Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 494.
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and stated that on that subject he "had received a very
explicit mandate" from the French Pari iament
. That
afternoon, the Committee on Program and Procedure with
respect to Limitation of Armament established the
subcommittees suggested by Briand.*^^
On November 24th, the B.E.D. received two related
cables from London. After the C.I.D. considered the French
intentions of resisting any limitation of military and
aerial strength, combined with possible expansion of their
submarine forces, Curzon sent his personal appreciation of
the position to Balfour. The Foreign Secretary predicted:
The situation of this country vis-a-vis France
will become impossible if British Navy is to be
restricted in accordance with the American
proposals while the French army continues on the
scale of at least a hundred divisions together
with overwhelming aviation and the inten|:ion to
build a very large fleet of submarines."'
After describing the French Army as "a serious menace to the
peace and freedom of Europe", he pointed out the degree to
which the Royal Air Force was outnumbered by its French
CAB 30/9: 2nd Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, November 23, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 422-
444.
"^CAB 30/8: 2nd Meeting of the Committee on Program and
Procedure with Respect to Limitation of Armament, November
23, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State Department,
Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 410-416.
"Sdarquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 495-97.
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counterpart. Curzon then noted the decision by the French
Senate to construct 24 additional submarines beyond the 12
already funded. He wrote: "We cannot contemplate a
situation where Great Britain would be in a few years at the
mercy of France if present happy relations were to
deteriorate." The Foreign Secretary urged Balfour to enlist
American assistance to achieve "a general disarmament rather
than disarmament by Britain alone." He concluded by
rejecting a naval arms limitation agreem.ent by the three
major powers without French participation.""'
The Foreign Secretary then sent another cable which
contained the views of the Prime Minister. Lloyd George
took a similar line to that followed by Curzon: he disputed
the French need for a massive army, he worried about the
potential of a French air attack on Britain, and he regarded
growth in the French submarine fleet as "the most serious
matter of all." The Prime Minister stated:
France dominates the sea approaches to the United
Kingdom from the south and could make the English
Channel and the Mediterranean Sea impossible for
British sea-borne trade by the use of her
submarines
.
He noted that in a war with France, Britain would require "a
"'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 495-97.
-•'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 497-500.
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very large force of destroyers and small craft"--in fact, a
much larger force than the American proposals would permit.
Lloyd George then reiterated his bias in favor of smaller
vessels: "The capital ships of Great Britain are becoming
obsolete as regards resisting attack by submarines and air
attack." He urged the abolition of the submarine, and
suggested Balfour adopt "an uncompromising attitude
regarding M. Briand's military and possible air proposals"
as a bargaining chip.*"^
Later that same day, Balfour sent a reply to London
that registered his unhappiness over his recent
instructions. He emphasized -che importance of countering
the "post- Jut 1 and naval programme of the United States. "*^^
While that goal remained possible, according to Balfour,
France was in a position to frustrate its achievement. The
Lord President explained that France was being asked to
accept an extraordinarily subordinate naval position in the
world, and that antagonizing France by opposing the size of
her military forces was an act of folly. He characterized
risking a probable naval arms agreement in an attempt to
secure an improbable military limitation treaty as "not the
"Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 497-500.
-^'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 503-05.
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highest wisdom." Balfour indicated his intention of
attempting the abolition of submarines but admitted little
hope of success."^
On November 25th, the Admiralty provided the Cabinet
with the latest information from France. Captain Alexander
Ramsay, the naval attache in Paris, had reported on November
18th that France intended to claim pride of place as "the
third naval power. ""^ The French would likely request
agreement to build to such a position, although they would
probably not do so. French naval officials thought America
desired submarines as " le moyen de defense de cotes a bon
marche " (inexpensive coastal defense), and did not
understand Britain's lack of desire to have submarines for
colonial defense. Lastly, France wanted compensation for
not having built during the war. Five days later, Ramsay
reported again. This time, he conveyed the French intention
to refuse to accept any limitation of submarine strength
below that of the strongest power. He explained the French
willingness to limit capital ship strength as a means of
reducing the gap between British and French sea power.
Ramsay then cited a work by French Captain Raoul Castex
that, in his opinion, clearly supported the German methods
"'Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 503-05.
"•ADM 116/1776: Admiralty Memorandum, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", November 25, 1921.
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of unrestricted submarine warfare. The French interpreted
British opposition to the submarine as an attack on
themselves. The Admiralty also forwarded Ramsay's
information to the B.E.D., with emphasis on the French
intention to demand a submarine strength equal to that of
the strongest powers .
Early on the morning of November 27th, Lloyd George
answered Balfour's request of the 25th for Cabinet
reconsideration of policy guidance. He explained that the
C . I . D
.
saw "the enormous French armies" as a "menace to
European peace." Lloyd George dismissed "the claim of
France and consequently of Italy to build up to the standard
of the 3rd naval power. "'"' He was far more concerned with
the growth of hostile submarine fleets in European waters.
He suggested allowing the Latin powers to expand their
capital ship strength in exchange for "the virtual abol ition
of the submarines or at least the prevention of new building
of submarines of any kind." If France and Italy refused to
limit their batt lef leets , Lloyd George advised Balfour to
accept a capital ship treaty with America and Japan. If
*^*ADM 116/1776: Admiralty Memorandum, "Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armaments", November 25, 1921.
^^^ADM 1/8615/207: Admiralty telegrams, November 26,
1921.
^^^Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on Bri tish Foreign Policy, 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 513-16.
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they persisted in building submarines, however, then
Britain:
could agree to no limitation upon the smaller
vessels, light cruisers, destroyers, etc. which
would be vital with a deadly submarine menace so
near her doors and... to protect our food supplies
from the submarine menace.
Here, the Prime Minister indicated a willingness to spend
money to prepare against the one naval threat he genuinely
feared
.
'^^
On the morning of December 9th, Balfour talked with
Hughes about the ratio of capital ships to be allocated to
France under the naval limitation proposal. After a meeting
with Viviani and Shidehara to place the finishing touches on
the four power arrangement for Pacific security, the Anglo-
American delegates stayed behind. Balfour informed Hughes
that Viviani had approached the Lord President with
instructions from Paris "to the effect that France was
likely to ask for the same proportion as Japan."*""' Hughes
said he regretted not formally raising the issue with
France , but he bel ieved agreement on the Japanese ratio took
priority. The Secretary of State noted that France
possessed seven modern capital ships displacing about
'Marquess Curzon to Arthur Balfour, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Doc^oments on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 513-16.
-^^Hankey Note, as recorded in Butler and Bury,
Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV,
548.
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170,000 tons, together with some older vessels. He stated
that in his discussions with Viviani and French Ambassador
Jules Jusserand, the French delegates had implied that their
nation would be content with an allocation of about 175,000
tons although she would prefer authorization to build to the
level of the third power. Hughes had suggested that he
thought 175,000 tons was a fair allocation. Balfour, at
that time, refrained from speculating on the effect of the
French demand on the British position, although Hughes had
already acknowledged the linkage.*'"
The agreement of Britain, Japan, and the United States
to accept the 5:5:3 ratio, as modified to include the Mutsu
arrangements, collided with French intransigence. On
December 15th, the Subcommittee of Fifteen met to discuss
American addenda to the original proposals whereby France
and Italy would receive a quota of 175,000 tons of capital
ships. French Admiral F.J. de Bon made the first public
profession of France's position toward capital ship
limitation. He declared that the situation in which France
found herself was "entirely different from that of the three
powers whose ratio had already been settled."*" France, who
*^Siankey Note, as recorded in Butler and Bury,
Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV,
548 .
'•^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 561-62.
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had possessed 28 capital ships in 1914. had lost over
210,000,000 working days which would have been spent on the
fleet. Her current strength of 7 modern ships and 3 older
vessels was "quite insufficient for her great mission in the
world." France could not build now, but could not agree
never to do so. The French required at least ten ships, and
if 35,000 tons were to be the standard, France must be
authorized a capital ship limit of 350,000 tons. As her
holiday began in 1915, she required permission to build in
1925. Italian Senator Carlo Schanzer then briefly
summarized his country's willingness to accept the naval
holiday and a minimal capital ship ratio, subject to
equality with France."^
Hughes had little patience with de Bon. When the
admiral refused to change his position the foil owing day
,
Hughes cabled Briand, then in London en route for France.
The Secretary of State reported the provisional naval
limitation agreement between the United Stares, Britain, and
Japan, based upon the original 5:5:3 proposals as modified
to include the Mutsu arrangements. He explained that the
sett 1 ement was "dependent upon an appropriate agreement with
France and Italy with respect to their capital ships."*"'
"^Arthur Bal f our to Marquess Cur z on , as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 561-62.
*"cAB 30/9: 4th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament , December 22 , 1921
.
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Hughes noted that the three major naval powers had accepted
the situation as it existed, rather than as they desired it
to be. They had scrapped 40% of their capital ship
strength, which, if applied to France, would reduce her navy
to 102,000 tons. He proposed instead to allow an increase
of the present strength of 164,000 tons of capital ships to
an authorization of 175,000 tons. Hughes then declared that
if "France desires a greater relative strength, the obvious
answer is that this would be impossible of attainment." If
there were no cuts, the Secretary noted, the American and
British Navies would outnumber the French by "more than 6-
1." He characterized the suggestion that France build 10
ships of more than 300,000 tons as raising "the greatest
difficulties," in fact precluding any capital ship
agreement. Hughes obliquely referred to American financial
contributions to the French economy before requesting Briand
••70
to reconsider the French position.
The following day, at French request, the naval experts
met in the morning. Admiral de Bon argued against the
American proposal to limit France to 175,000 tons with
respect to capital ships. He complained about the
*^"CAB 30/9: 4th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 22, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 446-
472. Balfour, in his report to the Cabinet, indicated
Hughes was prepared to use "the financial screw." See
Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in Butler and
Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol
XIV, 562.
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artificiality of talking about tonnage limitation, when
every nation would build the largest allowable ships. The
admiral then explained that the current French fleet was
skewed by the experience of the war and repeated his claim
that France needed more than five battleships. Roosevelt
replied that the basis of calculation involved existing
capital ship strength rather than past policy, such as
Britain's Two Power Standard, or building plans, such as
Japan's progress toward a fleet of eight battleships and
eight battle cruisers. Lee interjected that Britain could
not accept a weaker fleet with respect to France. At 3:1
before the war, the current position in capital ships was
20:7, reducing eventually to 15:5 under the Hughes'
proposals. He sympathized, however, with the French desire
to calculate in numbers of ships rather than tonnage. The
meeting ended with no satisfaction for the French.*''^
The same day, Beatty fired his last salvo at the naval
hoi i day • The First Lord had returned to London in late
November to protect the Navy against the predatory advances
of the Geddes Committee.^ He wrote a memorandum to the
***Roosevelt ignored the fact that the British intended
to maintain a two power standard against Japan and France.
^^^ADM 116/2149: Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon,
December 17, 1921.
-'^Roskill, Last Naval Hero , 311-12, notes that Beatty
wrote his mistress that he would be "'more use soothing
Lloyd George and keeping him straight' over the current Navy
Estimates than by remaining in Washington."
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Cabinet comparing the cost of a ten year holiday followed by
mass replacement with a gradual replacement program. In
Beatty's estimation, the ten years' holiday would cost some
£20 millions more than a replacement program. He estimated
that the naval holiday would increase the cost of the
unemployment dole by a further £20 millions. The admiral
argued that the continuous building program would improve
the efficiency of the fleet with regard to personnel and
design. He also declared that capital ships would thus keep
pace with aircraft and submarines. Beatty concluded by
stressing the economic value of a steady building program.*^'
The Cabinet took no apparent notice of his arguments.
"'The following tables of capital ship strength reflect
Beatty '
s
comparison
:
Original Britain United States Japan
1922-25: 22 + 2 - 4 = 20 18 + 2 - 3 = 17 10 = 10
1932-35 20 + 4 - 7 = 17 17 + 4 -- 5 = 16 10 + 2 - 2 = 10
1933-36: 17 + 3 - 4 = 16 16 + 3 - 3 = 16 10 + 2 - 2 = 10
1934-37 16 + 3 - 3 = 16 16 + 3 -- 3 = 16 10 + 2 - 2 = 10
1935-38: 16 + 2 - 3 = 15 16 + 2 -- 3 = 15 10 + 1 - 2 = 9
1936-39 15 + 1 - 1 + 15 15 + 1 -. 1 = 15 9 + 1 - 1 = 9
Modified Britain United States Japan
1922-25- 22 + 2 - 4 = 20 18 + 2 -- 3 = 17
1924-27
:
10 + 1 - 1 = 10
1925-28 20 + 2 - 2 = 20 17 + 2 -- 2 = 17
1927-30 10 + 1 - ]_ = 10
1928-31 * 20 + 1 - 1 = 20 17 + 1 -- 1 = 17
1929-32 • 20 + 1 - 4 = 17 17 + 1 - 3 = 15
1930-33 10 + 1 - 2 = 9
1932-35 •• 17 + 2 - 3 = 16 15 + 2 •- 2 = 15 9 + 1 - 1 = 9
1933-36 •• 16 + 2 - 2 = 16 15 + 2 - 2 = 15 9 + 1 - 1 = 9
1934-37 • 16 + 2 - 3 = 15 15 + 2 •- 2 = 15 9 + 1 - 1 = 9
1935-38 >• 15 + 2 - 2 = 15 15 + 2 - 2 = 15 9 + 1 - 1 = 9
1936-39 • 15 + 1 - 1 = 15 15 + 1 •- 1 = 15 9 + 1 - = 9
*^^ADM 116/2149: Admiralty Memorandum, "Proposals for a
Modified Building Holiday", December 17, 1921.
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On December 18th, the BNSW reviewed the situation
optimistically. They expected the United States to approach
Britain with a request to allow an increase in the French
capital ship authorization to 210,000 tons (six ships).
They believed the Cabinet would accept the adjustment in
order to save the agreement and therefore decided to seek
recompense. In their view, the tonnage method of
calculating capital ship strength was severely flawed and
should be replaced by numbers of ships, a position
apparently shared by the American naval experts.*'' The
substitution of a numbers basis of limitation instead of
aggregate tonnage for capital ships would have the effect of
allowing Britain to build the 48,000 ton ships desired by
the Royal Navy. The meeting ended with the rosy view that
the claim of the naval staff was logical and that "Mr.
Balfour can see it through and enable us to retrieve our
'77
lost position."*
The B.E.D. met for the fourteenth time on Monday
morning, December 19th. Lee raised the issue of submarines,
suggesting that Britain request the opportunity to present
Sprouts, New Order , 188, quotes the American naval
experts as agreeing "that it would be a good thing for
England to make a 'beau-geste' and allow France six
battleships" but deciding to "stand by our original
percentage basis and let suggested modifications come from
some other Power."
-^^ADM 116/2149: BNSW Memorandum, "French Ration of
Capital Ships", December 18, 1921.
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the case for abolition in open session, if possible within
the week. Geddes seconded Lee's proposal, whereupon Balfour
drafted a note to Hughes to that effect. During the
meeting, the B.E.D. learned that the Associated Press was
reporting from Paris that Briand had instructed Albert
Sarrault, his Colonial Minister, to accept the American
naval program."' This information completely undercut the
intention of the BNSW to trade an increase in capital ship
strength for France in return for the substitution of a
numbers basis for naval 1 imitation
.
That afternoon, Balfour met with Hughes to discuss the
submarine question. The Secretary of State informed the
Lord President that he personally supported the abolition of
submarines, but that his naval advisors opposed the idea.
An Advisory Body of the American delegation, according to
Hughes,' regarded the submarine as "the only defensive
instrument which a weak Power with an extensive seaboard
"79
could employ." He further expected that Japan, France,
and Italy would oppose abol i tion , as we 1 1 as nations outside
the Conference. Hughes suggested that rather than extending
the ratio system to submarines he desired to institute a
178CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 14th Conference, December 19, 1921.
-^'CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 15th Conference, Appendix II,
December 20, 1921. Also see Arthur Balfour to Marquess
Curzon, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on British
Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 567-68.
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universal ceiling of about 40,000 tons per nation, but
worried that premature efforts by Britain would appear self-
interested and prevent any limitation, such as a resolution
against misuse. Balfour withheld a general reply, but
observed that the British naval experts "did not regard
submarines as the powerful defensive weapon which popular
fancy painted them."*^-
The B.E.D. met again the next day, December 20th.
Balfour opened the meeting by reporting the results of a
morning session of the Subcommittee of Fifteen. Hughes had
read his December 16th appeal to the French Government to
accept a ratio of 1.75 with respect to the 5:5:3 capital
ship authorizations for America, Britain, and Japan, and the
response from Briand. After claiming that "the
preoccupation of France is not the offensive point of view,
but uniquely defensive," Briand had agreed to instruct his
delegation to cooperate with respect to capital ships but
that such cooperation did not extend to auxiliary craft
(light cruisers, torpedo-boats, and submarines), which
defended the vital interests of France. Hughes had
*^'CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 15th Conference, Appendix II,
December 20, 1921.
"*CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 15th Conference, Appendix I,
December 20, 1921. Also recorded in CAB 30/9: 4th Meeting
of the Committee on Limitation of Armament, December 22,
1921; U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limi tation of
Armament
,
446-472.
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privately indicated to Balfour that the French delegation
was "probably in the embarrassing position of receiving
conflicting instruction from M. Briand in London and from
the French Admiralty in Paris." Balfour had then arranged
with Hughes to move the issue to the full Committee on the
Limitation of Armament. Chatfield urged the group not to
allow the French an increase in capital ship tonnage. The
B.E.D. then debated the proper forum for the pursuit of the
submarine question. After much discussion, Balfour
convinced his colleagues to make the case at committee
level, accept a compromise (with prior agreement from
Hughes), and then make a public statement at a plenary
session.-^' He then relayed this intention to the Cabinet.
On the morning of December 22nd, the fourth session of
the Committee on Limitation of Armament began with a summary
of the naval limitation discussions. Hughes announced the
tentative naval limitation agreement: 5:5:3 capital ship
ratio, including the Mutsu and four compensatory ships;
35,000 ton maximum displacement for replacement capital
ships; and status quo in the Pacific with regard to
fortifications and bases; all arrangements remaining
"dependent upon a suitable arrangement with France and
182CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 15th Conference, December 20, 1921.
•'^Arthur Balfour to Marquess Curzon, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 569.
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Italy." Hughes then summarized the discussion of the
Subcommittee of Fifteen on December 15th, in which Admiral
de Bon had demanded for France an allocation of 350,000 tons
of capital ships. The chairman next presented his letter of
December 16th to Briand, which had been sent with the
knowledge of the French delegation. Hughes subsequently
read Briand's reply, which accepted the proposed ratio of
1.75 for capital ships, but not for auxiliary craft, and
then mentioned Admiral de Bon's continued desire to increase
the French allocation to six capital ships or to arrange a
settlement with respect to auxiliary vessels prior to
agreeing to a capital ship understanding. He concluded by
asking the French delegation to explain their position to
the f ul 1 commit tee.''^'^
De Bon again pled special consideration: other nations
had increased their naval strength in war, while France had
not. France willingly accepted, according to the admiral, a
limit of 7 ships, her present strength, and desired a
program of gradual replacement, in accordance with the
schedule proposed by Hughes. The French delegation, in
keeping with instructions from their government, had agreed
to the enormous concession of a limit of five capital ships.
Such a strength left her, from a naval perspective.
*^''CAB 30/9: 4th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 22, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department , Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 446-
472.
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"practically disarmed/' while with six ships she "could
still create a living organization." This reduction
mandated retention of greater numbers of light craft and
submarines. The British Empire question in regard to
abolition of the submarine took precedence, in de Bon's
view, as it would inform general progress. In response to a
comment by Hughes that U.S. proposals had not limited
numbers, only maximum size of vessels and maximum aggregate
tonnage, the French admiral stated that smaller capital
ships were foolish. If France should build, her battleships
would displace the full 35,000 tons, and the only question
concerned her total tonnage: 175,000 or 210,000 tons. He
suggested that the Conference should address the future of
submarines. The chairman held that question for the
afternoon session."'
Later that day, in the Columbus Room of the Pan
American Building, the Committee on Limitation of Armament
resumed discussion with regard to restrictions on the use of
submarines. Lord Lee summarized the existing position:
agreement on capital ships without any commitments on
smaller vessels. He then presented a comparison, by nation,
of the existing aggregate submarine tonnages with the
American proposals and described as "very strange" the idea
* CAB 30/9: 4th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 22, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 446-
472.
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that a Conference on limitation would allow increases
.
Furthermore, he noted, maritime nations would be forced to
increase their anti-submarine capacities. On behalf of the
B.E.D., Lee proposed "total and final abolition."
Submarines, the First Sea Lord claimed, had little value
against legitimate naval targets, as proved by recent
experience. They worked only against merchant ships,
against which they were dreadfully effective. Lee noted
that Britain had been reduced to a mere seven weeks' supply
of food and pointed out that other nations would have been
affected by British capitulation. He indicated that Britain
would be willing to abolish her large and efficient
submarine fleet. If, as he suspected, other powers would
reject abolition, then Britain would not overthrow the
capital ship agreement, but would welcome suggestions for
• 07
submarine reduction.
The other delegates quickly confirmed Lee's suspicion
that they would not support abolition. Colonial Minister
Albert Sarrault answered for France. He claimed submarines
were both legitimate and necessary, and further argued
Lee presented the following figures:
America Britain Japan France Italy
Existing Tonnage 83,500 80,500 32,200 28,360 18,250
Hughes' Proposal 90,000 90,000 54,000
Permitted Growth 6,500 9,500 21,800
*^^CAB 30/9: 5th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 22, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 474-
502.
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against any tonnage limitations. Sarrault reiterated the
French opposition to linking submarine allowances to a
proportion of capital ship strength. Schanzer emphasized
the difficulty of settling the future of submarines due to
the absence of other powers. Hanihara also opposed
abolition. Hughes sought to emphasize the one point of
agreement within the Committee, opposition to illegal use of
submarines. He then shared with the delegates the findings
of the technical commission appointed by President Harding.
The Advisory Committee found submarines to have legitimate
naval functions
,
despi te the reputation of the weapon being
tarnished by flagrant misuse in the recent conflict.
Hughes
' advisors therefore recommended that "unl imi ted
warfare by submarines on commerce shoul d be out 1 awed , " whi 1
e
opposing any limitation in size. After his presentation,
the committee adjourned until the next day.
On December 23rd, the Committee on Limitation of
Armament met for the sixth time , De Bon took issue with
Lee's position that submarines had little value against
warships . He ment i oned their effect on fleet operations
,
their ability to def end enc 1 osed areas , and their functions
as scouts . Then , almost as if deliberately attempting to
bait the British representatives, de Bon stated that the
*^^CAB 30/9: 5th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 22, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department , Con ference on the Limitation of Armament , 474-
502 .
393
submarine "has shown itself especially efficient against the
merchant marine." The admiral urged the need to restrict
illegal submarine activities, while emphasizing the scope
remaining for legitimate commerce destruction. He opposed
any limitation on the size of individual submarines, while
claiming that "90,000 tons is the absolute minimum for all
the navies who may want to have a submarine force."
Balfour, in reply, returned to Lee's point that the primary
purpose of submarines was the eradication of maritime trade.
He asserted that "f rom Admi ral de Bon * s own speech it is
clear that the main object they serve is the destruction of
commerce." Balfour then urged the committee to ban the sub.
De Bon, in a rather strange volte-face, claimed he had not
supported submarine activity against merchant marine, but
merely cited German usage. On that note, the meeting
'39
adjourned.
The foil owing day , the Committee on Limitation of
Armament met again . Sarraul t ampl if ied Schanzer ' s point
that other nations would not be limited by a decision to
abolish submarines taken by the Conference. He suggested a
general conference of all nations at which more effective
decisions might be reached. Balfour replied. France had
stopped all work on the limitation of land armaments by her
-^'CAB 30/9: 6th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 23, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department , Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 504-
530.
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declaration of danger. Now she proposed a sea policy of a
vast submarine fleet. The Lord President sought to identify
the threat. He pointed to a resurgent Germany, with land
forces and submarines. He then suggested that submarines
would be useless as a means to protect merchant trade and
could serve little purpose beyond attacking Britain. While
conceding that those nations present at the Conference could
not legislate for the rest of the world, Balfour predicted
that the moral example of five major powers abolishing subs
would influence others. He placed into record a statement
from the B.E.D. that "the use of submarines, whilst of small
value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which
are inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of
humanity." Hughes suggested abolition should be abandoned
as hopeless, due to technical disagreement as to the value
of submarines, and limits (such as numbers, tonnage, and
usage) considered. The Secretary of State concluded by
suggesting 60,000 tons for the United States and Britain,
with others nations retaining the status quo (according to
his figures: Japan, 31,452 tons; France, 31,391 tons; and
Italy, 21,000 tons).-'°
Later on December 24th, the full arms limitation
committee resumed its discussions. Balfour promptly
-''CAB 30/9: 7th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 24, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 532-
556.
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accepted Hughes' latest proposals. De Bon, however,
remained adamantly opposed. He stated that a force of 90
boats (each about 1000 tons) allowed 15 to 20 units for
action, which he called "a minimum limit." Further
limitation he described as "equivalent to abolishing the
whole French program." De Bon indicated that the French
delegation could not accept Hughes* figures and would have
to refer them to their government. Schanzer stated Italy's
willingness to accept virtually allotment of submarine
tonnage that met her requirement for naval parity with
France. Hanihara rejected the newest proposal, which would
limit Japan to 31,000 tons. He stated Japan needed 54,000
tons, which he claimed represented a minimum figure for
actual defensive requirements.*'* Hughes then scheduled a
delay of three days to allow the French delegation to await
instructions from Paris.
The BNSW view of submarine warfare during the
Conference remained generally consistent with earlier
Admiralty analysis. Commander J.G. Bower, of the Admiralty
*'*Hanihara may well have been attempting to apply to
submarine strengths the 5:5:3 ratio, under which the figure
of 54,000 tons reflected Japan's proportion of the original
proposal of 90,000 tons for the United States. If this
reading is correct, he would have settled for 36,000 tons
against 60,000 for Britain and America.
*'^CAB 30/9: 8th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 24, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department , Conference on the Limitation of Armament . 558-
566.
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Plans Division, argued that the laws of war were useless as
a check to submarines. Failing abolition, Britain could not
agree to any limitation on auxiliary craft. He also
admitted arguments against abolition: Britain was five years
in advance of other nations, such as Italy and France, whose
submarine forces were both small and inefficient. Submarine
forces, furthermore, lost much of their effectiveness
without fleet support, an arena in which only the United
States could compete with Britain.''" Beatty advised
Chatfield that if abolition failed, he should attempt to
limit aggregate submarine tonnage rather than the size of
individual ships. The First Sea Lord sought to reduce the
possibility of a large fleet of small submarines based near
the English Channel, where restrictions on si2e--and hence
range--would have only minor impact.*'" By the end of the
month, with the delegates suggesting that usage might be the
only aspect of submarine warfare subject to 1 imitation , the
BNSW prepared a position paper on the rules of submarine
engagements against merchant shipping. The memorandum
advocated "support for existing rul es of visit and search
against submarines," along with the requirement to place
crews and passengers in a place of safety prior to sinking
-%DM 116/2149: BNSW Memorandum, "Submarines", December
4, 1921.
^'"ADM 1/8615/207: Admiralty telegram, December 23,
1921.
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vessels carrying contraband. These strictures, if followed
in wartime, would have greatly reduced the effectiveness of
submarines. The BNSW believed, however, that "the adoption
of any such rules would not constitute adequate safeguard"
and that the B.E.D. should reserve the right, as long as
submarines existed, to retain a free hand against them.-'^
The Committee on Limitation of Armament convened its
ninth session on the morning of December 28th. Sarrault
explained that his government could not accept the latest
proposals from America. He stated they had concluded that:
it is impossible to accept a limitation below that
of 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and 90,000
tons for submarines, without imperiling the vital
interests of the country and of .^^ ts col onies and
the safety of their naval life.*'"
Sarrault claimed that France needed these types of ships
"for the protection of her territory," perhaps in one 1 ast
effort to extract the military guarantee to which Briand had
' Q7
made reference in late November. * Balfour attacked the
^''ADM 116/2149: BNSW Memorandum, "Rules for Submarine
Warfare against Merchant Shipping", December 27, 1921.
*^"CAB 30/9: 9th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 28, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 568-
588.
-S^See p. 373 above. Hardinge, from Paris, described
France as "desperately anxious for a British guarantee
against German attack" and claimed that the "French
insistence on submarines ... is really intended to provide a
bargain counter." See Lord Hardinge to Marquess Curzon, as
recorded in Butler and Bury, Document s on British Foreign
Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 581-82.
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French increase in submarine strength. He asked how "a
fleet of capital ships limited to 175,000 tons required
90,000 tons of submarines to scout for it and protect it?"
He declared that such a submarine force was "intended to
destroy commerce" and promised to place the issue publicly
before the full Conference. Balfour concluded by stating
that a fleet of 90,000 tons of submarines would cause
Britain to reserve "the full right to build any auxiliary
craft which she considered necessary to deal with the
situation."-' This exchange, which reflected the animus
between France and England following Versailles, marked the
final breakdown of negotiations to extend the 5:5:3 ratio to
auxiliary vessels.
The Committee on Limitation of Armament then turned its
attention to establishing a division between capital ships
and cruisers. At the end of the morning session on December
28th, Hughes offered the following resolution:
No ship of war other than a capital ship or
aircraft carrier hereafter built shall exceed a
total tonnage displacement of 10,000 tons and no
guns shall be carried by any si^ph ship with a
caliber in excess of 8 inches.*"
-^^CAB 30/9: 9th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 28, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 568-
588 .
-"CAB 30/9: 9th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 28, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation o f Armament, 568-
588 .
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Lee agreed with the need for an upper limit to cruisers lest
"it would be possible to build so-called light cruisers
which would be capital ships in disguise," but he worried
that Hughes' formula would permit a carrier to mount heavy
guns, becoming, in his words, "a capital ship with the
addition of flying appliances." He suggested a modification
of Hughes' resolution to preclude aircraft carriers from
carrying guns greater than eight inches."^ That afternoon,
De Bon questioned size limitation of cruisers, as he felt
limitation of armament defined the class. After some
further discussion, the Committee accepted, for all
practical purposes, the limits of 10,000 tons and 8-inch
guns for cruisers.
That same afternoon, Hughes presented proposals for the
lim.itation of aircraft carriers. He started with the
aggregate tonnage originally presented (80,000 tons for the
United States and Britain, with 48,000 tons for Japan) and
extended the capital ship ratios to France and Italy (28,000
tons each) . The Secretary avoided the presentation of a
detailed replacement program. He recommended a size limit
^""CAB 30/9: 9th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 28, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 568-
588 .
"•*CAB 30/9: 10th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 28, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 590-
604.
400
of 27,000 tons per vessel, which would carry guns not to
exceed eight inches. Lee's suggestion limiting capital ship
armament to 16-inch guns was unanimously approved.^"
This discussion resumed during the 14th session of the
full disarmament committee on December 30th. Acton
complained that the allowance of 28,000 tons would allow
Italy only a single aircraft carrier, which would inevitably
require refit and repair. He requested that the Italian
allowance be increased to 54,000 tons to allow for a second
carrier. Lee expressed sympathy for this position, and then
explained his view of the aircraft carrier as a "fleet
weapon." He asserted that "the number of airplane carriers
should be adequate and proportionate to the size of the
fleet."'' Britain had five carriers, four of which, in
Lee's view, required replacement. Since submarines had not
been limited, the First Lord stated that "it would be
impossible to reduce the number of airplane carriers for
fleet service." He further indicated that "the tonnage laid
down in the original American proposals was inadequate." De
Bon estimated that France required 60,000 tons, which would
^•^CAB 30/9: 10th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 28, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limitation of Armament , 590-
602.
^'-CAB 30/10: 14th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, December 30, 1921. Also recorded in
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limi tation of
Armament , 670-682.
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provide three small aircraft carriers. Kato similarly
rejected the proposed Japanese allowance of 48,000 tons as
providing a carrier and a half. He expressed Japan's desire
for three full-sized carriers, or a total of 81,000 tons.
Hughes then submitted a new proposal, allowing the United
States and Great Britain 135,000 tons (5 carriers at 27,000
tons), Japan 81,000 tons, and France and Italy 60,000 tons,
to which all present assented. The Secretary of State then
suggested that due to the experimental nature of the
aircraft carriers, as Lee had noted, they might be replaced
at whatever interval each government found appropriate.^'^
The other delegates promptly agreed. The full committee
then turned over the responsibility of drafting the final
naval limitation agreement to the technical subcommittee.^^'
The aircraft carrier agreement underwent further
modifications at the hands of the naval experts. The
American delegation desired to convert two partially built
battle cruisers into aire raft carriers, but could not reduce
their designed displacement ( 43 , 500 tons ) to 1 ess than
33,000 tons. During the first week of January, they
The free repl acement cl ause extended onl y to those
aircraft carriers designated as experimental, defined as
those existing or under construction before November 12,
1921. See ADM 1/8615/207: BNSW Memorandum, December 30,
1921.
^^'CAB 30/10: 14th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, December 30, 1921. Also recorded in
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament
,
670-682.
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requested permission to produce two carriers of this size,
while not increasing their aggregate carrier tonnage/^^ The
Japanese supported this request, as they desired to
transform two of their battleships into carriers. The
B.E.D. extracted two concessions in return for their
agreement. First, the size exemption was extended to
include any of the signatories and, more importantly, ships
built purposefully as aircraft carriers, to enable the
Admiralty to use materials collected for two of the super-
Hoods toward new ships. Second, the B.E.D. wanted
permission to add anti-torpedo bulges up to 3,000 tons
displ acement to the battle cruiser Renown , whose sister ship
Repul se had already been thus altered, and such bulging
became a general provision
.
The cumulative effect of the various exceptions and
exemptions to Hughes ' original proposals went far to
ameliorate the B.E.D.'s concerns with the ten years' naval
building holiday. The Mutsu arrangements entitled Britain
to construct two new capital ships of 35,000 tons
displacement. The aircraft carrier agreement, which allowed
the participants to replace existing warships at their own
^°*By this time, work on the draft naval agreement was
"in an advanced state," according to Lee. See CAB 30/la:
B.E.D. 17th Conference, January 2nd, 1922.
^•'CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 21st Conference, January 9th,^^1921;
ADM 116/2149: BNSW Note, "Technical Committee Meeting",
January 3, 1922.
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discretion, authorized Britain to construct five additional
major vessels, two of 33,000 tons displacement each, for a
total of 135,000 tons. The addition of anti-torpedo bulges
offered the opport^onity for further construction, which
could involve capital ships, while no limits were placed on
the production of auxiliary vessels. The Admiralty
therefore had vast scope to employ Britain's major
shipbuilding firms during the so-called holiday.
When H.W. Malkin of the Foreign Office Section asked on
January 6th "whether, in the draft Naval Treaty, any mention
should be made of the ten years' holiday," the B.E.D.
decided that the issue was no 1 onger very important and
should be left to the Americans.
The American delegation made a final effort to secure
limitation of the submarine. On December 28th, Elihu Root,
former Secretary of State
,
gave practical effect to the
recommendation of the Advisory Committee of the United
States when he delivered to the Committee on Limitation of
Armament a series of resolutions restricting submarine
attacks on merchant shipping. Root hoped to mobilize world
opinion and in that manner influence belligerent
governments. His first resolution stated that the signatory
powers recognized certain of the existing laws of war:
submarines were required to stop and search merchant vessels
^•^CAB 30/la: B.E.D. 20th Conference, January 6th, 1922.
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before capture or even attack; they were likewise required
to place crews and passengers in a place of safety before
destruction; and when these conditions could not be met,
submarines were required to desist from attack. His second
resolution stated the signatory powers recognized "the
practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce
destroyers" without violating the laws of war and hoped for
future universal prohibitions against unauthorized use.
Root ' s thi rd resolution stated that the signatory powers
would try violators as pirates. *^^'
The foil owing morning , when the Committee resumed its
discussions, the delegates took a remarkably similar line.
Bal f our praised the spirit of the Root Resolutions but
suggested a team of lawyers might profitably review the
text
,
eliciting concurrence f rom around the tabl e . Root
opposed this suggestion vigorously, albeit with humor:
It would be far from his thought to say anything
derogatory about the members of the profession of
which he had been a humble member for more years
that he cared to remember. They were the salt of
the earth; they were the noblest work of God; they
were superior in intellect and authority to all
other people whatsoever. But both this Conferencp
and his life were approaching their termination.^*
^^'CAB 30/9: 10th Meeting of the Committee on Limitation
of Armament, December 28, 1921. Also recorded in U.S. State
Department, Conference on the Limita tion of Armament, 590-
602.
^^•CAB 30/10: 11th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, December 29, 1921. Also recorded m
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament , 60 4-62 6
.
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Root implored the Committee to deal directly with his
proposal s
.
The reaction of the British delegation, although
containing certain reservations, was generally favorable.
The full B.E.D. first considered the resolutions on December
31st, 1921. Geddes explained that the technical
subcommittee had already modified Root's first resolution
slightly where it described the requirement of a blockading
vessel to search a merchant ship, by removing any possible
restriction of the search to the immediate vicinity of the
confrontation, in order to accommodate British blockade
practices. He then explained that "there was no agreed part
of international law which covered the question of torpedoes
fired from a submarine at a ship with passengers on board
which would not stop."^** By codifying the absolute
requirement for submarines to comply with the same
restrictions as surface ships (which Germany had found an
impossibility), the Conference would drastically reduce the
operational effectiveness of submarines against merchant
shipping, at least for governments that chose to adhere to
international law. Chatfield then voiced his opposition to
the third resolution. He worried about the possibility of a
naval officer being ordered to conduct unl imited submarine
warfare and then facing the choice of "being shot by his own
^"CAB 30/la: 16th B.E.D. Conference, December 31, 1921.
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country for disobedience or shot by another for breaking
international law." He suggested that "it was rather heads
of state than their tools who should be tried and
2* 2punished."^* It was probably this concern for the fate of
naval officers that caused the BNSW, two days earlier, to
describe the Root Resolutions in a draft letter for the
Foreign Secretary as "generally sound," but "too vague. ""^
Balfour's consistent support for the Root Resolutions led
him, at Root's behest, to call upon Baron Kato on January
4th, 1922, in order to derail any attempts to link the anti-
submarine clauses with limitations on the arming of merchant
ships. Hankey subsequently noted that Balfour "shared Mr.
Root's desire for passage of the submarine resolutions
.
The Committee on Limitation of Armament began a key
discussion of the Root Resolutions on January 5th. Schanzer
raised a series of questions with regard to the right of a
merchantman to carry defensive armament , which Hughes skated
over by declaring that:
all the representatives present accepted the
proposition that merchant vessels--a category well
known--stood where they were under the law, and
that this Resolution defined the duties of
^*^CAB 30/la: 16th B.E.D. Conference, December 31, 1921.
^^^ADM 116/2149: Draft letter to Curzon, December 29,
1921.
^•'Hankey Note, January 5, 1922 , as recorded in Butler
and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series,
Vol XIV, 585-587.
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submarines with respect to them.^"
After that fine piece of obfuscation, the Committee assented
to Root's first resolution. This consensus relieved the
B.E.D.'s concern over maintaining Britain's right to the use
of defensively armed merchant ships (DAMS).^*^ Schanzer then
raised the question as to the legality of a submarine
operating against a merchant vessel attempting to run a
legal (i.e., effective) blockade. Balfour ridiculed the
notion that submarines could not themselves make a blockade
effective but could legally attack merchant vessels
attempting to run a blockade made legal by the presence of
surface warships. The Committee then accepted Root's
resolution against "the use of submarines as commerce
destroyers" both as binding among themselves and as an
invitation to other nations, and adjourned.
On January 6th, the Committee on Limitation of
Armament finished its consideration of the Root Resolutions.
Schanzer again voiced a concern, this time as to whether
submarine officers were not being subjected to greater
^"CAB 30/10: 15th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, January 5, 1922. Also recorded in
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament , 684-712.
^*^ADM 116/2149: Technical Subcommittee Meeting,
December 31, 1921.
"'CAB 30/10: 15th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, January 5, 1922. Also recorded in
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limi tation of
Armament , 684-712.
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hazards than the officers of surface ships in the commission
of like acts. Hughes then modified Root's original proposal
to subject any violator of the laws of war to trial for
piracy, whereupon the Committee gave its assent/*' Balfour
later admitted the clause "caused me some anxiety," but
concurred in the belief that "we may confidently expect that
[as far as violators go] neither the Government nor sailors
will be British.""*^ The spirit of Root's original
res o 1 ut ions thus emerged from the Committee onl y s 1 ight 1
y
altered, and presented to any nation desirous of adhering to
the 1 aws of war a f ormidabl e obstacl e to the use of
submarines against sea-borne commerce
.
On February 1 , 1922 , Char 1 es Evans Hughes convened the
fifth plenary session of the Washington Conference. After a
discussion concerning China , the Secretary of State
announced that the Committee on Limitation of Armament had
reached agreement on a naval treaty. Hughes dwelt
extensivel y on the simi 1 arities between the final treaty and
the original proposals. He informed the Conference of the
limitations placed upon new capital ships: displacements not
to exceed 35,000 tons and main guns not to exceed sixteen
^'TAB 30/10: 16th Meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament, January 6, 1922. Also recorded in
U.S. State Department, Conference on the Limitation of
Armament , 714-740.
"^Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George, January 13,
1922, as recorded in Butler and Bury, Documents on British
Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV, 598-601.
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inches. He explained that the Treaty identified which
vessels each country would initially retain: for the United
States, 18 ships with an aggregate displacement of 500,650
tons; for Britain, 22 ships of 658,450 tons; for Japan, 10
ships of 301,320 tons; for France, 10 ships of 221,170 tons;
and for Italy, 10 ships of 182,800 tons. The final
agreement differed from the original American scheme with
respect to capital ship provisions in two minor regards:
first, the inclusion of France and Italy; and second,
Japan's retention of the new battleship Mutsu . America
would be allowed to complete two new ships of the West
Virginia class and then scrap two older vessels presently
retained, while Britain would be allowed to build two new
ships not to exceed 35,000 tons each and then scrap four
older vessels. Hughes also provided details of scrapping
and replacement procedures.
Hughes then addressed the subject of aircraft carriers
and their limitation. The Treaty embodied the spirit of the
proposals with regard to this class of vessel, limited to a
maximum size of 27,000 tons displacement--each power could
build two carriers of not more than 33,000 tons--and main
guns not to exceed eight inches. Britain and the United
States received an allotment of 135,000 tons; Japan, 81,000
^^'CAB 30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament , 182-276; for the treaty, see ibid. ,
^^7-^-1 fill; Ruell Washington Conference , 371-91.
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tons; and France and Italy, 60,000 tons each. All existing
vessels were categorized as experimental and could be
replaced at any time.^^-
Hughes glossed over the far greater difference between
the treaty and his proposals with respect to limitations
upon auxiliary combatant craft. He briefly acknowledged
that "the provisions relating to auxiliary craft contained
in the proposal made on behalf of the American government
were not carried into the final agreement." He hurried on
to note that these ships were limited to a maximum size of
10,000 tons and main guns of eight inches. Hughes failed to
explain why the Conference powers placed no limit on their
222holdings of cruisers
,
destroyers , or submarines
.
The Secretary of State then rel ayed the final two major
provisions of the new treaty. First, the United States,
Britain, and Japan agreed to maintain the status quo as of
February 1922, with certain limited exceptions, with regard
to the fortification of their Pacific possessions. Second,
the Treaty would remain in force through December 31, 1936,
and thereafter until two years beyond notice of denunciation
by one of the contracting parties. Hughes concluded his
^^-CAB 30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament , 182-276.
^^^CAB 30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, 182-276
.
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presentation by remarking that the agreement would diminish
"the burdens of naval armaments," end "the race in
competition of naval armaments," and leave "the relative
security of the great naval Powers unimpai red . "^^^
Root then introduced a companion treaty based upon
resolutions by the Committee on Limitation of Armament from
January 5th, 6th, and 7th condemning certain practices in
the late war. This treaty focused primarily upon submarine
warfare. Article I required submarines to stop and search
merchant vessels before seizure. It further requi red
submarines, as an absolute prerequisite to sinking captured
vessels, to place crew members and passengers in a place of
safety-- life boats not constituting a sufficient haven. The
subsequent articles invited other nations to accept these
conditions as 1 aws of maritime warfare and to treat
transgressors as violators of the laws of war (i.e., as
pirates ) .'^^^^
The results of the Washington Naval Conference
completely satisfied neither the British Cabinet nor the
Admiralty. The limitations on capital strength and future
construction provided considerable relief to the beleaguered
^"CAB 30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922-
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament , 182-276.
^^*CAB 30/3: 5th Plenary Session, February 1, 1922.
Also recorded in U.S. State Department, Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, 182-276.
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Exchequer, but Beatty and his colleagues would have far
preferred the slow and steady approach to the ten years'
naval holiday. The British entitlement to construct two new
battleships, which increased the relative strength of the
fleet and provided British naval construction firms with
much-needed employment, would draw grudging assent from the
Cabinet. These differences of opinion reflected the
divergent evaluations of the capital ship as seen from
Westminster and Whitehall. Both statesmen and sailors,
meanwhile, regretted the B.E.D.'s failure to secure the
abolition of the submarine.
The results of the Washington Conference, nonetheless,
protected British national security aims with remarkable
effectiveness. Balfour, in his final appreciation of the
Conference, wrote to the Prime Minister that:
in all essentials the safeguards of our Naval
position. . .have been fully secured. Nor has this
result been achieved at the cost of any other
nation. The financial burdens of the great Naval
Powers have been alleviated with no in jurjj. to
national honor or diminution of security.
The Anglo- Japanese Alliance became a four power treaty
involving the United States and France, and the
transformation took place in such a manner so as not to
'^^Arthur Balfour to David Lloyd George, as recorded in
Butler and Bury, Documents on British Foreign Poli cy, 1st
Series, Vol XIV, 643-45.
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offend Japan. Britain retained both the right of blockade
and the right to fortify Singapore, while neither the United
States nor Japan would establish new bases in the Pacific.
The treaty based on the Root Resolutions offered protection
against unlimited submarine warfare from any signatory
willing to honor its commitments. Furthermore, French
intransigence over the submarine issue influenced the
American delegation to accept the British arguments against
the limitation of cruisers and destroyers without engaging
in a competition for superiority in auxiliary combatant
craft. On the importance of anti-submarine capabilities, at
least, the British naval community shared a common
viewpoint. From the perspective of the supporters of the
capital ship, there were two positive aspects of the 5:5:3
ratio. First, the new rules created a relatively level
playing field on which Britain would not have to fear
overwhelming competition based on unmatchable finances. In
the words of Britain's Director of Naval Construction:
Naval Architects should welcome the new rules, as
they are really comparable to the rule for racing
yachts. Certain limitations are laid down and it
^^'British Ambassador to Japan Sir Charles Eliot wrote
to the Foreign Office on January 7, 1922: "Minister for
Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that Japanese
government were on the whole satisfied with results of
Washington conference so far. They regretted termination of
the Anglo- Japanese alliance but recognized that a good
understanding with America was essential and would not have
been possible had bilateral agreement continued." See Sir
C. Eliot to Sir E Crowe, as recorded in Butler and Bury,
Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1st Series, Vol XIV,
588-589 .
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is the Naval Architect's work to produce the best
results subject to those limitations, and the best
designer will produce the best ship. ^'
And, for the morale of the senior service and its partisans,
the Royal Navy, with its existing margin of superiority in
capital ship numbers and aggregate tonnage, avoided manifest
surrender of its maritime supremacy for the remainder of the
decade
.
^^'D'Eyncourt MSS 40: D'Eyncourt Note, July 4, 1922.
CONCLUSION
British participation in the Washington Naval
Conference of 1921-1922 reflected a number of competing and
sometimes contradictory influences. The most venerable of
these, undoubtedly, was the British tradition of maritime
supremacy. The Great War, however, exposed cracks in the
edifice of Churchill, Fisher, and Mahan. More importantly,
the experiences of the war discernibly weakened the union of
frocks and pea coats. Both groups perceived the challenge
of emerging technologies to the dominance of the capital
ship, but while the politicians, particularly Cabinet
members familiar with the full details of the 1917 U-boat
campaign, focused on the potential threat of the submarine
and, to a lesser degree, the airplane, the admirals looked
with complete confidence to countermeasures such as anti-
torpedo bulges, ASDIC, and depth charges.
Nonetheless, the British tradition of command of the
sea, despite its battering in the Mediterranean and North
Sea, was not so dilapidated as to have completely lost its
support in either Whitehall or Westminster. All respectable
legislators understood the need to protect Britain's
maritime commerce. Furthermore, both the voting public and
the Conservative backbenchers, swept to Parliament in the
Coupon election of 1918 and ably represented by Walter Long,
generally accepted the opinion of Jellicoe and Beatty that
the capital ship still constituted the dominant force
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afloat. Thus, the prime minister proved unwilling to risk
the political consequences of disowning the One Power
standard even as he established the Bonar Law Enquiry.
This loss of faith by leading members of the Ll oyd
George ministry would not have mattered except for two
independent circumstances. First, the United States aimed
to compete for command of the seas. Before and during the
Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson and his
representatives repeatedly threatened to build the "world's
greatest navy." The Cecil-House compromise of 1919 left
intact the 1916 building program of the United States Navy.
The First Lord warned the Cabinet in October 1919 that
Britain needed either to induce the Uni ted States to abate
the 1916 program or to commence capital ship construction in
order to avoid the sacrifice of sea supremacy, a warning
repeated throughout 19 20
.
The other factor that bore heavily on the British
willingness to come to Washington was the condition of His
Majesty's Exchequer. Britain saw her income from both
shipping and overseas markets decline significantly during
the conflict. The war increased the national debt to an
alarming degree, and many British loans, particularly those
to Russia, appeared irrecoverable. The United States,
however, showed no inclination to forgive its loans to
Britain. The Committee on National Expenditure, or "the
Geddes axe," espoused classical economic theory, which
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called for reduced government spending, and Chancellor
Austen Chamberlain found the service estimates the most
fertile field for reductions. The Imperial Conference of
1921 revealed the Dominions' unwillingness to assume a
significant share of the burden of imperial defense.
From 1919 to 1921, the Cabinet and the Admiralty shared
a willingness to negotiate a naval arms limitation agreement
with the United States. Both groups shared the opinion that
the possibility of war with the United States ranged from
remote to non-existent. The Cabinet hoped to avoid spending
money on the construction of capital ships , the value of
which appeared uncertain, while the Admiralty understood the
Cabinet's uncertainty and feared the loss of parity, let
alone supremacy. To be certain, both groups desired through
the negotiating process to retain supremacy. The Admiralty
simply valued that goal more highly. After the conclusion
of the Paris Peace Conference, however, the paralysis of the
Wilson administration precluded any serious discussion of
naval disarmament. Only the inauguration of President
Harding offered the Lloyd George government the chance to
make a deal
.
The decision of the Cabinet to send Balfour to
Washington reflected concern for the national treasury, fear
of the loss of naval supremacy, and apprehension that
capital ships did not represent the wisest allocation of
scarce resources. The Cabinet revealed its greater concern
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for Britain's anti-submarine defenses during the Conference
by confirming Balfour's acceptance of Hughes' capital ship
reduction proposals; directing Balfour to accept the ten
years' holiday for capital ships, over strenuous objections
from the B.E.D. and the Admiralty; repeatedly instructing
Balfour to seek the abolition of submarines; and refusing to
permit any limitation of Britain's auxiliary craft. The
Lloyd George ministry did not believe that capital ships
provided an adequate safeguard against the menace of
submarine warfare against merchant shipping.
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